New York Law Review

Tag: 2014

  • People v. Horton, 24 N.Y.3d 985 (2014): Establishing Witness Tampering Through Online Communication

    People v. Horton, 24 N.Y.3d 985 (2014)

    Evidence of online communications, including social media posts, can be sufficient to establish witness tampering if it demonstrates the defendant knew the person was a potential witness and wrongfully attempted to induce that person to avoid testifying.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for witness tampering, holding that the defendant’s Facebook posts and YouTube video identifying a confidential informant, combined with threatening comments, were sufficient evidence to prove he attempted to prevent her from testifying in a drug case. The court reasoned that the jury could reasonably infer the online communications were coded threats intended to dissuade the informant from testifying, particularly given the defendant’s knowledge of her role and the pending charges against his friend. The decision highlights the potential for online activity to constitute witness tampering.

    Facts

    A confidential informant assisted the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office in a controlled drug purchase from Clarence Jackson, which was recorded. Jackson was arrested and informed the defendant, Thomas Horton, about his arrest and intention to plead guilty, showing him the videotape. The confidential informant reported that Horton was “outing” her as an informant on Facebook, posting a clip of the surveillance video on YouTube with a link on his Facebook page. Horton and others made denouncing and threatening statements towards the informant on Facebook including “Snitches get stitches” and “I hope she gets what’s coming to her.”

    Procedural History

    Horton was arrested and convicted in Town Court for fourth-degree witness tampering. He was sentenced to one year in jail. Horton appealed to County Court, arguing insufficient evidence that he attempted to prevent the informant from testifying or knew she would testify. The County Court affirmed the conviction. A judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish that the defendant knew the confidential informant might testify in a proceeding and that he wrongfully sought to stop her from doing so through online communications.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence, viewed favorably to the prosecution, was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendant knew the informant might testify and that his online communications constituted a wrongful attempt to prevent her from doing so.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court emphasized that after learning about Jackson’s arrest and the informant’s role, Horton posted communications online that the jury could reasonably infer were coded threats intended to induce the informant not to testify. The court also noted that Horton was in contact with the informant and her mother via Facebook messages. The court stated, “[A]fter learning about Jackson’s arrest and the confidential informant’s role as a witness against Jackson and, potentially, himself, defendant immediately posted communications on the Internet that the jury might have reasonably inferred were coded threats that were intended to induce the confidential informant not to testify.” The court concluded that Horton’s actions satisfied the elements of Penal Law § 215.10, which defines witness tampering as wrongfully inducing or attempting to induce a person to avoid testifying, knowing that person is or is about to be called as a witness. The court considered the totality of the circumstances, including the context of the Facebook posts and YouTube video, to determine that the defendant’s intent was to dissuade the informant from testifying.

  • People v. Espinal, 24 N.Y.3d 136 (2014): Limits on Defendant’s Right to Choice of Counsel

    People v. Espinal, 24 N.Y.3d 136 (2014)

    A trial court is not obligated to inquire whether a defendant seeks new counsel when newly retained counsel requests an adjournment for more preparation time, unless the defendant communicates a desire to obtain new counsel.

    Summary

    Espinal was convicted of rape and related charges. He argued the trial court violated his right to counsel of choice by denying adjournment requests made by his newly retained attorney, Bruno, who stepped in for Espinal’s original attorney, Martineau, due to Martineau’s illness. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court had no obligation to inquire if Espinal wanted to retain new counsel because Espinal only requested more time for Bruno to prepare, not to seek a different attorney. The Court emphasized that the right to counsel of choice is not absolute and can be limited by the need for efficient administration of justice.

    Facts

    Espinal was charged with multiple counts of rape, sexual abuse, and endangering the welfare of a child.
    He initially retained attorney Martineau, who suffered a debilitating medical condition.
    Martineau requested and received an adjournment of Espinal’s trial due to his health.
    After another adjournment request, Martineau suggested that Espinal might need to find substitute counsel. Attorney Bruno was identified as a potential replacement.
    Bruno took over the case shortly before trial as Martineau’s health worsened.

