New York Law Review

Tag: 2016

  • Gevorkyan v. Judelson, 28 N.Y.3d 454 (2016): Bail Bond Premiums and the Requirement of Risk Assumption

    28 N.Y.3d 454 (2016)

    A bail bond surety may not retain a premium when the criminal defendant is not released on bail because the surety does not assume any risk if bail is denied after a bail-sufficiency hearing.

    Summary

    In Gevorkyan v. Judelson, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a bail bond entity could retain a premium when bail was denied after a bail-sufficiency hearing and the defendant was never released. The court held that the entity could not retain the premium. The court reasoned that under New York’s Insurance Law, a bail bond surety only earns a premium upon “giving bail.” The court interpreted “giving bail” to mean the actual release of the defendant. Because the court did not approve the bail and the defendant was not released, the bail bond was not “given,” and the premium was not earned. This decision emphasizes the principle that the premium follows the assumption of risk, which does not occur until the defendant is actually released on bail.

    Facts

    Arthur Bogoraz was indicted on fraud charges, with bail set at $2 million. Bogoraz’s family contacted Ira Judelson, a licensed bail bond agent affiliated with International Fidelity Insurance Company, to secure a bail bond. The family entered into an indemnity agreement with Judelson, and paid a premium of $120,560. Judelson posted the bail bond with the court. A bail-sufficiency hearing was held, and the court denied the bail bond. Bogoraz was never released, and when the family requested a refund of the premium, Judelson refused.

    Procedural History

    The family sued Judelson in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. The District Court ruled in favor of Judelson, finding the indemnity agreement permitted him to retain the premium. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, noting a lack of dispositive New York legal authority on the matter, certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals: Whether Judelson could retain the premium. The New York Court of Appeals answered in the negative.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a bail bond entity may retain a premium when a bond posted pursuant to CPL 520.20 is denied at a bail-sufficiency hearing conducted pursuant to CPL 520.30, and the criminal defendant is never admitted to bail.

    Holding

    1. No, because a bail bond surety may not retain a premium when the defendant is not released on bail, as per New York’s Insurance Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court primarily relied on the interpretation of New York’s Insurance Law Article 68, which regulates the bail bond industry. The court found that a premium is earned only when the bail bond is “given,” which the court equated with executing the bond and securing the defendant’s release. The court noted that the Insurance Law does not expressly define “give bail bond.” Therefore, the court examined the meaning of the term at the time the law was enacted, concluding that “giving bail” encompassed the release of the defendant. Because the court denied the bond at the hearing and the defendant was never released, the bond was never “given,” and no premium was earned. The court found the surety does not assume risk until the defendant is released on bail, and thus the premium is not earned until that time. The court stated, “The surety does not incur this risk when the principal is not released and so has no opportunity to jump bail.” Furthermore, the court considered the legislative intent to protect against abuses in the bail bond industry. The court reasoned that allowing the surety to retain the premium in this situation would be inconsistent with the legislature’s goal of regulating compensation and preventing exploitation of defendants.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides clear guidance on the enforceability of bail bond premiums when bail is denied after a bail-sufficiency hearing. Attorneys handling similar cases should: consider New York’s Insurance Law to determine when a premium is earned; recognize the importance of risk assumption in insurance law; and be aware that the premium is not earned until the defendant is released. The decision suggests that bail bond agents may need to adjust their practices to refund premiums when bail is denied, even after the bond has been initially posted. Later cases should likely follow this precedent and, under similar facts, deny the surety the right to retain the premium.

  • People v. Young, 28 N.Y.3d 415 (2016): Confidentiality of Presentence Reports and the Right to Respond

    28 N.Y.3d 415 (2016)

    A sentencing court violates a defendant’s due process rights and CPL 390.50 by failing to adequately explain on the record the reasons for withholding information from the defendant, reviewed by the court for sentencing purposes, even if the source was promised confidentiality.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed two issues concerning sentencing procedure. First, the court held that a sentencing court is not required to state its reasons for denying youthful offender (YO) status. Second, the court found that the sentencing court violated CPL 390.50 and the defendant’s due process rights by failing to sufficiently explain its reasons for withholding a confidential document from the defendant that was considered during sentencing. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the County Court for further proceedings, emphasizing the importance of transparency and the defendant’s right to respond to information used in sentencing.

