New York Law Review

Tag: 2017

  • People v. Price, 29 N.Y.3d 403 (2017): Authenticating Social Media Evidence in Criminal Trials

    People v. Price, 29 N.Y.3d 403 (2017)

    To authenticate evidence from a social media profile, the proponent must show both that the printout is an accurate depiction of the website content and that the website is attributable to the defendant; mere appearance of the defendant’s name and picture on the profile is insufficient.

    Summary

    In People v. Price, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained from a social media website, specifically a photograph allegedly depicting the defendant with a firearm. The court held that the prosecution failed to properly authenticate the photograph because it did not establish a sufficient link between the defendant and the social media account from which the photo was obtained. The court emphasized that for such evidence to be admissible, the prosecution must not only prove that the printout accurately represents the online content but also demonstrate that the account belongs to, and is controlled by, the defendant. Without this connection, the photograph lacks the necessary foundation of authenticity and is inadmissible.

    Facts

    The defendant, Chris Price, was convicted of robbery. At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce a photograph purportedly showing Price holding a handgun. The photograph was obtained from a public profile on the social media website BlackPlanet.com. A detective testified that she found the profile by searching Price’s surname. The profile used the username “Price_OneofKind” and displayed several photographs of Price. The victim identified the gun in the photograph as “similar” to the one used in the robbery. However, the prosecution presented no evidence to show that Price created or controlled the profile.

    Procedural History

    Price objected to the admission of the photograph, arguing a lack of authentication. The trial court admitted the photograph over objection. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the prosecution laid a proper foundation for the photograph’s admission. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to authenticate a photograph obtained from an internet profile page as a fair and accurate representation of the defendant holding a gun.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence was insufficient to establish that the website belonged to and was controlled by the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that the prosecution failed to adequately authenticate the photograph. The court reiterated the importance of authentication, requiring proof that the evidence is genuine and has not been tampered with. The court noted that in the case of photographs, authentication usually requires testimony that the photograph accurately represents the subject matter depicted. The court acknowledged that authentication methods may vary. Specifically, the court addressed whether a photograph found on social media could be authenticated. Assuming this was possible with proof that the website was attributable to the defendant, the court found the evidence presented – merely the appearance of the defendant’s surname and picture on the profile page – was insufficient. The court explained that the prosecution provided no evidence Price was aware of or exercised control over the profile.

    The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the photograph was sufficiently authenticated by the detective’s testimony about the profile page and the accuracy of the printout, combined with the indicia suggesting that the profile belonged to defendant. The court cited cases from other jurisdictions that have adopted a two-pronged analysis for authenticating evidence from internet profiles: proof of an accurate printout and proof that the website is attributable to the defendant. However, the New York court found the second prong, the link to the defendant, was absent here.

    The concurring opinion by Judge Rivera further emphasized the need for authentication. Judge Rivera clarified that the People’s proof needed to overcome two levels of authentication, demonstrating not only the accuracy of the printout but also that the web page belonged to Price. She agreed that the appearance of Price’s name and picture alone did not establish this link. Without evidence the defendant exercised dominion or control, the photograph was not properly authenticated.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides important guidance for attorneys regarding the authentication of social media evidence. It establishes that, at a minimum, more than the mere appearance of a defendant’s identifying information on a social media profile is required for authentication. Prosecutors and civil litigators must provide stronger evidence demonstrating the defendant’s link to the account. This might include evidence of the defendant’s communications through the account, use of electronic devices associated with the account, or other indicia of control. This case impacts:

    • How similar cases should be analyzed: Authentication of social media evidence requires careful attention to establishing the defendant’s control over the social media account.
    • Changes to legal practice in this area: Attorneys must anticipate needing to present evidence of ownership or control, not just content matching, to authenticate social media materials.
    • Business or societal implications: As social media use grows, this case impacts evidence presentation in an increasingly large number of legal contexts.
    • Later cases that have applied or distinguished this ruling: Other courts will likely use this case to establish a baseline for authentication standards.

  • People v. Frumusa, 29 N.Y.3d 364 (2017): Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Conduct Regarding the Same Crime

    29 N.Y.3d 364 (2017)

    Evidence related to the same crime for which the defendant is on trial is not considered "Molineux" evidence and is admissible if relevant, unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.

    Summary

    In People v. Frumusa, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of a civil contempt order in a criminal larceny case. The defendant was accused of stealing from his hotel business, WHD. The court considered whether the contempt order, which involved the same funds as the larceny charge, constituted inadmissible Molineux evidence (evidence of prior bad acts) and whether its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. The court held that the contempt order was not Molineux evidence because it related to the same crime charged and was relevant to the defendant’s intent to deprive WHD of its funds. The court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the order, emphasizing that the defendant’s actions in defiance of the order supported the inference of larcenous intent.

