New York Law Review

Tag: Abuse of Process

  • Bell v. New York Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 811 (2001): Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals

    Bell v. New York Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 811 (2001)

    Courts may impose sanctions on litigants who engage in frivolous conduct, including pursuing appeals that are completely without merit in law and are intended to delay resolution of a case.

    Summary

    This case concerns the imposition of sanctions on appellant John B. Bell for pursuing a frivolous appeal related to a nearly 30-year-old unpaid law school loan. The New York Court of Appeals determined that Bell’s appeal was completely without merit and part of a pattern of delaying litigation and avoiding payment of his student loan. Despite prior sanctions and an injunction against further litigating the claim, Bell continued to file frivolous motions. The Court, therefore, imposed a $5,000 sanction to prevent further abuse of the judicial process.

    Facts

    John B. Bell had an unpaid law school loan that was almost 30 years old.

    Bell had previously been sanctioned by the Court of Appeals and enjoined by the Supreme Court from further litigating his claim regarding the loan.

    Despite the prior sanctions and injunction, Bell continued to file appeals and motions related to the loan.

    Procedural History

    The New York Court of Appeals previously sanctioned Bell in a related matter (Bell v New York Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 76 NY2d 930, rearg denied 76 NY2d 1015).

    The Supreme Court issued an order enjoining Bell from further litigating his claim.

    Bell appealed a subsequent order related to the loan, leading the Court of Appeals to consider sanctions again.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the appellant’s appeal is “frivolous” within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a) and (c), thus warranting the imposition of sanctions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the appeal is “completely without merit in law” and “cannot be supported by a[ny] reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law” and is part of a continued strategy to delay the resolution of the litigation and payment of his student loan.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that Bell’s appeal met the definition of “frivolous” conduct under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a) and (c), which includes appeals that are “completely without merit in law” and are intended to delay the resolution of the case. The court noted that no constitutional question was directly involved in the order being appealed, and the appeal was merely the latest in a series of frivolous attempts to avoid paying the student loan. The court emphasized Bell’s continued strategy to delay the resolution of the litigation and the payment of his student loan, which constituted an abuse of the judicial process. Referring to prior instances where sanctions were imposed on Bell in connection with the same matter, the court found him undeterred. The court cited *Maroulis v 64th St. Third Ave. Assocs., 77 NY2d 831* and *Matter of Minister, Elders & Deacons of Refm. Prot. Dutch Church v 198 Broadway, 76 NY2d 411* to further support the imposition of sanctions. Considering the need to prevent appellant from engaging in further frivolous motion practice, the Court fixed the sanction at $5,000.

  • Parkin v. Cornell University, Inc., 78 N.Y.2d 523 (1991): Probable Cause and Abuse of Process Claims in Employment Disputes

    Parkin v. Cornell University, Inc., 78 N.Y.2d 523 (1991)

    The issue of probable cause in false arrest and malicious prosecution claims is a question of law for the court only when there is no factual dispute; abuse of process requires evidence the legal process was used for an improper purpose.

    Summary

    Two Cornell University employees, active in union negotiations, were arrested for stealing envelopes. They alleged the charges were retaliation for their union activities. The New York Court of Appeals held that the existence of probable cause for the arrest was a jury question because of conflicting evidence about the commonality of delivering materials without delivery slips and whether the employees had permission to retain the envelopes. The Court also reinstated the abuse of process claim, finding that the jury instructions, to which the defendants did not object, were satisfied by the evidence presented.

    Facts

    John Cleveland and Thomas Parkin, employees of Cornell University and active union members, were arrested and charged with petit larceny and possession of stolen property. The charges stemmed from Cleveland requesting and receiving four boxes of envelopes from Parkin at the university print shop. Cleveland claimed he requested the envelopes as samples for an Alumni House employee. University officials investigated, focusing primarily on whether the delivery was authorized rather than the employees’ intent. The arrests occurred shortly after the employees participated in union job actions.

    Procedural History

    After their arrest, Parkin and Cleveland were terminated but were later reinstated with back pay after filing grievances through their union. The criminal charges were subsequently dismissed. They then sued Cornell University for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the jury’s verdict and remitting the case to the Appellate Division to consider other issues raised in the appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the existence of probable cause for the arrest and prosecution of the plaintiffs should have been decided by the court as a matter of law or properly submitted to the jury as a question of fact.

    2. Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to support a claim for abuse of process.

    Holding

    1. No, because there were factual disputes regarding the delivery slip system and the employee’s intent, making it a question for the jury.