    Procedural History

    County Court initially granted adjournments due to Martineau’s health.
    After Bruno took over, the County Court denied further adjournment requests.
    Espinal was convicted on all charges in County Court.
    Espinal moved to set aside the verdict, arguing a violation of his right to counsel of choice; the motion was denied.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s judgment.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated the defendant’s right to counsel of choice by denying adjournment motions without inquiring whether the defendant sought to retain new counsel.

    Holding

    No, because no communication was made to the County Court that the defendant was asking for the opportunity to retain new counsel. The defendant simply sought an adjournment to give Bruno more time to prepare.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the fundamental right to counsel of one’s choosing under both the Federal and State Constitutions, citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 US 140, 144 (2006) and People v. Arroyave, 49 NY2d 264, 270 (1980). However, the Court emphasized that this right is qualified and can be subordinate to the efficient administration of justice, referencing People v. Griffin, 20 NY3d 626, 630 (2013).

    The Court reasoned that a defendant cannot use the right to counsel of choice as a delaying tactic, quoting Arroyave: “the efficient administration of the criminal justice system is a critical concern to society as a whole, and unnecessary adjournments for the purpose of permitting a defendant to retain different counsel will disrupt court dockets, interfere with the right of other criminal defendants to a speedy trial, and inconvenience witnesses, jurors and opposing counsel” (Arroyave, 49 NY2d at 271).

    The Court highlighted that Espinal never explicitly requested new counsel. Bruno’s requests for adjournment were framed as needing more time for preparation, not as a desire to find a different attorney. The Court noted that while it is “the better practice” for a court to inquire about a defendant’s intentions when new counsel requests an adjournment, there was no constitutional violation in this case because there was no indication that Espinal wanted to replace Bruno.

  • Colin Realty Co., LLC v. Town of N. Hempstead, 24 N.Y.3d 96 (2014): Off-Street Parking Variances Treated as Area Variances

    Colin Realty Co., LLC v. Town of N. Hempstead, 24 N.Y.3d 96 (2014)

    A zoning board of appeals should evaluate requests for off-street parking variances by applying the standards for an area variance so long as the property is intended to be used for a purpose permitted in the zoning district.

    Summary

    This case clarifies whether off-street parking variances should be treated as area or use variances. Manhasset Pizza sought to open a restaurant in a storefront in North Hempstead, NY, requiring variances from the town’s off-street parking requirements. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) granted the variances, treating them as area variances. Colin Realty, a neighboring property owner, challenged this decision, arguing that the variances should have been evaluated as use variances. The New York Court of Appeals held that off-street parking variances are generally treated as area variances when the intended use is permitted in the zoning district, overruling any conflicting suggestion in prior case law.

    Facts

    Fradler Realty Corporation owned a building in a Business A district in North Hempstead. Manhasset Pizza sought to lease a vacant storefront within the building to operate a 45-seat restaurant, a permitted use in the district contingent upon a conditional use permit. The Town Code required 24 off-street parking spaces for the proposed restaurant, a requirement stemming from a 1939 Town Code change. The existing building, constructed before the parking requirements, did not provide the requisite parking. Manhasset Pizza applied for the conditional use permit and requested variances from the parking requirements.

    Procedural History

    The Town of North Hempstead ZBA granted the conditional use permit and the requested variances, treating them as area variances. Colin Realty, a neighboring property owner, filed a hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding/declaratory judgment action challenging the ZBA’s determination. The Supreme Court denied Colin Realty’s petition, upholding the ZBA’s decision. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the ZBA properly treated the parking variances as area variances. Colin Realty appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a variance from off-street parking requirements for a permitted use should be treated as a use variance or an area variance.

