New York Law Review

Tag: 2018

  • In re Estate of Hennel, 31 N.Y.3d 486 (2018): Promissory Estoppel and the Enforcement of Gratuitous Promises

    In re Estate of Hennel, 31 N.Y.3d 486 (2018)

    Promissory estoppel can be invoked to enforce a promise, even without formal consideration, if the promisee reasonably relied on the promise to their detriment, and injustice can only be avoided by enforcement.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether promissory estoppel could be used to compel an estate to satisfy a mortgage on property the deceased had promised to leave to the claimants. The deceased, Edmund Hennel, promised his stepson and stepson’s wife that he would leave them his house if they took care of him and his wife. They provided care for years, and he executed a will to that effect. However, a later will omitted this devise. The court held that the promise was enforceable under promissory estoppel because the couple reasonably relied on the promise to their detriment by providing extensive care, and injustice could only be avoided by enforcing the promise.

    Facts

    Edmund Hennel promised his stepson, Gregory Hennel, and his wife, Barbara Hennel, that he would leave them his home upon his death if they took care of him and his wife. The Hennels provided care for many years, and in 2006, Edmund executed a will that devised the property to them. In 2008, he executed a new will, which omitted the devise of the home. After Edmund died, the Hennels sought to enforce the promise and filed a claim against the estate to satisfy the mortgage on the property. The Surrogate’s Court initially found for the Hennels on both promissory estoppel and the interpretation of the will’s directive to pay “just debts.” The Appellate Division affirmed on the basis of promissory estoppel. The estate appealed.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court granted the Hennels’ claim, ruling in their favor based on promissory estoppel and the interpretation of the will. The Appellate Division affirmed, focusing on promissory estoppel. The estate appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which reversed the Appellate Division’s ruling.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be applied to enforce a promise to devise real property where the promisee provided care and support in reliance on the promise, but there was no consideration.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Hennels reasonably relied on the promise to their detriment, and injustice can only be avoided by enforcing the promise through promissory estoppel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the elements of promissory estoppel: a clear and unambiguous promise, reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the promisee, and injury sustained by the promisee because of that reliance. The court noted that the Hennels provided extensive care, and they had changed their positions in reliance on Edmund’s promise. The court found that enforcing the promise was necessary to prevent injustice. While generally, gratuitous promises are not enforceable, promissory estoppel provides an exception when there is detrimental reliance. The court directly applied the law to the facts, concluding that the Hennels’ care for Edmund and his wife, given the promise, created a situation where failing to enforce the promise would be unjust. The court emphasized that the promise was clear and the reliance was reasonable, and the injury was significant.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the applicability of promissory estoppel in situations involving promises to transfer property or provide benefits where traditional contract elements, such as consideration, may be absent. Lawyers should consider promissory estoppel when advising clients who have relied on promises to their detriment, even if those promises might not be enforceable under traditional contract principles. This decision emphasizes that courts will look closely at the fairness of the situation, and the extent to which the promisee changed their position in reliance on the promise. This case can influence how attorneys advise clients involved in estate disputes, especially those involving claims based on promises of inheritance. It also influences how attorneys will craft arguments to both enforce and defend against these types of claims. The court’s focus on preventing injustice suggests that courts will be inclined to enforce promises when significant reliance has occurred, particularly when a party has provided care or performed services in reliance on the promise.

  • New Yorkers for Students’ Educational Rights (NYSER) v. New York, 31 N.Y.3d 505 (2018): Specificity Required in Education Article Claims

    31 N.Y.3d 505 (2018)

    Claims under the New York State Constitution’s Education Article, alleging a failure to provide a sound basic education, must be pleaded with district-specific facts demonstrating a causal link between inadequate funding and educational deficiencies, not just general statewide deficiencies.

