New York Law Review

Tag: 2014

  • Matter of Rosenthal v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 23 N.Y.3d 490 (2014): Validity of Out-of-Competition Equine Drug Testing

    Matter of Rosenthal v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 23 N.Y.3d 490 (2014)

    State agencies have the authority to implement out-of-competition drug testing for racehorses to prevent the use of performance-enhancing drugs, and such testing does not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a rule mandating out-of-competition drug testing (OCTR) for harness racehorses. The New York State Racing and Wagering Board implemented the rule to combat the use of new, undetectable performance-enhancing drugs. Petitioners, standardbred owners and trainers, challenged the rule, arguing it exceeded the Board’s authority and violated constitutional protections against unreasonable searches. The Court of Appeals upheld the Board’s authority, finding the rule a reasonable measure to prevent circumvention of existing regulations and that the testing regimen did not constitute an unreasonable search given the pervasively regulated nature of the horse racing industry.

    Facts

    The New York State Racing and Wagering Board (Board) promulgated a rule requiring licensees to make their harness racehorses available for random blood and urine sampling, even when the horses were not participating in an imminent race. This out-of-competition testing rule (OCTR) was designed to address the emergence of protein-based drugs capable of enhancing a horse’s speed while evading detection during race-day testing. Dr. Maylin, an expert in equine pharmacology, stated these drugs could turn even naturally lame horses into competitors. Petitioners, owners and trainers of standardbred horses, challenged the rule.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners initiated a hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding/declaratory judgment action challenging the rule’s validity before its effective date. The Supreme Court granted the petition, finding the Board exceeded its authority. The Appellate Division modified the decision, denying the petition except for one provision not at issue, and upheld the rule’s validity. The Court of Appeals heard the case on appeal as of right.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the New York State Racing and Wagering Board has the legal authority to promulgate a rule mandating out-of-competition drug testing for racehorses.
    2. Whether a testing regimen of the sort proposed would involve constitutionally unreasonable intrusions by the Board’s agents.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Board has broad authority to supervise harness race meetings and prevent circumvention of regulations designed to ensure fair competition and protect the integrity of the sport.
    2. No, because licensees in the pervasively regulated horse racing industry have a diminished expectation of privacy, and the proposed testing regimen meaningfully limits the scope of any intrusion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law § 301(1) grants the Board broad supervisory powers over pari-mutuel harness race meetings, including the power to adopt rules and regulations to prevent circumvention or evasion of its purposes. The court stated, “[T]he legislature had no purpose of restricting respondent’s general supervisory power over pari-mutuel harness race meetings, but it specifically authorizes regulatory action to prevent the circumvention or evasion of existing rules.”

    The court acknowledged the legislative delegation to administrative officials requires a reasonable amount of discretion. The OCTR addressed a loophole in the existing regulatory framework created by new doping agents undetectable through traditional race-day testing.

    Regarding the Fourth Amendment challenge, the Court found that licensees in the horse racing industry, “having voluntarily entered a pervasively regulated field of commercial endeavor…can claim no privacy expectation that would prevent respondent from testing their racehorses’ blood and urine.”

    The court distinguished the intrusions from unreasonable searches, emphasizing the limited scope of the testing and the commercial nature of the stables. It stated, “The intrusion contemplated by such a testing regimen is not one into any residential or otherwise notably private space, but a highly focused, guided and brief veterinary foray into leased commercial stabling areas…with the object, not of discovering evidence of criminal activity…but of sampling, exclusively for regulatory enforcement purposes, the blood and urine of a specifically identified racehorse.”

  • Nesmith v. Allstate Insurance Co., 24 N.Y.3d 183 (2014): Interpreting Non-Cumulation Clauses in Insurance Policies

    Nesmith v. Allstate Insurance Co., 24 N.Y.3d 183 (2014)

    When a liability insurance policy contains a non-cumulation clause, successive injuries arising from continuous or repeated exposure to the same general conditions constitute a single accidental loss, limiting the insurer’s liability to one policy limit, regardless of the number of injured parties or claims.

    Summary

    This case addresses the interpretation of a non-cumulation clause in successive liability insurance policies issued to a landlord. Two families, the Youngs and the Nesmiths, lived in the same apartment at different times, and children in both families suffered lead poisoning. Allstate paid the Youngs’ claim but argued that the non-cumulation clause limited total liability to one policy limit, precluding full payment to the Nesmiths. The court held that the injuries resulted from continuous or repeated exposure to the same general conditions, constituting a single accidental loss under the policy. Thus, Allstate’s liability was capped at the single policy limit, consistent with the holding in Hiraldo v. Allstate Ins. Co.