    Facts

    The defendant, then 18, was indicted for attempted murder and assault after a stabbing incident. He pleaded guilty and requested youthful offender status and disclosure of victim impact statements. At sentencing, the court denied disclosure of victim impact statements and imposed a 20-year prison sentence. The Appellate Division remitted for the sentencing court to make a record of its determination regarding youthful offender (YO) status and to explain the reasons for refusing to disclose certain written statements. On remittal, the court denied YO status and stated that it had reviewed a confidential page of the presentence investigation report (PSI), withholding it from disclosure. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the sentencing court had sufficiently complied with its prior order, prompting the defendant’s appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at the trial court and appealed to the Appellate Division, which remitted the case for specific findings. After a second sentencing, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Division again, which affirmed the sentencing court’s decision. The defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case back to the County Court for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a sentencing court is required to state, on the record, its reasons for denying youthful offender (YO) treatment.

    2. Whether the sentencing court violated CPL 390.50 and the defendant’s due process rights by failing to adequately explain its reasons for withholding a confidential document from disclosure.

    Holding

    1. No, because the legislature did not explicitly require courts to state the reasons for denying YO status, and the court is not obligated to articulate its reasoning for a sentence that is within statutory parameters.

    2. Yes, because the sentencing court failed to adequately explain its reasons for withholding the confidential document, thereby depriving the defendant of the ability to respond to information used in sentencing and violating his due process rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court first addressed the YO status issue, referencing the plain language of CPL 720.20, and concluding that the legislature left it to the sentencing court’s discretion to decide whether to explain the denial of YO status. The court emphasized that CPL 720.20 does not mandate a statement of reasons, unlike some other sentencing provisions. The court reasoned that policy considerations support this discretion, as sentencing courts are best positioned to weigh the benefits and detriments of explaining the decision to deny YO status. The court determined that the sentencing court had complied with CPL 720.20 by explicitly denying the defendant’s request for YO treatment.

    The court then examined the withholding of the confidential document. Citing CPL 390.50, the court recognized that defendants have a due process right to contest information used in sentencing. Although the court can except information from disclosure based on a promise of confidentiality, it must still exercise its own discretion. The court found that the sentencing court failed to explain the nature or reasons for the confidentiality of the document. The court held that without this explanation, neither the Court of Appeals nor the Appellate Division could adequately review whether the court had abused its discretion, violating the defendant’s rights and CPL 390.50. The court quoted: “In all cases where a part or parts of the report or memoranda are not disclosed, the court shall state for the record that a part or parts of the report or memoranda have been excepted and the reasons for its action.”

    Practical Implications

    This case emphasizes the importance of transparency in sentencing. It clarifies that while sentencing courts are not obligated to provide reasons for denying youthful offender status, they must clearly justify withholding information from a defendant that will be considered in sentencing. The court recognized the importance of ensuring the accuracy and reliability of information used in sentencing and protecting the defendant’s right to respond. This means that the court must state on the record the nature of any withheld document, as well as the reason for withholding it. If a court intends to keep confidential any portion of a document, it should disclose the nature of that document, or redacted portion, as much as possible without revealing confidential information. The court may also choose not to rely on the document, and state that on the record. This decision impacts how judges handle sentencing, specifically the balancing act between confidentiality and a defendant’s right to a fair process.

  • People v. Spencer, 28 N.Y.3d 302 (2016): Juror’s Inability to Render Impartial Verdict Justifies Removal

    People v. Spencer, 28 N.Y.3d 302 (2016)

    A trial court must discharge a juror as “grossly unqualified to serve” under CPL 270.35(1) if the juror’s statements make it obvious that they cannot render an impartial verdict based on the evidence and the law.

