New York Law Review

Tag: 2025

  • Fossella v. Adams, 2025 NY Slip Op 01668: Home Rule and the Power of Local Governments to Determine Voter Eligibility

    2025 NY Slip Op 01668

    The New York State Constitution limits the right to vote in elections to U.S. citizens, but local governments have broad home rule power to manage their affairs. The phrase “People” in Article IX of the Constitution, for voting purposes, includes those eligible under Article II (citizens) and the local government’s right to determine local election rules is limited by these two articles.

    Summary

    In Fossella v. Adams, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of a New York City law (Local Law 11) that allowed non-citizen lawful permanent residents and individuals authorized to work in the U.S. to vote in municipal elections. The Court held that Article II, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution, which states “Every citizen shall be entitled to vote,” restricts the right to vote in New York elections to U.S. citizens. Further, the court held that Article IX, the Home Rule provision, does not override this limitation. The Court found that the City Council could not implement Local Law 11, which expanded the electorate, absent a public referendum, and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision as modified.

    Facts

    The New York City Council passed Local Law 11 in December 2021, which allowed non-citizen lawful permanent residents and those authorized to work in the United States to vote in municipal elections. After the mayor took no action on the bill, it became effective in January 2022. Plaintiffs, including current and former elected officials and registered voters, sued to declare Local Law 11 unconstitutional, arguing it violated the New York State Constitution, the New York State Election Law, and the Municipal Home Rule Law. The trial court sided with the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division modified the judgment as to the Election Law claim and affirmed the trial court’s other decisions. The City Council and intervenors (non-citizens who would be eligible to vote under Local Law 11) appealed.

    Procedural History

    1. Trial Court: Granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, declaring Local Law 11 unconstitutional. The court held that Local Law 11 violated the New York State Constitution, the New York State Election Law, and the Municipal Home Rule Law.

    2. Appellate Division: Modified the trial court’s judgment regarding the Election Law claim but affirmed the remainder of the lower court’s ruling.

    3. Court of Appeals: Affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision as modified, holding that the New York State Constitution restricts voting rights to citizens and that Article IX did not override that restriction, and Local Law 11 could not be implemented absent a referendum.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Article II, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution limits voting to citizens?

    2. Whether Article IX of the New York State Constitution, which grants local governments home rule powers, creates an exception to the citizen-only voting requirement of Article II?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the language of Article II, Section 1, states: “Every citizen shall be entitled to vote at every election.” The court interpreted this language to restrict the right to vote to citizens.

    2. No, because Article IX expressly incorporates Article II, Section 1, which limits voting to citizens. Therefore, the home rule powers granted by Article IX do not supersede the citizenship requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    1. Article II, Section 1: The court emphasized that Article II, Section 1, clearly grants the right to vote to citizens. The court considered that Article II, Section 5, laws “for ascertaining, by proper proofs, the citizens” and Section 7, which dictates “all elections by the citizens” confirmed the limited franchise. The court rejected arguments that the term “citizen” merely provided a minimum qualification, stating that the constitutional language and historical context supported a restriction. The court looked to the history of this provision and relevant case law such as People ex rel. Smith v. Pease and Matter of Hopper v. Britt to support this view.

    2. Article IX and Home Rule: The Court held that Article IX’s incorporation of Article II’s definition of “People” as “Persons entitled to vote as provided in section one of article two of this constitution” maintained the citizen-only voting restriction. The Court found no language in Article IX that directly or indirectly permits municipalities to expand the definition of who may vote in local elections beyond citizens. The Court rejected arguments that the phrase “mean or include” in Article IX, Section 3(d) granted broader discretion. It found that this phrase did not change the fact that the term “people” was defined to align with Article II’s voting rights, which are limited to citizens.

    Practical Implications

    1. Impact on Similar Cases: The decision clarifies that in New York, only citizens may vote in elections, even those at the local level. Any local laws that attempt to grant voting rights to non-citizens are likely unconstitutional. Future cases will likely focus on the precise scope of the definition of “citizen.”

    2. Changes to Legal Practice: This ruling establishes that the home rule power of local governments is limited by the state constitution’s voting requirements. Legal practitioners advising local governments must understand that they cannot unilaterally expand the franchise beyond citizens.

    3. Business and Societal Implications: This decision reinforces the role of citizenship in the electoral process. It will likely affect the political participation of non-citizens. The decision also raises questions about how local governments can best engage with and represent the interests of non-citizen residents, and how local governments’ role will be defined. This decision ensures that, absent a state constitutional amendment, only citizens will have the right to vote in New York elections.

    4. Later Cases: While this decision is relatively recent, it will undoubtedly be cited in future cases dealing with the intersection of voting rights, home rule, and local government powers in New York. Cases regarding the definition of citizenship and the scope of “municipal elections” are probable.

