New York Law Review

Tag: 2014

  • Matter of New York City Coalition to End Lead Poisoning v. Giuliani, 248 N.Y. 339 (2014): Prevailing Party Status Under the New York State Equal Access to Justice Act and the Catalyst Theory

    Matter of New York City Coalition to End Lead Poisoning v. Giuliani, 248 N.Y. 339 (2014)

    A party is considered a “prevailing party” under the New York State Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) if their lawsuit prompted a change in the position of the party from whom they seek reimbursement of legal fees, even if a court order was not obtained.

    Summary

    The New York City Coalition to End Lead Poisoning (Coalition) sought attorney’s fees under the New York State Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) after the New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA) reversed a decision to reduce a petitioner’s shelter allowance. The petitioner argued that the lawsuit prompted HRA’s reversal, making her a “prevailing party” under EAJA, even though the court did not issue a ruling. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that even if the catalyst theory was applicable, the State of New York did not change its position, so attorneys’ fees were not recoverable.

    Facts

    The New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA) reduced a petitioner’s shelter allowance. The petitioner requested a “fair hearing” before the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA). HRA agreed to restore the lost benefits retroactively. OTDA issued a “Decision After Fair Hearing” consistent with HRA’s representation. When HRA did not act, the petitioner’s attorney contacted OTDA seeking enforcement. OTDA responded that to its knowledge, HRA had complied. The petitioner commenced an Article 78 proceeding to compel HRA and another city agency to comply with the OTDA decision, and OTDA to enforce it. HRA subsequently restored the shelter allowance. The petitioner then sought attorneys’ fees from the State under New York State’s Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding as moot and denied the application for attorneys’ fees, citing the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Resources, which rejected the catalyst theory. The Appellate Division reversed, granted the application for attorneys’ fees, and remanded for a hearing. The Appellate Division recognized the catalyst theory. The Appellate Division granted the respondent leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the catalyst theory applies to determine “prevailing party” status under New York’s EAJA.

    2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the catalyst theory.

    Holding

    1. The Court did not decide whether the catalyst theory applies to determine “prevailing party” status under New York’s EAJA.

    2. No, because even assuming the catalyst theory applies, the petitioner is not entitled to attorneys’ fees.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the focus should be on whether the party from whom the fees are sought has changed their position in response to the lawsuit. The court stated, “Under the pre-Buckhannon federal precedent that petitioner would have us apply, a fee claimant recovers attorneys’ fees only if his or her lawsuit prompted a change in position by the party from which claimant seeks reimbursement.” The court emphasized that even if the catalyst theory was applied to determine “prevailing party” status, attorneys’ fees would not be recoverable because the State of New York (the party from whom fees were sought) had not altered its position. The City of New York changed its position. The court did not need to decide whether the catalyst theory is New York law, and took no position on that question. The court stated that, even if the catalyst theory applied, the petitioner could not recover fees because “the State has consistently sided with petitioner regarding HRA’s reduction of her shelter allowance.”

  • People v. Repanti, 23 N.Y.3d 707 (2014): Harassment as a Lesser Included Offense of Attempted Assault

    23 N.Y.3d 707 (2014)

    Harassment in the second degree is not a lesser included offense of attempted assault in the third degree because the intent elements of the two crimes are distinct and it is theoretically possible to commit attempted assault without also committing harassment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that harassment in the second degree is not a lesser included offense of attempted assault in the third degree. The court clarified that to be considered a lesser included offense, it must be theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without simultaneously committing the lesser offense. The court found that the intent elements for the two crimes are distinct; attempted assault requires intent to cause physical injury, while harassment requires intent to harass, annoy, or alarm. Therefore, the court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for both attempted assault and harassment, as the latter was not a lesser included offense of the former.

    Facts

    The defendant, Steven Repanti, and the complainant lived in the same senior community. Following an altercation in a staircase, Repanti was charged with attempted assault in the third degree. The prosecution subsequently added a charge of harassment in the second degree before trial. At trial, the complainant testified that Repanti forcefully “banged into” her with his shoulder. Repanti denied any physical contact. The trial court convicted Repanti of both attempted assault and harassment. The Appellate Term affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Repanti of both attempted assault and harassment. The Appellate Term affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted Repanti leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether harassment in the second degree is a lesser included offense of attempted assault in the third degree.