    Facts

    Allstate issued liability insurance to a landlord from September 1991, renewing it annually through September 1993. The policy had a $500,000 limit for each occurrence and contained a non-cumulation clause. The Young family lived in the insured property from November 1992 to September 1993. A child in the Young family was found to have elevated blood lead levels in July 1993, and the Department of Health notified the landlord of lead paint violations. After the Youngs moved out, the Nesmith family moved in. In December 1994, a child in the Nesmith family was also found to have elevated blood lead levels. Both families sued the landlord for personal injuries caused by lead paint exposure.

    Procedural History

    The Youngs’ action was settled for $350,000, paid by Allstate. The Nesmiths settled their claim, reserving the issue of policy limits. Allstate paid $150,000, claiming it was the remaining coverage. Nesmith then sued Allstate for a declaratory judgment, arguing each family’s claim was subject to a separate $500,000 limit. The Supreme Court granted the declaration sought by Nesmith. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that, under Hiraldo, the injuries resulted from continuous exposure to the same general conditions, constituting one accidental loss. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under the terms of the Allstate insurance policy’s non-cumulation clause, the injuries sustained by the Young children and the Nesmith children, resulting from lead paint exposure in the same apartment at different times, constitute a single "accidental loss," thereby limiting Allstate’s liability to a single policy limit of $500,000.

    Holding

    No, because the injuries sustained by the Young children and the Nesmith children resulted from continuous or repeated exposure to the same general conditions (lead paint) in the same apartment, constituting a single accidental loss under the policy’s non-cumulation clause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied heavily on its prior decision in Hiraldo, which interpreted a similar non-cumulation clause. The court emphasized that the policy language limited Allstate’s total liability to the amount on the declarations page, regardless of the number of injured persons, claims, or policies involved. The court rejected Nesmith’s argument that the injuries were separate losses because they did not result from exposure to the same general conditions. The court reasoned that both families were exposed to the same hazard (lead paint) in the same apartment. The court stated, “Perhaps they were not exposed to exactly the same conditions; but to say that the ‘general conditions’ were not the same would deprive the word ‘general’ of all meaning.” The court dismissed the argument that the landlord’s attempted remediation efforts created new conditions, finding no evidence of a new lead paint hazard. Because the same general conditions persisted, the injuries were part of a single "accidental loss," and only one policy limit applied. The dissenting opinion argued that this interpretation was inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the insured, who would have expected each renewal to provide additional coverage for lead paint claims.

  • Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving v. Lewiston Golf Course, 24 N.Y.3d 558 (2014): Defining “Arm of the Tribe” for Sovereign Immunity

    Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving, Inc. v. Lewiston Golf Course Corp., 24 N.Y.3d 558 (2014)

    A corporation owned by a Native American tribe is not automatically entitled to the tribe’s sovereign immunity; courts must examine various factors, with financial independence being paramount, to determine if the corporation functions as an “arm of the tribe.”

    Summary

    Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving sued Lewiston Golf Course Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Seneca Nation of Indians, for breach of contract. Lewiston Golf claimed sovereign immunity. The New York Court of Appeals held that Lewiston Golf was not entitled to the Seneca Nation’s sovereign immunity because, despite being tribally owned and operated, its charter explicitly shielded the Seneca Nation’s assets from Lewiston Golf’s liabilities, making it financially independent and not truly an “arm” of the tribe. This decision emphasizes the importance of financial factors in determining whether a tribal entity qualifies for sovereign immunity.

    Facts

    The Seneca Nation chartered Seneca Gaming Corporation to develop gaming facilities. Seneca Gaming then created Seneca Niagara Falls Gaming Corporation to operate a casino. Seneca Niagara created Lewiston Golf Course Corporation to develop a golf course near the casino. Sue/Perior contracted with Lewiston Golf to build the course. A payment dispute arose, and Sue/Perior filed a mechanic’s lien and a foreclosure action. Lewiston Golf claimed sovereign immunity.

    Procedural History

    Sue/Perior sued Lewiston Golf in New York State Supreme Court. Lewiston Golf moved to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding Lewiston Golf was not an “arm” of the Seneca Nation. Lewiston Golf appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Lewiston Golf, a corporation indirectly owned by the Seneca Nation, is entitled to the Nation’s sovereign immunity from suit.

