New York Law Review

Tag: Abuse of Power

  • In the Matter of Robert M. Corning, Sr., 96 N.Y.2d 451 (2001): Judicial Removal for Misconduct

    In the Matter of Robert M. Corning, Sr., 96 N.Y.2d 451 (2001)

    A judge may be removed from office for misconduct that demonstrates a pattern of serious disregard for the standards of judicial conduct, abuse of power, lack of judicial temperament, and mishandling of public funds.

    Summary

    Robert M. Corning, Sr., a Town Justice, was removed from office following a determination by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct sustaining five charges of misconduct. The charges included mishandling court funds, engaging in unprofessional conduct toward an attorney representing an opposing party, retaliating against an attorney for a past complaint, and improperly suspending a defendant’s driver’s license due to animosity toward the defendant’s attorney. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination, finding a pattern of serious disregard for judicial conduct standards.

    Facts

    Robert Corning, as Town Justice, failed to deposit court funds within 72 hours and remit them to the State Comptroller as required. His court account was deficient by $2,886.64, and he failed to report any funds to the State Comptroller, leading to a suspension of his salary. He also engaged in a dispute with an attorney representing a funeral home in a case against him, making threatening and derogatory remarks. He retaliated against another attorney who had previously filed a complaint against him. Finally, he suspended a traffic defendant’s driver’s license out of animosity for the defendant’s attorney, even after initially agreeing to recuse himself from the case.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Corning based on complaints received. The Commission sustained five charges of misconduct. Corning sought review by the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s determination and the record of the proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence supported the Commission’s findings that Corning violated regulations governing the handling of court funds.
    2. Whether Corning’s conduct toward attorneys and litigants constituted judicial misconduct.
    3. Whether the appropriate sanction for Corning’s misconduct was removal from office.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Corning admitted to deficiencies in his court account and failure to remit funds, providing no valid excuse.
    2. Yes, because Corning abused the power of his office and demonstrated a lack of judicial temperament in his interactions with attorneys and litigants.
    3. Yes, because Corning’s actions demonstrated a pattern of serious disregard for the standards of judicial conduct, warranting removal from office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that judges must observe high standards of conduct to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary, citing 22 NYCRR 100.1. The court found that Corning’s actions, both on and off the bench, demonstrated a pattern of serious disregard for these standards. The court highlighted that Corning repeatedly abused the power of his office, demonstrated a lack of judicial temperament, and mishandled public funds. The court stated that these standards “exist to maintain respect toward everyone who appears in a court and to encourage respect for the operation of the judicial process at all levels of the system” (Matter of Roberts, 91 NY2d 93, 97). The Court deferred to the Commission’s determination that removal was the appropriate sanction, finding it justified based on the severity and pattern of Corning’s misconduct.

  • Matter of LaBuda, 96 N.Y.2d 199 (2001): Judicial Misconduct and Removal for Racial and Ethnic Slurs

    96 N.Y.2d 199 (2001)

    Judges must adhere to the highest standards of conduct, and engaging in racial epithets, ethnic slurs, attempts to influence dispositions, intemperate behavior, and false testimony warrants removal from office.

    Summary

    Judge LaBuda faced review by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct, which sustained four of seven misconduct charges and removed him from office. The charges included making derogatory racial remarks about a crime victim, displaying intemperate behavior and pressuring a prosecutor for personal convenience, making disparaging remarks about Italian-Americans, and testifying with reckless disregard for the truth. The Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination, finding that the judge’s cumulative misconduct undermined the integrity of the judiciary and warranted removal, despite his prior unblemished record.