    Facts

    Defendant Frumusa and a partner formed Webster Hospitality Development LLC (WHD) to operate a hotel. Hernandez invested $1 million for a 25% ownership stake. Frumusa controlled 75% and managed the hotel. After encountering financial troubles, Hernandez discovered Frumusa diverted hotel proceeds into accounts for his other businesses. She initiated a civil suit. Frumusa was then indicted for grand larceny. The People alleged that Frumusa stole approximately $300,000 from WHD by diverting funds to his other businesses. A civil court appointed a receiver who prohibited Frumusa from managing WHD assets. A contempt order was issued against Frumusa’s businesses for failing to comply with a court order to return WHD funds to WHD. Frumusa did not dispute transferring funds but claimed he lacked larcenous intent. The trial court admitted the contempt order into evidence over the defendant’s objection. The jury found Frumusa guilty.

    Procedural History

    Frumusa was convicted of grand larceny in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding the contempt order was relevant to intent. The dissent argued the order should have been excluded. The defendant was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred by admitting the civil contempt order as Molineux evidence.

    2. Whether, even if not considered Molineux evidence, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the contempt order.

    Holding

    1. No, because the contempt order involved the same funds and conduct as the larceny charge, it did not constitute Molineux evidence.

    2. No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion; the probative value of the contempt order was not substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals clarified that the Molineux rule applies to evidence of a defendant’s separate crimes or bad acts, designed to show a propensity to commit the charged crime. “Molineux analysis is limited to the introduction of a prior uncharged crime or a prior bad act.” Since the contempt order involved the same funds and conduct as the larceny charge, the court reasoned that it was not Molineux evidence, and therefore, the court applied general evidentiary principles of relevance and prejudice. The court found the contempt order relevant to prove Frumusa’s intent to deprive WHD permanently of the funds (an element of the larceny charge). Evidence is relevant if it makes the determination of an action more probable or less probable. Frumusa’s refusal to return the funds, despite the court order, was probative of his intent. The court then addressed the balancing test, noting that the trial court could exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. However, the court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court because the contempt order’s relevance to intent outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice. “Plainly, almost all relevant, probative evidence the People seek to admit in a trial against a defendant will be, in a sense, prejudicial.”

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the distinction between evidence of a defendant’s propensity for crime (barred by Molineux) and evidence related to the charged crime itself. Attorneys must carefully distinguish between “bad acts” evidence and evidence directly relating to the elements of the crime at issue. Evidence concerning the same funds or transactions as the alleged crime will likely be admissible if relevant to proving an element of the crime, such as intent. Furthermore, the case emphasizes the trial court’s discretion in balancing probative value and prejudice. Attorneys should be prepared to argue both the relevance and the potential prejudice of evidence, and should consider requesting limiting instructions to minimize any prejudice to the defendant. The court also indicated that the failure to request a limiting instruction may impact appellate review of a claim of undue prejudice. This case impacts the way attorneys strategize the introduction and objection to evidence in a trial and is instructive for determining whether to bring a Molineux motion, as such motions may not be applicable when the conduct involves the same crime being charged.

  • Matter of City of New York v. New York State Nurses Association, 29 N.Y.3d 486 (2017): Information Rights in Collective Bargaining and Grievance Procedures

    29 N.Y.3d 486 (2017)

    A public employer must provide a union with data normally maintained in the regular course of business, reasonably available and necessary for the administration of the parties’ agreements, including the processing of grievances, which encompasses disciplinary actions when the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) defines grievances to include disciplinary actions.

    Summary

    The New York State Nurses Association (NYSNA) sought information from the City of New York’s Human Resources Administration (HRA) to represent two nurses in disciplinary proceedings. The City refused, leading NYSNA to file an improper practice petition. The Board of Collective Bargaining (Board) found the City’s refusal improper, citing NYCCBL § 12-306(c)(4). The City challenged this decision, but the Appellate Division affirmed, finding the Board’s decision rational. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that because the CBA defined “grievance” to include disciplinary actions, the City was obligated to provide the requested information, which included data normally maintained in the regular course of business. The dissent argued that the statute, focused on good faith bargaining, did not extend to information requests for disciplinary proceedings and that the information requests were not necessary for the collective bargaining process.

