A.E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182 (1970)

A state law prohibiting the sale of products made from endangered species is a valid exercise of police power and does not violate the Commerce Clause or Supremacy Clause, provided it does not conflict with federal law and serves a legitimate state interest like wildlife conservation.

Summary

A.E. Nettleton Co. challenged the constitutionality of New York’s Mason Law, which prohibited the sale of products made from certain endangered animal species. The company argued that the law violated the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, and deprived them of property without due process. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the law, finding that it was a valid exercise of the state’s police power to protect wildlife, and that it did not conflict with federal law. The court reasoned that wildlife conservation is a legitimate state interest, and that the law was a reasonable means of achieving that interest.

Facts

A.E. Nettleton Co. manufactured and sold men’s footwear made from alligator, crocodile, and caiman skins. New York enacted the Mason Law, prohibiting the sale of products made from certain endangered animal species after September 1, 1970. The law allowed for exceptions for zoological, educational, and scientific purposes. Nettleton sued, claiming the law was unconstitutional. Other businesses involved in the fur and reptile product industries joined the suit.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court, Onondaga County, found the Harris Law (related to endangered species) constitutional, but declared the Mason Law unconstitutional, finding it violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the New York State Constitution. The State appealed directly to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the Mason Law violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution by being pre-empted by the Federal Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969?
2. Whether the Mason Law violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution?
3. Whether the Mason Law is a valid exercise of the state’s police power?
4. Whether the Mason Law deprives the Industry of property without due process of law?

Holding

1. No, because there is no conflict between the state and federal laws, and Congress did not intend to pre-empt state action in this area.
2. No, because the Mason Act merely regulates the sale of certain products within New York State, which is permissible under the Commerce Clause, especially given Congressional authorization.
3. Yes, because wildlife conservation is within the police power, and the means employed are reasonable given the importance of protecting endangered species.
4. No, the law does not apply to legally obtained products already in the U.S. before the law’s effective date.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the Federal Endangered Species Conservation Act did not pre-empt state laws in the area of wildlife conservation. The court noted that the federal act specifically allows for the enforcement of state laws related to wildlife. The court found that the Mason Law served a legitimate state interest in protecting endangered species. The court emphasized that “[t]he police power of the State is the least limitable of all the powers of government” and extends to moral, intellectual, and spiritual needs, not just physical or material interests. Citing Barrett v. State of New York, 220 N.Y. 423 (1917), the court noted, “The eagle is preserved; not for its use but for its beauty.”

The court rejected the argument that the law was an unreasonable exercise of police power, finding that it was not unreasonable for the State to declare that banning the sale of skins from certain animals was necessary for their continued existence. The court distinguished People v. Bunis, 9 N.Y.2d 1 (1961), noting that in this case, the evil the Legislature sought to prevent was as broad as the statute itself. The court held that the Mason Law did not apply to goods already legally imported into the U.S. before the law’s effective date, to avoid being unconstitutionally confiscatory.

The dissenting judges argued that the Mason Law was an unreasonable exercise of the police power.