    2. Yes, because the jury instructions regarding abuse of process were satisfied by the evidence presented and the defendants did not object to those instructions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding probable cause, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the issue is a question of law for the court only when there is no real dispute as to the facts or the proper inferences to be drawn from such facts. Here, the evidence presented at trial created factual disputes, namely the commonality of deliveries without slips and whether Cleveland had permission to retain the envelopes. These disputes were directly relevant to determining whether the employees intended to deprive the university of property, an essential element of petit larceny. The court noted the public safety officer’s mistaken belief that intent was irrelevant, which further supported the jury’s role in determining probable cause.

    Regarding abuse of process, the Court acknowledged prior language suggesting that improper conduct must occur after the issuance of process. However, it found that the defendants did not object to the jury instructions on abuse of process, which only required a finding that the charges were brought to interfere with union activities. The court stated, “Inasmuch as plaintiffs’ evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict under the law as charged, without objection, in this case, there is no basis for dismissing this cause of action.”

  • Parkin v. Cornell Records, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 573 (1984): Establishing Claims for Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process

    Parkin v. Cornell Records, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 573 (1984)

    To successfully plead malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must present facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of probable cause resulting from a court’s initial issuance of temporary restraining orders; to successfully plead abuse of process, a plaintiff must allege misuse of process to achieve an end outside its proper scope.

    Summary

    Parkin sued Cornell Records, alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process related to prior temporary restraining orders. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the complaint, finding that Parkin failed to adequately plead either cause of action. Specifically, Parkin did not present sufficient facts to overcome the presumption of probable cause arising from the issuance of the temporary restraining orders, nor did Parkin demonstrate any misuse of process to achieve an improper end. The court also held that denying Parkin the opportunity to replead was not an abuse of discretion, as the record indicated Parkin could not state a valid claim.

    Facts

    Cornell Records obtained temporary restraining orders against Parkin. Parkin subsequently sued Cornell Records, alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process based on the issuance of these orders.

    Procedural History

    The lower court dismissed Parkin’s complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal and denied Parkin the right to replead. Parkin appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Parkin adequately pleaded a cause of action for malicious prosecution by presenting facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of probable cause arising from the issuance of temporary restraining orders.

    2. Whether Parkin adequately pleaded a cause of action for abuse of process by alleging misuse of process to achieve an end outside its proper scope.

    3. Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion by denying Parkin the right to replead.

    Holding

    1. No, because Parkin failed to specifically plead facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of probable cause for the prior temporary restraining orders, which arose as a result of the fact that those temporary restraining orders were necessarily passed upon initially by the issuing court.

    2. No, because Parkin failed to allege any actual misuse of the process to obtain an end outside its proper scope.

    3. No, because the record, viewed as a whole, indicates that Parkin cannot plead a sound cause of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that Parkin’s malicious prosecution claim was deficient because Parkin did not provide sufficient facts to overcome the presumption of probable cause that arose when the court initially issued the temporary restraining orders. The court cited Burt v. Smith, stating that the initial issuance of a temporary restraining order by a court establishes a presumption of probable cause that must be rebutted with specific factual allegations. The court emphasized that a mere allegation of malice is insufficient; the plaintiff must demonstrate a lack of reasonable grounds for the initial orders.

    Regarding the abuse of process claim, the court found that Parkin failed to allege any misuse of the legal process to achieve an objective outside the process’s legitimate purpose. Quoting Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Assn., the court reiterated that an abuse of process claim requires demonstrating that the process was used to gain an advantage that was not a legitimate objective of the lawsuit. A mere allegation that the lawsuit was initiated with malicious intent is not sufficient; there must be an overt act indicating misuse of the process itself.

    Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in denying Parkin the opportunity to replead. Citing ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, the court noted that leave to replead should be denied when it is clear that the plaintiff cannot state a viable cause of action. The court determined that, based on the entire record, Parkin could not assert a valid claim for either malicious prosecution or abuse of process.

  • Curiano v. Suozzi, 63 N.Y.2d 113 (1984): Limits on Prima Facie Tort for Retaliatory Lawsuits

    Curiano v. Suozzi, 63 N.Y.2d 113 (1984)

    New York courts disallow retaliatory lawsuits based on prima facie tort predicated on the malicious institution of a prior civil action, emphasizing the need for open access to courts without fear of reprisal.