  • Matter of Dourdounas v. City of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 01671: Exhaustion of CBA Grievance Procedures and Article 78 Proceedings

    2025 NY Slip Op 01671

    When a claim arises exclusively from a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a mandatory grievance process, an employee must pursue the grievance procedure, and may not bring an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the employer’s actions, unless a breach of the duty of fair representation by the union is alleged.

    Summary

    In Matter of Dourdounas v. City of New York, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the proper method for a unionized public employee to seek judicial review of a claim arising under a collective bargaining agreement. The court held that because the employee’s claim concerned a breach of contract under the CBA, and the CBA contained a mandatory grievance process, an Article 78 proceeding was improper. The employee could not bypass the CBA’s dispute resolution mechanism and bring the action directly, especially since the employee did not allege that the union breached its duty of fair representation. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Article 78 petition, clarifying the distinction between statutory claims, which can proceed under Article 78, and contract claims governed by a CBA, which require a different procedure and cause of action.

    Facts

    George Dourdounas, a high school math teacher, was assigned to the Absent Teacher Reserve (ATR) pool as per the CBA between the NYC Department of Education (DOE) and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT). The CBA allowed for a severance package for ATR teachers who retired by a certain date. Dourdounas was temporarily assigned to Bronx International High School. He requested the severance incentive, but was denied because he was considered permanently assigned to Bronx International. Dourdounas initiated a grievance process through the CBA. The grievance was denied at the school and Chancellor levels, and the UFT denied arbitration. Dourdounas then brought an Article 78 proceeding against the City.

    Procedural History

    Dourdounas initiated the grievance process under the CBA, which was denied at each step including a denial of arbitration by the UFT. Dourdounas then commenced an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, which was dismissed as time-barred. The Appellate Division affirmed, also holding the claim was time-barred. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an Article 78 proceeding is the proper mechanism for judicial review of a claim arising exclusively under a collective bargaining agreement, which has a mandatory grievance process, when the employee has exhausted the grievance procedure.
    2. Whether the statute of limitations for a claim arising under a collective bargaining agreement, and subject to a mandatory grievance process, begins to run when the employee is informed of the action, or when the grievance process is exhausted.

    Holding

    1. No, because the claim arose solely under the CBA, and the CBA included a mandatory grievance process, an Article 78 proceeding was not proper.
    2. The statute of limitations begins to run when the employee has exhausted the mandatory grievance process and is aware of the final decision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Ambach v. Board of Education, which established that when a claim arises under a CBA with a mandatory grievance process, an employee may not sue the employer directly for breach of that agreement but must proceed through the union in accordance with the contract. Only if the union fails in its duty of fair representation can the employee go beyond the agreed procedure and litigate a contract issue directly against the employer. The court emphasized that claims arising exclusively from an alleged breach of a term in a CBA must be brought through a civil action for breach of contract. The court distinguished this case from claims based on statutory or constitutional violations, which are properly brought in an Article 78 proceeding.

    The court explained that disrupting the contract’s settlement procedures threatens the union’s authority as representative and weakens the individual employee’s protection. Therefore, since Dourdounas’s claim was based solely on a contract right, and he did not allege a breach of the duty of fair representation by the UFT, the Article 78 proceeding was improper, and his claim should be dismissed.

    The court clarified that even if the claim could have been properly brought under Article 78, the Appellate Division’s application of the exhaustion rules would have been incorrect because the statute of limitations would not have begun to run until the grievance process was exhausted.

    Practical Implications

    This decision highlights several key considerations for attorneys dealing with public sector employees in New York. First, it underscores the importance of identifying the source of the legal claim. If the claim is solely based on the CBA, the employee must exhaust the CBA’s grievance process before any judicial review can be sought. Second, it clarifies that an Article 78 proceeding is not the proper mechanism for a breach of contract claim arising from a CBA with a mandatory grievance process; a breach of contract action is required. Third, to bring a claim against the employer, the employee must allege both breach of contract by the employer and breach of the duty of fair representation by the union. Fourth, the statute of limitations for a claim arising under a CBA with a mandatory grievance process starts to run once the grievance process is exhausted. This case should inform how attorneys analyze cases involving public employees and their rights under a collective bargaining agreement, as the decision makes clear the path that must be taken to pursue a legal action. Finally, it underscores that the failure to allege a breach of the duty of fair representation will result in the dismissal of the claim.

    This case, especially concerning the analysis of when the statute of limitations begins to run, distinguishes claims involving mandatory versus optional grievance processes, and its emphasis on the Ambach rule, are crucial for attorneys practicing in employment law in New York.