    Holding

    1. No, because it is not theoretically impossible to commit attempted assault without also committing harassment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on New York’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 1.20(37), which defines a lesser included offense. The court stated that to establish a lesser included offense, a defendant must show “that it is theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without at the same time committing the lesser.” The court emphasized this determination must be based on a comparison of the statutes in the abstract, without reference to the specific facts of the case. The court found that attempted assault requires the intent to cause physical injury, while harassment requires the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm. The court explained, “an additional element or fact must be shown to be present in a case of harassment, requiring proof of an intent to harass, annoy or alarm, which is not a required element of an assault count.”

    The court cited *People v. Moyer*, which held that harassment is not a lesser included offense of assault, because it requires proof of an intent to harass, annoy, or alarm, which is not a required element of assault. The court also rejected Repanti’s argument that the *Stanfield* rule applied because the counts were based on the same conduct. The court clarified that *Stanfield* was limited by *Glover* which stated, “the theoretical impossibility requirement “is mandated by the provisions of CPL 1.20 (subd 37)”. The court affirmed the convictions based on the distinct intent elements of the two crimes.

  • Matter of Veronica P. v. Radcliff A., 22 N.Y.3d 668 (2014): Appeals of Expired Orders of Protection and the Mootness Doctrine

    Matter of Veronica P. v. Radcliff A., 22 N.Y.3d 668 (2014)

    An appeal from an expired order of protection is not moot if the order’s issuance has significant enduring consequences, even after it has expired.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an appeal of an expired order of protection was rendered moot by the order’s expiration. The court held that the appeal was not moot because the order’s issuance had significant legal and reputational consequences for the respondent, which could be alleviated if the appeal were successful. The court emphasized the impact of the order on future legal proceedings, potential for impeachment, increased law enforcement scrutiny, and damage to the respondent’s reputation. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of the appeal as moot and remitted the matter for consideration of the merits.

    Facts

    Veronica P. filed a family offense petition against her nephew, Radcliff A., alleging harassment and assault. Family Court issued a temporary order of protection and, after a hearing, found Radcliff A. guilty of a family offense (harassment in the second degree) and issued a two-year order of protection against him. Radcliff A. appealed the order. The order of protection expired while the appeal was pending.

    Procedural History

    Family Court found Radcliff A. guilty of a family offense and issued an order of protection. Radcliff A. appealed to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal as moot because the order of protection had expired. The New York Court of Appeals granted Radcliff A. leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the appeal of an expired order of protection is rendered moot by the order’s expiration.

    Holding

    1. No, because the order of protection has enduring consequences for Radcliff A. that could be alleviated by a favorable appellate decision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court began by restating the general rule that an appeal is moot unless a decision will directly affect the parties’ rights and interests. However, the court recognized an exception: an appeal is not moot if it will eliminate readily ascertainable and legally significant enduring consequences of the order being appealed. The court found the order of protection had enduring consequences, including that the order of protection on its face strongly suggested Radcliff A. committed a family offense which could influence future sentencing in criminal cases or adverse civil adjudications. Also, the court noted that the order could be used for impeachment purposes and that the order would remain in a police database. Further, the court found the order placed a severe stigma on Radcliff A., potentially impacting his business contacts, social acquaintances, and employment opportunities. The Court of Appeals found that the consequences of the order’s issuance were substantial and enduring enough to prevent mootness. The Court then reversed the Appellate Division and remitted for consideration of the merits of the appeal.

    The court stated: “In this case, the expiration of the order of protection does not moot the appeal because the order still imposes significant enduring consequences upon respondent, who may receive relief from those consequences upon a favorable appellate decision.”