    Summary

    In this consolidated case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether plaintiffs adequately pleaded violations of the state’s Education Article. The court held that claims alleging a statewide failure to provide a sound basic education must include specific factual allegations on a district-by-district basis, showing a causal link between funding and educational outcomes. General allegations of statewide funding deficiencies or violations of prior court orders were insufficient. The court affirmed the dismissal of most claims, allowing only those with detailed, district-specific allegations, such as those pertaining to New York City and Syracuse, to proceed. This decision underscores the need for precise pleading in Education Article cases, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate how funding inadequacies affect student outcomes in particular school districts.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, including New Yorkers for Students’ Educational Rights (NYSER) and parents from New York City, sued the State of New York, alleging violations of the Education Article. They claimed the state failed to adequately fund public schools, violating the constitutional right to a sound basic education. NYSER’s complaint included causes of action related to non-compliance with prior court decisions (CFE), inadequate implementation of the 2007 Budget and Reform Act, and insufficient accountability mechanisms. The Aristy-Farer plaintiffs focused on the state’s withholding of funds due to non-compliance with the Annual Professional Performance Review (APPR) program. Both sets of plaintiffs alleged that the state’s actions led to educational deficiencies.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s orders, dismissing some causes of action but allowing others to proceed. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals considered the sufficiency of the pleadings under CPLR 3211(a)(7), focusing on whether, accepting the factual averments as true, plaintiffs could succeed on any reasonable view of the facts stated.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the NYSER plaintiffs’ first cause of action, alleging non-compliance with prior CFE decisions, stated a valid claim?

    2. Whether the NYSER plaintiffs’ second cause of action, related to the implementation of the Budget and Reform Act, stated a valid claim?

    3. Whether the NYSER plaintiffs’ third cause of action, regarding accountability mechanisms, stated a valid claim?

    4. Whether the NYSER plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action, alleging a general Education Article violation, stated a valid claim?

    5. Whether the Aristy-Farer plaintiffs’ first cause of action, concerning the withholding of APPR funds, stated a valid claim?

    Holding

    1. No, because the CFE litigation had concluded, and no current injunctive remedies applied.

    2. No, because the claim was based on the State’s alleged violation of its own funding plans, not on a constitutional violation.

    3. Yes, as to New York City and Syracuse, because the defendants did not appeal the Appellate Division’s decision on this matter.

    4. Yes, as to New York City and Syracuse, because the complaint provided sufficient district-specific allegations.

    5. No, because the Aristy-Farer complaint lacked specific factual allegations regarding educational deficiencies in New York City.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the importance of district-specific pleading in Education Article cases. Citing prior cases like Levittown, R.E.F.I.T., Paynter, and NYCLU, the court reiterated that statewide claims of inadequate funding, without linking those inadequacies to specific educational deficiencies in particular districts, were insufficient. The court found that the NYSER complaint’s first and second causes of action were based on violations of previous cases and state funding plans that did not state a present constitutional claim. The third and fourth causes of action were allowed to proceed only as they pertained to New York City and Syracuse because of the specific factual allegations of educational input and output deficiencies. The Aristy-Farer complaint was dismissed because it lacked the district-specific allegations of educational deficiencies. The court applied the standard of review for a motion to dismiss: accepting factual averments as true and determining if the plaintiffs could succeed on any reasonable view of those facts.

    “Because public schools are funded through a mixture of state and local funds, and because ‘the Education Article enshrined in the Constitution a state-local partnership in which ‘people with a community of interest and a tradition of acting together to govern themselves’ make the ‘basic decisions on funding and operating their own schools’… it cannot ordinarily be inferred that deficiencies in funding or educational services in one school district are mirrored in another.”

    Practical Implications

    This case sets a high bar for pleading Education Article violations in New York. Attorneys must ensure that complaints include detailed, district-specific factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss. General claims of statewide funding deficiencies are unlikely to succeed. The decision reinforces the need to show a causal connection between funding and educational outcomes (inputs and outputs). This impacts how future cases are analyzed and litigated, emphasizing the need for attorneys to focus on the direct impact of funding inadequacies on student performance within specific school districts. The holding also underscores that previous case outcomes (CFE) are not continuing mandates; they are resolved.

  • People v. Honghirun, 31 N.Y.3d 286 (2018): Strategic Choices by Counsel and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

    31 N.Y.3d 286 (2018)

    An ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a defendant to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant, or that the attorney did not provide meaningful representation based on the facts of the case.