    The decision reinforces the importance of adhering to established procedures and the limits on individual employees’ rights when collective bargaining agreements are in place. The ruling is consistent with prior cases concerning the need for exhaustion of remedies and the scope of Article 78 proceedings.

  • People v. Moss, 2025 NY Slip Op 01673: Effect of Prior Unchallenged Conviction on Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) Risk Level

    People v. Moss, 2025 NY Slip Op 01673 (2025)

    The Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) guidelines’ override for a prior felony sex crime conviction applies if the conviction has not been vacated or overturned, even if a subsequent court finds the conviction constitutionally infirm for sentencing purposes.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the application of a SORA risk level override, mandating a presumptive risk level three classification for Dwight Moss because he had a prior felony conviction for a sex crime. Although a later court determined that Moss’s 2006 guilty plea was likely coerced and could not be used as a sentencing predicate in a subsequent case, the Court of Appeals held that the prior conviction remained valid for SORA purposes because it had not been directly vacated or overturned. The court emphasized that the SORA guidelines should be applied when a prior felony sex crime conviction exists on a defendant’s record and has not been successfully challenged through the proper legal channels.

    Facts

    Dwight Moss had a history of sex crime convictions, including a 2006 felony conviction for course of sexual conduct against a child. In 2016, he was convicted of additional sex crimes. During sentencing for the 2016 conviction, Moss argued that the 2006 conviction was unconstitutionally obtained due to coercion. The sentencing court agreed and determined the 2006 conviction could not be used as a predicate offense for sentencing in that case. However, the 2006 conviction was never vacated. Following Moss’s release from prison, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (Board) prepared a risk assessment, applying the SORA guidelines. The Board applied the override for prior felony sex crime convictions, resulting in a presumptive risk level three classification. Moss contested this determination, arguing that the 2006 conviction should not trigger the override due to the finding of coercion in his later sentencing. The SORA court upheld the override because the conviction had not been vacated or overturned.

    Procedural History

    Moss was convicted of multiple sex offenses spanning several years, including a 2006 conviction for a felony sex crime. In 2016, he was convicted of additional sex crimes, and during sentencing, argued that the 2006 conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. The sentencing court agreed and determined the 2006 conviction could not be used as a predicate offense for sentencing in that case. A SORA hearing followed, with the Board applying the SORA guidelines and the override for prior felony sex crime convictions, resulting in a presumptive risk level three classification. The SORA court upheld the override, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the SORA guidelines’ override for a prior felony sex crime conviction applies where a subsequent court determines the conviction was likely coerced and cannot be used as a sentencing predicate, but the conviction itself has not been vacated or overturned?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the SORA guidelines’ override for a prior felony sex crime conviction applies when the conviction remains on the defendant’s record, even if a court later determines it was unconstitutionally obtained for the purposes of sentencing, as long as it has not been vacated or overturned.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the purpose of SORA: to protect the public from sex offenders. The court deferred to the Board’s interpretation of the guidelines, recognizing its expertise. The court distinguished between a conviction being deemed unconstitutional in a sentencing context and a conviction being directly challenged and vacated or overturned. The court reasoned that while a subsequent court found the 2006 guilty plea constitutionally infirm and thus unusable for sentencing, Moss had never taken steps to directly challenge the 2006 conviction, therefore it remained on his record. The court emphasized the higher evidentiary burden Moss would have faced had he directly challenged the constitutionality of the 2006 conviction. Since Moss failed to pursue the proper procedural avenues to vacate the conviction, the court found no basis to depart from the guideline’s clear language mandating the override.

    Practical Implications

    This case highlights the critical importance of challenging a prior conviction directly and using the proper legal channels. Legal practitioners should advise clients to challenge all prior convictions directly, rather than collaterally, if such challenges are available and could affect a future SORA determination. When representing a client in a SORA proceeding, counsel must carefully examine the client’s prior convictions and determine whether any challenges have been made. Even if a conviction has been deemed constitutionally infirm in a subsequent case, it may still trigger SORA consequences if it has not been vacated. This ruling also underscores the need for a defendant seeking to avoid the SORA override to meet the higher evidentiary burden required to vacate or overturn a conviction. The decision also underscores the importance of the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders’ interpretation of the guidelines and their expertise in applying them.

  • Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP v. Koukis, 2025 NY Slip Op 01565: Factual Disputes Regarding Attorney Authority and Waiver of Personal Jurisdiction

    2025 NY Slip Op 01565

    When the record reveals a material factual dispute regarding an attorney’s authority to act on a client’s behalf, a court must hold a hearing to resolve the dispute before determining issues such as the validity of a waiver of personal jurisdiction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the lower court erred by deciding without a hearing whether an attorney, Mr. Santamarina, was authorized to waive a client’s (Mr. Koukis) personal jurisdiction defenses. The court found that a factual dispute existed as to whether Mr. Koukis had authorized Mr. Santamarina to represent him or subsequently ratified Mr. Santamarina’s actions, necessitating a hearing to determine the validity of the waiver. This ruling emphasizes the importance of resolving factual disputes regarding attorney authority before making legal determinations that affect a party’s rights.