    Facts

    Two nurses, members of NYSNA, employed by the City’s Human Resources Administration (HRA), faced disciplinary charges for falsifying time records. HRA sent notices outlining the disciplinary process, including a Step 1 conference and a Step 2 Grievance Hearing. NYSNA requested information from HRA, including policies, records, and witness statements, to represent the nurses. The City refused. NYSNA filed an improper practice petition with the Board of Collective Bargaining, alleging a violation of NYCCBL § 12-306(a)(1) and (4). The Board ruled in favor of NYSNA, which the City then challenged in court.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Collective Bargaining found that the City’s refusal to provide information was an improper practice. The City initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, which granted the City’s petition and annulled the Board’s determination. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court, holding that the Board’s decision was rational and granting the City leave to appeal on a certified question. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether NYCCBL § 12-306(c)(4) requires the City to provide information to NYSNA for disciplinary proceedings against its members.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the CBA defined grievance to include disciplinary action, and the information requested was data normally maintained in the regular course of business, necessary for grievance processing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court considered the language of NYCCBL § 12-306, which requires employers to provide data reasonably necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation. The court noted that the CBA defined “grievance” to include disciplinary actions, incorporating the information requirements applicable to grievances. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Pfau v. Public Employment Relations Board, which did not have the same contractual framework. The court held that the City’s arguments regarding the expedited timeline of disciplinary proceedings were unpersuasive, especially since other agencies followed the same process.

    Practical Implications

    This ruling clarifies that the duty to provide information in collective bargaining extends to disciplinary proceedings when the CBA defines disciplinary actions as grievances. Legal practitioners representing unions should review CBAs to identify the scope of “grievance” definitions. This decision reinforces the importance of clear contract language in defining the scope of information rights. Public employers must be prepared to provide relevant information during disciplinary proceedings. This case underscores that access to information is a crucial aspect of union representation and contract administration. Subsequent cases involving information requests related to disciplinary actions will likely cite this case as precedent.

  • Wilson v. Dantas, No. 62 (N.Y. 2017): Enforceability of Agreements and Fiduciary Duty in Shareholder Disputes

    Wilson v. Dantas, No. 62 (N.Y. June 6, 2017)

    A court will not enforce an agreement or modify an existing contract, in the absence of a signed writing that unambiguously reflects an intent to vary the terms.

    Summary

    In Wilson v. Dantas, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the enforceability of various agreements and claims in a shareholder dispute involving a Cayman Islands investment fund. The court considered whether a letter of employment could form a binding contract, whether a promise to share in settlement proceeds modified a shareholders’ agreement, and the extent of fiduciary duties owed between shareholders. The Court of Appeals dismissed most of the plaintiff’s claims, finding that agreements had been superseded or were unenforceable. The Court also clarified the standards for establishing a fiduciary duty, particularly under Cayman Islands law where the fund was formed.

    Facts

    Robert Wilson, III, formerly employed by Citibank, devised an investment strategy for Brazil. In 1997, Wilson, Daniel Dantas, and Citibank agreed to form a Cayman Islands entity, Opportunity Equity Partners, Ltd. (OEP). Wilson, who was to move to Brazil to assist with management, sent Dantas a letter specifying his terms of employment, including 5% of the carried interest generated by the funds. Neither Dantas nor OEP signed the letter. Later, the seven shareholders of OEP, including Wilson, entered into a Shareholders’ Agreement. Wilson alleged that Dantas promised to use settlement proceeds from a 2008 settlement of litigation between Citibank, Dantas, and OEP to pay Wilson his carried interest. After the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal, Wilson amended his complaint to eliminate the personal jurisdiction defects raised. Wilson then brought claims against Dantas and related entities, alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and fraudulent concealment.

    Procedural History

    Wilson initially sued in federal court, but the case was dismissed for lack of diversity jurisdiction. He then filed in state court. The state Supreme Court dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Appellate Division reversed, conferred personal jurisdiction, and, at the same time, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as to three of the nine causes of action, denying it as to the other six. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision based on questions of law arising from the motions to dismiss.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the alleged 1997 letter agreement, unsigned by Dantas, constituted a binding contract.
    2. Whether the oral promise by Dantas to use proceeds from the 2008 settlement to pay Wilson’s carried interest modified the Shareholders’ Agreement.
    3. Whether Wilson’s seventh cause of action stated a claim for breach of contract under the Partnership Agreement.
    4. Whether Wilson had stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

