New York Law Review

Tag: Access Rights

  • Lake George Associates v. State, 8 N.Y.3d 475 (2007): Establishing Legal Access After Land Appropriation

    8 N.Y.3d 475 (2007)

    When the state appropriates land for highway improvement and re-establishes access to a public road, an implicit legal right of access can be created through easements and statutory authority, even without a formal deed conveying cross-vehicular access rights.

    Summary

    Lake George Associates sought consequential damages after the State appropriated a portion of its land for highway improvements, altering its direct access to two roads. The State created shared driveways on easements along the property lines, requiring customers to cross neighboring properties to access the plaza from certain directions. The Court of Appeals held that the State’s actions, under Highway Law § 10 (24-d) and the establishment of permanent easements, created an enforceable legal right of access for the claimant, precluding consequential damages. The court reasoned that the Highway Law grants the Commissioner of Transportation the power to re-establish access over neighboring parcels, and the intent to provide such access was clear from the easements’ language and purpose.

    Facts

    Lake George Associates owned a shopping plaza at the corner of Route 9 and Route 149. Prior to 1998, the property had two curb cuts providing direct access to both highways. The State appropriated a frontage strip of claimant’s land to install turning lanes and a sidewalk as part of a highway improvement project. As part of the project, the state also acquired permanent easements over claimant’s land and that of its neighbors, White and Tatko. The state reduced the Route 9 access and eliminated the Route 149 access. The state established new shared driveways on the easements to reestablish access, resulting in indirect access, requiring customers to cross White and Tatko properties.

    Procedural History

    Lake George Associates sued the State for damages. The Court of Claims awarded direct compensation for the appropriated land but denied consequential damages. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the permanent easements provided legal access regardless of a formal deed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State’s appropriation of land and establishment of permanent easements on neighboring properties, without explicitly granting cross-vehicular access, provides the claimant with an enforceable legal right of access, thereby precluding consequential damages.

    Holding

    Yes, because Highway Law § 10 (24-d) and the language and purpose of the permanent easements, considered together, demonstrate a clear intent to re-establish access to the landowners, thus creating an enforceable legal right of access despite the absence of an explicit conveyance of cross-vehicular access rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that property owners are entitled to consequential damages when the State’s appropriation results in a loss of the right to enter and exit their property, citing Pollak v. State of New York. However, the Court distinguished the present case, emphasizing that in Pollak, there was no statute analogous to Highway Law § 10 (24-d), which authorizes the Commissioner of Transportation to re-establish private access to a public road when such access is destroyed by highway construction. The Court emphasized that Highway Law § 10 (24-d) vests significant authority in the Commissioner to act in the interests of the state in constructing and improving highways, including the power to reestablish access over neighboring parcels. The court stated that “[t]he easements here, which undeniably served the purpose of reestablishing permanent joint driveways for access to the retail outlets, when viewed in reference to the powers of the Commissioner under Highway Law § 10 (24-d), create a legal right of access to claimant.” The court reasoned that the language employed in creating the easements reflected a clear intent to reestablish access and referencing Highway Law § 10 in the easements gives rise to an enforceable legal right of access, thereby precluding consequential damages.

  • Poliak v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 900 (1977): State Appropriation and Loss of Access Rights

    41 N.Y.2d 900 (1977)

    When the state appropriates property without explicitly reserving the property owner’s legal right of access to a public highway, the property owner is entitled to compensation for the loss of that access, even if the state provides permissive, but not legally guaranteed, alternative access.

    Summary

    This case concerns two property owners, Poliak and a related claimant, whose properties were appropriated by the State of New York. The central issue revolves around the State’s failure to reserve the property owners’ legal right of access to the public highway during the appropriation. While the State allowed the claimants to use a service road on other State-held property for access, this was a permissive arrangement, not a guaranteed legal right. The Court of Appeals held that the deprivation of the legal right of access rendered the properties unmarketable, entitling the claimants to compensation. Additionally, in Poliak’s case, the court addressed the issue of a reduced railroad siding, finding sufficient evidence to support the lower courts’ determination that it negatively impacted the property’s suitability for its prior use.

    Facts

    • The State appropriated portions of the claimants’ properties.
    • The appropriation did not explicitly reserve the property owners’ legal right of access to the public highway.
    • The State allowed claimants to use a service road on other State-held property, offering practical access to the highway.
    • The service road access was permissive and not a guaranteed legal right.
    • In Poliak’s case, the length of the railroad siding was reduced due to the appropriation.

