New York Law Review

Tag: 2021

  • People v. Couser, 37 N.Y.3d 370 (2021): Consecutive Sentences for Robbery and Attempted Robbery; Concurrent Sentencing for Felony Murder

    People v. Couser, 37 N.Y.3d 370 (2021)

    Under New York law, consecutive sentences for robbery and attempted robbery are only permissible if the acts constituting the crimes are separate and distinct; sentencing for felony murder must run concurrently with the underlying felony.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed two consolidated appeals concerning sentencing for robbery and attempted robbery, and for attempted felony murder. In the first appeal, the court considered whether consecutive sentences were permissible where a defendant committed both a completed robbery and several attempted robberies. The court held that because the taking of the victim’s purse was not a separate and distinct act of force, the sentences for robbery and attempted robbery must run concurrently. In the second appeal, the court addressed whether the sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder could run consecutively to the sentences imposed on the underlying felonies. The court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that a concurrent sentence was required. The court rejected the People’s argument that the attempted felony murder sentence could run consecutively to the sentences imposed on the underlying felony.

    Facts

    In the first appeal, the defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and three counts of attempted robbery in the first degree. During the commission of the crimes, the defendant displayed what appeared to be a firearm and demanded money from the victims. One victim, complying with the defendant’s demands, placed her purse on the ground, which the defendant then directed his accomplice to take. The People sought consecutive sentences for the robbery and the attempted robberies, arguing that the taking of the purse constituted a separate act. In the second appeal, the defendant was also convicted of attempted first-degree felony murder. The People did not specify which underlying felony supported this charge.

    Procedural History

    The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences for the robbery and attempted robberies. The Appellate Division modified the sentence, ruling that concurrent sentences were required. In the second appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s act of taking a victim’s purse authorized consecutive sentences for robbery and attempted robbery.
    2. Whether the sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder should run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony.

    Holding

    1. No, because the taking of the purse was not a separate and distinct act, the sentences must run concurrently.
    2. Yes, a sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder must run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the first issue, the court relied on the New York Penal Law § 70.25 (2) which states that sentences imposed for multiple offenses committed through a single act or omission must run concurrently. The court also discussed the two-part test established in People v. Laureano, 87 N.Y.2d 640 (1996), determining whether consecutive sentences are permissible. The court found that the statutory elements of attempted robbery and robbery overlapped, and there was no separate and distinct act of force to warrant consecutive sentences. The taking of the purse was part of the same act of displaying a firearm to commit the robbery, and thus not a separate act. The court cited the case People v. Ramirez, 89 N.Y.2d 444 (1996) to support its conclusion that the mere taking of property, even through separate movements, did not justify consecutive sentences in this scenario. Regarding the second issue, the court held that, as a matter of law, a sentence imposed for attempted first-degree felony murder must run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony. The court cited previous case law and statutory interpretation to support this. As the People could have corrected their failure to specify the underlying felony, the defendant’s plea was deemed rational and valid. The court emphasized that “it is the acts of the defendant, and not the intent with which he or she acted, that control for consecutive sentencing purposes.”

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance for practitioners on when consecutive sentences are permissible in New York. It clarifies the requirements for separate and distinct acts in robbery and attempted robbery cases. Lawyers should be mindful that a single act of force or threat of force that accomplishes the taking of multiple items of property from different individuals, or multiple attempts to rob multiple individuals, does not permit consecutive sentences. This case also affirms the long-standing rule that sentences for felony murder and the underlying felony should run concurrently. It also underscores the importance of properly charging and specifying underlying felonies in indictments, particularly in the context of plea bargains. The failure to specify the underlying felony will result in concurrent sentences for the felony murder and underlying felony charges.

  • Matter of New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 37 N.Y.3d 195 (2021): Statute of Limitations for Constitutional Claims Against Government

    Matter of New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 37 N.Y.3d 195 (2021)

    A claim accrues for statute of limitations purposes when a party suffers a concrete and redressable injury, which, in the context of challenges to government action, typically occurs when the action directly affects the party bringing suit, not merely upon the initial governmental approval of the action.

