Tag: 509 Sixth Avenue Corp.

  • 509 Sixth Avenue Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority, 15 N.Y.2d 48 (1964): Statute of Limitations for Underground Trespass

    509 Sixth Avenue Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority, 15 N.Y.2d 48 (1964)

    An unlawful encroachment, even if underground, constitutes a continuing trespass that gives rise to successive causes of action until title or an easement is acquired by operation of law.

    Summary

    509 Sixth Avenue Corp. sued the City of New York and the New York City Transit Authority for trespass after discovering an underground subway encroachment while excavating its property. The defendants moved to dismiss based on the three-year statute of limitations for injury to property. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding that the encroachment was a continuing trespass, not a permanent one. Therefore, each day the encroachment continued created a new cause of action, and the statute of limitations had not run on the claim. The court distinguished a permanent structure from a permanent trespass, emphasizing that New York law treats unlawful encroachments as continuous trespasses. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

    Facts

    Plaintiff owned premises at 509/511 Avenue of the Americas and 103/105 West 13th Street in Manhattan. While excavating for a 16-story apartment building in March 1960, the plaintiff discovered an underground encroachment by the Sixth Avenue Subway, completed in 1939, at a depth of approximately ten feet. The plaintiff claimed damages because it had to redesign its substructure and foundations, lost basement space, and incurred increased construction costs due to the encroachment.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City of New York and the New York City Transit Authority. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the three-year statute of limitations for injuries to real property barred the action. Special Term granted the defendants’ motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the three-year statute of limitations for injury to property applies to an underground trespass, such that the cause of action accrued when the trespass was initially committed, or whether it constitutes a continuing trespass giving rise to successive causes of action.

    Holding

    Yes, the encroachment constitutes a continuing trespass because New York law characterizes unlawful encroachments as continuous trespasses giving rise to successive causes of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that under New York law, an unlawful encroachment is considered a continuing trespass, giving rise to successive causes of action. The court distinguished its prior holding in Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., explaining that while a cause of action typically accrues upon the violation of a legal right, regardless of actual pecuniary damage, this principle does not apply to continuing trespasses. The court rejected the argument that the lack of knowledge of the trespass prevented the cause of action from accruing in 1939, stating, “Except in cases of fraud where the statute expressly provides otherwise, the statutory period of limitations begins to run from the time when liability for wrong has arisen even though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of the wrong or injury.” However, even if the trespass were considered constructive fraud, the action would still be timely under the ten-year statute of limitations for fraud actions. The court emphasized that New York law differed from the California rule, which treats permanent structures as creating permanent trespasses, giving rise to a single cause of action. The Court stated, “From the above, the New York rule is readily perceived: an encroaching structure is a continuing trespass which gives rise to successive causes of action, except where barred by acquisition of title or an easement by operation of law.” Since the case was before the court on a motion to dismiss, the possibility of acquiring title by adverse possession was not considered. The court specifically noted that it was not addressing other grounds urged for dismissal, including whether the complaint stated a cause of action against the Transit Authority.