    Procedural History

    • The claimants sought compensation for the appropriation, arguing the loss of the legal right of access diminished their property value.
    • The lower courts ruled in favor of the claimants.
    • The State appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the State’s appropriation of property without reserving the legal right of access to a public highway entitles the property owner to compensation, even if permissive access is provided.
    2. Whether sufficient evidence supported the lower courts’ finding that the reduction in the length of the railroad siding rendered the Poliak property insufficient for its previous chemical operations.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the deprivation of the legal right to access rendered the claimants’ titles unmarketable. The State’s permissive use of a service road did not constitute a permanent legal right.
    2. Yes, because there was expert testimony, credited by both courts below, that the property was rendered insufficient to sustain the chemical operations previously conducted on the premises as a result of a reduction in the length of the railroad siding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, emphasizing that the State’s failure to explicitly reserve the property owners’ legal right of access to the public highway constituted a compensable taking. The court distinguished between permissive access, which the State could revoke at any time, and a legal right of access, which is a permanent and valuable property interest. The court cited Kravec v State of New York, 40 NY2d 1060 and Wolfe v State of New York, 22 NY2d 292, reinforcing the principle that provisional expedients offered by the State do not cure the absence of an explicit reservation of a right to access in the original appropriation. The court stated, “That the State acquiesced in claimants’ use of a service road, on other State-held property, which led to the highway, afforded permissive and practical access but not a permanent legal right of access.” The court highlighted that the State was under no legal obligation to maintain the roadway. As for the Poliak property, the court deferred to the lower courts’ findings, supported by expert testimony, that the reduced railroad siding diminished the property’s utility for its intended purpose. The court noted, “The affirmed findings, in this respect, have a basis in the record and there our review must end.”

  • Bopp v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 368 (1967): Compensation for Diminished Access to State Highway

    Bopp v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 368 (1967)

    A property owner is not entitled to damages for diminished property value resulting from rerouting of a state highway, provided reasonably adequate access to the new highway is maintained.

    Summary

    Bopp owned a motel and restaurant on a state highway. The state reconstructed the highway, appropriating a small portion of Bopp’s land and rerouting the highway so it no longer directly accessed Bopp’s property, requiring use of a spur road. Bopp claimed damages for the reduced property value. The Court of Appeals held that while Bopp was entitled to compensation for the land taken, consequential damages due to rerouting and diminished traffic are not compensable, so long as reasonably adequate access to the highway is maintained. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s reduced award, emphasizing that property owners have no inherent right to direct highway access or traffic flow.

    Facts

    John and Mary Bopp owned a motel, lodge, and restaurant on State Route 28, strategically located opposite the road to the Belleayre recreational area. In 1959, the State reconstructed Route 28, appropriating 0.044 acres of Bopp’s land and severing the old route near their property. The State constructed a “G-spur connection” to the new Route 28, west of the property. The new Route 28 was not on the same grade as the property and was barely visible from it, requiring a sharp turn off the new route to reach the property, now 700-800 feet away. After the reconstruction, the motel-lodge and restaurant were no longer profitable and were used as a summer residence except during the ski season. The old Route 28 was the same width as the G-spur, but the highway traffic shifted away from Bopp’s property.

    Procedural History

    Bopp sued in the Court of Claims, which awarded $15,000 for damages resulting from the inadequate access road, reducing the property’s highest and best use. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the award to $4,175 (for the land actually taken) based on cases establishing that damages from circuity of access and loss of traffic are not compensable. Bopp appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a property owner is entitled to compensation for the decrease in property value resulting from the State’s reconstruction of a highway that diverts traffic away from the property, when the owner retains reasonably adequate access to the new highway via an access road.

    Holding

    No, because the State’s obligation to the property owner is fulfilled if they have a reasonably adequate means of access to and from the new highway, regardless of any decrease in traffic or visibility.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, stating that a property owner is not entitled to damages because access is no longer as direct as it once was, or because the access is less than ideal. The court emphasized that damages are not recoverable simply because traffic no longer passes in front of the claimant’s property or because the property is no longer visible from the main highway, citing Selig v. State of New York. The court reasoned that property owners have no inherent right to be located directly on a state highway or to have traffic pass in front of their property; any increase in value due to those factors is purely fortuitous. The State’s obligation is met if reasonably adequate access to the new highway is provided. The court found that the access road provided was adequate because the Court of Claims found the property could still be operated as a residence and a motel for specifically directed guests. The court analogized the situation to the state closing a recreation center, which would affect the claimant’s property just as drastically as the construction of the new highway, for which the State would not be liable. The court stated, “The State’s obligation to them is fulfilled if they have a reasonably adequate means of access to and from the new highway.”

  • Raymond Corp. v. State, 14 N.Y.2d 303 (1964): Recovery for Change of Street Grade Despite Alternate Access

    Raymond Corp. v. State, 14 N.Y.2d 303 (1964)

    An abutting landowner can recover damages for a change in street grade under a statute authorizing such payment, even if the property retains suitable access via another street.

    Summary

    Raymond Corp. sought damages from the State for a change in the grade of Chicago Street in Buffalo. The State lowered the street to its original grade after demolishing a viaduct that had provided access to the second story of Raymond’s warehouse. The State argued that because the property retained access via Scott Street, no damages were owed. The Court of Appeals held that the existence of alternate access does not preclude recovery for damages caused by a change in grade when a statute authorizes such payment. The Court distinguished cases involving street closures, where alternate access may bar recovery, and emphasized that statutes providing for change-of-grade damages reflect a policy decision to compensate landowners for actual losses sustained.