    Holding

    No, because off-street parking requirements regulate how property area may be developed and are akin to minimum lot size or setback restrictions; therefore, area variance rules apply so long as the underlying use is permitted in the zoning district.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the distinction between use and area variances under Town Law § 267 (1), which defines a use variance as permission to use land for a purpose “which is otherwise not allowed or is prohibited” and an area variance as permission to use land “in a manner which is not allowed by the dimensional or physical requirements.” The court revisited its prior decisions in Matter of Overhill Bldg. Co. v Delany and Matter of Off Shore Rest. Corp. v Linden, acknowledging some ambiguity in the latter regarding parking variances. The Court noted that off-street parking requirements, while differing based on use, regulate how the property’s area may be developed, similar to minimum lot size or set-back restrictions. The Court stated that area variance rules apply to requests to relax off-street parking requirements, “so long as the underlying use is permitted in the zoning district; use variance rules prevail only if the variance is sought in connection with a use prohibited or otherwise not allowed in the district.” The Court explicitly overruled any conflicting suggestion in Off Shore. In this case, because the restaurant was a permitted use, the ZBA properly considered the variance application as a request for an area variance. The court emphasized the importance of considering the benefit to the applicant versus the detriment to the community, as required for area variances under Town Law § 267-b (3) (b). The court noted that in Overhill, “when courts are faced with applications for variances from zoning regulations which prescribe the number of off-street parking spaces required for a building, the rules relating to area variances obtain.” The Court determined the ZBA balanced the statutory factors and based its findings on facts in the record, making its determination rational.

  • Town of North Hempstead v. County of Nassau, 23 N.Y.3d 72 (2014): County Authority to Charge Back Community College Costs

    23 N.Y.3d 72 (2014)

    A county can charge back to its towns the costs associated with residents attending the Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT), even for four-year degree programs, and can offset these costs against sales tax revenue owed to the towns.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether Nassau County can charge back to the Town of North Hempstead the costs for town residents attending the Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT). The court held that the county could charge back these costs, even for FIT’s four-year programs, and could offset the amount owed against the town’s share of sales tax revenue. The court reasoned that the Education Law allows counties to seek reimbursement for community college costs, and the state’s failure to fund its reimbursement obligation did not eliminate the county’s right to seek chargebacks from the towns. The expansion of FIT’s degree programs did not change the financing structure. The county’s right to offset the debt was upheld under common-law principles.

    Facts

    FIT, while initially a two-year community college, expanded to offer baccalaureate and master’s degrees. Nassau County, the local sponsor, began charging back to its towns the costs associated with residents attending out-of-county community colleges. In 2010, the county began including FIT chargebacks. By April 2011, the Town of North Hempstead owed the county $1,174,462.60 in FIT expenses for the 2010 fiscal year. The county withheld this amount, along with other community college expenses, from the town’s share of sales tax revenue.

    Procedural History

    The Town commenced a hybrid action seeking a declaration that the County lacked the authority to charge back FIT expenses. Supreme Court found the County could collect chargebacks, but only for two-year programs. The Appellate Division modified, applying chargebacks to all FIT degree programs, but found the County needed a formal resolution and couldn’t offset against sales tax revenue. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and cross-appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the County has the authority to charge back FIT costs to the Town, considering the State’s previous reimbursement obligation?

    2. Whether the County’s reimbursement should be limited to expenses associated with FIT’s two-year programs?

    3. Whether the County has the authority to offset the Town’s debt by retaining the appropriate amount from the Town’s share of sales tax revenue?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the State’s reimbursement obligation was superseded when the legislature failed to appropriate the required funding and the statute continues to authorize chargebacks to the towns and cities for all community colleges.

    2. No, because the statute expanding FIT’s curriculum states that the school “shall be financed and administered in the manner provided for community colleges” (Education Law § 6302 [3]).

    3. Yes, because the County, like any other creditor, is permitted to employ the common-law right of set-off.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the State’s failure to fund its reimbursement obligation did not eliminate the County’s ability to seek chargebacks from the towns under Education Law § 6305 (5). The statutes were not in irreconcilable conflict, but could be harmonized to allow the counties to be reimbursed using funds from the State or the local municipalities. The effect of the State’s failure to fund its reimbursement obligation did not impose an additional expense upon the counties.