    Summary

    In People v. Honghirun, the New York Court of Appeals addressed a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a child sex abuse case. The defendant argued that his attorney’s failure to object to the admission of testimony about the victim’s delayed disclosures of the abuse constituted ineffective assistance. The Court held that the attorney’s actions were part of a strategic defense, designed to portray the victim as a troubled individual and highlight inconsistencies in her statements. The Court found that the attorney provided meaningful representation, and that his strategic choices did not fall below the standards of reasonable competence, affirming the conviction.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with course of sexual conduct against a child. The victim, a member of defendant’s extended family, disclosed to a school counselor that the defendant had molested her repeatedly between the ages of 5 and 10. The defense strategy at trial was that the victim’s disclosure was a recent fabrication. The victim testified that she first told anyone about the abuse approximately three years after it stopped, and then disclosed it again four years later to a school counselor. The defense counsel did not object to the testimony of the victim’s disclosures to her friends, the school counselor and to the police.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted by a jury of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defense counsel’s failure to object to the testimony regarding the victim’s disclosures was a result of ignorance or misunderstanding of the law, therefore constituting ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defense counsel’s actions were part of a trial strategy aimed at portraying the victim as a troubled teen and to highlight inconsistencies in her statements, therefore counsel’s performance was not deficient.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the New York State Constitution. The Court reiterated that under federal law, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced by that deficiency. New York’s state standard requires “meaningful representation.” The Court determined that, here, the defendant had not met either standard because the defense counsel’s actions were strategic.

    The Court acknowledged the general rule against bolstering a witness with prior consistent statements but also noted exceptions for prompt outcry, rebutting recent fabrication charges, or explaining the investigative process. The Court found that defense counsel strategically chose to use the evidence to defendant’s advantage by exploring the substance of the disclosures. Furthermore, counsel was able to demonstrate inconsistencies in the disclosures, thereby supporting the defense’s theory. The Court emphasized that a reviewing court must avoid “confusing ‘true ineffectiveness with mere losing tactics’” and that an attorney’s efforts should not be second-guessed with the clarity of hindsight.

  • People v. Jones, 31 N.Y.3d 160 (2018): License Plate Checks and the Fourth Amendment

    People v. Jones, 31 N.Y.3d 160 (2018)

    A police officer’s check of a vehicle’s license plate against a DMV database does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, and information obtained from such a check can provide probable cause for a traffic stop, even without any initial suspicion of wrongdoing.

    Summary

    In People v. Jones, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a police officer’s action of running a license plate through a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) database constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. The court held that it does not, as drivers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information provided to the DMV concerning vehicle registration. Consequently, the information obtained from such a check, indicating a violation of the law, can provide probable cause to stop a vehicle. The case clarifies the permissible scope of license plate checks and their implications for traffic stops.

    Facts

    A police officer observed a vehicle and, without any initial suspicion of wrongdoing, entered its license plate number into a computer linked to the DMV database. The database revealed that the vehicle’s registration was suspended due to unpaid parking tickets. Based on this information, the officer stopped the vehicle. During the stop, the officer also learned that the driver’s license was suspended. The driver was then arrested for driving while intoxicated and related offenses. The defendant argued that the stop was unlawful because the license plate check was an impermissible search without probable cause.

    Procedural History

    The trial court suppressed the evidence, holding that the officer had no basis to run the license plate. The appellate court reversed, ruling that both the license plate check and the subsequent stop were lawful. The New York Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal, and ultimately affirmed the appellate court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a police officer’s action of running a vehicle’s license plate number through the DMV database constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

    2. If not a search, whether information obtained from the DMV database, indicating a suspended registration, provided the officer with probable cause to stop the vehicle.

    Holding

    1. No, because drivers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the DMV database information associated with a license plate number.