    Facts

    The case involved several incidents of alleged misconduct by Judge LaBuda:
    1. While discussing a murder case at a charity event, the judge made a derogatory racial remark about the victim to pressure a prosecutor into offering a plea deal.
    2. During jury deliberations in a rape case, the judge displayed intemperate behavior, used profanity, and pressured the prosecutor to offer a plea for his personal convenience.
    3. The judge made disparaging remarks about Italian-Americans during a conversation with a District Attorney.
    4. The judge provided false testimony as a character witness in a criminal trial.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated the allegations against Judge LaBuda. A Referee found against the judge on six of the seven charges after a hearing. The Commission sustained the Referee’s findings on four charges (I, II, IV, and VII) and determined that the judge should be removed from office. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s determination de novo.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Commission on Judicial Conduct met its burden of proving that Judge LaBuda engaged in judicial misconduct.
    2. Whether the sanction of removal from office was excessive, given the judge’s prior unblemished record.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Commission’s determination was supported by a preponderance of the evidence regarding the judge’s racial and ethnic slurs, attempts to influence dispositions, intemperate behavior, and false testimony.
    2. No, because the judge’s cumulative misconduct undermined the integrity of the judiciary, and removal was an appropriate sanction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that judges must be held to a higher standard of conduct than the public at large. The court found that Judge LaBuda’s derogatory racial remark about the crime victim, his disparaging comments about Italian-Americans, his intemperate behavior and pressure on the prosecutor, and his false testimony demonstrated a pattern of misconduct that warranted removal from office. The court stated, “These words, as well as the context in which they were uttered, are indefensible. Petitioner’s racially charged assessment of the case not only devalued the victim’s life but also cast doubt on the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary and, by itself, puts into question petitioner’s fitness to hold judicial office.” The court rejected the judge’s attempts to rationalize his behavior, deferring to the Referee’s firsthand assessment of his responses. The Court further reasoned, “the ‘harm inured when [petitioner] indicated he would use his judicial powers to satisfy a personal [interest], a classic instance in which ‘an appearance of such impropriety is no less to be condemned than is the impropriety itself.’” The court concluded that the cumulative effect of the judge’s misconduct undermined public confidence in the judiciary, justifying the sanction of removal, stating, “Petitioner’s judicial record cannot excuse racial epithets and ethnic slurs in the official and quasi-official context in which they were uttered, attempts to influence dispositions, intemperate behavior and false testimony.”

  • In the Matter of Gelfand, 70 N.Y.2d 211 (1987): Judicial Misconduct and Abuse of Power

    In the Matter of Gelfand, 70 N.Y.2d 211 (1987)

    A judge’s misuse of judicial power to pursue a personal relationship and subsequent lack of candor during judicial conduct proceedings warrants removal from office, even if some of the allegations considered were based on uncharged conduct.

    Summary

    Bertram Gelfand, Surrogate of Bronx County, was charged with judicial misconduct stemming from his actions related to a former law assistant with whom he had an affair. The charges included misusing his position to prolong the relationship and later seeking vengeance when the assistant ended it. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct recommended removal, finding Gelfand lacked candor during the proceedings. The New York Court of Appeals accepted the determined sanction of removal, holding that Gelfand’s conduct violated the standards of integrity and propriety required of judicial officers and undermined public confidence in the judiciary.

    Facts

    Gelfand had an extramarital affair with his law assistant. After she ended the relationship, Gelfand fired her, emptied her office, and delivered her belongings to her home. He then made numerous phone calls, leaving obscene messages. He falsely identified himself as her attorney to gain access to her. He confronted her boyfriend and threatened to speak to the boyfriend’s employer (the Bronx County District Attorney) to get him fired. Gelfand also asked a Deputy Chief Administrative Judge to view any of the law assistant’s future employment applications unfavorably. He later met with the law assistant’s new employer and expressed his displeasure at them for hiring her without consulting him.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct filed a formal complaint against Gelfand. A Referee sustained all charges and found Gelfand lacked candor. The Commission determined removal was appropriate. Gelfand sought review from the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Surrogate of Bronx County’s actions, motivated by a personal relationship with a former law assistant, and his subsequent lack of candor during the proceedings, constituted judicial misconduct warranting removal from office.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Surrogate misused his judicial powers and failed to be candid, conflicting with the standards of integrity and propriety required of judges, undermining public confidence in the judiciary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that Gelfand misused his position as Surrogate to prolong a sexual relationship and later to exact personal vengeance. This conduct constituted violations of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and the Code of Judicial Conduct. The court emphasized that the effectiveness of the judicial system depends on public trust, which Gelfand’s actions undermined. Quoting the Code of Judicial Conduct, the court noted that judges must maintain integrity and impartiality. While acknowledging that the Commission improperly considered some uncharged conduct, the court held that the acts described in the formal complaint and proven at the hearing were sufficient cause for removal. The court stated, “By allowing his personal relationships to influence both his judgment and the administration of the court over which he presides he could not help but impair public confidence in his integrity and impartiality.” The Court also cited previous cases: “effectiveness of the judicial system is dependent upon the public’s trust and violations such as these which undermine that trust are so contrary to the ethical obligations required of Judges in conducting their personal and judicial duties that removal is essential (see, Matter of Aldrich v State Commn. on Judicial Conduct, 58 NY2d 279, 283; Matter of Shilling, 51 NY2d 397, 402; Matter of Kuehnel, 49 NY2d 465, 469).”

