New York Law Review

Tag: 911 Call

  • People v. Vasquez, 88 N.Y.2d 561 (1996): Admissibility of 911 Calls as Present Sense Impressions

    88 N.Y.2d 561 (1996)

    For a statement to be admissible under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, it must be made substantially contemporaneously with the event it describes and be corroborated by independent evidence supporting the statement’s content.

    Summary

    This case consolidates three appeals concerning the admissibility of 911 calls as present sense impressions. The New York Court of Appeals clarified the requirements for this hearsay exception, emphasizing contemporaneity and corroboration. In People v. Vasquez, a 911 call reporting a shooting was deemed inadmissible due to lack of corroboration of the caller’s description. In People v. Dalton, the defendant’s 911 call after a shooting was excluded because it wasn’t contemporaneous with the event. In People v. Adkinson, a 911 call reporting a sexual assault was deemed inadmissible. The Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, stressing the need for statements to be made during or immediately after the event and supported by independent evidence to ensure reliability.

    Facts

    • People v. Vasquez: An anonymous 911 caller reported a shooting, describing a black man fleeing. A defense witness described the shooter differently.
    • People v. Dalton: The defendant called 911 after shooting the victim, claiming self-defense.
    • People v. Adkinson: A victim’s aunt called 911 after a sexual assault; the victim stated he couldn’t see the attacker’s face, contradicting his later testimony.

    Procedural History

    • People v. Vasquez: The trial court excluded the 911 call; the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    • People v. Dalton: The trial court excluded the 911 call; the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    • People v. Adkinson: The trial court excluded the 911 call; the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    • Each case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the 911 call in People v. Vasquez was admissible as a present sense impression.
    2. Whether the 911 call in People v. Dalton was admissible as a present sense impression or an excited utterance.
    3. Whether the 911 call in People v. Adkinson was admissible as a present sense impression.

    Holding

    1. No, because the content of the 911 call was not sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence.
    2. No, because the statement was not contemporaneous with the event, nor was it made under the stress of excitement.
    3. No, because the statement was not contemporaneous with the event.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the present sense impression exception requires both contemporaneity and corroboration. Contemporaneity means the statement must be made during or immediately after the event, leaving no time for reflection. Corroboration requires independent evidence supporting the substance of the statement. In Vasquez, the 911 call lacked corroboration because the caller’s description of the fleeing man differed from the defense witness’s description of the shooter. In Dalton, the defendant’s call was made after the shooting and his retreat indoors, allowing time for reflection. The court noted, “Without satisfaction of this requirement, the essential assurance of reliability—the absence of time for reflection and the reduced likelihood of faulty recollection—is negated.” In Adkinson, the victim’s statement on the 911 call was not contemporaneous with the assault. The Court distinguished present sense impressions from excited utterances, noting that the former relies on contemporaneity and corroboration, while the latter depends on the declarant’s excited state. The Court stated, “‘Excited utterances’ are the product of the declarant’s exposure to a startling or upsetting event that is sufficiently powerful to render the observer’s normal reflective processes inoperative…’Present sense impression’ declarations, in contrast, are descriptions of events made by a person who is perceiving the event as it is unfolding.”

  • People v. Tankleff, 84 N.Y.2d 992 (1994): Harmless Error and Exclusion of Exculpatory Evidence

    People v. Tankleff, 84 N.Y.2d 992 (1994)

    Exclusion of critical exculpatory evidence, particularly when concerning a justification defense, is not harmless error when it potentially influences the jury’s verdict, especially if the jury in a prior trial where the evidence was admitted was unable to reach a verdict.

    Summary

    Martin Tankleff was convicted of murder in his second trial. At the second trial, the court excluded the testimony of Tankleff’s son regarding a 911 call made during the crime, where the son reported someone had a gun. The son testified to that effect in the first trial, which ended in a hung jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding the error harmless. The dissent argued the exclusion was not harmless because the 911 call testimony was crucial to Tankleff’s justification defense (i.e., that he acted in self-defense because he believed the victim had a gun). The dissent emphasized the potential impact this evidence could have had on the jury, especially considering the prosecutor’s focus on the absence of a gun found on the victim.

    Facts

    During an altercation, Tankleff’s son, Uli, made a 911 call from inside the house. At Tankleff’s first trial, Uli testified he told the 911 operator, “I said there is somebody with a gun… There are people here. They got guns and there is going to be a problem.” At the second trial, the prosecution objected to this testimony, claiming the 911 tape was excluded as hearsay in the first trial (a misrepresentation). Other family members testified they believed the victim possessed a gun.

    Procedural History

    Tankleff was convicted of murder after a second trial; his first trial resulted in a hung jury. At the second trial, the trial court excluded Uli’s 911 call testimony, which had been admitted in the first trial. Tankleff appealed, arguing the exclusion of the 911 testimony was reversible error. The appellate division affirmed the conviction, and Tankleff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s exclusion of the 911 call testimony from the defendant’s son, Uli, regarding the presence of a gun, constitutes harmless error when the testimony was admitted in the first trial, which resulted in a hung jury, and when the defendant is asserting a justification defense.

    Holding

    No, the exclusion of the testimony was harmless error because other evidence presented at trial established the defendant’s guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority found the error harmless. The dissent argued that excluding Uli’s 911 testimony was not harmless error. The dissent reasoned the testimony was critical to Tankleff’s justification defense. The dissent emphasized that the 911 call served as objective support for the claim that the victim possessed a gun. The dissent cited People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 242, noting that if there is a “significant probability” that the error contributed to the conviction, it cannot be deemed harmless. The dissent pointed to the fact that the first trial, where the 911 testimony was admitted, resulted in a hung jury, suggesting the evidence’s potential to create reasonable doubt. The dissent also noted the prosecutor’s focus on the absence of a gun found on the victim during summation further highlighted the importance of the excluded testimony.

    The dissent also cited recent cases where the Court rejected harmless error claims involving less substantial errors, such as People v Taylor, 80 NY2d 1, 11, People v Johnson, 80 NY2d 798, 799, People v Vasquez, 76 NY2d 722, 725, and People v Newball, 76 NY2d 587, 592. The dissent concluded that the trial court’s error, contributed to by the prosecutor’s misrepresentation, likely affected the verdict, thus warranting a new trial.