    2. Yes, because the information obtained from the database provided the officer with probable cause to stop the vehicle.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that since Katz v. United States, the existence of a privacy interest under the Fourth Amendment depends on a demonstration of a subjective expectation of privacy, and whether that expectation is reasonable. The court cited the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which requires all vehicles to have a distinctive number assigned to them by the commissioner, and a set of number plates conspicuously displayed. The court found that the purpose of vehicle registration is to facilitate identification of the owner, and that drivers have no reasonable expectation of privacy in such information. The court cited numerous federal and state court decisions, and concluded that the license plate check did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court also cited federal law regarding the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, and determined that the information obtained from the DMV database was not kept private from law enforcement. The Court concluded that the information obtained by the officer gave him valid reason to stop defendant’s car.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that police officers in New York can run license plates through the DMV database without any initial suspicion of wrongdoing. This decision provides law enforcement with a valuable tool for identifying vehicles with suspended registrations and other violations. Attorneys should advise their clients that the vehicle registration information is considered public. Subsequent cases can be expected to follow this precedent, and the decision affects how Fourth Amendment arguments are framed in traffic stop cases. This case confirms the legality of license plate checks, which impacts law enforcement’s ability to enforce vehicle and traffic laws effectively. The ruling also sets a boundary on privacy expectations for drivers, which is important in cases involving search and seizure. It also shows that the court will look at the statutory scheme in determining whether a privacy expectation is reasonable.

  • Toure v. New York City Transit Authority, 31 N.Y.3d 1075 (2018): Establishing Causation and Negligence in a Subway Accident

    Toure v. New York City Transit Authority, 31 N.Y.3d 1075 (2018)

    A plaintiff in a negligence case must establish both negligence and causation, meaning the defendant’s actions were a substantial cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Summary

    In Toure v. New York City Transit Authority, the New York Court of Appeals addressed a negligence claim arising from a subway accident. The plaintiff, under the influence of medication, fell onto subway tracks and was struck by a train. The central issues were whether the plaintiff proved that the train operator was negligent, and whether he established that the train, not a previous train, caused his injuries. The court, siding with the lower courts, found that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof on both counts, thus reversing the jury’s verdict in his favor. The decision underscored the importance of establishing both negligence and causation in tort cases.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, while under the influence of Xanax and Klonopin, fell onto the subway tracks. At least two trains passed through the station. The plaintiff claimed the second train was responsible for his injuries. The operator of the second train reported seeing white sneakers on the track. The plaintiff had no memory of the incident, but contended the second train caused his injuries due to the operator’s negligence. Evidence of bloodstains was found on the first train, but not the second. The plaintiff’s expert offered theories attempting to explain the lack of blood on the second train and the operator’s negligence.

    Procedural History

    The trial court set aside a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case, ultimately upholding the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that the second train, rather than the first, caused his injuries.

    2. Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that the operator of the second train acted negligently.

    Holding

    1. No, because the physical evidence pointed to the first train as the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, and the plaintiff’s expert’s attempt to refute the physical evidence was unconvincing.

    2. No, because the plaintiff failed to provide credible evidence that the operator of the second train had adequate time to stop the train after observing the plaintiff or the sneakers, thereby failing to demonstrate negligence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the requirement that the plaintiff establish both negligence and causation. The court found the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof regarding causation. Evidence, such as bloodstains on the first train, suggested that the first train caused the injuries. The court found the plaintiff’s expert testimony unpersuasive. The court also found no credible evidence that the operator of the second train had enough time to stop the train after seeing the plaintiff or the sneakers.

    The dissenting opinion pointed out that the physical evidence, including bloodstains, indicated the first train caused the injuries. The dissent further emphasized that the plaintiff’s expert’s theories and assumptions were not supported by the evidence, highlighting the failure to demonstrate negligence.

    The Court cited Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499 (1978), stating there was “no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences” to sustain the plaintiff’s verdict.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the importance of concrete evidence of both causation and negligence in tort cases. Attorneys must meticulously gather and present evidence linking a defendant’s actions to a plaintiff’s injuries. Expert testimony must be supported by credible evidence and logical reasoning. Furthermore, the case serves as a reminder that courts will not base their decisions on speculation or unsubstantiated assumptions. This case is a reminder of the importance of conducting thorough investigations into the cause of an accident and the need for strong evidence of causation and negligence. The decision also highlights the potential for courts to scrutinize expert testimony and to disregard opinions that lack a solid evidentiary foundation.