    Holding

    1. No, because Lewiston Golf’s charter ensures it cannot obligate the Seneca Nation’s funds, and therefore a lawsuit against Lewiston Golf will not impact the Nation’s fiscal resources. This financial independence indicates that Lewiston Golf is not an “arm” of the tribe for sovereign immunity purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the factors from Matter of Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Community Fund, 86 N.Y.2d 553 (1995), to determine if Lewiston Golf was an “arm” of the Seneca Nation. While Lewiston Golf was organized under tribal law and its governing body consisted of tribal officials, the Court emphasized the importance of financial factors. The Court noted that Lewiston Golf’s charter explicitly stated that its debts would not encumber Seneca Nation assets and that the Nation would not be liable for Lewiston Golf’s obligations. The Court reasoned that this demonstrated a clear intent to keep Lewiston Golf financially separate from the Seneca Nation. The court distinguished the case from *Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.* (523 US 751 [1998]), because Kiowa dealt with suits against tribes themselves, not corporate affiliates. The Court reasoned that because a judgment against Lewiston Golf would not reach the Seneca Nation’s assets, the Nation was not the real party in interest, and Lewiston Golf was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The dissent argued that the majority improperly prioritized financial factors over the purpose and structure of Lewiston Golf, which was created to benefit the Seneca Nation’s gaming operations and its members. The dissent asserted that Lewiston Golf should be treated the same as Seneca Gaming and Seneca Niagara Falls Gaming, which lower courts had found to be arms of the Nation. The majority responded that it was not bound by lower federal court decisions and that the question of whether Seneca Gaming and Seneca Niagara Falls Gaming were entitled to sovereign immunity was not before the court.

  • People v. Argyris, 23 N.Y.3d 177 (2014): Anonymous Tips and Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Argyris, 23 N.Y.3d 177 (2014)

    An anonymous tip can provide reasonable suspicion for a vehicle stop if it contains sufficient indicia of reliability under the totality of the circumstances or satisfies the Aguilar-Spinelli test.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard for police stops based on anonymous tips. The Court of Appeals considered three separate cases with similar fact patterns. In Argyris and DiSalvo, the Court upheld the vehicle stops based on a 911 call reporting a gun in a car. In Johnson, the court suppressed evidence from a stop initiated by a 911 call about a possible intoxicated driver. The key issue was whether the anonymous tips provided reasonable suspicion for the stops. The majority found the Argyris/DiSalvo tip reliable but the Johnson tip unreliable, though different justices disagreed on the appropriate standard to apply (totality of the circumstances vs. Aguilar-Spinelli). The decision underscores the complexities of relying on anonymous tips for law enforcement action and the ongoing debate in New York regarding the proper legal framework for assessing the reliability of such tips.

    Facts

    <p>Argyris/DiSalvo: An anonymous 911 caller reported seeing men put a gun in a black Mustang. Police located the car and stopped it, finding weapons. </p>
    <p>Johnson: An anonymous 911 caller reported a possible intoxicated driver in a blue BMW. A deputy stopped the car after observing a minor traffic violation outside his jurisdiction.</p>

    Procedural History

    <p>Argyris/DiSalvo: The trial court initially granted a motion to suppress but reversed itself on reargument. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
    <p>Johnson: The Town Court denied a motion to suppress. County Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, granted the suppression motion, and dismissed the accusatory instrument.</p>

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an anonymous tip can provide reasonable suspicion for a vehicle stop.

    2. What standard should be used to determine the reliability of an anonymous tip: totality of the circumstances or the Aguilar-Spinelli test?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the tip had sufficient indicia of reliability (Argyris/DiSalvo) but no, because the tip was unreliable (Johnson).

    2. The court did not come to a consensus. Four judges found reasonable suspicion, agreeing that the tip in Argyris/DiSalvo was reliable and the tip in Johnson was not; Smith and Pigott, JJ., favored the totality of the circumstances test and Abdus-Salaam and Graffeo, JJ., favored the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Read, J., dissented (in Argyris/DiSalvo) in an opinion stating, essentially, the anonymous tips must contain “predictive information”. Rivera, J., dissented (in Argyris/DiSalvo) in an opinion emphasizing that predictive information must be provided in the tip.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority memorandum opinion stated that regardless of whether they apply a totality of the circumstances test or the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, record support exists for the lower courts’ findings that the stops were lawful in Argyris and DiSalvo. They stated that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendants’ vehicle based on the contents of a 911 call from an anonymous individual and the confirmatory observations of the police. The absence of predictive information in the tip was not fatal to its reliability under these circumstances.