    The Court also rejected the argument that reimbursement should be limited to expenses associated with FIT’s two-year programs, citing Education Law § 6302 (3), which states that FIT “shall be financed and administered in the manner provided for community colleges.”

    Finally, the Court upheld the County’s authority to offset the Town’s debt against sales tax revenue, citing the common-law right of set-off. The Court noted that “the Education Law allows the County to seek chargebacks from the Town and the amount of the Town’s debt has been reliably determined based on concrete FIT enrollment figures.” As a result, the County may offset the amounts owed by the Town and a specific resolution for this purpose is not required.

    The court stated, “Generally, a statute is deemed impliedly repealed by another statute only if the two are in such conflict that it is impossible to give some effect to both. If a reasonable field of operation can be found for each statute, that construction should be adopted” (Alweis v Evans, 69 NY2d 199, 204 [1987]).

  • People v. Ramos, 24 N.Y.3d 63 (2014): Warrantless Searches and the Exigent Circumstances Exception

    People v. Ramos, 24 N.Y.3d 63 (2014)

    Once the exigency that justifies a warrantless search dissipates, the search must cease unless another exception to the warrant requirement applies.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Police officers, responding to gunshots, pursued the defendant into an apartment. After securing the defendant and other occupants, an officer searched a closed box and found a gun. The New York Court of Appeals held that the warrantless search of the box was unreasonable because the exigent circumstances that initially justified the entry into the apartment had abated once the defendant and the other occupants were secured. Therefore, the evidence should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    Responding to reports of gunshots and observing muzzle flashes, police officers entered an apartment building. Hearing a gunshot directly above them and voices in the hallway, officers found the defendant holding a firearm. The defendant fled into an apartment, and the officers forced entry. Inside, two women were present. The officers located the defendant and another man hiding under a bed, handcuffed them, and brought them to the living room with the women. A subsequent search of the apartment by one of the officers led to the discovery of a closed metal box in an adjoining bedroom. The officer opened the box and found a gun.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the exigent circumstances had dissipated once the defendant was handcuffed. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the same exigent circumstances that justified the entry into the apartment also justified the search for the gun. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting the motion to suppress.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search of a closed metal box in the defendant’s apartment was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement after the defendant and other occupants were secured by police.

    Holding

    No, because the exigent circumstances that justified the initial entry into the apartment had abated by the time the officer searched the closed box. The defendant and other occupants were secured, and there was no immediate threat to the public or the police.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principle that warrantless searches of a home are per se unreasonable unless subject to specific, narrow exceptions. The exigent circumstances exception allows police to act without a warrant when urgent events make it impossible to obtain one in time to preserve evidence or prevent danger. However, the scope of a search under exigent circumstances is strictly limited by the necessities of the situation. Once the exigency abates, the authority to conduct a warrantless search also ends.

    In this case, the Court found that any urgency had abated by the time the officer opened the box. The defendant and the other man were handcuffed and under police supervision in the living room along with the two women. The Court reasoned that the police were in complete control, and there was no longer a danger that the defendant would dispose of the weapon or pose a threat to the public or the police. Absent another exception to the warrant requirement, the police were required to obtain a warrant before searching the box.

    The Court distinguished this situation from cases where the exigency remained present, such as when a suspect could access a weapon or pose an immediate threat. The Court emphasized that the burden is on the People to prove that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search, a burden they failed to meet in this case. The court noted, “[A]ll occupants were out of commission.” (Knapp, 52 NY2d at 696-697)

  • People v. Coleman, 23 N.Y.3d 116 (2014): Scope of Drug Law Reform Act Resentencing for Persistent Felony Offenders

    23 N.Y.3d 116 (2014)

    The Drug Law Reform Act of 2009’s resentencing exclusion for offenders ineligible for merit time allowances applies only to those convicted of specific serious crimes listed in Correction Law § 803(1)(d)(ii), not to offenders ineligible solely due to persistent felony offender status.