  • In the Matter of Joseph E. Myers, 67 N.Y.2d 550 (1986): Judicial Misconduct and Abuse of Power

    In the Matter of Joseph E. Myers, 67 N.Y.2d 550 (1986)

    A judge’s exploitation of the criminal process and misuse of judicial office for personal or familial gain, coupled with attempts to conceal such activity and intimidate witnesses, warrants removal from office.

    Summary

    Joseph E. Myers, a Town Justice, was investigated by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct for allegedly abusing his power by participating in a case where he, his son, and daughter had a personal interest. The Commission found Myers prepared a criminal summons and improperly influenced police to serve it, attempted to transfer the case to another judge without proper notification, and threatened a witness in the Commission’s proceedings. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination that Myers’ conduct constituted judicial misconduct and warranted removal from office, emphasizing the importance of maintaining public trust in the judiciary.

    Facts

    An automobile accident occurred involving damage to a car owned by Justice Myers’ daughter, insured under a policy for which Myers paid premiums. Terry Kerr was allegedly responsible. Myers discussed the case with the Police Chief, leading to a traffic ticket and unsigned criminal summons for Kerr. Myers then asked a State Trooper and a Sheriff’s Department Sergeant to serve the summons after the Police Chief was unable to. After Kerr failed to appear in court, Myers allegedly contacted Kerr’s sister and threatened to have Kerr’s license suspended if damages weren’t paid.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct initiated proceedings against Myers based on a complaint. A Referee found all counts sustained except for the phone call to Kerr’s home. The Commission affirmed the Referee’s findings, concluding Myers violated multiple rules and canons of judicial conduct. Myers petitioned for review, arguing the evidence was insufficient and the sanction too harsh. The Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination and accepted the sanction of removal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Justice Myers violated sections 100.1 and 100.2 of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and canons 1, 2, and 3(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct by involving himself in a case where he and his family had a personal interest.

    2. Whether the determined sanction of removal from office was appropriate given the alleged misconduct.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Justice Myers exploited the criminal process and misused his judicial office for his and his family’s personal gain.

    2. Yes, because Justice Myers’ abuse of power brought disrepute to the judiciary and damaged public confidence in the integrity of the court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that Myers’ actions constituted an egregious violation of judicial ethics. The court relied on the testimony of multiple witnesses, including police officers and another judge, to establish that Myers had improperly prepared a criminal summons and attempted to influence the service of that summons. The Court highlighted Myers’ attempt to mislead the Commission by presenting a false note purporting to transfer the case to another judge, as well as his intimidation of a witness. The court found this deception antithetical to the role of a judge. Citing Matter of Steinberg, 51 NY2d 74, 78, 1, the court reiterated that judges are sworn to uphold the law and seek the truth. The court also noted Myers’ failure to testify regarding the charges against him. The Court concluded that Myers’ actions demonstrated a clear abuse of power, warranting the sanction of removal from office. The Court stated, “In short, petitioner has clearly abused the power of his office in a manner that has brought disrepute to the judiciary and damaged public confidence in the integrity of his court.”