    Smith, J., concurring, argued that the Aguilar-Spinelli test needlessly complicates reasonable suspicion analysis and that a totality-of-the-circumstances approach is preferable.

    Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring, advocated for the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, suggesting that hearsay information cannot provide an officer with probable cause unless the hearsay report reveals a reliable basis for the informant’s knowledge and shows that the informant is generally credible. Furthermore, the determination of whether a tip provides the police with probable cause or reasonable suspicion depends on the quality of the tip’s description of the crime itself, as opposed to its statements regarding the suspect’s physical appearance and non-criminal conduct.

    Read, J., dissenting in Argyris and DiSalvo, emphasized the importance of predictive information in anonymous tips. She stated, “We have held that an anonymous tip supplies reasonable suspicion only if it ‘contains predictive information—such as information suggestive of criminal behavior—so that the police can test the reliability of the tip’ (People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 499 [2006]; see generally Rivera dissenting op at 14-18 [discussing Moore]).”

    Rivera, J., dissenting in Argyris and DiSalvo, argued that anonymous tips must contain predictive information to justify forcible stops and that the Aguilar-Spinelli test, requiring the informant is reliable and there is a basis for the knowledge of the informant’s tip, should be used. "[A]n anonymous tip must ‘contain[] predictive information — such as information of criminal behavior — so that the police can test the reliability of the tip’" (

  • People v. Spears, 24 N.Y.3d 1030 (2014): Trial Court Discretion on Adjournment Requests at Sentencing

    24 N.Y.3d 1030 (2014)

    A trial court has discretion to deny a defendant’s request for an adjournment at sentencing, especially when the defendant has had ample time to confer with counsel and fails to articulate a valid ground for withdrawing a guilty plea.

    Summary

    Kelvin Spears pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the second degree and requested an adjournment at sentencing to explore withdrawing his plea. The trial court denied the request, finding he had sufficient time to consult with counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because Spears had ample opportunity to confer with counsel and failed to articulate a ground for plea withdrawal. The dissent argued the trial court’s refusal was an abuse of discretion given the circumstances of the case.

    Facts

    Kelvin Spears was indicted for first-degree sexual abuse. He pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of second-degree sexual abuse and was released on his own recognizance. Over two months later, at sentencing, Spears requested an adjournment to discuss potentially withdrawing his plea. He stated he hadn’t been able to reach his counsel to address certain issues. His counsel had spoken with him the morning of the sentencing and also requested an adjournment.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the adjournment and sentenced Spears per the plea agreement. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the adjournment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for an adjournment at sentencing to discuss a potential motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant had more than a fair amount of time to speak with counsel regarding withdrawing his plea and failed to articulate a ground upon which the plea could be withdrawn.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that granting an adjournment is within the Supreme Court’s discretion. The court emphasized that Spears had ample time to consult with counsel after being released and before sentencing. Although he contacted his lawyer the day before sentencing, counsel spoke with him the morning of sentencing. Crucially, neither Spears nor his counsel articulated any specific grounds for withdrawing the plea. The court indicated it would have considered an adjournment if such grounds had been presented. The court found that “absent any indication that defendant had grounds to support a plea withdrawal, Supreme Court refusal to grant the adjournment was not an abuse of discretion.”

    The dissent argued that the court should consider the series of events leading up to the request, including the defendant’s pretrial detention and what the dissent characterized as a one-sided process. The dissent pointed to People v. Nixon, 21 N.Y.2d 338 (1967), arguing that a sound discretion exercised on an individual basis is better than mandating a uniform procedure. The dissent concluded that a simple adjournment would have harmed no one and demonstrated a more balanced approach.