    Facts

    Gibson Dunn sought to enforce a judgment against Be In, Inc., and its investors, including Mr. Koukis, who resided in Switzerland. An attorney, Mr. Santamarina, entered an appearance on behalf of Mr. Koukis and other defendants, and subsequently signed a stipulation that waived the defendants’ defenses based on personal jurisdiction and service of process. Later, Mr. Koukis claimed Mr. Santamarina lacked authority to represent him and moved to vacate the default judgment. He submitted evidence, including his own emails, to that effect. The lower courts addressed the motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding that personal jurisdiction existed pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(2). The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that there was no basis to conclude that Koukis authorized Santamarina to appear and waive all jurisdictional defenses on his behalf.

    Procedural History

    1. Gibson Dunn sued to enforce a judgment. Mr. Santamarina entered an appearance on behalf of Mr. Koukis and others.

    2. The trial court granted Gibson Dunn’s motion for a default judgment against Mr. Koukis.

    3. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court, concluding that Mr. Koukis had not authorized Mr. Santamarina to represent him and lacked personal jurisdiction.

    4. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division erred in concluding there was no basis to conclude that Koukis authorized Santamarina to appear and waive all jurisdictional defenses on his behalf without a factual hearing.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the court found that there was a material factual dispute as to whether Mr. Koukis authorized or ratified the waiver of personal jurisdiction by his attorney, Mr. Santamarina, the Court of Appeals reversed and remitted for further proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a hearing is required when the record reveals a material factual dispute. The court found that evidence, including emails, suggested Mr. Koukis may have given Joseph D’Anna apparent authority to retain Mr. Santamarina. Further, the Court noted that Mr. Koukis may have ratified Mr. Santamarina’s actions by his acquiescence and retaining the benefit of that representation. The court cited agency law principles, stating that an attorney-client relationship is subject to these laws. Specifically, an attorney needs specific authorization to “compromise or settle a claim.”

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the significance of resolving factual disputes before determining legal issues, especially those concerning attorney authority and waivers of jurisdictional defenses. Attorneys must ensure they have clear authorization from their clients, preferably in writing, for critical actions like waiving personal jurisdiction. Businesses and individuals facing lawsuits should promptly verify the authority of any attorney claiming to represent them and provide an express statement as to whether or not the attorney is authorized to represent them.

  • People v. Scott, 2025 NY Slip Op 01562: Plea Voluntariness when Sentencing Information is Erroneous

    2025 NY Slip Op 01562

    A guilty plea is involuntary if a court provides inaccurate information about a defendant’s sentencing exposure, especially when the misinformation is significantly higher than the statutorily permitted maximum.

    Summary

    Marquese Scott pleaded guilty to three counts of burglary, but the trial court repeatedly and incorrectly informed him that he faced a maximum sentence of 45 years if convicted at trial, when the statutory maximum was 20 years. The New York Court of Appeals held that Scott’s guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because the court’s misinformation about his potential sentence created an unduly coercive environment. The court emphasized that a plea must be a free and informed choice, considering the totality of the circumstances. Due to the significant disparity between the court’s stated potential sentence and the actual maximum, the plea was deemed invalid, and the case was remitted for further proceedings.

    Facts

    Marquese Scott, aged 23, was charged with three counts of burglary in the second degree. The prosecution initially indicated Scott faced up to 15 years on each count with a potential 45-year consecutive sentence. A plea deal was offered: if Scott pleaded guilty, he would be sentenced to 6 to 8 years. The court, however, misinformed Scott several times, stating he faced a maximum of 45 years if convicted. Scott pleaded guilty, stating he understood the potential 15-year sentences per count. At sentencing, the court imposed an enhanced sentence of 5 years on each count, for a total of 15 years, followed by 5 years of post-release supervision, despite the original agreement. The court’s misstatement of the maximum potential sentence was in error because Penal Law 70.30(1)(e)(i) capped Scott’s aggregate sentence at 20 years.