    Summary

    This case addresses when the statute of limitations begins to run for constitutional claims challenging government contracts. The New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) sued the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCS) alleging that contracts with MCI for inmate calling services violated inmates’ and their families’ rights. The Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations began to run when the allegedly unconstitutional rates were actually charged, not when the contract was initially approved. This decision emphasizes that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff experiences a concrete injury, providing clarity on the accrual of claims against government entities.

    Facts

    DOCS entered into contracts with MCI (later Verizon) for inmate calling services. The NYCLU, representing inmates and their families, challenged these contracts, arguing that the calling rates were excessively high and unconstitutional. The NYCLU asserted these rates infringed upon the rights of inmates and their families to communicate. The Comptroller approved the DOCS-MCI contract and subsequent amendments. The NYCLU filed suit, alleging the rates were unconscionable and violated constitutional rights.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially dismissed the petition as time-barred, finding the statute of limitations began running from the Comptroller’s approval of the contract. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute of limitations began to run when the allegedly unconstitutional rates were actually charged to inmates and their families, not merely upon the contract’s approval.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statute of limitations for challenging the constitutionality of government contracts begins to run upon the contract’s approval or when the allegedly unlawful actions (e.g., excessive charges) occur.

    Holding

    No, because the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suffers a concrete injury as a result of the government action, which in this case, was the actual charging of the allegedly unconstitutional rates. The cause of action accrues when the petitioners experienced a “concrete and redressable injury.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff suffers a concrete and redressable injury. In the context of challenges to government action, this injury typically occurs when the action directly affects the party bringing suit. The Court distinguished between the initial approval of a contract and the subsequent implementation of its terms. The Court emphasized that it was the actual charging of allegedly excessive rates that caused injury to the inmates and their families, not the mere approval of the contract. The court noted the importance of avoiding a situation where constitutional claims are time-barred before the affected parties could reasonably know of their existence. As Justice Smith stated in his concurrence, "I have trouble accepting the idea that agencies can extinguish constitutional rights so easily." The decision aligns with principles of fairness and due process, ensuring that individuals have a reasonable opportunity to challenge government actions that directly harm them. This approach is particularly relevant when dealing with parties who may lack immediate access to information about government contracts. The court differentiated this case from situations involving direct challenges to the validity of a statute or regulation, where the act of enactment itself can constitute the injury. Here, the injury stemmed from the application of the contract terms. The court distinguished prior cases, explaining that the focus should be on when the actual injury occurred, not when the government action was authorized. The practical implication of this decision is that it provides a more reasonable timeframe for individuals to bring claims against government entities based on the implementation of contracts or policies.

  • People v. Robinson, 37 N.Y.3d 78 (2021): Harmless Error and Defendant’s Right to Testify

    People v. Robinson, 37 N.Y.3d 78 (2021)

    An error preventing a defendant from testifying in their own defense is not per se reversible and may be deemed harmless if the prosecution’s case is overwhelming and the defendant’s proffer of testimony is not credible.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals considered whether preventing a defendant from testifying constitutes harmless error. The Court held that while a defendant has a fundamental right to testify, the denial of that right can be deemed harmless if the prosecution’s case is overwhelming and the defendant’s proposed testimony lacks credibility. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the error was harmless in this instance because of the strength of the evidence against the defendant and the lack of a credible proffer regarding the defendant’s intended testimony.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of a crime after a trial. During the trial, the defendant sought to testify in their own defense, but an error occurred that prevented them from doing so. Specific details of the crime itself are not central to the legal issue, which concerns the denial of the right to testify and the application of the harmless error doctrine.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The conviction was appealed, arguing that the denial of the right to testify was reversible error. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding the error harmless. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the denial of a defendant’s right to testify is per se reversible error, or whether it can be subject to harmless error analysis.