  • 172 Van Duzer Realty Corp. v. Globe Alumni Student Assistance Association, Inc., 24 N.Y.3d 532 (2014): Enforceability of Lease Acceleration Clauses and the Unlawful Penalty Doctrine

    172 Van Duzer Realty Corp. v. Globe Alumni Student Assistance Association, Inc., 24 N.Y.3d 532 (2014)

    An acceleration clause in a commercial lease, which allows the landlord to collect all remaining rent immediately upon the tenant’s default, is not automatically invalid but may be deemed an unenforceable penalty if the accelerated damages are grossly disproportionate to the actual damages suffered by the landlord.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the enforceability of an acceleration clause in a commercial lease. The court held that such clauses are not automatically invalid simply because the landlord terminated the lease and retook possession of the property. However, the court emphasized that the tenant must be given an opportunity to prove that the acceleration clause constitutes an unenforceable penalty because it results in damages grossly disproportionate to the landlord’s actual losses. The court found that the lower court erred in limiting the hearing on damages, and remanded the case to determine the proportionality of the damages under the acceleration clause.

    Facts

    172 Van Duzer Realty Corp. (Van Duzer) leased a property to Globe Alumni Student Assistance Association, Inc. (Association), with Globe Institute of Technology, Inc. (Globe) as guarantor. The lease was extended for nine years. When the Association failed to maintain the premises and ceased paying rent, Van Duzer terminated the lease and initiated legal proceedings. The lease contained an acceleration clause, entitling Van Duzer to recover the balance of the rent for the remaining lease term as liquidated damages upon the tenant’s default. Van Duzer sought to recover rent arrears and the future remaining rent based on the acceleration clause. The trial court granted Van Duzer summary judgment and entered a judgment in the amount of the accelerated rent minus reletting income. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Procedural History

    Van Duzer initially sued in Civil Court for possession and past due rent. Van Duzer then commenced a second action in Supreme Court seeking accelerated rent. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Van Duzer on liability and referred the matter to a Special Referee for a damages determination. The trial court denied the defendants’ request for discovery and entered a judgment for Van Duzer. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals heard the appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the acceleration clause in the lease is per se invalid because the landlord terminated the lease and retook possession of the property.

    2. Whether the tenant should be permitted to present evidence that the undiscounted acceleration of all future rents constitutes an unlawful penalty.

    Holding

    1. No, because the acceleration clause is not automatically invalid; the Court held the clause could be enforceable under the specific facts.

    2. Yes, because the tenant should be allowed to present evidence to establish that the damages resulting from the acceleration clause are an unenforceable penalty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the tenant’s argument that the acceleration clause was per se invalid after the landlord terminated the lease and retook possession of the property. The Court distinguished this case from Fifty States Mgt. Corp. v. Pioneer Auto Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573 (1979), because the landlord was not seeking to enforce the clause in the context of a continuing leasehold. Here, the landlord terminated the lease and sought damages as a result of the tenant’s breaches. Furthermore, the Court rejected arguments that the landlord had a duty to mitigate damages by re-letting the premises. New York law does not impose a duty to mitigate damages on the landlord.

    However, the Court held that the tenant was entitled to a hearing to prove that the acceleration clause constituted an unenforceable penalty. The Court reiterated the general rule that liquidated damages clauses are enforceable if they are not unconscionable or against public policy. However, such a clause is an unenforceable penalty if it provides for damages grossly disproportionate to the actual damages. The Court stated, “A provision which requires damages ‘grossly disproportionate to the amount of actual damages provides for [a] penalty and is unenforceable.’” Because the tenant argued that the acceleration clause allowed the landlord to recover all future rent while also retaining possession of the property, the Court concluded that the tenant should be allowed to present evidence that the accelerated rent constituted a penalty.

    The Court explained that the lower court had improperly limited the hearing on damages, and that the tenant should have the opportunity to show that the undiscounted accelerated rent was disproportionate to the landlord’s actual losses, even though the landlord had possession and no duty to mitigate damages. As the Court noted, “[O]n its face this argument is compelling because arguably the ability to obtain all future rent due in one lump sum, undiscounted to present-day value, and also enjoy uninterrupted possession of the property provides the landowner with more than the compensation attendant to the losses flowing from the breach—even though such compensation is the recognized purpose of a liquidated damages provision.”