  • Borden v. 400 E. 55th St. Assoc., L.P., 24 N.Y.3d 382 (2014): Class Action Allowed for Rent Overcharges Despite Treble Damages Provision

    Borden v. 400 E. 55th St. Assoc., L.P., 24 N.Y.3d 382 (2014)

    CPLR 901(b) permits class actions to recover compensatory rent overcharges under Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., even if the Rent Stabilization Law doesn’t explicitly authorize class actions and imposes treble damages for willful violations, provided the plaintiffs waive the treble damages claim.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether tenants can bring a class action lawsuit to recover rent overcharges resulting from improper deregulation under the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL) after landlords received J-51 tax benefits. The Court of Appeals held that CPLR 901(b) allows such class actions, even though the RSL doesn’t explicitly allow for class actions and provides for treble damages. The Court reasoned that the base rent overcharge is compensatory, not a penalty, and tenants can unilaterally waive treble damages to proceed with a class action, aligning with the intent of the CPLR and RSL to provide an effective remedy for tenants.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, current or former tenants, claimed rent overcharges because their apartments were improperly decontrolled while the landlords were receiving J-51 tax abatements. This claim was based on the NY Court of Appeals’ prior holding in Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Properties, L.P. Initially, the plaintiffs sought treble damages in their complaints but then waived that demand through attorney affirmation.

    Procedural History

    In Borden, the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s grant of class certification. In Gudz, the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s grant of class certification. In Downing, the Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the complaint and reinstated it. Each case reached the Court of Appeals after the Appellate Division certified a question to the Court.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CPLR 901(b) permits plaintiffs to utilize the class action mechanism to recover compensatory overcharges under Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P. when the Rent Stabilization Law does not specifically authorize class action recovery and imposes treble damages upon a finding of willful violation.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the recovery of the base amount of rent overcharge is actual, compensatory damages, not a penalty, within the meaning of CPLR 901(b), and it does not contravene the letter or the spirit of the RSL or CPLR 901(b) to permit tenants to waive treble damages in these circumstances when done unilaterally and through counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPLR 901(b) prohibits class actions for penalties unless specifically authorized by statute, but the statute’s language allows for class-action recovery of actual damages, even when a statute provides for treble damages. The legislative history supports a liberal interpretation of CPLR 901(b), intending to allow plaintiffs to waive penalties to pursue class actions for actual damages. The Court emphasized that plaintiffs sought a refund of overcharges, which constitutes actual damages, and CPLR 901(b) was not meant to bar such actions.

    The Court further addressed policy considerations, noting that class actions address information asymmetry and economies of scale, enabling tenants to pursue claims they might not otherwise bring individually. The Court distinguished the RSL from other statutes, such as General Business Law § 340(5), where treble damages are mandatory and cannot be waived. Because the RSL allows a landlord to disprove willfulness and avoid treble damages, the treble damages provision is not mandatory, allowing for waiver.

    The Court also rejected the argument that unilateral waiver of treble damages violates Section 2520.13 of the Rent Stabilization Code, which prohibits agreements waiving RSL provisions. The Court reasoned that a unilateral waiver, particularly when supported by court order and made with counsel representation, complies with the law’s intent. In Roberts cases, landlords often followed DHCR guidance when deregulating units, making a finding of willfulness unlikely, further justifying the waiver.

    Regarding class certification under CPLR 901(a), the Court found the lower courts’ evaluations adequate, noting the numerosity of class members, the predominance of common legal questions (whether apartments were unlawfully deregulated under Roberts), and the adequacy of class representation, especially given the opt-out provision. The Court referenced the legislative history that contemplated classes involving as few as 18 members “where the members would have difficulty communicating with each other, such as where ‘barriers of distance, cost, language, income, education or lack of information prevent those who are aware of their rights from communicating with others similarly situated’”.

    The Court quoted Mohassel v. Fenwick, stating that the provisions of RSL § 26-516(a) “establish the penalty as the amount of the overcharge plus interest… are designed… to compensate the tenant.”

    In conclusion, the Court held that maintaining the actions as class actions does not contravene the letter or the spirit of the CPLR or Rent Stabilization Law.

  • People v. DeLee, 24 N.Y.3d 603 (2014): Repugnant Verdicts and the Remedy of Retrial

    People v. DeLee, 24 N.Y.3d 603 (2014)

    When a jury renders a repugnant verdict by convicting a defendant of a crime containing all the elements of another crime for which the defendant was acquitted, the prosecution may retry the defendant on the repugnant charge.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime but acquitted of first-degree manslaughter. The New York Court of Appeals held that the verdict was repugnant because the elements of first-degree manslaughter are included in the elements of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime. The Court modified the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the People could resubmit the charge of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime to a new grand jury, rather than dismissing the charge altogether. This decision clarifies the remedy for repugnant verdicts in New York, allowing for retrial on the repugnant charge rather than automatic dismissal, balancing the need to avoid convictions where the jury found an element lacking with the jury’s prerogative to show leniency.