  • People v. Brown, 32 N.Y.3d 98 (2018): Consecutive Sentencing for Separate Acts During a Single Criminal Transaction

    People v. Brown, 32 N.Y.3d 98 (2018)

    Consecutive sentences are permissible when acts underlying different crimes, even if part of a single transaction, are separate and distinct, and not a single act that constitutes two offenses or where a single act is a material element of another offense.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether consecutive sentences were authorized for a defendant convicted of burglary and intentional murder. The court held that consecutive sentences were permissible because the acts supporting the burglary and murder convictions were separate and distinct. The evidence showed the defendant inflicted injuries on the victim upstairs before dragging her downstairs and committing the fatal stabbing, supporting the determination that the acts were not a single, inseparable act, and thus not a single punishment.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with murder and burglary after he killed his former girlfriend. He broke into the victim’s home, assaulted her upstairs, and then dragged her downstairs, stabbing her multiple times. The defendant admitted to the police that he “dragged her down the stairs and murdered her.” The victim’s blood was found both upstairs and downstairs, indicating separate acts of violence in different locations. At trial, the defendant stipulated that he caused the victim’s death. The prosecution argued that consecutive sentences were appropriate because the crimes involved separate acts.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of intentional murder and two counts of first-degree burglary. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences for the burglary and murder convictions. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions and sentences, finding that the People had established that the acts were separate and distinct. The defendant was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the actus reus of the burglary charges overlapped with the actus reus of the murder charge.

    2. Whether the acts underlying the burglary and murder convictions were separate and distinct, thereby justifying consecutive sentences.

    Holding

    1. No, because the actus reus of burglary, based on using a dangerous instrument, did not overlap with the actus reus of murder. Yes, there was some overlap between the actus reus of burglary (causing physical injury) and murder.

    2. Yes, because the People identified evidence that showed separate and distinct acts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court cited Penal Law § 70.25(2), which restricts consecutive sentencing when crimes are committed through a single act or an act that is a material element of another offense. The court found that the actus reus of burglary, where the dangerous instrument was used, did not overlap with the actus reus of murder. However, it acknowledged an overlap between the murder and the burglary charge of causing physical injury. The court then emphasized that even if the actus reus elements overlap, consecutive sentences are permissible if the acts are separate and distinct. The court determined that the evidence supported the finding of separate acts: the infliction of injuries upstairs and the fatal stabbing downstairs. The court stated that the People met their burden by pointing to evidence in the record that the offenses involved separate and distinct acts.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance for prosecutors and defense attorneys on when consecutive sentences are appropriate in New York. The decision emphasizes that even within a single criminal transaction, separate and distinct acts can justify consecutive sentences. Lawyers must carefully analyze the evidence to determine if the acts supporting each charge can be separated. This case underscores that, even if crimes arise from a single criminal event, if there are discrete acts that cause different injuries or involve different elements of the crimes, consecutive sentences may be imposed. Attorneys should focus on identifying whether the acts underlying the convictions are separable and distinct, and be prepared to present evidence supporting their arguments.

  • People v. Canady, People v. Brown, People v. Young, 31 N.Y.3d 403 (2018): Speedy Trial and the ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ Exception

    31 N.Y.3d 403 (2018)

    When the prosecution declares readiness for trial and later becomes unready, the time between declarations is chargeable against the prosecution under CPL 30.30 unless the unreadiness is due to an ‘exceptional fact or circumstance’ with due diligence by the prosecution.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the application of Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 30.30, the speedy trial statute. The court considered how to calculate the time chargeable to the prosecution when it initially declares readiness for trial but later indicates it is not ready. The court held that time is chargeable unless the prosecution’s unreadiness stems from an exceptional fact or circumstance, as defined in the statute, and the prosecution exercised due diligence. The case clarifies the burden of proof and the standard for determining when delays are attributable to the prosecution, and also reinforces the significance of prosecutorial readiness.

    Facts

    The cases involved defendants who moved to dismiss indictments based on violations of CPL 30.30. The prosecutions had initially declared readiness for trial but subsequently indicated they were not ready. The specific facts regarding the reasons for the prosecution’s change in readiness varied across the cases.

    Procedural History

    The cases originated in trial courts, with defendants filing motions to dismiss due to speedy trial violations. The trial courts reached different conclusions on whether to grant the motions. Some cases proceeded to the appellate level, with the Appellate Term reversing or affirming lower court decisions. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the cases to resolve the legal questions regarding CPL 30.30 and the speedy trial calculations.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the time between the prosecution’s declaration of readiness for trial and a subsequent declaration of unreadiness is chargeable to the prosecution under CPL 30.30.

