New York Law Review

Tag: absolute liability

  • Bland v. Manocherian, 66 N.Y.2d 452 (1985): Absolute Liability for Improperly Placed Ladders Under Labor Law § 240

    Bland v. Manocherian, 66 N.Y.2d 452 (1985)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors bear absolute liability for failing to provide adequate safety devices, such as properly placed ladders, to protect workers from elevation-related risks, regardless of the worker’s own negligence.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of liability under New York Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries sustained in construction accidents. Bland, a worker, was injured when a ladder he was using collapsed. The jury found that the ladder was not defective but was improperly placed, causing the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment holding the owner absolutely liable. The court emphasized that the statute imposes a non-delegable duty on owners and contractors to provide adequate safety devices to protect workers from elevation-related risks, and comparative negligence is not a defense.

    Facts

    Bland was hired to make alterations to an apartment building owned by Manocherian. While standing on a ladder to remove window sashes, the ladder collapsed beneath him, causing him to fall through a fourth-story window. A co-worker had brought the ladder into the apartment, and Bland himself positioned the ladder “sideways” to and several inches from the window. The floor where the ladder was placed was bare, polished, and shiny. There was no safety equipment such as safety belts, hard hats, or scaffolding used to protect Bland from falling or to secure the ladder.

    Procedural History

    At the first trial, the court initially refused to instruct the jury that improper placement of the ladder was a statutory violation, but the jury found for the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial. At the second trial, the jury found that the ladder was improperly placed and that the improper placement was a proximate cause of the accident. The trial court directed a verdict for the owners against the employer and reduced damages. The Appellate Division modified, ordering a new trial on damages unless plaintiffs accepted the reduced amount. The Court of Appeals then heard the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors when a worker is injured due to an improperly placed ladder, regardless of the worker’s potential negligence.

    Holding

    Yes, because Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a non-delegable duty on owners and contractors to ensure that safety devices, such as ladders, are placed and operated to provide proper protection to workers, and the worker’s contributory negligence is not a defense to liability under this statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its recent decision in Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, which established that Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for failing to provide necessary safety devices. The court emphasized the legislative intent to place ultimate responsibility for safety practices on owners and general contractors. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the ladder was not “placed so as to give proper protection” and that the improper placement was a proximate cause of the accident. The court noted testimony regarding the job foreman’s description of the work being performed (twisting and forcibly removing window sashes while on the ladder), the condition of the floor (bare and polished), the ladder’s position (sideways and close to the window), and the lack of any safety equipment. The court distinguished this case from Long v. Forest-Fehlhaber, which involved § 241(6), a provision with a more general standard of care. The court also stated that comparative causation, as applied in Arbegast v. Board of Educ., is inapplicable because Labor Law § 240 imposes a “flat and unvarying” duty on owners and contractors. The court directly quoted Labor Law § 240 (1): “All contractors and owners…shall furnish or erect…scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders…and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed.”

  • Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 513 (1985): Establishes Absolute Liability for Failure to Provide Any Safety Devices Under Labor Law § 240(1)

    65 N.Y.2d 513 (1985)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), an owner or contractor is absolutely liable for injuries sustained by a worker when they fail to provide any safety devices at a building worksite, and this failure is the proximate cause of the injury.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases concern the liability of owners and contractors under New York Labor Law § 240(1) for failing to provide safety devices at construction sites. In Zimmer, an ironworker was injured when he fell while erecting a steel skeleton. In Hunt, an ironworker fell from a roof while welding. In both cases, no safety devices were provided. The Court of Appeals held that an owner or contractor is absolutely liable under § 240(1) when they fail to provide any safety devices, and that failure proximately causes a worker’s injuries. Evidence of industry custom or the feasibility of safety devices is irrelevant when no devices are provided at all.

    Facts

    Zimmer:

    Plaintiff, an ironworker, was injured while erecting a steel skeleton for a building addition.

    He scaled a 31-foot column to direct a crane operator.

    He lost his grip and fell, striking a beam and landing in an excavation.

    No safety devices were provided, though ladders were present but not used for his specific task.

    Hunt:

    Plaintiff, an ironworker, fell 25 feet from a flat roof while welding corrugated decking.

    No safety devices were provided.

    Defendants presented evidence of industry custom and usage, arguing safety devices were not typically used on this type of building.

    Procedural History

    Zimmer:

    The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict, and the jury found for the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Hunt:

    The trial court reserved decision on the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict and submitted the case to the jury. The jury found no cause of action. The trial court then granted the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on liability, which the Appellate Division affirmed.