    Procedural History

    Scott was indicted on three counts of burglary. He subsequently appeared with counsel to discuss a plea agreement. After the trial court made several erroneous statements regarding his potential sentence, Scott pleaded guilty. He was later sentenced to an enhanced sentence. Scott appealed, claiming his plea was involuntary due to the court’s misstatements, but the Appellate Division deemed the claim unpreserved, reducing the sentence but not addressing the plea’s voluntariness. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Scott’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, given the court’s erroneous statements about his potential maximum sentence.
    2. Whether Scott was required to preserve the challenge to his guilty plea by moving to withdraw the plea or vacate the judgment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the court’s misinformation about the potential sentence created an environment where the plea was not a free and informed choice.
    2. No, because when a court provides the defendant with erroneous information concerning their maximum sentencing exposure, that is contrary to the undisputed text of the Penal Law, fails to correct its error on the record, and the defendant has no apparent reason to question the accuracy of that information, the defendant need not preserve a challenge to the voluntariness of the guilty plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that a guilty plea must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently and must represent an informed choice. This depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the agreement, the reasonableness of the bargain, and the age and experience of the accused. The court found that the trial court’s error in misinforming Scott that he faced 45 years (versus the actual 20-year maximum) rendered the plea involuntary, due to a severe misrepresentation of the risks. The court distinguished the case from People v. Williams, where the court had expressed uncertainty about the sentencing options. The court determined that the defendant did not need to preserve the issue, as the error was clear from the record.

    Practical Implications

    This case emphasizes that trial courts must accurately inform defendants about their potential sentencing exposure during plea proceedings. This case significantly reinforces the requirement for accurate information in plea bargains. Attorneys must thoroughly review the statutes to ensure accuracy, especially in cases involving multiple charges or consecutive sentencing. The case also supports the need for a thorough plea colloquy, and for the court to correct its own errors. The ruling suggests a careful review of the plea colloquy is critical, as any misstatements could invalidate a guilty plea and lead to a retrial. Moreover, this case potentially eliminates the need for a CPL 440 motion and allows a direct appeal.

  • Matter of Rosbaugh v. Town of Lodi, 2025 NY Slip Op 01406 (2025): Treble Damages Under RPAPL 861 Are Punitive and Not Recoverable Against Municipalities

    2025 NY Slip Op 01406

    Treble damages under RPAPL 861 are punitive in nature, thus unavailable in a suit against a municipality due to the state’s immunity from punitive damages.

    Summary

    The Town of Lodi, acting under the belief that trees on Rosbaugh’s property posed a hazard, hired a tree service to trim or remove them, resulting in the removal of fifty-five trees. The Rosbaughs sued, seeking treble damages under RPAPL 861. The arbitrator awarded treble damages, which was upheld by the lower courts. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that treble damages under RPAPL 861 are punitive. Because municipalities are immune from punitive damages, the award against the Town was improper. The court found that the good faith exception in the statute and the legislative history confirmed the punitive nature of the damages.

    Facts

    The Town of Lodi determined that trees on Rosbaugh’s property, bordering an unpaved road, presented a hazard. The Town hired a tree service to cut or trim the trees. Rosbaugh disagreed with the Town’s assessment, however fifty-five trees were cut or trimmed. Rosbaugh sued, seeking treble damages under RPAPL 861. The parties went to arbitration, and the arbitrator awarded damages, including treble the stumpage value of the damaged trees. Supreme Court confirmed the award, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Town appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The Rosbaughs initiated an action against the Town of Lodi seeking damages, including treble damages under RPAPL 861. The case proceeded to binding arbitration. The arbitrator awarded damages, and Supreme Court confirmed the arbitrator’s award. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals heard the case on appeal from the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether treble damages awarded under RPAPL 861 are punitive in nature.

    2. Whether punitive damages can be awarded against a municipality.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the structure and history of RPAPL 861 indicate that the treble damages authorized are intended to punish those who do not act in good faith.

    2. No, because municipalities are immune from punitive damages under established New York law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principle that the state and its political subdivisions are generally not subject to punitive damages. The court examined RPAPL 861 to determine whether the treble damages it provided were intended to be punitive. The court noted that the statute defines “stumpage value” and allows for treble damages, unless the defendant can establish by clear and convincing evidence that they acted in good faith. The court found this “good faith” provision demonstrated the punitive nature of the damages: “In contrast to compensatory damages, which are intended to redress the concrete loss that a plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct, punitive damages are essentially private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct, and deter its future occurrence.” The court reasoned that the good-faith exception indicated that the treble damages were intended to punish culpable behavior, not merely compensate for loss. The court also reviewed the statute’s legislative history, finding that the damages were intended to deter illegal timber harvesting, and the damages had historically been punitive in nature. The court cited Sharapata v. Town of Islip, reiterating that public funds should not be used for punitive damages as it does not advance the purposes of punishment and deterrence. The court reversed the lower court’s ruling, concluding that the arbitrator lacked authority to award treble damages against the Town.