    Summary

    In a murder trial, a juror repeatedly stated during deliberations that she could not separate her emotions from the case and could not decide it based solely on the facts and the law. Despite the court’s efforts to encourage her to fulfill her duty, she remained resolute in her inability to be impartial. The trial court did not discharge the juror and, ultimately, the defendant was found guilty of manslaughter. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred by failing to discharge the juror, as her statements made it obvious that she was grossly unqualified to serve. The court emphasized that a juror’s inability to follow the law, not just bias, could render them unfit.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with murder. During deliberations, a juror informed the court that she could not separate her emotions from the case. The court questioned the juror, and the juror repeatedly stated she was unable to base her decision solely on the evidence and the law, despite trying her best. The juror stated “I don’t have it in me,” and “I can’t separate it anymore. I don’t know, I don’t know. I don’t have the capabilities to.” The trial court, after a *Buford* inquiry, declined to discharge the juror. The jury ultimately convicted defendant of manslaughter.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant of manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed. The dissenting Justice in the Appellate Division granted defendant leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred by not discharging a sworn juror who repeatedly stated during deliberations that she could not separate her emotions from the case and could not decide it based solely on the facts and the law.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the juror’s statements made it obvious that she was grossly unqualified to serve, and the trial court was required to discharge her under CPL 270.35(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the juror’s statements demonstrated a clear inability to render an impartial verdict. The court explained that CPL 270.35(1) requires a trial court to discharge a juror who is “grossly unqualified to serve.” A juror is grossly unqualified “only ‘when it becomes obvious that a particular juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict.’” The Court emphasized that a trial judge has discretion in making the findings regarding a juror’s qualifications, but the ultimate determination is a legal one. The court distinguished the standard for removing a sworn juror, which requires a higher burden of proof that the juror is grossly unqualified, than the standard for excusing a prospective juror for cause. The court stated that a juror is “grossly unqualified to serve” where the “juror’s statements made it plain that she possess [ed] a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict.” The Court held that it was “obvious the juror possessed a state of mind preventing her from rendering an impartial verdict.”

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the importance of a juror’s ability and willingness to follow the law and base their decision solely on the evidence. Attorneys must be prepared to challenge jurors who express an inability to do so. This case highlights a significant distinction: it’s not just bias that can disqualify a juror, but also an inability to separate emotion from the facts and the law. It emphasizes the trial court’s duty to ensure the fairness of the trial by removing unqualified jurors. Courts must conduct thorough inquiries (a Buford inquiry) to assess whether a juror is grossly unqualified to serve, and must err on the side of caution and impartiality when deciding whether to remove a juror. This case guides attorneys on when to move for a mistrial based on a juror’s inability to perform their duties.

  • D&R Global Selections, S.L. v. Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro, 28 N.Y.3d 295 (2016): Determining When a Foreign Corporation Transacts Business in NY for Long-Arm Jurisdiction

    D&R Global Selections, S.L. v. Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro, 28 N.Y.3d 295 (2016)

    A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation under New York’s long-arm statute if the corporation transacts business within the state, and the cause of action arises from that business activity.

    Summary

    A Spanish winery (defendant) contracted with a Spanish company (plaintiff) to find a U.S. distributor for its wine. The defendant traveled to New York multiple times to meet potential distributors and promote its wine. Eventually, the defendant began selling wine to a New York-based distributor. When the defendant stopped paying commissions to the plaintiff, the plaintiff sued in New York for breach of contract. The court held that New York had personal jurisdiction over the defendant because the defendant transacted business in New York, and the plaintiff’s claim arose from those New York contacts. The court emphasized the “articulable nexus” between the business conducted in New York and the claim.

    Facts

    The defendant, a Spanish winery, entered into an oral agreement with the plaintiff, a Spanish company. Under this agreement, the plaintiff would find a U.S. distributor for the defendant’s wine, and the defendant would pay the plaintiff commissions. The defendant, along with the plaintiff, traveled to New York several times to meet potential distributors and promote its wine. The defendant attended wine industry events in New York, including one where it met Kobrand Corp., a New York-based distributor. The defendant subsequently began selling wine to Kobrand. When the defendant stopped paying commissions, the plaintiff sued the defendant in New York for breach of contract.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff initially obtained a default judgment in New York Supreme Court. The defendant moved to vacate the default judgment, claiming lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that whether the court had personal jurisdiction raised an issue of fact. On remand, the Supreme Court again denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a)(1), claiming that the promotional activities in New York did not have a substantial nexus to the plaintiff’s claim. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a New York court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant under CPLR 302(a)(1).
    2. If so, whether the plaintiff’s claim arises from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant transacted business in New York.
    2. Yes, because the plaintiff’s claim arises from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied CPLR 302(a)(1), which allows New York courts to exercise jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who transact business within the state. The court followed a two-fold inquiry: whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within New York, and whether the claim arises from that business. The court found that the defendant purposefully availed itself of doing business in New York by seeking out and initiating contact with New York, soliciting business, and establishing a continuing relationship. The court held that the plaintiff’s cause of action had an “articulable nexus” or “substantial relationship” with the defendant’s New York business activities. The court reasoned that “at least one element arises from the New York contacts.” The court emphasized that the defendant’s activities in New York directly related to the claim for unpaid commissions.

