New York Law Review

Tag: Academic Freedom

  • New York University School of Law, In re, 26 N.Y.2d 143 (1970): Upholding Bar Admission Requirements Despite Faculty Resolutions

    In re New York University School of Law, 26 N.Y.2d 143 (1970)

    A law school cannot unilaterally alter its established program of studies, specifically the requirement of final course examinations, if that program was the basis upon which the school gained “approved law school” status for bar admission purposes.

    Summary

    New York University School of Law petitioned the New York Court of Appeals to reconsider its order requiring final examinations for bar admission eligibility, arguing that a faculty resolution had eliminated these exams due to extenuating circumstances. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. The court reasoned that Rule IV of the Rules of the Court of Appeals for the Admission of Attorneys and Counselors at Law requires a final course examination when appropriate, and the law school’s curriculum, which was registered and approved, included this requirement. The court emphasized that relaxing this rule would undermine the quality of legal education and that only those evaluated through authentic written examinations could qualify for the bar exam.

    Facts

    New York University School of Law (NYU) was an “approved law school” under the New York Court of Appeals’ rules for bar admission. NYU’s curriculum, submitted to the New York State Education Department, stated that students were required to take scheduled examinations unless excused for illness or other uncontrollable causes. This curriculum aligned with the standards of the American Association of Law Schools (AALS), which generally requires written examinations to test scholastic attainment. Following a faculty resolution, NYU sought to eliminate final examinations for the Spring 1970 semester.

    Procedural History

    NYU filed a petition with the New York Court of Appeals to reconsider its order requiring final examinations. The Court of Appeals denied the petition after considering arguments from NYU, Rutgers University School of Law (which filed a similar petition), and an Amici Curiae brief. This denial upheld the original order regarding examination requirements.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York Court of Appeals should interpret Rule IV of its Rules for Admission as not requiring final examinations in the Spring 1970 semester, or, in the alternative, waive or rescind the rule for NYU students.

    Holding

    No, because the law school’s approved program of studies included a firm requirement of final course examinations, and the court’s rules for admission are designed to promote the best interests of the students, the legal profession and society at large. Eliminating or dispensing with final examinations in course would tend to downgrade the quality of legal education in this State.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that its Rule IV, consistently interpreted, requires final course examinations where appropriate. NYU, as an approved law school, represented its curriculum as including these examinations. The court found no basis for NYU’s claim that the order imposed new retroactive requirements. The court noted that its order was published shortly after the faculty resolution and before the voluntary examinations were scheduled. The court rejected the argument that academic freedom justified the unilateral change, stating that a law school cannot change an essential basis of its approval without risking its approved status. The court emphasized that the law school faculty could not modify the court’s rules or lower bar admission requirements. The court quoted the AALS Executive Committee’s statement that accreditation standards and methods of evaluating student work cannot be changed hurriedly, even in emergency circumstances. The court concluded that relaxing the rules would degrade legal education, and only those evaluated by authentic written examinations could qualify for the bar exam. The court stated, “The Rules may not be relaxed, the standards lowered, by decision or resolution of a majority of the faculty of a law school. Only those applicants whose work in their courses has been evaluated by authentic written examination (whenever such examination is appropriate) may qualify to take the July 1970 Bar examination.”

  • Anonymous v. Baker, 32 A.D.2d 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969): Compelling Testimony of Grand Jury Target

    32 A.D.2d 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969)

    A prospective defendant or target of a grand jury investigation can be compelled to appear before the grand jury, and the issuance of a subpoena for this purpose does not, by itself, violate the target’s Fifth Amendment rights.

    Summary

    Faculty members at SUNY Stony Brook, subjects of a grand jury investigation into campus drug use, sought to quash subpoenas compelling their appearance. They argued that as targets of the investigation, they couldn’t be forced to testify, citing Fifth Amendment concerns and academic freedom. The court held that being subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury does not violate a target’s Fifth Amendment rights. The court also found that academic freedom is not violated by requiring teachers to appear before a grand jury to discuss matters relevant to an investigation of misconduct. The order denying the motion to quash the subpoenas was affirmed.

    Facts

    Faculty members at the State University of New York at Stony Brook were subpoenaed to appear before a Suffolk County Grand Jury investigating potential drug abuse on campus. The District Attorney acknowledged the faculty members were targets of the investigation. The faculty members were expected to be asked questions about their own drug use with students, advocacy of illegal drug use to students, and discussions with administrators about such advocacy or use.

    Procedural History

    The faculty members initiated an action to quash the subpoenas. The application to quash was denied by the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial. The case then was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals based on constitutional questions.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether prospective defendants or targets of a Grand Jury investigation may be compelled to attend a Grand Jury hearing without violating their Fifth Amendment rights?
    2. Whether compelling teachers to respond to a subpoena to appear before a grand jury violates their First Amendment right to academic freedom?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Fifth Amendment does not prevent a prospective defendant from being compelled to at least attend a grand jury investigation.
    2. No, because no constitutional right is violated by a subpoena requesting a teacher to appear before a Grand Jury inquiry and discuss matters relevant to an investigation of misconduct, which he may freely discuss in a classroom.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from prior New York cases (People v. Steuding and People v. Laino), which held that a prospective defendant could not be both called and examined before a grand jury without immunity from self-incrimination. Those cases were deemed inapplicable as the present case only involved the issuance of a subpoena, not compelled testimony.

    The court relied on Supreme Court decisions in Gardner v. Broderick and Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comr., stating that they suggest a public employee who is a target of an investigation may be subpoenaed by a Grand Jury without automatically violating the employee’s Fifth Amendment rights. The court emphasized that those cases affirm the right of public employees to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but do not preclude being subpoenaed.

    Addressing the First Amendment argument, the court distinguished the case from Keyishian v. Board of Regents and Dombrowski v. Pfister, where state laws were found to be unconstitutional because they infringed upon First Amendment rights. The court noted that there were no statutes attempting to proscribe conduct in this case. The court reasoned that the teachers’ argument that they would be intimidated in their lectures by the potential threat of a grand jury appearance does not amount to a violation of constitutional rights. As the court stated, “no constitutional right is violated by a subpoena which requests a teacher to appear before a Grand Jury inquiry and discuss matters — relevant to an investigation of misconduct— which he may freely discuss in a classroom.”

    The court explicitly stated that mere discussion or advocacy of conduct that might itself be criminal is different from the actual solicitation of crime with the specific intent of having it committed. Only the latter may be constitutionally prohibited.