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies that treble damages under RPAPL 861 cannot be recovered against municipalities. Attorneys must be aware that governmental entities are immune from punitive damages. When representing clients pursuing claims under RPAPL 861, the defendant’s status (private individual or municipality) will be critical in determining the potential remedies. This decision reinforces the importance of carefully considering the potential for punitive damages against governmental entities, as public funds are not available for these types of damages. Cases involving tree cutting or damage on public property will require thorough legal research to determine the availability of remedies against the governmental entity. This case reaffirms New York’s general prohibition against punitive damages against municipalities and sets precedent for similar statutory damage schemes.

  • People v. Willis, 2025 NY Slip Op 01405: Sufficiency of Misdemeanor Complaints in Aggravated Unlicensed Operation Cases

    2025 NY Slip Op 01405

    A misdemeanor complaint for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle is facially sufficient if it alleges facts of an evidentiary character demonstrating reasonable cause to believe the defendant knew or had reason to know their license was suspended, even without alleging direct receipt of a summons.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether misdemeanor complaints charging aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (AUO3) were facially sufficient. The Court held that the complaints, which alleged that defendants’ licenses were suspended for failing to answer traffic summonses, were sufficient even though they did not explicitly state that defendants received the summonses. The Court found the complaints’ allegations, including the DMV records and statements about summons warnings, provided reasonable cause to believe the defendants knew or should have known of their license suspensions. The defendants had waived their right to prosecution by information.

    Facts

    In two consolidated cases, police officers stopped the defendants for traffic violations and discovered, through DMV records, that their licenses were suspended multiple times for failing to answer traffic summonses. The subsequent misdemeanor complaints alleged the officers observed the defendants driving, reviewed the DMV records, and knew or had reason to know of the license suspensions based on the records, and that traffic summonses contained warnings that failure to respond would result in license suspension. Defendants waived prosecution by information, pleaded guilty to AUO3, and appealed the facial sufficiency of the complaints.

    Procedural History

    Both defendants were charged by misdemeanor complaints in the lower courts and convicted. They appealed to the Appellate Term, which affirmed the convictions, concluding the complaints were facially sufficient to establish reasonable cause. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the misdemeanor complaints were facially sufficient, even though they did not specifically allege that the defendants received the traffic summonses?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the complaints, coupled with the DMV records and other facts, provided sufficient reasonable cause to believe the defendants knew or should have known their licenses were suspended.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals explained that misdemeanor complaints require only a showing of reasonable cause, a less stringent standard than the prima facie case required for informations. The factual part of a misdemeanor complaint must allege “facts of an evidentiary character” demonstrating “reasonable cause” to believe the defendant committed the crime charged. The Court found that the complaints satisfied this standard because they provided information sufficient to put defendants on notice of the crime and to prevent double jeopardy. The Court found that the allegations provided sufficient facts for a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience to infer that at least one of the summonses was received, noting also that the defendants could assess what defenses were available.

    The Court distinguished cases involving conclusory allegations in misdemeanor complaints. The Court found that the officers’ statements about the warnings on summonses and automatic suspensions demonstrated nonconclusory bases for believing that defendants knew their licenses were suspended, providing sufficient evidence from which a person could reasonably infer defendants knew or had “reason to know that [their] license[s] . . . [were] suspended” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [1] [a]).

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that a misdemeanor complaint alleging AUO3 is sufficient if it provides facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the defendant knew or should have known of their license suspension, even without alleging direct receipt of a summons. Prosecutors should ensure complaints include sufficient detail regarding the basis for the officer’s knowledge of the suspension, such as DMV records and standard procedures. Defense attorneys can challenge complaints by arguing that the facts do not support a reasonable inference that the defendant knew or should have known of the suspension.

  • Jones v. Cattaraugus-Little Valley Central School District, 2025 NY Slip Op 01007: Waiting Period in Child Victims Act Not a Statute of Limitations or Condition Precedent

    2025 NY Slip Op 01007

    The six-month waiting period in the Child Victims Act (CVA) before commencing revived claims is neither a statute of limitations nor a condition precedent.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed a certified question from the Second Circuit regarding the nature of a six-month waiting period in the Child Victims Act (CVA). The CVA allowed previously time-barred claims of child sexual abuse to be revived but required a waiting period before those claims could be filed. The Court of Appeals held that this waiting period is not a statute of limitations because it doesn’t bar claims filed too late, but rather those filed too early, and it doesn’t further the policies behind a statute of limitations. The Court also determined that the waiting period is not a condition precedent, because the CVA revived existing causes of action, rather than creating new ones.