    The court stated that “a non-domiciliary defendant transacts business in New York when ‘on his or her own initiative[,] the non-domiciliary projects himself or herself into this state to engage in a sustained and substantial transaction of business.’” Furthermore, the court stated that an articulable nexus exists “where at least one element arises from the New York contacts.”

    Practical Implications

    This case is crucial for determining personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations in New York. It clarifies that a foreign company can be subject to New York jurisdiction if it purposefully engages in business activities within the state, even if the primary agreement was made outside of New York. It underscores the importance of establishing an “articulable nexus” between the business conducted in New York and the claim. Legal practitioners should carefully analyze a foreign defendant’s contacts with New York to determine whether those contacts meet the threshold of “transacting business” and whether the plaintiff’s claim arises from those contacts. This case also highlights that foreign companies who take purposeful actions to generate business in New York can reasonably expect to be haled into court in the state. Later cases have cited this case to establish jurisdictional nexus in the state. This has implications for international contracts and business deals.

  • People v. Viruet, 28 N.Y.3d 526 (2016): Adverse Inference Instruction for Lost Evidence

    People v. Viruet, 28 N.Y.3d 526 (2016)

    When the state loses evidence requested by the defendant, and that evidence is reasonably likely to be material, an adverse inference instruction is mandatory if requested.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court erred by denying an adverse inference instruction after the police lost surveillance video of a shooting, which the defendant was charged with committing. The court held that the trial court should have given the instruction because the video was likely to contain material information. However, the court affirmed the conviction because the error was harmless given the strength of the evidence against the defendant, including eyewitness testimony and a confession.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with second-degree murder after a shooting outside a nightclub. The incident occurred shortly after the defendant’s brother was assaulted. The police obtained surveillance video from the club, but the arresting officer lost the video. The defendant requested the video during discovery and sought an adverse inference instruction based on its absence. The trial court denied the instruction, finding insufficient evidence that the video would have been favorable to the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The defendant appealed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant of second-degree murder and weapons possession. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred by declining to provide an adverse inference instruction to the jury regarding the missing surveillance video, which the defendant requested in discovery.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the lost video was reasonably likely to be of material importance to the case, the court erred by denying the adverse inference instruction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the precedent set in People v. Handy, which established that when the State destroys evidence, the defendant is entitled to an adverse inference instruction if the evidence was requested, acted upon with due diligence, and was reasonably likely to be of material importance. Here, the court found that the defendant met those conditions. The video could have depicted key events such as the shooting and the positions of witnesses, making it potentially relevant. Even though the prosecution argued it did not intend to use the video, the court found it had an obligation to preserve evidence once the police collected it. Ultimately, the court held that the trial court should have given the instruction.

    The court then considered whether the error was harmless. Quoting People v. Crimmins, the court explained that “errors of law of nonconstitutional magnitude may be found harmless where ‘the proof of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to the error, is overwhelming’ and where there is no ‘significant probability . . . that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error.’” The court found that overwhelming evidence supported the guilty verdict, including eyewitness accounts and a confession. As a result, the error was deemed harmless, and the conviction was upheld.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the importance of preserving potentially relevant evidence, especially video footage, for the prosecution. It clarifies that if the prosecution loses requested evidence that might be helpful to the defendant, they could be forced to give the jury an adverse inference instruction. Defense attorneys can use this ruling to argue for adverse inference instructions when potentially exculpatory evidence is lost or destroyed by the State. This case emphasizes that it is not enough for the prosecution to claim they did not plan to use the evidence; they must still preserve it. When similar cases come before the court, this case should guide the decision on whether an adverse inference is warranted.

  • Matter of Acevedo v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 27 N.Y.3d 211 (2016): Standard for Review of Agency Regulations on Driver’s License Relicensing

    27 N.Y.3d 211 (2016)

    Agency regulations concerning driver’s license relicensing are valid if they have a rational basis and are not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and do not exceed the agency’s delegated authority.

    Summary

    The New York State Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) adopted regulations to address the high rate of recidivism among drunk drivers seeking relicensing. These regulations imposed stricter criteria, including lifetime reviews of driving records and potential denials based on prior convictions and serious driving offenses. The court addressed several challenges to the regulations, including claims that they conflicted with state law, violated the separation of powers doctrine, and were applied retroactively. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the regulations were a valid exercise of the DMV’s rulemaking authority, did not conflict with the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and were not impermissibly retroactive. The court emphasized that the regulations had a rational basis and were designed to promote public safety by addressing the serious risk posed by repeat drunk-driving offenders.