    2. If the time is chargeable, what standard should courts apply to determine whether the prosecution’s unreadiness is excused due to exceptional circumstances?

    Holding

    1. Yes, the time between the declaration of readiness and the subsequent declaration of unreadiness is chargeable to the prosecution.

    2. The prosecution’s unreadiness is excused if it is due to ‘some exceptional fact or circumstance,’ provided the prosecution exercised due diligence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court examined CPL 30.30 and its purpose: to ensure a speedy trial. The court emphasized that the prosecution must be ready for trial. The court referenced earlier cases establishing that a declaration of readiness must reflect present readiness and not merely future expectation. The court referenced CPL 30.30(3)(b), which provides an exception if the present unreadiness is due to an ‘exceptional fact or circumstance’.

    The majority held that, after a declaration of readiness, the burden shifts to the prosecution to demonstrate that the time should be excluded, because their present unreadiness is due to “some exceptional fact or circumstance” and that the prosecution exercised due diligence. The court acknowledged the legislative intent behind CPL 30.30 to reduce delays and ensure the prompt resolution of criminal cases. The court also emphasized the importance of maintaining the burden on the defendant to establish the initial speedy trial violation.

    Dissenting Judge Rivera argued that the majority’s interpretation would undermine the intent of CPL 30.30. The dissenting judge stated that the court should adopt the view that the People must demonstrate that “some exceptional fact or circumstance arose after their declaration of readiness so as to render them presently not ready for trial.”

    Practical Implications

    This ruling requires prosecutors to maintain a good faith readiness for trial. Prosecutors must be prepared to explain why they are not ready if they change their position. This case reinforces that prosecutors must act with diligence to secure evidence or prepare for trial. When evaluating a speedy trial claim, the court must determine the extent of any delay. The decision clarifies that the period between a statement of readiness and a subsequent statement of unreadiness must be charged against the prosecution unless there is a valid justification, such as the exceptional circumstances that were beyond the control of the prosecution.

    This case highlights that the prosecutors must be able to demonstrate that they exercised due diligence and that their unreadiness resulted from an exceptional fact or circumstance. This decision should influence how courts analyze similar cases. It clarifies the burden-shifting framework and emphasizes the importance of prosecutorial accountability in ensuring speedy trials.

  • Ace Fire Underwriters Ins. Co. v. New York State Special Disability Fund, 31 N.Y.3d 1014 (2018): Workers’ Compensation Carrier’s Right to Reimbursement from Special Disability Fund After Third-Party Settlement

    31 N.Y.3d 1014 (2018)

    A workers’ compensation carrier may seek nunc pro tunc approval from a court to a third-party settlement, even if the Special Disability Fund’s consent was not initially obtained, provided the Fund’s consent is required under Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (1).

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a workers’ compensation carrier, Ace Fire Underwriters Insurance Company, could retroactively obtain the Special Disability Fund’s consent to a third-party settlement under Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5). The employee sustained a work-related injury, and the Special Disability Fund was responsible for reimbursing the carrier for benefits after a certain period due to the employee’s pre-existing condition. The carrier approved the employee’s third-party personal injury settlement without the Special Disability Fund’s prior written consent. The Court of Appeals held that the carrier could seek court approval nunc pro tunc because Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5) allows court approval for settlements even if the required consent of the lienor was not initially obtained, aligning the carrier’s actions with the statute’s intent.

    Facts

    An employee of Coca-Cola Bottling Company suffered a work-related injury in March 2007. Ace Fire Underwriters Insurance Company, Coca-Cola’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, paid benefits to the injured employee. The employee was classified as having a permanent partial disability. Due to a pre-existing condition, the Workers’ Compensation Board held that the claim was subject to Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (8), and the Special Disability Fund was responsible for reimbursement after a certain period. The employee also initiated a third-party personal injury action, subject to Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (1). Ace Fire approved the settlement of the third-party action. However, Ace Fire did not seek the Special Disability Fund’s written approval before the settlement.