    Holding

    1. No, because the letter was not signed by the party to be charged, and it was superseded by the subsequent Shareholders’ Agreement.
    2. No, because the Shareholders’ Agreement contained a provision requiring written modifications, and because it contained a merger clause.
    3. No, because Wilson was not a party to the Partnership Agreement.
    4. Yes, to the extent that Wilson’s first cause of action seeks to recover payments owed to Wilson arising from his status as an OEP shareholder, predicated on a theory that defendants, as directors and officers of OEP treated him unfavorably when compared to other shareholders

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied New York law, and, in some instances, Cayman Islands law, in analyzing the contract claims. The court stated that “before one may secure redress in our courts because another has failed to honor a promise, it must appear that the promisee assented to the obligation in question.” Because Dantas and OEP did not sign the letter, there was no binding contract. The court further held that the Shareholders’ Agreement, by its terms, superseded any prior agreements. The court emphasized the importance of written agreements and held that oral modifications to the Shareholder Agreement were unenforceable due to its written modification requirements. For the breach of fiduciary duty, the court found that, under the Shareholder Agreement, Cayman Islands law applied. The Court held that, under Cayman law, there was no fiduciary duty owed between shareholders. However, to the extent that it could be alleged that the officers and directors of the company, in settling claims, treated Wilson, a minority shareholder, unfairly compared to other shareholders, Wilson stated a claim. In the dissent, the court found that there should be a dismissal of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, as the issues on appeal were rendered academic by plaintiff’s subsequent amendment of his complaint.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores several important points for attorneys and parties involved in business disputes:

    • Importance of Written Agreements: The court’s emphasis on written agreements highlights the need for parties to ensure that all significant terms are clearly documented in a signed writing. Relying on unsigned letters or oral agreements is risky. The court quoted that “a mere agreement to agree, in which a material term is left for future negotiations, is unenforceable.”
    • Merger Clauses: The presence of merger clauses in agreements, such as the Shareholder Agreement, can extinguish prior representations and agreements, so parties must consider all prior discussions and agreements when negotiating contracts.
    • Modification Clauses: Written agreements should include clauses that mandate that any modifications be made in writing, which is essential to avoid arguments about oral modifications.
    • Fiduciary Duties: The case highlights the differences in fiduciary duties that apply, depending on the legal jurisdiction. Parties need to consider the relevant law (here, Cayman Islands law) to determine the scope of duties owed.
    • Shareholder Disputes: The case demonstrates that minority shareholders can, in certain circumstances, bring claims against directors and officers for unfair treatment, even if fiduciary duties are not owed between shareholders.

  • Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Authority, 29 N.Y.3d 315 (2017): Proximate Cause Required for Additional Insured Coverage

    Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Authority, 29 N.Y.3d 315 (2017)

    Under an insurance policy with an additional insured endorsement, coverage extends to the additional insured only if the named insured’s actions or omissions were the proximate cause of the injury, not just a “but for” cause.

    Summary

    Burlington Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment that it did not owe coverage to the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) and MTA New York City Transit (MTA) as additional insureds under a policy issued to Breaking Solutions, Inc. (BSI). An NYCTA employee was injured when a BSI machine struck a live electrical cable. The court held that because BSI’s actions were not the proximate cause of the employee’s injury, the additional insureds (NYCTA and MTA) were not covered under the policy. The policy stated coverage was provided for injury “caused, in whole or in part, by” BSI’s acts or omissions. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s ruling, emphasizing that the policy language required proximate, not just “but for,” causation by the named insured.

    Facts

    NYCTA contracted with BSI for excavation work. BSI secured a commercial general liability insurance policy from Burlington, listing NYCTA, MTA, and New York City as additional insureds. An NYCTA employee was injured when a BSI machine contacted a live electrical cable, and the employee sued the City and BSI. Discovery revealed NYCTA’s negligence in failing to mark or de-energize the cable. Burlington initially defended the City, but later denied coverage, arguing BSI’s actions were not the proximate cause of the injury. Burlington settled the lawsuit. Burlington then sued for a declaratory judgment that it did not owe coverage to NYCTA and MTA.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted Burlington’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the policy provided coverage. The New York Court of Appeals granted Burlington’s leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the additional insured endorsement in the insurance policy provided coverage to NYCTA and MTA where the named insured’s (BSI’s) actions were not the proximate cause of the injury.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the insurance policy required proximate causation from BSI’s acts or omissions for the additional insureds to be covered.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court interpreted the insurance policy according to principles of contract interpretation, giving “unambiguous provisions of an insurance contract… their plain and ordinary meaning.” The policy stated coverage for injuries “caused, in whole or in part, by” the named insured’s acts or omissions. The court determined that “caused, in whole or in part” meant that the named insured’s actions must be the proximate cause of the injury. The court distinguished between “but for” causation and proximate cause. “But for” causation is a link in the chain that can be one of many causes. Proximate cause is a legal cause to which the court has assigned liability. The court reasoned that the phrase “in whole or in part” modifies proximate cause, not merely any cause. The court also found that the additional insured language was not triggered because BSI was not at fault; the injury resulted from NYCTA’s sole negligence.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the scope of additional insured endorsements. Insurance policies using the “caused, in whole or in part” language require the named insured’s actions to be the proximate cause of an injury for the additional insured to be covered. This means that even if a named insured’s actions played a role in an accident, coverage is not triggered unless those actions were a legally recognized cause of the injury. This case should be considered when drafting or interpreting such policies. Later courts have followed this precedent.