    Facts

    Petitioners, all with multiple drunk-driving convictions, had their driver’s licenses revoked. They applied for relicensing, which was denied under new DMV regulations. These regulations implemented a lifetime review of an applicant’s driving record, leading to denial if certain criteria, such as a history of multiple alcohol-related incidents or serious driving offenses, were met. Petitioners challenged the validity of these regulations, arguing they exceeded DMV’s authority and were improperly applied.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners’ applications were denied by the DMV. The Administrative Appeals Board affirmed these denials. Petitioners then brought separate Article 78 proceedings in the Supreme Court, which dismissed their petitions. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the DMV regulations conflict with the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

    2. Whether the DMV regulations violate the separation of powers doctrine by exceeding the agency’s rulemaking authority.

    3. Whether the DMV regulations are arbitrary and capricious.

    4. Whether the DMV regulations were improperly applied retroactively.

    Holding

    1. No, because the regulations are consistent with the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which grants the Commissioner broad discretion in relicensing decisions.

    2. No, because the DMV regulations do not amount to legislative policymaking; they are a valid exercise of administrative rulemaking.

    3. No, because the regulations have a rational basis and are not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.

    4. No, because the regulations were applied prospectively to the relicensing applications, not retroactively to the prior driving offenses.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the Vehicle and Traffic Law gives the Commissioner broad discretion in relicensing after a revocation period. The DMV did not exceed its authority by creating clear rules that provide consistent and uniform application of the law. The court used the four-factor test from Boreali v. Axelrod, which evaluates whether the agency action constituted legislative policymaking. The court emphasized that the DMV’s expertise in highway safety justified the regulations. The court found that the DMV’s interpretation of what constitutes a “serious driving offense” and “alcohol- or drug-related driving conviction or incident” was rational and based on legitimate policy considerations. The court distinguished that the regulations applied prospectively, despite consideration of prior conduct.

    Practical Implications

    This case establishes a high bar for challenging DMV regulations concerning driver’s licenses. It confirms that agencies have broad discretion in implementing rules to protect public safety, provided the rules have a rational basis and do not conflict with statutory law. Attorneys representing clients seeking relicensing should be aware that challenging regulations based on separation of powers or arbitrariness requires a strong showing. Specifically, the Court emphasized that the Commissioner could adopt regulations that go beyond the text of the enabling legislation, so long as those regulations are consistent with the statutory language and underlying purpose. Subsequent courts have applied Acevedo in cases involving challenges to regulations enacted by other government agencies. The case also clarifies that regulations affecting future actions based on past conduct are not necessarily retroactive, which is relevant to various areas of administrative law.

  • Matter of Loehr v. Administrative Board of the Courts of the State of New York, 28 N.Y.3d 376 (2016): The Broad Discretion of the Administrative Board in Certifying Retired Justices

    28 N.Y.3d 376 (2016)

    The Administrative Board of the Courts has broad discretion in determining whether to certify retired justices for continued service, and its decisions are not subject to judicial review unless they violate statutory prescriptions or promote a constitutionally impermissible purpose.

    Summary

    This case involved three retired New York Supreme Court Justices who sought certification to continue serving after reaching the mandatory retirement age of 70. The Administrative Board of the Courts adopted a policy denying certification to those who would simultaneously receive a judicial salary and retirement benefits. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, upholding the Board’s policy. The court reasoned that the Board has broad discretion in determining whether certification is “necessary to expedite the business of the court” and that the Board’s policy, aimed at addressing concerns about “double-dipping” and its impact on the courts’ public image and budgetary negotiations, fell within its discretion. The court emphasized that the Board’s determination was rationally related to expediting court business and did not violate any statutes or constitutional provisions.

    Facts

    Three retired Supreme Court Justices, Loehr, Murphy, and Miller, applied for certification to continue serving as Justices after reaching age 70. The Administrative Board of the Courts issued an administrative order stating that it would no longer certify applicants who, upon reappointment, would receive both a retirement allowance and a salary as a certified justice. The Board’s concern was that the practice of “double-dipping” negatively impacted the public’s perception of the court and its budget negotiations. The plaintiffs brought a hybrid Article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action challenging the policy’s legality and constitutionality.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition, finding the Board’s policy lawful. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the policy violated the New York Constitution, the Judiciary Law, and the Retirement and Social Security Law. The Board appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Administrative Board’s policy, denying certification to retired justices who receive both a salary and a pension, is a valid exercise of its discretion under the New York Constitution and Judiciary Law.