    Procedural History

    The Workers’ Compensation Board determined the employee’s benefits were reimbursable by the Special Disability Fund. The employee filed a third-party personal injury action. Ace Fire approved the settlement of the third-party action. Ace Fire sought retroactive consent from the Special Disability Fund, which was denied. Ace Fire commenced a proceeding in Supreme Court, seeking to compel the Special Disability Fund’s consent nunc pro tunc. The Appellate Division’s order was reversed, and the matter was remitted to Supreme Court.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a workers’ compensation carrier can obtain court approval nunc pro tunc under Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5) to a third-party settlement if the carrier did not obtain the prior consent of the Special Disability Fund, assuming the Fund is a lienor.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5) permits a carrier to seek nunc pro tunc approval for a third-party settlement, even without prior consent from a lienor, aligning with the statute’s provisions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the principle of statutory interpretation that a statute should be construed as a whole, and that the various sections should be considered together and with reference to each other. The court noted that the language in Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (1), establishing who may be deemed lienors, is essentially identical to the language in § 29 (5), which refers to entities whose consent to settlement is required. The court reasoned that there was no basis to distinguish the Special Disability Fund, as it is subject to the same rules as other lienors and that the failure to obtain the Fund’s consent can be cured by court order. The court emphasized that the legislature intended for employers to be encouraged to hire disabled employees, and the Special Disability Fund’s purpose is connected to this goal. The court highlighted, “We have repeatedly recognized ‘that a statute . . . must be construed as a whole and that its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each other.’”

    Practical Implications

    This ruling clarifies that workers’ compensation carriers, when settling third-party claims, have a potential remedy if they fail to obtain the Special Disability Fund’s consent initially. This allows the carrier to seek court approval after the fact to protect their right to reimbursement from the Fund. This reduces the risk for carriers by providing a mechanism to cure procedural errors and recover funds. The decision reinforces the importance of complying with all requirements under Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 and highlights the need for workers’ compensation carriers to consider the interplay between the various provisions of the law when settling third-party actions. Failure to adhere to procedures could impact the recovery of funds. Furthermore, this case impacts how the Special Disability Fund will handle these situations in the future.

  • People v. Henry, 31 N.Y.3d 273 (2018): Admissibility of Prior Conduct Evidence in Child Sexual Abuse Cases

    31 N.Y.3d 273 (2018)

    In child sexual abuse cases, evidence of a defendant’s prior consensual sexual conduct with adults, if it demonstrates a unique pattern of behavior mirroring the alleged abuse, may be admissible to corroborate a victim’s testimony, provided its probative value outweighs its potential for prejudice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of evidence concerning a defendant’s prior sexual conduct in a child sexual abuse case. The court held that evidence of the defendant engaging in oral sex with consenting adults in a manner similar to the alleged abuse of the children was properly admitted to corroborate the victims’ testimony. The court distinguished this evidence from inadmissible propensity evidence, emphasizing its relevance in demonstrating a distinctive pattern. The court further affirmed the trial court’s discretion in balancing the probative value of the evidence against potential prejudice to the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with sexually abusing two minor sisters. The girls described being forced by the defendant to perform oral sex while he smoked crack cocaine with his shirt over his head. The prosecution sought to introduce evidence that the defendant engaged in the same sexual acts with the girls’ mother and another adult woman. The trial court admitted the evidence of the defendant’s similar sexual conduct with adults. The defendant was found guilty by the jury.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence of the defendant’s prior consensual sexual conduct with adults was properly admitted, despite the defendant’s argument that it was impermissible propensity evidence.

    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for prejudice.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence was not considered propensity evidence and was relevant to corroborating the victims’ testimony.

    2. No, because the trial court properly balanced the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual conduct with adult women was not “propensity” evidence because it did not show a propensity to commit the crimes charged, but instead demonstrated a unique, corroborating pattern of behavior. The court stated that the defendant engaging in oral sex with consenting adult women in the same manner as the alleged abuse of the victims, while smoking crack, showed no propensity to commit the crimes for which he was on trial. The court emphasized that the evidence corroborated the girls’ accounts of their abuse. The Court further noted that the trial court’s admission of the evidence was proper since it was relevant and probative to the People’s case. The Court also found that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the prejudice. The court recognized that almost all relevant evidence is prejudicial to some degree. The Court referenced the trial court’s broad discretion in determining evidentiary matters and the high threshold for overturning such decisions.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance to prosecutors and defense attorneys regarding the admissibility of prior conduct evidence in child sexual abuse cases. It establishes that evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual conduct with adults, similar to the alleged abuse, can be admissible if it corroborates the victim’s testimony and demonstrates a unique pattern, provided the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for prejudice. Attorneys should consider the specific facts of the case and the need for corroboration when arguing for or against the admissibility of such evidence. This case underscores the importance of a detailed evidentiary analysis. The ruling requires that the court’s decision to admit such evidence be made with care.