    Summary

    Earl Coleman, convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance and sentenced as a persistent felony offender, sought resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) of 2009. The prosecution argued he was ineligible due to his status preventing merit time allowances. The New York Court of Appeals held that Coleman was eligible for resentencing. The court reasoned that the DLRA exclusion applies only to convictions for specific serious crimes that inherently preclude merit time, not to those whose ineligibility stems solely from a recidivist sentencing adjudication. This interpretation aligns with the DLRA’s remedial purpose of lessening excessive punishments for low-level, nonviolent drug offenders.

    Facts

    In 2001, Earl Coleman was convicted of two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. Due to prior felony convictions (robbery and criminal possession of stolen property), the court sentenced him as a persistent felony offender to 15 years to life. He later sought resentencing under the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA). The prosecution opposed, arguing Coleman was ineligible due to his persistent felony offender status, which prevented him from receiving merit time allowances.

    Procedural History

    Coleman’s initial resentencing motion was denied by the County Court. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the County Court erred in failing to assign counsel. Upon remittal, the County Court again denied resentencing. The Appellate Division reversed, holding Coleman eligible. The dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the DLRA resentencing exclusion for those ineligible for merit time allowances applies to all offenders ineligible, including those due to recidivist sentencing, or only to those convicted of crimes listed in Correction Law § 803(1)(d)(ii)?

    Holding

    1. No, because the exclusion applies only to offenders convicted of crimes listed in Correction Law § 803(1)(d)(ii) that automatically preclude merit time allowances, regardless of recidivist sentencing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the interpretation of CPL 440.46(5)(a), which defines an “exclusion offense” with reference to Correction Law § 803(1)(d)(ii). While acknowledging ambiguity in the statutory language, the Court emphasized the DLRA’s remedial purpose: to alleviate excessive punishments for low-level, nonviolent drug offenders. Interpreting the exclusion to apply only to convictions for specific serious crimes that inherently preclude merit time better aligns with this legislative intent. The court reasoned that the legislature’s focus was on the nature of the offense, not merely the resulting sentence. The Court also noted that the DLRA generally excludes offenders based on the violent or unsavory nature of their crimes. "[W]hen the legislature enacted the 2009 DLRA, it sought to ameliorate the excessive punishments meted out to low-level, nonviolent drug offenders under the so-called Rockefeller Drug Laws, and therefore the statute is designed to spread relief as widely as possible, within the bounds of reason, to its intended beneficiaries." Therefore, persistent felony offenders whose underlying crimes are not those listed in Correction Law § 803(1)(d)(ii) remain eligible for resentencing. The Court stated: "[T]he merit-time-related exclusion follows the offense-based approach of the other exclusions by precluding resentencing only for individuals whose offenses are so serious as to make it impossible for them to receive a merit time allowance under the Correction Law."

  • People v. Rossi, 23 N.Y.3d 969 (2014): Applying the Emergency Exception to Warrantless Searches

    People v. Rossi, 23 N.Y.3d 969 (2014)

    The emergency exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement justifies a warrantless search when there is a reasonable belief that an emergency exists requiring immediate action to protect life or property, and the scope of the search is reasonably related to the exigency.

    Summary

    Police responded to a 911 call from the defendant’s wife, who reported he had shot himself. Upon arrival, officers found Rossi bleeding and learned children were present. Rossi claimed he didn’t know where the gun was. Officers searched the house and backyard, finding the loaded weapon near a shed. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the warrantless search under the emergency exception, finding sufficient record support for the lower court’s conclusion that an ongoing emergency existed due to the unsecured firearm and the presence of children. The court emphasized its limited review of mixed questions of law and fact when record support exists for the lower courts’ findings.