    Facts

    Raymond Corp. owned a warehouse at the intersection of Chicago and Scott Streets in Buffalo. Chicago Street’s level had been raised by a viaduct, level with the warehouse’s second story, providing access via an aerial ramp. The State demolished the viaduct as part of Thruway construction, lowering Chicago Street to its original grade, which afforded access only to the warehouse’s first floor. Before the viaduct removal, the only truck access to the second floor was via doors on Chicago Street. Post-removal, the only means to transport goods to the second floor was a single elevator, substantially impairing the second floor’s utility for warehousing.

    Procedural History

    Raymond Corp. filed a claim against the State in the Court of Claims, which dismissed the claim. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the claimant had suffered damages. The State appealed to the Court of Appeals from the Appellate Division order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a property owner, whose property abuts intersecting streets, can recover damages for a change of grade to one street when access to the property remains via the other street, under a statute directing payment of damages for such grade changes.

    Holding

    Yes, because the common-law rule precluding recovery when suitable access remains via another street does not apply to changes of grade where a statute authorizes payment of damages. The statute prevents the preclusion of damages from change of grade by the common-law rule.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from those involving street closures, where alternate access might preclude recovery. The Court emphasized that, at common law, there was no liability for damages due to a change of grade (“Sauer v. City of New York, 180 N.Y. 27”). However, many statutes have been enacted providing for damages for change of grade due to perceived injustice of the common-law rule. The Court analyzed several cases where awards were upheld despite alternate access, including Matter of Grade Crossing Comrs. of City of Buffalo (Michigan St.), 154 N.Y. 550, where the grade of Michigan Street was changed but access remained at the same grade via Exchange Street, and the award was affirmed. The court stated that it disagreed with the dissent in Baldwin-Hall Co. v. State of New York, 16 Y 2d 1005, stating that Baldwin-Hall was about entirely preventing access to one street, and that the majority decided that “Such damage as claimant suffered was due to circuity of access and as held in Selig there is no provision in law for recovery thereof.” The Court found that “the legally authorized street elevation based upon the actual grading work performed by city authorities is the established grade” (Lawrence Constr. Corp. v. State of New York, 293 N. Y. 634) and that this technical oversight of the City Engineer could hardly be held to exonerate the city or the State for payment of damages to the abutting property owner.

  • Northern Lights Shopping Center v. State of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 688 (1965): Eminent Domain and Consequential Damages from Highway Construction

    15 N.Y.2d 688 (1965)

    Consequential damages to property resulting from changes in traffic patterns and highway construction are generally not compensable in eminent domain proceedings unless there is an unreasonable restriction of access.

    Summary

    Northern Lights Shopping Center sought compensation from the State of New York for consequential damages allegedly caused by the construction of Interstate Highway Route 81 and associated changes to surrounding roadways. The shopping center argued that the new highway, one-way traffic routing, and other modifications negatively impacted its business by altering traffic flow and access. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that most of the alleged damages were not compensable because they stemmed from alterations in traffic patterns, which are within the state’s police power. However, a dissenting judge argued that the right of access to Route 11 and County Highway 208 had been unreasonably restricted and should be subject to compensation.

    Facts

    Northern Lights Shopping Center owned property abutting Route 11 and County Highway 208. The State of New York constructed Interstate Highway Route 81, which impacted the roadways surrounding the shopping center. The construction resulted in a new traffic circle, a weaving lane, and one-way traffic routing on Route 11 and County Highway 208. The shopping center claimed these changes caused consequential damages to its property, arguing that the altered traffic patterns negatively affected customer access and, consequently, its business.

    Procedural History

    The shopping center filed a claim against the State of New York seeking compensation for consequential damages. The trial court ruled against the shopping center, finding that the alleged damages were not compensable. The shopping center appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the alleged consequential damages resulting from traffic pattern changes were not compensable unless access was unreasonably restricted. Judge Van Voorhis dissented, arguing for a remand to determine if access to Route 11 and County Highway 208 was unreasonably restricted.

    Issue(s)

    Whether consequential damages to property, resulting from highway construction and changes to traffic patterns, are compensable in an eminent domain proceeding.

    Holding

    No, because changes in traffic patterns and flow, resulting from highway construction, are within the state’s police power and do not create a right to compensation unless the access to the property has been unreasonably restricted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the state has the right to regulate traffic patterns for public safety and convenience. Changes to traffic flow, even if they negatively impact a business, are generally not compensable as consequential damages. The court distinguished between damages resulting from changes in traffic flow and damages resulting from a physical taking or an unreasonable restriction of access. Only the latter warrants compensation. The dissent argued that the right of access to the highways abutting the property had been unreasonably restricted, which constitutes a taking that requires just compensation. The dissenting judge cited Red Apple Rest. v. McMorran (12 Y 2d 203) to support the principle that reasonable access to a highway is a property right. The dissent concluded that the changes in this case transcended the bounds of reasonableness, meriting a separate determination of this element of consequential damage. The court made no specific mention of legal rules or precedent other than referring to the Red Apple Rest. v. McMorran case. The court’s decision hinges on the inherent power of the state to regulate traffic and the distinction between regulating traffic versus taking property rights.