    Facts

    Dwight DeLee was indicted for second-degree murder as a hate crime, second-degree murder, and third-degree criminal weapon possession. At trial, the jury convicted him of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime and weapon possession, but acquitted him of first-degree manslaughter. Defense counsel argued that the verdict was inconsistent, but the trial judge initially dismissed the jury. The judge later recalled the jury to confirm their acquittal on second-degree manslaughter before finally dismissing them.

    Procedural History

    Prior to sentencing, DeLee moved to set aside the verdict as repugnant, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reversing the conviction for first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime and dismissing that count. The Appellate Division reasoned that the acquittal of first-degree manslaughter meant the jury found at least one element of that crime unproven, making the hate crime conviction logically inconsistent. The dissenting Justice argued the verdict was not repugnant. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission of the dissenting Justice.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a jury verdict convicting a defendant of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime, while acquitting him of first-degree manslaughter, is repugnant.

    Whether the remedy for a repugnant verdict is dismissal of the repugnant conviction or whether the People may resubmit the charge to a new grand jury.

    Holding

    Yes, because all of the elements of first-degree manslaughter are included in the elements of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime, making the verdict inconsistent.

    The People may resubmit the charge of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime to a new grand jury because there is no constitutional or statutory provision that mandates dismissal for a repugnancy error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the established principles of People v. Tucker and People v. Muhammad, stating that a verdict is repugnant when it is legally impossible for the jury to have convicted on one count but not the other. The court emphasized that repugnancy depends on the jury’s instructions and the essential elements of the crimes charged, not on the evidence presented at trial. The court reasoned that in this case, the jury’s acquittal of first-degree manslaughter necessarily meant that they found at least one element of that crime unproven, which is inconsistent with the conviction for first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime, which requires all the elements of the former. The court stated, “All of the elements of first-degree manslaughter are included in the elements of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime. Thus, to find the defendant not guilty of first-degree manslaughter necessarily means that at least one of the elements of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

    Regarding the remedy, the Court acknowledged its prior statement in Muhammad that the remedy for a repugnant verdict was dismissal of the repugnant conviction. However, the court clarified that this statement was dictum and that there is no constitutional or statutory provision mandating dismissal. The Court reasoned that allowing a retrial on the repugnant charge strikes a reasonable balance because a reviewing court can never know the reason for the repugnancy and because juries may freely reject evidence and exercise its mercy function. The court cautioned trial courts that when “a trial court finds that an announced verdict is repugnant, it may explain the inconsistency to the jurors and direct them to reconsider their decision”.

  • Paterno v. Laser Spine Institute, 24 N.Y.3d 370 (2014): Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Medical Providers

    Paterno v. Laser Spine Institute, 24 N.Y.3d 370 (2014)

    A non-domiciliary medical provider is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York under CPLR 302(a)(1) based solely on responsive communications with a New York resident who sought out the provider’s services in another state, or under CPLR 302(a)(3) where the injury occurred outside of New York.

    Summary

    Frank Paterno, a New York resident, sought medical treatment from Laser Spine Institute (LSI) in Florida after seeing their advertisement online. Following surgeries in Florida, Paterno sued LSI in New York, alleging medical malpractice. The New York Court of Appeals held that New York courts lacked personal jurisdiction over LSI under CPLR 302(a)(1) because LSI’s contacts with New York were primarily responsive to Paterno’s initial contact and did not constitute transacting business in New York. The court further held that CPLR 302(a)(3) was inapplicable because the injury occurred in Florida, not New York. The decision emphasizes that merely responding to a patient’s inquiries does not equate to purposefully availing oneself of the privilege of conducting business in New York.

    Facts

    Frank Paterno, a New York resident, saw an online advertisement for LSI, a Florida-based surgical facility, and contacted them about his back pain. He sent MRI films to LSI in Florida for evaluation. LSI sent Paterno a letter outlining preliminary treatment recommendations. Paterno scheduled surgery at LSI in Florida after being offered a discounted rate. He exchanged emails with LSI regarding registration, payment, and travel arrangements. Paterno had blood work done in New York and attempted to arrange a conference call between his New York doctor and an LSI doctor. Following surgeries in Florida, Paterno experienced pain and contacted LSI physicians, who called in prescriptions to New York pharmacies. After further issues, he eventually had another surgery in New York with a different doctor.