    Facts

    A plaintiff sued a school district for alleged sexual abuse that occurred when she was a minor. The action was filed in April 2019, several months before the CVA authorized the commencement of suits. The school district moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was premature based on the waiting period. The District Court granted the motion. The Second Circuit certified a question to the Court of Appeals regarding the nature of the CVA’s waiting period.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff initially filed suit in state court. The defendant removed the case to federal court. The District Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding the plaintiff’s claim was prematurely filed. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals, to determine whether the waiting period constituted a statute of limitations, a condition precedent, or some other affirmative defense.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the six-month waiting period for claims filed pursuant to the claim-revival provision of New York’s Child Victims Act (CVA), establishes a statute of limitations.

    2. Whether the six-month waiting period for claims filed pursuant to the claim-revival provision of New York’s Child Victims Act (CVA), establishes a condition precedent.

    3. Whether the six-month waiting period for claims filed pursuant to the claim-revival provision of New York’s Child Victims Act (CVA), establishes some other affirmative defense.

    Holding

    1. No, because a statute of limitations generally bars claims asserted too late, whereas the defendant’s assertion was that the claim was brought too early.

    2. No, because the CVA revived previously time-barred claims, not create new causes of action.

    3. The Court declined to answer, as the answer would not be determinative of the cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals considered the plain language and purpose of the CVA. The court found that the waiting period wasn’t a statute of limitations. As the court stated, “a statute of limitations is ‘[a] law that bars claims after a specified period’” and that, “[u]nsurprisingly, defendant can point us to no precedent in which a statute of limitations barred premature claims.” The court reasoned that the waiting period was implemented to give the courts time to prepare for an influx of cases and not to give a benefit to defendants.

    The court also determined that the waiting period was not a condition precedent, as the CVA did not create new causes of action, but revived existing claims. The Court referenced past precedent, stating that timely commencement is a substantive part of the cause of action where a statute creates a cause of action, but where a statute only revived a claim, it was not.

    Finally, the court determined that the answer to whether the waiting period was “some other affirmative defense” would not be “determinative of the cause,” therefore not needing an answer.

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies that the six-month waiting period in the CVA is not a statute of limitations or a condition precedent. This ruling means that premature filings under the CVA are not automatically barred. This is significant for attorneys handling cases under the CVA, as they cannot rely on a statute of limitations or condition precedent defense based on the timing of the filing. Litigants, on the other hand, may be able to overcome the procedural issues raised if the case was filed prematurely, and will have to prepare for litigation on the merits if the defendant does not have another valid defense. Later cases will likely cite this decision to determine the effect of the filing date requirements in the CVA.

  • NYP Holdings, Inc. v. New York City Police Dept., 2025 NY Slip Op 01009: Retroactive Application of FOIL Repeal and Law Enforcement Disciplinary Records

    2025 NY Slip Op 01009

    The repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a, which had exempted certain law enforcement personnel records from disclosure, applies retroactively to records created before the repeal, thereby making such records subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL).

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether law enforcement disciplinary records created before the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a, which shielded certain personnel records from public disclosure, are subject to disclosure under FOIL. The court held that the repeal had retroactive effect, thereby making pre-repeal records subject to disclosure. The decision emphasized the Legislature’s intent to enhance public trust and accountability by increasing access to police disciplinary records, concluding that this purpose would be undermined by exempting pre-repeal records. The court’s decision also weighed the remedial nature of the law and the legislative history to support the decision, which rejected the PBA’s argument that the repeal should only apply prospectively.

    Facts

    NYP Holdings, Inc., and New York Post reporter Craig McCarthy submitted FOIL requests to the NYPD seeking disciplinary records of specific police officers. The NYPD effectively denied most requests, citing that the burden of compliance would be too onerous. The Police Benevolent Association (PBA) intervened, arguing that records created before the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a were not subject to disclosure. The Supreme Court granted the Post’s petition, and the Appellate Division affirmed, determining that the repeal of section 50-a applied retroactively. The PBA appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the Post’s petition to compel disclosure, rejecting both the NYPD’s burden argument and the PBA’s retroactivity argument. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a applied retroactively to records created before the repeal. The Court of Appeals granted the PBA leave to appeal and stayed the Appellate Division’s order pending the appeal’s resolution.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a applies retroactively to law enforcement disciplinary records created before the repeal.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Court determined that the Legislature intended the repeal to have retroactive effect, making pre-repeal records subject to disclosure under FOIL.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals examined whether the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a should be applied retroactively. The court began by noting that retroactive application of statutes is not favored unless expressly required or implied by the language of the statute. It then assessed that the legislation was remedial in nature and considered other factors relevant to retroactivity, including legislative intent and the statute’s design. The court concluded that the Legislature intended the repeal to have retroactive effect, based on the plain reading and intent of the law as well as its legislative history. The court found that the amendments did not single out records for special treatment based on the date they were created. The court cited legislative history indicating the legislation’s urgent response to public demands for reform and its intent to increase public trust and accountability by allowing access to records related to police misconduct. The court noted that “remedial legislation should be given retroactive effect in order to effectuate its beneficial purpose”. The court found that the legislation was enacted in rapid response to public outcry over the killing of George Floyd by a police officer with an extensive disciplinary record. The court found that the legislative purpose could not be achieved if the pre-repeal records were not subject to FOIL.