    Summary

    Curiano sued Suozzi, alleging prima facie tort and abuse of process due to Suozzi’s prior defamation suit against them. The defamation suit stemmed from campaign literature criticizing Suozzi. The New York Court of Appeals held that Curiano could not maintain a separate action for prima facie tort based on the malicious institution of the prior defamation action. The court reasoned that allowing such retaliatory suits would misuse the doctrine of prima facie tort, create inconsistent results, and undermine the policy of open access to the courts.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, government officials, published campaign literature criticizing Defendant Suozzi. The literature alleged Suozzi had engaged in speculative real estate purchases and profited from his brother’s decisions as Mayor while Suozzi was a judge. Suozzi, through his law firm, sued the plaintiffs for libel (Suozzi v. Parente). Plaintiffs then initiated a second lawsuit alleging that the Suozzi v. Parente action was brought maliciously to harm them and punish them for exercising their right to free speech.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the prima facie tort claim, citing Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Assn. The Appellate Division reversed, characterizing the claim as abuse of process and dismissing it for failure to allege improper use of process after issuance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to dismiss the action.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiffs’ complaint states a cause of action for abuse of process based on the malicious institution of a prior lawsuit.

    2. Whether the plaintiffs’ complaint states a cause of action for prima facie tort based on the malicious institution of a prior lawsuit.

    Holding

    1. No, because the mere institution of a civil action by summons and complaint is not legally considered process capable of being abused.

    2. No, because New York courts consistently refuse to allow retaliatory lawsuits based on prima facie tort predicated on the malicious institution of a prior civil action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding abuse of process, the court stated that the process used must involve “an unlawful interference with one’s person or property.” The court found that issuing a summons to begin a lawsuit is not considered an abuse of process. The court emphasized that the “ ‘gist of the action for abuse of process’ ” is “ ‘the improper use of process after it is issued’ ”, and the plaintiffs only alleged malicious motive in bringing the action, which is insufficient. Quoting Hauser v. Bartow, the court stated that “[a] malicious motive alone, however, does not give rise to a cause of action for abuse of process.”

    Regarding prima facie tort, the court acknowledged the elements: (1) intentional infliction of harm, (2) causing special damages, (3) without excuse or justification, (4) by an act or series of acts that would otherwise be lawful. However, the court emphasized the strong public policy against allowing retaliatory lawsuits based on prima facie tort predicated on the malicious institution of a prior civil action. The court reasoned that allowing such actions would undermine the principle of open access to the courts. The court stated that “[p]rima facie tort is designed to provide a remedy for intentional and malicious actions that cause harm and for which no traditional tort provides a remedy.” The court considered the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ claim to sound in malicious prosecution, which requires the underlying action to have ended in failure. The court feared a situation where litigation could continue ad infinitum with each party claiming the other’s action was malicious.

  • Drago v. State, 42 N.Y.2d 887 (1977): Accrual of Abuse of Process Claim

    Drago v. State, 42 N.Y.2d 887 (1977)

    A cause of action for abuse of process accrues when the improper process is used, not necessarily upon the termination of the underlying action.

    Summary

    This case addresses the timeliness of an abuse of process claim against the State of New York. Drago filed a claim alleging abuse of process, arguing that his notice of intention to file the claim was timely because it was filed within 90 days of the dismissal of indictments against him. The Court of Appeals held that the accrual of a cause of action for abuse of process does not require the termination of the underlying action in the claimant’s favor. Because Drago’s notice was filed well after the alleged abuse of process occurred, the claim was deemed untimely.

    Facts

    Claimant Drago was subject to indictments, the dismissal of which he argued triggered the accrual of his abuse of process claim. He contended his notice of intention to file the claim was timely because it was filed within 90 days of the indictments’ dismissal. The underlying facts constituting the alleged abuse of process are not detailed in the brief opinion but are presumed to have occurred before the dismissal of the indictments.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the Court of Appeals after proceedings in lower courts. The Appellate Division’s order was modified. The Court of Appeals dismissed Drago’s cause of action for abuse of process, finding it untimely. The specific rulings of the lower courts are not detailed in this Court of Appeals memorandum.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the accrual of a cause of action for abuse of process is dependent on the termination of the action in the claimant’s favor, specifically, whether the 90-day period to file a notice of intention to sue the State for abuse of process begins upon dismissal of the indictments against the claimant.

    Holding

    No, because the accrual of a cause of action for abuse of process does not require the termination of an action in the claimant’s favor. The claim accrues when the alleged abuse of process occurs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the established principle that an abuse of process claim accrues when the process is improperly used, not when the underlying action terminates. The court cited Keller v. Butler, 246 N.Y. 249, to support this principle. The court reasoned that Drago’s notice of intention was untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the alleged abuse of process occurred, regardless of the subsequent dismissal of the indictments. The Court made a simple application of the statute of limitations in Court of Claims Act Section 10(3). There were no dissenting or concurring opinions mentioned.