    Procedural History

    Paterno sued LSI and its doctors in New York, alleging medical malpractice. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under CPLR 3211(a)(8). The Supreme Court granted the motion, dismissing the case. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that LSI was not transacting business in New York under CPLR 302(a)(1) and that CPLR 302(a)(3) was inapplicable because the injury did not occur in New York. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether LSI’s contacts with New York constituted transacting business within the state under CPLR 302(a)(1), thus conferring personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

    2. Whether LSI committed a tortious act outside New York causing injury within the state under CPLR 302(a)(3), thus conferring personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

    Holding

    1. No, because LSI’s activities were primarily responsive to the plaintiff’s initial contact and did not demonstrate a purposeful availment of conducting business in New York.

    2. No, because the injury occurred in Florida where the surgeries took place, not in New York where the plaintiff experienced the consequences of the injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that under CPLR 302(a)(1), a non-domiciliary transacts business when they purposefully avail themselves of conducting activities within New York, establishing a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim. The court emphasized that the "overriding criterion" is whether the non-domiciliary "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [New York]." Paterno initiated contact with LSI after seeing their online advertisement, which the court deemed a passive website. The court stated, "[i]t is not the quantity but the quality of the contacts that matters under our long-arm jurisdiction analysis." LSI’s subsequent communications were responsive to Paterno’s inquiries and facilitated his decision to undergo surgery in Florida. Contacts after the surgeries cannot form the basis of jurisdiction because "there [must be] a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted." Citing Etra v. Matta, the court noted that even sending an experimental drug to New York and acting as a consultant to a New York doctor was insufficient to constitute a transaction of business. Extending jurisdiction in this case would set a precedent for almost limitless jurisdiction over out-of-state medical providers. Regarding CPLR 302(a)(3), the court determined that the injury occurred in Florida, where the surgeries were performed, not in New York, where Paterno experienced the pain and consequences of the alleged malpractice. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.

  • Kigin v. State of New York Workers’ Compensation Board, 24 N.Y.3d 459 (2014): Authority to Limit Medical Treatment

    24 N.Y.3d 459 (2014)

    The Workers’ Compensation Board has the authority to create medical treatment guidelines that limit the scope and duration of pre-authorized medical procedures, provided a variance procedure exists for cases falling outside the guidelines.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of the Workers’ Compensation Board’s authority to regulate medical treatments for injured workers. The claimant, Maureen Kigin, sought additional acupuncture treatments beyond what was pre-authorized under the Board’s Medical Treatment Guidelines. The Board denied her request, and Kigin challenged the Board’s authority to create such guidelines. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Board’s authority, finding that the guidelines were a reasonable exercise of its regulatory power and did not unduly shift the burden of proof to claimants or violate due process, given the availability of a variance procedure.

    Facts

    Maureen Kigin, a hearing reporter for the Workers’ Compensation Board, sustained neck and back injuries in a 1996 work-related car accident. Her claim was accepted, and she received wage replacement benefits and medical treatment. In 2006, her case was transferred to the Special Fund for Reopened Cases. In 2011, her physician, Dr. Coladner, recommended additional acupuncture treatments beyond the limits set by the Board’s newly implemented Medical Treatment Guidelines. The carrier denied the request for a variance based on an independent medical examination by Dr. Chiu who found the treatments medically unnecessary.

    Procedural History

    A Workers’ Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) determined that Kigin’s medical provider failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the additional acupuncture. The Workers’ Compensation Board panel affirmed the WCLJ’s decision. Kigin appealed, arguing the Board lacked authority, the variance procedure shifted the burden of proof, and the guidelines violated due process. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Workers’ Compensation Board exceeded its statutory authority by using Medical Treatment Guidelines to effectively “pre-deny” medical treatment.

    2. Whether the variance procedure improperly shifts the burden of proof to the claimant’s physician to prove the medical necessity of a proposed treatment.

    3. Whether the Medical Treatment Guidelines violate the claimant’s due process right to a meaningful hearing.

    Holding

    1. No, because the guidelines reasonably supplement Workers’ Compensation Law § 13 and promote the statutory framework by providing appropriate medical care to injured workers, and a variance procedure exists.

    2. No, because the regulations reasonably require the treating medical provider to demonstrate that a variance is appropriate and medically necessary.