    Holding

    No, because while a defendant has a fundamental right to testify, the denial of that right can be deemed harmless error if the prosecution’s case is overwhelming and the defendant’s proposed testimony lacks credibility.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the fundamental nature of the right to testify, citing previous decisions such as People v. Williams and People v. Shields. However, the Court reasoned that not all constitutional errors require automatic reversal. The Court applied the harmless error doctrine, which requires a determination of whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. Here, the Court found the prosecution’s case to be “overwhelming,” suggesting that the evidence presented was so strong that it negated any potential impact from the defendant’s absence from the witness stand. Moreover, the Court considered the lack of a “credible” proffer from the defendant, implying that the defendant failed to adequately demonstrate how their testimony would have altered the outcome of the trial. The dissent argued that preventing a defendant from telling their side of the story should never be considered harmless, as it infringes on the jury’s role. The dissent cited Holmes v. South Carolina, emphasizing a defendant’s right to present a defense. The majority, however, concluded that, based on the specific facts, the error was harmless. The court states that to hold otherwise, would allow defendants to manipulate the system and escape convictions despite overwhelming evidence against them.

  • People v. Marcos, 37 N.Y.3d 831 (2021): Appeal Dismissed Due to Deportation

    People v. Marcos, 37 N.Y.3d 831 (2021)

    An appeal may be dismissed when a defendant is unavailable to obey the mandate of the court, even if the unavailability is due to involuntary deportation, but such dismissal should be without prejudice to reinstatement of the appeal upon the defendant’s return to the court’s jurisdiction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant’s appeal without prejudice because he had been involuntarily deported and was therefore unavailable to comply with any potential court mandate. While deportation did not automatically require dismissal, the court found the situation analogous to mootness. Exercising its discretion, the Court dismissed the appeal, allowing the defendant to seek reinstatement if he returned to the court’s jurisdiction, ensuring the appeal could be properly adjudicated if the defendant became subject to the court’s power again.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of a crime and appealed the conviction. While the appeal was pending, the defendant was involuntarily deported from the United States.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after the defendant’s conviction and subsequent deportation. The Court of Appeals considered whether it could properly adjudicate the appeal given the defendant’s absence from the jurisdiction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the appeal of a defendant who has been involuntarily deported should be dismissed because the defendant is unavailable to obey the mandate of the court.

    Holding

    Yes, because although involuntary deportation does not mandate dismissal, it creates a situation analogous to mootness, and the court has discretion to dismiss the appeal without prejudice to reinstatement upon the defendant’s return to the court’s jurisdiction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the principle that criminal proceedings require the defendant to be under the court’s control, as stated in People v. Genet, 59 N.Y. 80, 81 (1874), stating that “[t]he whole theory of criminal proceedings is based upon the idea of the defendant being in the power, and under the control of the court, in his person.” Citing precedent where appeals were dismissed when a defendant absconded (People v. Smith, 44 N.Y.2d 613 (1978); People v. Parmaklidis, 38 N.Y.2d 1005 (1976)) or voluntarily left the jurisdiction (People v. Del Rio, 14 N.Y.2d 165 (1964)), the Court found that while involuntary deportation was different, the defendant’s unavailability to obey the court’s mandate presented a similar issue of mootness. The court emphasized it was exercising its discretion and dismissed the appeal without prejudice, ensuring that the defendant could seek reinstatement if he returned to the Court’s jurisdiction, aligning with the precedent set in People v. Sullivan, 28 N.Y.2d 900, 901 (1971) and People v. Sullivan, 28 N.Y.2d 992 (1971), where appeals were dismissed when the appellant was “not presently available to obey the mandate of the court in the event of an affirmance,” but reinstated upon the defendant’s return to custody. The court reasoned that this approach balanced the defendant’s right to appeal with the court’s need to have effective control over the parties before it.