  • Gammons v. City of New York, 24 N.Y.3d 189 (2014): Labor Law § 27-a as a Predicate for General Municipal Law § 205-e Actions

    24 N.Y.3d 189 (2014)

    Labor Law § 27-a (3)(a)(1), which mandates employers to provide a workplace free from recognized hazards, can serve as a valid predicate for a cause of action under General Municipal Law § 205-e for police officers injured in the line of duty.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Labor Law § 27-a, specifically its general duty clause, could serve as a predicate for a police officer’s claim under General Municipal Law (GML) § 205-e. The plaintiff, a police officer, was injured while loading barriers onto a truck. The Court held that Labor Law § 27-a(3)(a)(1), which requires employers to provide a safe workplace, could serve as a valid predicate for a GML § 205-e claim. The Court emphasized the legislative intent behind GML § 205-e to provide broad protection for police officers and the expansive interpretation that the courts must apply to the statute. The Court found that Labor Law § 27-a imposed a clear legal duty, satisfying the requirements for a GML § 205-e predicate. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied because the plaintiff’s injury was, at least arguably, caused by the truck being improperly equipped, thus presenting a recognized hazard.

    Facts

    Allison Gammons, a New York City police officer, was injured while working on a "barrier truck detail." She was loading wooden barriers onto a police flatbed truck when another officer pushed a barrier into her, causing her to fall off the truck. Gammons claimed the truck was unsafe because it was too short, lacked a tailgate and adequate side railings. She sued the City of New York and the Police Department, alleging common law negligence and a violation of GML § 205-e, based on the alleged unsafe condition of the truck and violation of Labor Law § 27-a(3)(a)(1). Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the general duty clause of Labor Law § 27-a could not serve as a statutory predicate for a GML § 205-e cause of action, and that the plaintiff failed to establish a “recognized hazard”.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) may serve as a predicate for a violation of GML § 205-e. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The Appellate Division granted defendants leave to appeal on a certified question whether the court properly affirmed the denial of defendants' summary judgment motion to dismiss plaintiff's GML § 205-e claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1), the general duty clause of the Public Employee Safety and Health Act (PESHA), can serve as a predicate for a claim under GML § 205-e.

    2. Whether the plaintiff established a violation of Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) by demonstrating a “recognized hazard” in the workplace.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Court held that Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) contains a clear legal duty that may serve as a predicate for a GML § 205-e claim.

    2. The court found that defendants failed to meet their burden to establish that the plaintiff's injuries were not caused by a "recognized hazard."

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the legislative history and purpose of GML § 205-e. The Court emphasized that the Legislature intended a broad application of GML § 205-e to protect police officers. The Court reviewed prior cases which discussed legislative amendments meant to broaden police officers’ rights to sue for injuries. The Court noted that these amendments were enacted to counteract judicial decisions limiting the application of GML § 205-e, emphasizing the legislative goal of providing a cause of action for police officers. The Court referred to cases, such as Williams v. City of New York, that directed the courts to apply GML § 205-e "’expansively’ so as to favor recovery by police officers whenever possible."

    The Court addressed the question of whether Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) could serve as a predicate for a GML § 205-e claim. The Court held that it could, reasoning that Labor Law § 27-a contained a clear legal duty. Specifically, it stated that "[e]very employer shall: (1) furnish to each of its employees, employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to its employees and which will provide reasonable and adequate protection to the lives, safety or health of its employees." The Court found that this imposed a clear legal duty, despite being general in nature.

    The Court distinguished the case from Williams, noting that the plaintiff’s claim involved an improperly equipped vehicle, which the Court said could be an occupational injury covered by PESHA. The Court also rejected the argument that Labor Law § 27-a could not serve as a predicate because the Commissioner of Labor had sole authority over enforcement, noting that GML § 205-e allows courts to consider noncompliance with statutes and regulations as evidence of negligence. Dissenting, Judge Pigott argued that a plaintiff should cite to a specific regulation violated to meet the threshold under GML § 205-e when using Labor Law § 27-a as a predicate.

  • Vibar Construction Corp. v. Rigano, 23 N.Y.3d 416 (2014): Amending Mechanic’s Liens for Misnamed Property Owners

    23 N.Y.3d 416 (2014)

    A mechanic’s lien can be amended to correct a misnomer of the property owner, where the true owner and listed owner are closely related, the true owner consented to the work, and no third party would be prejudiced.