  • Matter of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 32 N.Y.3d 1 (2018): Redefining “Parent” for Custody and Visitation Rights

    32 N.Y.3d 1 (2018)

    A non-biological, non-adoptive partner has standing to seek visitation and custody under Domestic Relations Law § 70 if they can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed to conceive a child and raise the child together.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals overruled its prior decision in Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., which held that only biological or adoptive parents had standing to seek custody or visitation rights. The court consolidated two cases, Matter of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C. and Matter of Estrellita A. v. Jennifer L.D., where same-sex partners sought custody or visitation of children to whom they were not biologically related. The Court of Appeals held that the definition of “parent” in Domestic Relations Law § 70 should be expanded. Now a non-biological or non-adoptive parent can obtain standing if they can prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of an agreement with the biological parent to conceive and raise a child as co-parents.

    Facts

    Matter of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.: The parties, a same-sex couple, jointly decided to have a child. The respondent became pregnant through artificial insemination. The petitioner was actively involved during the pregnancy, birth, and subsequent upbringing of the child. After the relationship ended, the respondent terminated the petitioner’s contact with the child. The petitioner sought joint custody and visitation. The Family Court dismissed the petition, citing Alison D.

    Matter of Estrellita A. v. Jennifer L.D.: The parties, a same-sex couple, agreed to have a child. The respondent bore the child through artificial insemination. The petitioner participated actively in the child’s life. After the relationship ended, the petitioner sought visitation. The respondent initially obtained child support from the petitioner, arguing that the petitioner was a parent. Then, the respondent moved to dismiss the visitation petition, citing Alison D. The Family Court denied the motion, applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel based on the prior child support determination.

    Procedural History

    Brooke S.B.: The Family Court dismissed the petition for lack of standing, relying on Alison D. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Estrellita A.: The Family Court denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss, finding judicial estoppel. The Appellate Division affirmed, also finding judicial estoppel. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a non-biological, non-adoptive parent has standing to seek custody or visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 70.

    2. Whether the ruling in Alison D. should be overruled.

    Holding

    1. Yes, a non-biological, non-adoptive parent can obtain standing if there was a pre-conception agreement to conceive and raise the child as co-parents.

    2. Yes, the court overruled Alison D.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that its prior decision in Alison D., which limited standing to biological or adoptive parents, was no longer workable due to evolving family structures and legal recognition of same-sex relationships. The court cited the need to consider the best interests of the child, who could suffer from being separated from a primary attachment figure, and the inequity created by Alison D., especially in light of the enactment of same-sex marriage. The Court emphasized the historic use of equity powers. The Court reasoned that the narrow definition of “parent” in Alison D. was inconsistent with the state’s broader equitable powers to ensure that custody and visitation matters served the best interests of the child. The court found that Alison D.’s “bright-line” rule had led to unfair outcomes for children in non-traditional families. The court also held that the right to marry provides benefits not only for same-sex couples, but also the children being raised by those couples.

    The Court held that a non-biological, non-adoptive parent may obtain standing to petition for custody or visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 70 (a) if they prove by clear and convincing evidence an agreement with the biological parent to conceive and raise the child as co-parents. This is a “narrow” and carefully constructed approach. The court declined to adopt a functional test for all situations.

    Practical Implications

    Attorneys handling custody and visitation cases should now assess whether the parties had a pre-conception agreement to conceive and raise the child. This case broadens the class of individuals who can seek custody or visitation, particularly in same-sex and unmarried couple situations. Legal practice in this area must now consider these factors, in determining standing under Domestic Relations Law § 70. The real-world impact of this decision is to make access to courts more equitable and to provide increased stability and potential parental figures to children.

    This ruling creates a significant shift in the approach to standing in custody and visitation cases and underscores the importance of pre-conception planning and agreements for prospective parents.