  • People v. Sivertson, No. 3 (N.Y. 2017): Warrantless Entry and Exigent Circumstances in Home Searches

    People v. Sivertson, No. 3 (N.Y. 2017)

    The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement for a home search is narrowly construed; the police must demonstrate an urgent need for immediate action, and that the circumstances made obtaining a warrant impossible or impracticable.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the warrantless entry into Sivertson’s home was justified by exigent circumstances. The dissent argued that the facts did not support exigent circumstances, as Sivertson posed no immediate threat or risk of escape at the time of entry. The majority deferred to the lower court’s findings, emphasizing the need for deference when the facts are disputed or reasonable minds might differ on the inferences from the facts. The case underscores the importance of a fact-specific analysis for exigent circumstances to justify warrantless home entries.

    Facts

    Police responded to a convenience store robbery near the University of Buffalo. Based on the video and employee statements, they described the suspect and learned that the suspect had been seen earlier on a building stoop across the street. Officers went to the building, learned the person had moved into a rear apartment, and surrounded the building. They observed Sivertson in his apartment, lying in bed watching TV, through a window. After knocking for ten minutes and yelling for Sivertson to come out, he made eye contact, rolled over, and closed his eyes. Officers forced entry based on the other officers’ observations and the fact that Sivertson matched the robber’s description. Inside, they seized a black knit hat, gloves, knives, and a scarf and jacket. The trial court partially denied the suppression motion, finding exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry, but the jacket and scarf were suppressed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    Procedural History

    Sivertson was convicted of first-degree robbery and sentenced to 20 years to life. The trial court denied his suppression motion in part. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the warrantless entry into Sivertson’s home was justified by exigent circumstances.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Court found that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into Sivertson’s home.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority deferred to the lower court’s ruling that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry. The dissenting judge believed there was no legal basis for exigent circumstances. The dissent emphasized the high level of protection afforded to the home under the Fourth Amendment. The dissent argued that the officers had no facts suggesting Sivertson posed a danger or that he might escape. The dissent underscored that “the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need” that justifies warrantless searches. The dissent referenced McBride, which held that exigent circumstances existed based on what the police observed when they arrived. In this case, the dissent argued, the police’s actions were not objectively justified, and they could have waited to obtain a warrant or waited for Sivertson to emerge. The dissent noted that Sivertson made no aggressive actions towards officers.

    Practical Implications

    This case is a reminder that any exceptions to the warrant requirement are construed narrowly. It emphasizes the importance of objective justification for warrantless entries. Police must be able to articulate why obtaining a warrant was not practical in a given situation, and mere probable cause to believe someone committed a crime is not sufficient. The specific facts known to the officers at the time of entry are crucial. The case suggests that in cases involving potential exigent circumstances, police should take precautions such as surrounding the building, and the court will examine the totality of the circumstances at the time of entry to determine if the police’s actions were justified. It also implies a preference for obtaining a warrant whenever possible.

  • Kimmel v. State of New York, No. 36 (2017): Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) and Sex Discrimination Claims

    Kimmel v. State of New York, No. 36 (2017)

    The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) allows for the award of attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff in an action against the State of New York under the Human Rights Law for sex discrimination in employment by a state agency.

    Summary

    Betty Kimmel, a former New York State Trooper, sued the State for sex discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, ultimately prevailing at trial and receiving a substantial jury award. Kimmel and her attorneys sought fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The trial court denied the motion, holding the EAJA inapplicable to actions seeking compensatory damages for tortious acts of the State. The Appellate Division reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the EAJA, which provides for attorney’s fees in certain civil actions against the state, applied to Kimmel’s case. The Court relied on the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, which supported a broad interpretation of the term “any civil action,” rejecting the State’s argument that the term was limited to review of administrative actions.