    Summary

    Vibar Construction Corp. filed a mechanic’s lien on property, mistakenly identifying the owner as Fawn Builders, Inc., when the property was actually owned by Fawn Builders’ sole shareholder, Rigano. The court addressed whether this misnomer invalidated the lien. The Court of Appeals held that the misnomer was a correctable misdescription, not a jurisdictional defect, because Rigano and Fawn Builders were closely related, Rigano consented to the work, and no third party was prejudiced. The court emphasized a liberal construction of the Lien Law to protect those providing labor and materials, permitting amendments that do not prejudice third parties, and require a close relationship between the listed and actual owner.

    Facts

    Vibar Construction Corp. (Vibar), owned by Vignogna, contracted with Fawn Builders, Inc. (Fawn), owned by Rigano, for construction work. After a dispute over payment for constructing a common driveway, Vibar filed a mechanic’s lien on the property. The lien incorrectly stated that Fawn owned the property, when Rigano, Fawn’s sole shareholder, was the actual owner. Rigano had acquired title to the property through a non-arm’s-length transfer from Fawn. Vibar sought to amend the lien to reflect the correct owner, but the trial court initially held in favor of Vibar, finding that the notice substantially complied with the Lien Law requirements. However, on reargument, Supreme Court granted Rigano’s petition and discharged the mechanic’s lien. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that misidentification of the true owner constituted a jurisdictional defect that could not be cured through amendment.

    Procedural History

    Vibar filed a mechanic’s lien, incorrectly identifying the property owner. The Supreme Court initially held in favor of Vibar and allowed amendment, but later granted Rigano’s motion to discharge the lien, finding a jurisdictional defect. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the misidentification of the property owner in the mechanic’s lien constituted a jurisdictional defect that could not be amended.

    Holding

    1. No, because the misnomer was a correctable misdescription and not a jurisdictional defect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied a liberal construction of the Lien Law, emphasizing its purpose to protect laborers and materialmen. The Court referenced Lien Law § 23 which states, “substantial compliance . . . shall be sufficient for the validity of a lien and to give jurisdiction to the courts to enforce the same” and Lien Law § 9 (7) stating, “a failure to state the name of the true owner . . . or a misdescription of the true owner, shall not affect the validity of the lien.” The Court found that the misidentification of the owner was a misdescription, not a jurisdictional defect, because Rigano and Fawn were closely related (Rigano was the sole shareholder), Rigano had consented to the construction work (as demonstrated by the contract), and no third party would be prejudiced. The Court distinguished between cases of misdescription and misidentification, the former being curable by amendment, the latter invalidating the lien. The court cited cases where amendment was permitted when there was a close relationship between the listed and actual owner. The Court quoted from Gates & Co. v. National Fair & Exposition Assn. that “it was not the legislative intent to give a lien upon the property through the filing of any notice describing it; it was intended that such a lien should be acquired as against the title or interest of the person party to or assenting to the agreement under which the work was done.”

  • Matter of Rosenthal v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 23 N.Y.3d 490 (2014): Validity of Out-of-Competition Equine Drug Testing

    Matter of Rosenthal v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 23 N.Y.3d 490 (2014)

    State agencies have the authority to implement out-of-competition drug testing for racehorses to prevent the use of performance-enhancing drugs, and such testing does not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a rule mandating out-of-competition drug testing (OCTR) for harness racehorses. The New York State Racing and Wagering Board implemented the rule to combat the use of new, undetectable performance-enhancing drugs. Petitioners, standardbred owners and trainers, challenged the rule, arguing it exceeded the Board’s authority and violated constitutional protections against unreasonable searches. The Court of Appeals upheld the Board’s authority, finding the rule a reasonable measure to prevent circumvention of existing regulations and that the testing regimen did not constitute an unreasonable search given the pervasively regulated nature of the horse racing industry.