    2. Whether the Board’s policy violated any provision of the Retirement and Social Security Law.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Board’s determination was rationally related to whether certification is “necessary to expedite the business of the court” and the Board was within its discretion in determining how to expedite court business.

    2. No, because the Board’s policy did not contravene any provisions of the Retirement and Social Security Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the strong public policy in New York against the simultaneous receipt of a state pension and a state salary. The court cited the broad discretion granted to the Administrative Board in determining whether to certify retired justices. The court held that the Board’s policy was rationally related to the goal of expediting court business, encompassing factors beyond just docket size, such as the impact of “double-dipping” on public prestige and budget negotiations. The court found that the Board’s decision to announce a prospective rule, rather than making individual determinations, did not exceed its authority. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that section 212 of the Retirement and Social Security Law entitled them to certification, stating that the certification process initiated a new designation to judicial office and thus, justices have no right to such certification.

    “The Board enjoys ‘the very broadest authority for the exercise of responsible judgment’ and ‘very nearly unfettered discretion in determining whether to grant applications of former Judges for certification.’”

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the significant deference given to the Administrative Board in deciding certification matters for retired justices. It clarifies that the Board can consider factors beyond pure workload in making its decisions, including policy considerations and the perceived impact of the certification on the court system. Attorneys should advise clients seeking certification that the Board has the discretion to deny certification even if the applicant meets all other qualifications, particularly if their circumstances are perceived to negatively impact the court. This case highlights the importance of understanding the Board’s unwritten considerations and policies, which may influence decisions.

  • People v. Small, 28 N.Y.3d 151 (2016): Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts (Molineux Evidence) When Defendant Raises Agency Defense in Drug Sale Case

    28 N.Y.3d 151 (2016)

    When a defendant asserts an agency defense in a drug sale case, the prosecution may introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior drug sale convictions (Molineux evidence) on their direct case to establish the defendant’s intent to sell, even if the defense is based on evidence presented by the prosecution.

    Summary

    The case concerns the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence (Molineux evidence) in a drug sale case. The defendant argued an agency defense – that he was merely assisting the buyer. The trial court, after the defendant requested an agency instruction, allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior drug sale conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when a defendant raises an agency defense, even based on the prosecution’s evidence, the prosecution may introduce Molineux evidence of prior drug sales to prove intent. The court emphasized that the trial court must first determine whether the probative value of such evidence outweighs its potential prejudice to the defendant.

    Facts

    Undercover officers observed the defendant and another individual, Barrios. Barrios gave the defendant money, after which the defendant entered a building, emerged, and gave Barrios glassine envelopes. Police arrested the pair and recovered heroin from Barrios and a small amount of money from the defendant. The defense counsel gave notice of a possible agency defense. During cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to establish that the defendant was acting as a friend to the buyer, focusing on their relationship and the small amount of money the defendant possessed. The defense did not call the buyer to testify. After the close of the People’s case, the court granted the defendant’s request for an agency instruction, after which the prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior drug sale conviction, with the proper limiting instructions. The jury found the defendant guilty.

    Procedural History

    The trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce the Molineux evidence. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, ruling the evidence was properly admitted. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and also affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior drug sale conviction on their direct case, given that the agency defense was supported solely by inferences drawn from the prosecution’s evidence?

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion as the defendant raised the issue of intent by seeking the agency defense, thereby opening the door for the introduction of the prior conviction evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court explained that under New York law, a defendant is guilty of selling a controlled substance when they knowingly and unlawfully sell a narcotic drug. The agency defense holds that if the defendant acted solely as the agent of the buyer, they cannot be convicted of the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The court referenced People v. Molineux, which addressed the admissibility of evidence of uncharged crimes. Such evidence is generally inadmissible to show bad character or propensity to commit a crime, but it is admissible when relevant to an issue other than criminal disposition, such as intent. The Court of Appeals found that the defendant’s actions during cross-examination of the prosecution’s witnesses and the request for an agency charge raised the issue of intent. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing evidence of the prior conviction after balancing its probative value against its potential prejudice.