    Facts

    Betty Kimmel, a New York State Trooper from 1980-1994, experienced sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. Kimmel filed a complaint in 1995 against the State of New York and the New York State Division of State Police, alleging a hostile work environment and seeking damages, including attorney’s fees. The State defendants denied any wrongdoing and engaged in obstructionist tactics, leading the Appellate Division to strike their answers. After over a decade, Kimmel prevailed at trial and received a jury award exceeding $700,000. Kimmel and her attorneys then sought attorney’s fees under the EAJA.

    Procedural History

    Kimmel filed suit in 1995. The State defendants’ answers were struck due to their obstructionist tactics. Supreme Court held that the EAJA did not apply. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. The Court of Appeals heard the case on appeal from the Appellate Division order, and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the EAJA permits the award of attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff in an action against the State under the Human Rights Law for sex discrimination in employment by a state agency.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the plain language of the EAJA defines “any civil action” broadly and there are no explicit limitations that would exclude Kimmel’s case, which was brought under the Human Rights Law and was not brought in the Court of Claims.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals first looked at the plain language of the statute and found the EAJA applicable to “any civil action” against the state. The Court acknowledged that two limitations exist: that another statute does not specifically provide for counsel fees, and that an action was not brought in the Court of Claims. Since Kimmel’s case was brought in Supreme Court under the Human Rights Law, neither of these exceptions applied. The Court rejected the State’s argument that the term “judicial review” in the EAJA limited its scope to Article 78 proceedings or actions seeking review of a state agency’s administrative actions. The court determined that to accept the State’s interpretation would render the exclusion of actions in the Court of Claims meaningless. The Court also cited that the EAJA was intended to be comparable to the federal Equal Access to Justice Act, and is a remedial statute and therefore, should be construed broadly.

    The Court emphasized that “the word ‘any’ means ‘all’ or ‘every’ and imports no limitation” and further noted that the State’s interpretation would require adding an exception to the statute that was not clearly expressed.

    The concurring opinion agreed that the statutory language was ambiguous but concurred in the result. The concurrence emphasized a concession made by the State during oral arguments, where the State admitted that the EAJA could apply to a Human Rights Law action seeking injunctive relief against a State agency.

    The dissenting opinion maintained that the EAJA’s language, when read in context and with consideration to legislative history, limits its application to judicial review of agency actions and does not encompass actions seeking compensatory damages.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that under the EAJA, attorney’s fees can be awarded in sex discrimination cases brought under the Human Rights Law, which can be brought in Supreme Court, against state agencies. The Court’s emphasis on the plain language of the statute and its legislative history highlights the importance of examining the specific statutory language. Attorneys should consider the possibility of obtaining attorney’s fees under the EAJA for clients who prevail in actions against the State, particularly in the absence of other fee-shifting provisions. Furthermore, the Court’s decision emphasizes the broad construction of remedial statutes. Lawyers and lower courts should be aware of the practical and fiscal consequences of this ruling and its impact on the state’s willingness to engage in litigation.

    Subsequent cases will likely apply this ruling to similar cases involving state agencies and discrimination, and could extend to other types of civil actions against the state that do not fall under the Court of Claims jurisdiction.

  • Griffin v. Sirva, Inc., 30 N.Y.3d 174 (2017): Liability under the NYS Human Rights Law for Discrimination Based on Criminal Conviction

    Griffin v. Sirva, Inc., 30 N.Y.3d 174 (2017)

    Under the New York State Human Rights Law, liability for employment discrimination based on a criminal conviction is limited to employers, while aiding and abetting liability can extend to non-employers.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed three questions certified by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the scope of liability under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). The case involved two former employees of Astro Moving and Storage Co., Inc. who were fired after their criminal records revealed past convictions for sexual offenses. The court held that liability under NYSHRL § 296(15), which prohibits discrimination based on criminal convictions, is limited to employers, as defined by common-law principles that emphasize the power to control the employee. However, the Court found that NYSHRL § 296(6), the aiding and abetting provision, could extend liability to non-employers, even out-of-state entities, who aid or abet discriminatory practices.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, former employees of Astro Moving and Storage Co., Inc., had prior convictions for sexual offenses. Astro contracted with Allied Van Lines, Inc., a subsidiary of Sirva, Inc. Under the contract, Astro was required to adhere to Allied’s guidelines, which included criminal background checks and automatic failure for employees with sexual offense convictions. After Sirva investigated the plaintiffs’ criminal records, Astro fired them. Plaintiffs sued Astro, Sirva, and Allied, alleging violations of the NYSHRL, among other claims.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, which the district court denied. The court granted summary judgment to Allied and Sirva, holding that § 296(15) applied only to employers and that Allied and Sirva were not the plaintiffs’ employers. The plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit, which certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the scope of liability under the NYSHRL.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether NYSHRL § 296(15), prohibiting employment discrimination based on a criminal conviction, limits liability to an aggrieved party’s “employer.”