    Facts

    On July 11, 2009, police responded to Rossi’s residence after his wife reported he shot himself. Rossi was found bleeding, and officers learned his children and another child were in the house. Rossi stated he had been cleaning a gun, which discharged, but claimed he didn’t know where the gun was. Officers searched the premises, eventually finding a loaded gun in the backyard.

    Procedural History

    Rossi was charged with criminal possession of a weapon. He moved to suppress the gun as evidence, arguing the emergency had ended when he was secured. The suppression court denied the motion, finding the search lawful under the emergency exception. After a jury trial, Rossi was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search of Rossi’s property was justified under the emergency exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, considering the presence of children and the unsecured firearm.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was record support for the lower court’s conclusion that the search was lawful under the emergency exception. The Appellate Division majority determined that “defendant’s incoherence and evasive answers about the location of the gun and the presence of children on the premises . . . established an ongoing emergency and danger to life, justifying the search for and seizure of the gun.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that applying the emergency doctrine involves a mixed question of law and fact. The Court’s review is limited to determining whether there is record support for the findings of the lower courts. Here, both the Appellate Division majority and dissent applied the test from People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173 (1976), but reached different conclusions on when the emergency ceased.
    Because there was record support for the majority’s conclusion that the search was lawful under the emergency exception, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court stated, “ ‘any further review is beyond this Court’s jurisdiction’ ” (quoting People v. Dallas, 8 N.Y.3d 890, 891 [2007], quoting People v. Molnar, 98 N.Y.2d 328, 335 [2002]). This highlights the importance of establishing a clear record in suppression hearings to support the application of the emergency exception. The court implicitly acknowledged that once Rossi was frisked and the children were determined not to have the gun, the exigency lessened, however there was deference to the finding that officers were not aware that the children were safe, and the record supported that conclusion. The case illustrates how the emergency exception can extend beyond the immediate threat if there’s a reasonable, ongoing concern for safety.

  • People v. Maldonado, 24 N.Y.3d 48 (2014): Depraved Indifference and High-Speed Chases

    People v. Maldonado, 24 N.Y.3d 48 (2014)

    Evidence of a defendant’s attempt to avoid collisions during a high-speed chase negates the element of depraved indifference required for a murder conviction, even if the conduct is reckless and results in a fatality.

    Summary

    Jose Maldonado was convicted of depraved indifference murder after a high-speed police chase resulted in the death of a pedestrian. Maldonado stole a minivan and led police on a five-minute chase through Brooklyn, during which he ran red lights, drove on the wrong side of the road, and sped through traffic. He struck and killed a pedestrian. At trial, Maldonado argued that his actions, while reckless, did not demonstrate the depraved indifference to human life required for a murder conviction. The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reducing the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree, holding that Maldonado’s attempts to avoid collisions indicated he did not possess the required mental state for depraved indifference murder.

    Facts

    Maldonado stole a minivan and led police on a high-speed chase through a mixed commercial-residential area in Brooklyn. During the chase, Maldonado ran multiple red lights, drove on the wrong side of the road, and weaved through traffic at speeds well above the speed limit. He narrowly avoided hitting a pedestrian at one point. Maldonado then struck and killed a woman in a crosswalk. After hitting the pedestrian, Maldonado continued to flee, again driving on the wrong side of the road, until he crashed into a parked car. After his arrest, Maldonado admitted to stealing the minivan and driving recklessly but stated he tried to avoid hitting people and cars and expressed remorse.

    Procedural History

    Maldonado was charged with depraved indifference murder, manslaughter, and other related crimes. At trial, he moved to dismiss the depraved indifference murder charge, arguing that the evidence only supported a charge of recklessness. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted Maldonado of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to establish that Maldonado acted with depraved indifference to human life, as required for a conviction of murder in the second degree under New York Penal Law § 125.25(2), given his attempts to avoid collisions during the high-speed chase.