    3. No, because the Guidelines provide claimants with a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the denial of any variance request.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Board’s guidelines were a valid exercise of its authority under Workers’ Compensation Law § 117 (1), which allows the Board to “adopt reasonable rules consistent with and supplemental to the [Workers’ Compensation Law].” The court reasoned that the guidelines reasonably supplement Workers’ Compensation Law § 13 and promote the provision of appropriate medical care to injured workers. The court emphasized that the possibility of obtaining a variance means that treatments not on the pre-authorized list are not “pre-denied.”

    Regarding the burden of proof, the Court found that requiring the treating medical provider to demonstrate the medical necessity of a variance request is consistent with the claimant’s general burden of proving facts sufficient to support a claim for compensation. The court also stated that Worker’s Compensation Law § 21 (5), which creates a presumption in favor of the claimant’s medical reports, does not preclude the Board from requiring proof of medical necessity.

    Finally, the court rejected the due process argument, noting that the variance procedure provides a process for requesting review of a denial, including the option of a hearing. The court highlighted that Kigin had the opportunity to present testimony and cross-examine the carrier’s expert. The court quoted Matthews v Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976), stating, “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”

  • Matter of Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Rochester v. Nyquist, 24 N.Y.3d 505 (2014): Employee’s Right to Elect Disciplinary Procedures

    Matter of Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Rochester v. Nyquist, 24 N.Y.3d 505 (2014)

    When a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is renegotiated or becomes effective on or after September 1, 1994, Education Law § 3020(l) requires that tenured employees must be given the option to elect the disciplinary procedures outlined in Education Law § 3020-a, regardless of any alternative disciplinary procedures detailed in the CBA.

    Summary

    A tenured school social worker was suspended without pay and denied a hearing under Education Law § 3020-a, with the School District insisting she could only challenge the discipline through the CBA’s grievance procedure. The CBA, while containing an alternative disciplinary procedure, was renegotiated after September 1, 1994. The Court of Appeals held that Education Law § 3020(l) mandates that any CBA effective after that date must allow tenured employees to choose between the CBA’s procedure and the statutory § 3020-a process, thus affirming the employee’s right to elect the statutory procedure.

    Facts

    The petitioner, a tenured school social worker, was suspended for 30 days without pay by the respondent School District for alleged misconduct. The School District informed the petitioner that she was required to challenge her suspension using the grievance procedures outlined in the CBA. The petitioner was denied a hearing under Education Law § 3020-a despite her request. The CBA, originally negotiated before September 1, 1994, had been renegotiated in 2006 and stated that disciplinary actions “may” be processed as a grievance. The CBA also stipulated that tenured teachers could not be discharged without Education Law §3020 and §3020-a process.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner commenced an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the disciplinary action, arguing she was entitled to the protections of Education Law § 3020-a. Supreme Court initially ruled against the petitioner. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, granting the petition and holding that the petitioner had the right to choose the statutory review process. The School District appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Education Law § 3020(l) requires that all CBAs becoming effective on or after September 1, 1994, afford tenured employees facing discipline the right to elect the review process provided by Education Law § 3020-a, even if the CBA contains an unaltered alternative grievance procedure agreed upon before September 1, 1994, but the CBA itself was altered after that date.

    Holding

    Yes, because Education Law § 3020(l) mandates that CBAs altered by renegotiation or becoming effective on or after September 1, 1994, must provide tenured employees with the option to choose the disciplinary procedures outlined in Education Law § 3020-a, irrespective of any alternative procedures in the CBA. The purpose of the 1994 amendment was to “secure the right of tenured employees to avail themselves of the process set forth in Education Law § 3020-a.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the legislative intent behind the 1994 amendment to Education Law § 3020(l) was to ensure that tenured educators facing disciplinary charges could choose the procedural protections of Education Law § 3020-a. While the statute grandfathers pre-September 1, 1994, CBA discipline review procedures in unaltered CBAs, its dominant purpose was to secure the right of tenured employees to use § 3020-a. The court stated, “the statute unambiguously provides that when a CBA is altered by renegotiation or takes effect on or after September 1, 1994, it must permit tenured employees to elect section 3020-a’s discipline review procedures.” The Court rejected the School District’s argument that only renegotiation of the *discipline procedures* themselves triggers the employee’s option, finding this interpretation grammatically incorrect and at odds with the statute’s purpose. The Court noted the legislature’s recognized the importance of tenure in the educational context and its intention to preserve the process by which tenured educators are disciplined. The Court also noted that the CBA stated that a disciplinary action “may,” not that it “must,” be processed in accordance with the agreement’s grievance and arbitration provisions, making it statutorily inoffensive.