    2. If § 296(15) is limited to an employer, how should courts determine whether an entity is the aggrieved party’s “employer” under § 296(15)?

    3. Whether NYSHRL § 296(6), providing for aiding and abetting liability, applies to § 296(15) such that an out-of-state principal corporation that requires its New York State agent to discriminate in employment based on a criminal conviction may be held liable for the employer’s violation of § 296(15).

    Holding

    1. Yes, because NYSHRL § 296(15) incorporates Article 23-A of the Correction Law, which limits liability to employers, both public and private.

    2. Common-law principles, focusing on the employer’s power to control the employee in their work, determine whether an entity is an employer under § 296(15).

    3. Yes, because § 296(6), the aiding and abetting provision, extends liability to out-of-state non-employers who aid or abet discriminatory practices.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that NYSHRL § 296(15) is limited to employers, finding that the statute’s language, legislative history, and incorporation of Article 23-A of the Correction Law all supported this interpretation. Article 23-A specifies that the prohibition applies to applications “at” an employer or to employment held. The Court noted that an employer has to consider exceptions under Correction Law § 752, making it clear that only employers could violate the statute. The court also found that when determining who constitutes an employer, common-law principles would apply, giving “greatest emphasis” to the alleged employer’s power to control the employee in their work. For the aiding and abetting claim, the Court found that § 296(6) applies to any “person,” and is not limited to employers. The purpose of this section, as expressed in legislative history, was to hold liable anyone who aids or abets discriminatory conduct, regardless of their status. The court cited a previous case, *National Organization for Women v. State Division of Human Rights*, where the aiding and abetting provision was applied to a newspaper that was not an employer.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the scope of liability under the NYSHRL for employment discrimination based on criminal convictions. It confirms that non-employers can be held liable for aiding and abetting discrimination under NYSHRL § 296(6), even if they are not the direct employer, especially if they have significant control over an employer’s employment practices. Businesses, especially those with contractual relationships that influence employment decisions of other entities, must be aware of this potential liability. Attorneys should use the common-law test, and *GTE* factors, when determining if an entity is an “employer”. Moreover, the case highlights that the NYSHRL’s extraterritoriality provision can extend liability for discriminatory acts committed outside of New York if they impact New York residents.

  • Connaughton v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, 29 N.Y.3d 138 (2017): Fraudulent Inducement Requires Proof of Pecuniary Loss

    <strong><em>Connaughton v. Chipotle Mexican Grill</em></strong>, 29 N.Y.3d 138 (2017)

    In a fraudulent inducement claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that they suffered actual, out-of-pocket pecuniary loss, and cannot recover damages based on speculative or lost opportunities.

    <strong>Summary</strong>

    Chef Kyle Connaughton sued Chipotle for fraudulent inducement, alleging that Chipotle’s failure to disclose a prior business arrangement with another chef regarding a similar ramen restaurant concept led him to enter into an employment agreement to develop a similar concept. Connaughton claimed damages including the value of his Chipotle equity and lost business opportunities. The New York Court of Appeals held that Connaughton’s claim failed because he could not prove actual out-of-pocket losses. Because the damages claimed were speculative and based on lost opportunities, they were not compensable under New York law. The Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the case.

    <strong>Facts</strong>

    Connaughton, a chef, had a ramen restaurant concept. Chipotle’s CEO, Steven Ells, showed interest, leading Connaughton to develop ideas for Chipotle. Connaughton entered an at-will employment agreement with Chipotle as Culinary Director. The agreement included a salary, allowances, and stock options. Connaughton developed the ramen concept for Chipotle, but later learned that Ells had a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) with another chef. Ells fired Connaughton after he confronted him about the NDA. Connaughton sued, alleging fraudulent inducement because he would not have entered into the agreement with defendants had he known of the prior business arrangement. He claimed damages for the value of his equity and lost business opportunities.

    <strong>Procedural History</strong>

    Connaughton sued Chipotle for fraudulent inducement and other claims. The trial court dismissed the complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action. The Appellate Division affirmed, with a dissent. Connaughton appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as of right based on the dissent on a question of law.

    <strong>Issue(s)</strong>

    1. Whether Connaughton sufficiently alleged compensable damages to sustain a cause of action for fraudulent inducement, despite his employment agreement being at-will.