    Practical Implications

    This decision reinforces the presumption that government records, including law enforcement disciplinary records, are accessible under FOIL unless specifically exempted. It clarifies that repeals of statutory exemptions may apply retroactively when the legislative intent supports such application. The decision influences the scope of FOIL requests and the records that must be produced, particularly in cases involving allegations of police misconduct, or in cases where a government entity has withheld documents based on now-repealed statutes. This means that media outlets and the public have greater access to disciplinary records, promoting transparency and accountability. This case highlights the importance of legislative intent and the remedial nature of statutes in determining their retroactive application. Attorneys should consider legislative history and the overall purpose of statutes when assessing whether a change in law applies to prior events.

  • People v. Santos, 2025 NY Slip Op 01008: Enforceability of Shock Incarceration Waivers in Plea Agreements

    2025 NY Slip Op 01008

    A waiver of participation in a shock incarceration program, agreed to as part of a plea bargain, is not a component of the sentence and does not render the sentence illegal, even though the waiver is noted in the uniform sentence and commitment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the legality of a plea agreement condition where a defendant waived participation in the shock incarceration program. The defendant argued the waiver was an illegal component of his sentence. The Court held that the waiver was not a component of the sentence and, therefore, did not render the sentence illegal. The Court reasoned that the waiver did not direct the Department of Corrections to impose a specific form of punishment and its impact on the sentence’s duration was speculative. The dissent argued that allowing such waivers contravened public policy favoring rehabilitation and undermined the Department’s authority.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with operating as a major trafficker. He pleaded guilty to a lesser charge as part of a plea bargain, receiving a determinate sentence and agreeing to waive enrollment in the shock incarceration program. At sentencing, he asked the court to enroll him in the program, acknowledging the waiver. The court, bound by the plea agreement, denied the request, and the defendant was sentenced according to the agreement. The uniform sentence and commitment noted the waiver.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the Supreme Court and sentenced to a determinate term and post-release supervision. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing the shock waiver was illegal. The Appellate Division affirmed. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the waiver of participation in the shock incarceration program, as a condition of a plea agreement, is an illegal component of the sentence.

    Holding

    No, because the waiver is not a component of the sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the waiver of shock incarceration was not a component of the sentence itself. The Court cited prior cases to demonstrate that sex offender certification, surcharges, and orders of protection are not part of a sentence, so a waiver of shock incarceration, which merely affected the defendant’s *eligibility* for a program that could potentially affect his time served, was not a component of the sentence either. The waiver does not dictate how the sentence should be served. It only addresses the possibility of future participation in a program and has an uncertain effect on the duration of the sentence.

    The Court also rejected the dissenting judges’ attempt to reframe the defendant’s argument, which was specifically a challenge to the legality of the sentence based on the inclusion of the waiver. The Court held that the defendant was not challenging the waiver itself, but the legality of a sentence that included a prohibition on his access to the shock incarceration program, which is not the same thing.

    The dissenting judges disagreed, arguing the shock waiver violates public policy favoring rehabilitation and contradicts the legislature’s intent to delegate decisions on shock program participation to the Department of Corrections. They contend that despite the waiver not being a component of the sentence, its validity can be challenged because it infringes on public policy, specifically the goal of reducing recidivism through rehabilitative programs. The dissent criticized the majority for failing to address this public policy concern, arguing that the waiver improperly restricts the Department’s ability to use shock incarceration, which has proven successful in lowering recidivism rates and reducing costs.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the scope of what constitutes a component of a sentence in New York. The Court distinguished between conditions that directly alter the execution of the sentence (which the waiver did not do) and other elements of a plea agreement. Attorneys should understand that a waiver of eligibility for a post-sentencing program is treated differently from a condition that directly impacts the sentence’s length or the requirements of incarceration. The Court’s reasoning suggests a broad deference to plea bargains, even if they involve stipulations that could impact a defendant’s future options. This decision implies that unless a plea agreement condition is explicitly prohibited by statute or directly affects the sentence’s nature, it is likely to be upheld. This case also illustrates the importance of clearly framing legal arguments. The Court focused on the specific claim made by the defendant about the illegality of the *sentence*, as opposed to broader challenges to the waiver itself. Finally, the dissent raises an important point about balancing the value of plea bargaining with public policy considerations; attorneys must understand the potential for challenge when a plea agreement conflicts with public policy.