    The court distinguished this case from situations where intent is easily inferred from the act itself, noting that the agency defense specifically disputes the intent to sell. The court relied on its previous holding in People v. Small, where Molineux evidence was deemed admissible when the defendant raised an agency defense. The court emphasized that there is no requirement that the court rule on the admissibility of the Molineux evidence prior to trial and reiterated that the agency defense is triggered where there is some evidence, however slight, supporting the inference that the defendant was acting as an extension of the buyer.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces that a defendant’s decision to pursue an agency defense in a drug sale case opens the door for the prosecution to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior drug sale convictions to establish intent, even if the defense is based on evidence presented by the prosecution. This ruling highlights that the timing of the presentation of such evidence is within the trial court’s discretion. Defense attorneys must carefully consider the implications of raising the agency defense, understanding it may result in the introduction of prior bad acts evidence, and the possible prejudice to the client. It is important to carefully assess the strength of the prosecution’s case, as well as the potential prejudicial impact of prior bad acts evidence on the jury. Prosecutors should be prepared to present such evidence and should ensure they have a proper foundation established for the prior acts and that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect.

  • Rivera v. Department of Housing Preservation & Development of the City of N.Y., 28 N.Y.3d 45 (2016): Facial Validity of Liens and the Scope of Summary Discharge

    28 N.Y.3d 45 (2016)

    A dispute over the reasonableness of claimed expenses in a facially valid notice of lien must be resolved in a foreclosure trial, not through summary discharge.

    Summary

    This case concerns the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) placing liens on properties to recover relocation expenses. The central issue is whether a court can summarily discharge a lien, under Lien Law § 19(6), if the notice of lien seeks an unreasonable amount of expenses. The court held that summary discharge is inappropriate if the notice of lien is facially valid. Disputes about the reasonableness of claimed expenses must be resolved at a foreclosure trial. The court emphasized that facial invalidity exists only under specific circumstances not present in this case, such as the lien not including the information required by Lien Law § 9.

    Facts

    In the case of Rivera, the Fire Department issued a vacate order for a building in Brooklyn owned by Rivera. HPD provided temporary shelter to tenants. HPD filed a notice of lien to recover its relocation expenses. Rivera sought to summarily vacate the lien, arguing that the expenses were unreasonable. The Supreme Court held HPD’s shelter service expenses were lienable and that a foreclosure trial was the appropriate venue to dispute the validity of the lien. The Appellate Division affirmed. In the Enriquez case, the Department of Buildings issued a vacate order for a building owned by Enriquez. HPD provided relocation services. HPD filed a notice of lien. Enriquez argued the lien was facially invalid, but Supreme Court disagreed. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the notice of lien facially invalid. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the cases.

    Procedural History

    In Rivera, the Supreme Court granted HPD’s motion to dismiss Rivera’s complaint to summarily vacate the lien and denied Rivera’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed. In Enriquez, Supreme Court granted HPD’s motion to dismiss the petition to summarily vacate the lien. The Appellate Division, First Department reversed, holding the notice of lien facially invalid. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in both cases, consolidating them to resolve conflicting approaches to facial validity.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a court may summarily discharge a lien for relocation expenses under Lien Law § 19(6) based on a claim that the expenses are unreasonable.

    2. Whether the notices of lien in either Rivera or Enriquez were facially invalid.

    Holding

    1. No, because a dispute over the reasonableness of expenses does not make the lien facially invalid, which must be decided at a foreclosure trial.

    2. No, because the notices of lien in both cases were facially valid, as they contained all the required information and were properly filed under Lien Law § 9 and Administrative Code § 26-305(4)(a).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found the notices of lien were facially valid because they contained all the required elements under Lien Law § 9 and the Administrative Code. The court held that summary discharge is only appropriate when a notice of lien is facially invalid, such as when it includes non-lienable expenses. The court distinguished between challenges to the facial validity of a lien and challenges to the amount or reasonableness of the expenses claimed. It emphasized that the extent to which services may be recovered through a mechanic’s lien, and therefore the resolution of disputes regarding the expenses claimed in a lien, “should be decided after a trial, and not in a summary proceeding.” The court found no basis to conclude that the notices of lien were facially invalid. The court noted that the Administrative Code gives HPD broad discretion to determine what services must be provided to displaced tenants.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the distinction between challenges to the facial validity of a lien and challenges to the reasonableness of expenses. Attorneys representing property owners should understand that claims of unreasonable expenses alone will not be enough to discharge a lien summarily; instead, they must be raised during a foreclosure trial. It clarifies that, in New York, the determination of whether expenses claimed in a lien are reasonable is a matter for trial if the notice of lien is facially valid. This decision also provides guidance on what constitutes a valid notice of lien, emphasizing the importance of including all required information. Later courts will likely rely on this case when distinguishing between grounds for summary discharge and those requiring a foreclosure trial. This ruling supports the HPD’s authority to recover temporary shelter expenses from building owners and protects HPD’s ability to recoup relocation expenditures.