    <strong>Holding</strong>

    1. No, because Connaughton’s claimed damages were speculative and did not represent actual out-of-pocket pecuniary loss, his claim for fraudulent inducement failed.

    <strong>Court’s Reasoning</strong>

    The Court of Appeals reiterated that a claim for fraudulent inducement in New York requires a showing of (1) a misrepresentation or material omission of fact, (2) falsity known to the defendant, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff, and (5) injury. The Court emphasized that the injury element requires proof of actual, out-of-pocket pecuniary loss and that the “true measure of damage is indemnity for the actual pecuniary loss sustained as the direct result of the wrong.” The court cited multiple precedents supporting the “out-of-pocket” rule, and stated that damages for lost profits or opportunities, were not recoverable. The Court found that Connaughton’s claim was based on the lost value of his lost business opportunities, which are not compensable, and affirmed the dismissal.

    <strong>Practical Implications</strong>

    This case underscores the importance of demonstrating specific pecuniary loss in fraudulent inducement claims. It clarifies that speculative damages, such as lost business opportunities or potential future legal expenses, are generally not recoverable under New York law. Attorneys should advise clients to gather evidence of actual financial harm, such as documented expenses or losses, to support a fraudulent inducement claim. This decision impacts how lawyers analyze and present claims, particularly during the pleadings phase, when focusing on the evidence to establish compensable damages. Later cases will follow this precedent by requiring a showing of actual harm in fraudulent inducement cases and not allowing speculative claims based on lost opportunities. This may also affect the drafting of employment agreements and the disclosures required during contract negotiations.

  • People v. Cook, 29 N.Y.3d 121 (2017): SORA Risk Assessment – One Determination per ‘Current Offense’ When Multiple Counties Involved

    People v. Cook, 29 N.Y.3d 121 (2017)

    When a sex offender is convicted in multiple counties for offenses arising from a single set of actions, only one Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) risk level determination is permitted, based on the totality of the offenses.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether multiple SORA risk assessments could be conducted when an offender committed crimes in multiple counties stemming from the same underlying conduct. The court held that only one risk level determination is permissible when a single Risk Assessment Instrument (RAI) evaluates an offender’s risk based on offenses in multiple jurisdictions. This decision prevented duplicative proceedings, conserved judicial resources, and ensured consistent application of the SORA guidelines. The court clarified that while each sentencing court must fulfill its SORA obligations, only one risk determination is appropriate when based on a singular set of current offenses within the RAI.

    Facts

    The defendant committed multiple sexual offenses against several children in both Queens and Richmond Counties, New York. He pleaded guilty to various charges in each county. The Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders prepared a single RAI to evaluate the defendant’s risk. Both counties received the RAI. The Richmond County court conducted a SORA risk assessment hearing and adjudicated the defendant a level three offender based on all the underlying offenses. Subsequently, the Queens County court sought to conduct a separate risk assessment hearing. The defendant argued that the Queens County proceeding was duplicative and barred by res judicata.

    Procedural History

    The Queens County trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the SORA proceeding. The Appellate Division reversed, agreeing with the defendant that only one SORA determination was permissible. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether multiple SORA risk level determinations are permissible when an offender is convicted in multiple counties for related offenses, and a single RAI is used.

    Holding

    1. No, because only one SORA risk level determination is permitted when a single RAI addresses all relevant conduct, regardless of the number of counties involved. This interpretation is the most effective way to implement SORA’s objectives.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that SORA aims to protect the public from sex offenders by assessing their risk of reoffending. The court held that where a single RAI is used, the assessment of risk is fulfilled by a single SORA adjudication. Permitting multiple determinations would be redundant and a waste of judicial resources. The court noted that the SORA Guidelines direct the Board to complete a single RAI encompassing all relevant conduct, regardless of the county in which the charges originated. The court addressed statutory language regarding the sentencing court’s duty, stating that this language does not mandate separate risk determinations based on a single RAI. The court recognized the potential issue if the initial convictions were overturned, and stated that in such circumstances, a de novo hearing would be warranted in the other jurisdiction.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that when an offender’s crimes in multiple jurisdictions are evaluated within one RAI, only one SORA risk determination is permissible. This is important for: how similar cases are analyzed, potentially streamlining the SORA process when offenders are sentenced in multiple counties. The ruling emphasizes the importance of the prosecuting offices coordinating their submissions to ensure all relevant information from all jurisdictions is before the court. Later cases will likely cite Cook to prevent duplicative risk assessment proceedings.