    The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed the Appellate Division in Zimmer and affirmed in Hunt.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an owner or contractor is liable under Labor Law § 240(1) when they fail to provide any safety devices at a construction site, and that failure is the proximate cause of a worker’s injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors who fail to provide any safety devices to workers at a construction site when such failure proximately causes injury, irrespective of industry custom or the feasibility of such devices. The statute’s purpose is to protect workers by placing ultimate responsibility for safety on owners and contractors.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the legislative history of the Labor Law demonstrates an intent to protect workers by placing ultimate responsibility for safety on owners and contractors. The Court emphasized that § 240(1) is to be construed liberally to accomplish this purpose. The Court distinguished between violations of specific statutory provisions like § 240(1) and violations of administrative rules promulgated under § 241(6). A violation of § 240(1), which contains specific safety measures, creates absolute liability, while a violation of § 241(6) does not. In cases where no safety devices are provided, industry custom and usage are immaterial. Evidence of custom and usage is admissible under sections 200 and 241(6) to determine the standard of care in a negligence context, but not for a section 240(1) violation because this section establishes its own unvarying standard. The court quoted Quigley v Thatcher, 207 N.Y. 66, 68, stating that the statute “is one for the protection of workmen from injury and undoubtedly is to be construed as liberally as may be for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was thus framed.” The dissent argued that the statute should not impose liability when no safety devices were available or adaptable to the situation, and that proximate cause is a necessary element that is a jury question.

  • Van Gaasbeck v. Webatuck Central School District, 21 N.Y.2d 239 (1967): Establishing Absolute Liability for School Bus Drivers Violating Pupil Safety Statute

    21 N.Y.2d 239 (1967)

    Violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b), requiring school bus drivers to instruct pupils to cross in front of the bus and keep the bus halted with flashing red lights until they reach the other side, imposes absolute liability on the school district, precluding the defense of contributory negligence.

    Summary

    This case concerns the wrongful death of a 14-year-old boy struck by a car after being discharged from a school bus. The bus driver violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b) by failing to instruct the boy to cross in front of the bus and not activating the flashing red lights. The Court of Appeals held that this violation imposed absolute liability on the school district, meaning the boy’s contributory negligence was not a bar to recovery. The court reasoned the statute was designed to protect children, who are often incapable of avoiding traffic hazards, and the statute imposed a flat, unvarying duty on the bus driver. A new trial was ordered to determine proximate cause between the statutory violation and the accident.

    Facts

    Michael Van Gaasbeck, 14, was dropped off by a school bus on the east side of Route 22. The bus driver knew Michael lived on the west side of the road and would need to cross. The bus driver did not instruct Michael to cross in front of the bus, nor did she activate the bus’s flashing red signal lights. Michael and a friend walked to an intersection, and as Michael attempted to cross Route 22, he was struck by a car driven by defendant Alvin Huehnel, resulting in his death three days later.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the bus driver, the school district, and the driver of the car that struck Michael. The trial court charged the jury that violating the statute was negligence per se, allowing a contributory negligence defense, and the jury returned a verdict for all defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions regarding the school district and bus driver, holding that the violation of the statute constituted absolute liability.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b) constitutes negligence per se or gives rise to absolute liability?

    2. Whether the plaintiff’s complaint stated a cause of action based on the violation of the statute, even if it was framed as a common-law negligence claim?

    3. Whether proximate cause must be established between the violation of the statute and the accident for the school district to be held liable?

    Holding

    1. Yes, a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b) gives rise to absolute liability because the statute is designed to protect a specific class (school children) from a hazard they are incapable of avoiding.

    2. Yes, the plaintiff’s complaint was sufficient because it stated the facts making out a cause of action, regardless of whether it was explicitly labeled as a statutory violation claim.

    3. Yes, proximate cause must be established because absolute liability does not automatically equate to recovery; there must be a causal link between the statutory violation and the resulting injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the statute was designed to protect school children, a specific class inherently vulnerable to traffic hazards. The statute’s language, using the word “shall,” imposes a “flat and unvarying duty” on bus drivers. The court distinguished between statutes that define a general standard of care (negligence per se) and those that impose a specific duty for the protection of a defined class (absolute liability). The court cited Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp., stating, “Only when the statute is designed to protect a definite class from a hazard of definable orbit, which they themselves are incapable of avoiding, is it deemed to create a statutory cause of action and to impose a liability unrelated to questions of negligence.”

    Regarding the pleading issue, the court emphasized that modern pleading rules require only that the facts constituting a cause of action be stated, regardless of the label attached to the claim. The complaint’s allegations regarding the driver’s failure to follow the statute were sufficient. However, the Court also stated that the defendant that struck the child was only negligent and the child was contributorily negligent.

    The court acknowledged the need to establish proximate cause, stating, “There is no doubt that there is a question of proximate cause in this case. This question, however, is one for the jury…” This means the jury must determine whether the driver’s failure to follow the statute was a direct cause of Michael’s death.

    The dissenting opinion argued that not every statute prescribing standards of reasonable care creates absolute liability. The dissent maintained that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b) prescribes standards of care, and violations of such standards constitute negligence, not absolute liability. The dissent felt that since the action was based on tort, contributory negligence should apply.