  • 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc. v. New York County Dist., 27 N.Y.3d 236 (2016): Appealability of Orders Regarding Stored Communications Act (SCA) Warrants

    27 N.Y.3d 236 (2016)

    Orders denying motions to quash search warrants issued under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) in criminal proceedings are not appealable under New York law, as there is no statutory basis for such an appeal.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the appealability of two Supreme Court orders related to warrants issued to Facebook under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) in connection with a criminal investigation. The court held that neither order was appealable because they arose from a criminal proceeding, and New York’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) does not authorize appeals from orders denying motions to quash search warrants. The court distinguished SCA warrants from subpoenas, emphasizing the former’s alignment with traditional search warrants in initiating a criminal proceeding and invoking Fourth Amendment concerns. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of Facebook’s appeals, underscoring the importance of adhering to statutory requirements for appeals in criminal cases and the need for legislative action to create a right of appeal where none currently exists.

    Facts

    In July 2013, Supreme Court issued 381 warrants to Facebook based on probable cause, seeking subscriber information and content from user accounts related to a disability fraud investigation. Facebook moved to quash the warrants, arguing overbreadth and lack of particularity, which Supreme Court denied, directing Facebook to comply. Facebook complied with the warrants after the Appellate Division denied a stay. After the warrants were unsealed, Facebook sought disclosure of the supporting affidavit. Supreme Court denied this motion as well. Facebook appealed both Supreme Court orders.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court denied Facebook’s motion to quash the warrants and later denied its motion to compel the disclosure of the supporting affidavit. The Appellate Division dismissed Facebook’s appeals from both orders, finding them non-appealable because they stemmed from a criminal proceeding, and there was no statutory basis for an appeal. The New York Court of Appeals granted Facebook leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division correctly dismissed Facebook’s appeal from the order denying its motion to quash the SCA warrants?

    2. Whether the Appellate Division correctly dismissed Facebook’s appeal from the order denying Facebook’s motion to compel disclosure of the supporting affidavit?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there is no statutory basis for an appeal of an order denying a motion to quash a warrant issued in a criminal proceeding.

    2. Yes, because the same rule applies to the order denying Facebook’s motion to compel disclosure of the supporting affidavit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court focused on the appealability of orders in criminal proceedings under New York law. The court noted that the CPL does not provide for appeals from orders denying motions to quash search warrants. The court found that SCA warrants, although compelling third-party disclosure of electronic data, are more analogous to traditional search warrants than subpoenas because they initiate criminal proceedings. They noted, “[n]o appeal lies from [an] order denying … [an] application to vacate a search warrant … as this is an order in a criminal [case], [and] an appeal from [such an order] is not provided for” by statute. The court emphasized that a motion to quash a subpoena is considered civil, but a motion to quash a warrant is criminal because the warrant itself commenced a criminal proceeding. The court found that SCA warrants are governed by the same laws as traditional warrants. The court further stated, “[a]n SCA warrant — and the relief sought in a challenge to such a warrant — arises in a criminal, not a civil, proceeding.” The court also considered the potential for protracted litigation if appeals were allowed. The court declined to create a right to appeal where the legislature had not authorized one.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the strict limitations on appeals in New York criminal proceedings. Lawyers handling cases involving SCA warrants should understand that orders denying motions to quash those warrants are not directly appealable. To appeal such an order, parties must challenge it within the framework of the criminal case, typically after conviction. The case underscores the importance of distinguishing between warrants and subpoenas, with the former triggering criminal procedure and the latter civil procedure rules. This ruling clarifies that third-party providers like Facebook, who are subject to SCA warrants, do not have an automatic right to appeal the denial of a motion to quash a warrant under state law. The decision has significant implications for digital privacy, law enforcement investigations, and the procedural avenues available to challenge the acquisition of electronic data.