    Holding

    No, because Maldonado’s attempts to avoid hitting other vehicles indicated that he did not possess the utter disregard for human life necessary for a depraved indifference murder conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that depraved indifference requires an utter disregard for the value of human life, a mental state distinct from recklessness. The court stated that “[a] person who is depravedly indifferent is not just willing to take a grossly unreasonable risk to human life—that person does not care how the risk turns out.” The court found that Maldonado’s actions of swerving to avoid collisions demonstrated a concern for the safety of others, which is inconsistent with depraved indifference. The court distinguished this case from People v. Heidgen, where defendants drove long distances in the wrong direction without attempting to avoid collisions. The court noted that Maldonado’s driving, although reckless, was characterized by attempts to mitigate the risk to others, bringing it closer to the facts in People v. Prindle, where the court reduced a depraved indifference murder conviction to manslaughter. The court rejected the argument that Maldonado’s looking in the rearview mirror before hitting the victim demonstrated depraved indifference, stating it was a manifestation of his desire to evade police, not a total disregard for human life. The court concluded that allowing the depraved indifference charge in this case would risk that such a charge be brought in every high-speed chase case, which is not the intent of the law. The court ruled that the evidence only supported a conviction for manslaughter in the second degree, which requires recklessness but not the higher mental state of depraved indifference.

  • People v. Marquan M., 24 N.Y.3d 1 (2014): Overbroad Cyberbullying Laws and First Amendment Rights

    24 N.Y.3d 1 (2014)

    A cyberbullying law that is overbroad, encompassing a wide array of protected speech beyond the cyberbullying of children, violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of Albany County’s cyberbullying law. Defendant, a high school student, anonymously posted sexual information about classmates on Facebook and was criminally prosecuted under the local law. The New York Court of Appeals held that the law was facially invalid under the First Amendment because it was overbroad, criminalizing a variety of constitutionally-protected modes of expression beyond the cyberbullying of children. The court reasoned that the law’s reach extended to communications aimed at adults and fictitious entities, and included various forms of electronic communication intended to harass or annoy, not just those intended to inflict significant emotional harm on children.

    Facts

    Defendant Marquan M., a 16-year-old high school student in Albany County, created a Facebook page under the pseudonym “Cohoes Flame.” He posted photographs of classmates with vulgar descriptions of their alleged sexual practices and personal information. A police investigation revealed that defendant was the author of the postings. He admitted his involvement and was charged with cyberbullying under Albany County’s local law.

    Procedural History

    Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the cyberbullying statute violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The City Court denied the motion. Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of cyberbullying, reserving his right to raise his constitutional arguments on appeal. The County Court affirmed the conviction, concluding the law was constitutional as applied to minors. The New York Court of Appeals granted defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Albany County’s cyberbullying law violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment because it is overbroad and unlawfully vague.

    Holding

    No, because Albany County’s Local Law No. 11 of 2010, as drafted, is overbroad and facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals began by recognizing that while the government generally cannot restrict expression based on its message or content, it has a compelling interest in protecting children from harmful materials. The court acknowledged that cyberbullying is not conceptually immune from government regulation. However, the specific language of the Albany County law was too broad. The law criminalized “any act of communicating…by mechanical or electronic means…with no legitimate…personal…purpose, with the intent to harass [or] annoy…another person.” This encompassed a wide array of protected speech, beyond cyberbullying of children. The court noted that the law covered communications aimed at adults and fictitious entities, not just children. It also included every conceivable form of electronic communication, intended to “harass, annoy…taunt…[or] humiliate,” not just those intended to inflict significant emotional harm on children.

    The court rejected the County’s argument to sever the offending portions of the statute to save it, stating, “the doctrine of separation of governmental powers prevents a court from rewriting a legislative enactment through the creative use of a severability clause when the result is incompatible with the language of the statute.” Modifying the statute to the extent suggested would result in an amended scope that bore little resemblance to the actual language of the law, leading to vagueness. The court stated, “Even if the First Amendment allows a cyberbullying statute of the limited nature proposed by Albany County, the local law here was not drafted in that manner.” The court concluded that Albany County failed to meet its burden of proving that the restrictions on speech in its cyberbullying law survived strict scrutiny. As the court said, “the text of Albany County’s law envelops far more than acts of cyberbullying against children by criminalizing a variety of constitutionally-protected modes of expression.”

  • In re Thelen LLP, 24 N.Y.3d 16 (2014): Law Firm Dissolution and “Unfinished Business” Doctrine

    In re Thelen LLP, 24 N.Y.3d 16 (2014)

    Under New York law, a dissolved law firm’s pending hourly fee matters are not partnership property or unfinished business entitling the firm to profits earned on those matters after dissolution; a law firm only owns the right to be compensated for services already rendered.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed certified questions from the Second Circuit regarding whether a dissolved law firm has a property interest in hourly fee matters pending at the time of dissolution, such that the firm is entitled to profits earned on those matters as unfinished business. The court held that pending hourly fee matters are not partnership property under New York law. The court reasoned that clients have the unfettered right to choose their counsel and terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time. A law firm’s expectation of future business is too contingent to create a property interest. The court emphasized public policy considerations, including client autonomy and attorney mobility, which would be negatively impacted by treating pending hourly matters as firm property.

    Facts

    The law firm Thelen LLP dissolved in 2008 and filed for bankruptcy in 2009. Prior to dissolution, Thelen’s partners adopted an “Unfinished Business Waiver” intending to waive any rights to unfinished business of the partnership. After Thelen’s dissolution, several partners joined Seyfarth Shaw LLP, taking pending client matters with them. Seyfarth billed clients for their services on these matters. The bankruptcy trustee for Thelen’s estate sued Seyfarth, arguing that the unfinished business waiver was a fraudulent transfer and seeking to recover the profits earned by Seyfarth on the former Thelen matters.

    Procedural History

    The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted judgment on the pleadings to Seyfarth, holding that the unfinished business doctrine does not apply to pending hourly fee matters under New York law. The District Court certified its order for interlocutory appeal. The Second Circuit agreed that New York law governed the dispute and certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the applicability and scope of the unfinished business doctrine under New York law.

    Issue(s)

    1. Under New York law, is a client matter that is billed on an hourly basis the property of a law firm, such that, upon dissolution and in related bankruptcy proceedings, the law firm is entitled to the profit earned on such matters as the ‘unfinished business’ of the firm?

    2. If so, how does New York law define a ‘client matter’ for purposes of the unfinished business doctrine and what proportion of the profit derived from an ongoing hourly matter may the new law firm retain?

    Holding

    1. No, because clients have the unqualified right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time, and a law firm’s expectation of future hourly legal fees is too contingent to create a property interest.

    2. This question was not answered because the first question was answered in the negative.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Partnership Law provides default rules for dividing property upon dissolution, but does not define what constitutes property. The court cited Verizon New England Inc. v Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., stating that the “expectation of any continued or future business is too contingent in nature and speculative to create a present or future property interest.” The court emphasized the client’s unfettered right to choose counsel and terminate the attorney-client relationship, citing Matter of Cooperman, which establishes that clients are only obligated to compensate the attorney for “the fair and reasonable value of the completed services.” The court distinguished cases involving contingency fee arrangements, noting that those cases involved disputes between a dissolved partnership and a departing partner, not outside third parties, and only entitled the partnership to an accounting for the value of the cases as of the date of dissolution. The Court distinguished Stem v. Warren, stating it was a breach of fiduciary duty case and not a case that defines what makes up partnership property. The court also considered public policy implications, noting that treating pending hourly fee matters as partnership property would create an “unjust windfall” and discourage partners from remaining to bolster a struggling firm. The court highlighted New York’s strong public policy encouraging client choice and attorney mobility, citing Cohen v Lord, Day & Lord. The court also noted that clients are not merchandise. Lawyers are not tradesmen. They have nothing to sell but personal service. The court concluded that the trustees’ theory does not comport with the legal profession’s traditions and commercial realities, and that a Jewel waiver could not cure this deficiency.