    Facts

    The New York State Racing and Wagering Board (Board) promulgated a rule requiring licensees to make their harness racehorses available for random blood and urine sampling, even when the horses were not participating in an imminent race. This out-of-competition testing rule (OCTR) was designed to address the emergence of protein-based drugs capable of enhancing a horse’s speed while evading detection during race-day testing. Dr. Maylin, an expert in equine pharmacology, stated these drugs could turn even naturally lame horses into competitors. Petitioners, owners and trainers of standardbred horses, challenged the rule.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners initiated a hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding/declaratory judgment action challenging the rule’s validity before its effective date. The Supreme Court granted the petition, finding the Board exceeded its authority. The Appellate Division modified the decision, denying the petition except for one provision not at issue, and upheld the rule’s validity. The Court of Appeals heard the case on appeal as of right.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the New York State Racing and Wagering Board has the legal authority to promulgate a rule mandating out-of-competition drug testing for racehorses.
    2. Whether a testing regimen of the sort proposed would involve constitutionally unreasonable intrusions by the Board’s agents.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Board has broad authority to supervise harness race meetings and prevent circumvention of regulations designed to ensure fair competition and protect the integrity of the sport.
    2. No, because licensees in the pervasively regulated horse racing industry have a diminished expectation of privacy, and the proposed testing regimen meaningfully limits the scope of any intrusion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law § 301(1) grants the Board broad supervisory powers over pari-mutuel harness race meetings, including the power to adopt rules and regulations to prevent circumvention or evasion of its purposes. The court stated, “[T]he legislature had no purpose of restricting respondent’s general supervisory power over pari-mutuel harness race meetings, but it specifically authorizes regulatory action to prevent the circumvention or evasion of existing rules.”

    The court acknowledged the legislative delegation to administrative officials requires a reasonable amount of discretion. The OCTR addressed a loophole in the existing regulatory framework created by new doping agents undetectable through traditional race-day testing.

    Regarding the Fourth Amendment challenge, the Court found that licensees in the horse racing industry, “having voluntarily entered a pervasively regulated field of commercial endeavor…can claim no privacy expectation that would prevent respondent from testing their racehorses’ blood and urine.”

    The court distinguished the intrusions from unreasonable searches, emphasizing the limited scope of the testing and the commercial nature of the stables. It stated, “The intrusion contemplated by such a testing regimen is not one into any residential or otherwise notably private space, but a highly focused, guided and brief veterinary foray into leased commercial stabling areas…with the object, not of discovering evidence of criminal activity…but of sampling, exclusively for regulatory enforcement purposes, the blood and urine of a specifically identified racehorse.”

  • In the Matter of State of New York v. Michael M., 24 N.Y.3d 651 (2014): Distinguishing ‘Difficulty’ from ‘Inability’ to Control Sexual Conduct in Civil Commitment

    In the Matter of State of New York v. Michael M., 24 N.Y.3d 651 (2014)

    In Mental Hygiene Law Article 10 proceedings, the legal standard for confinement requires demonstrating an ‘inability’ to control behavior, not merely a ‘difficulty’ in controlling it; the state must prove the individual is likely to be a danger to others if not confined.

    Summary

    This case addresses the distinction between a sex offender who has “serious difficulty” controlling their conduct and one who has an “inability” to control it under Mental Hygiene Law Article 10. Michael M., a previously incarcerated sex offender, was initially placed under strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST) upon release. After a series of events including job loss, eviction, and discharge from a treatment program, the State sought to revoke his SIST status and confine him. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision to confine him, holding that the evidence presented demonstrated only a “difficulty” in controlling his sexual urges, not an “inability,” which is the required standard for confinement under the statute. The Court emphasized that the State failed to prove Michael M. was likely to be a danger to others if not confined.

    Facts

    Michael M. pleaded guilty to sex offenses and served over a decade in prison. Upon his impending release, the State initiated civil commitment proceedings under Mental Hygiene Law Article 10. Initially, probable cause was found to believe he was a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement. After a legal challenge, he was released into the community without supervision for nearly two years. Following a bench trial, the court ordered SIST instead of confinement. After a series of adverse life events, including losing his job and housing, and being discharged from a treatment program for non-cooperation, the State sought to revoke his SIST status and confine him.

    Procedural History

    1. Supreme Court initially dismissed the Article 10 petition and granted habeas corpus relief, releasing Michael M. 2. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order. 3. After a bench trial, Supreme Court imposed SIST. 4. Following alleged violations of SIST conditions, the State petitioned to revoke SIST and confine Michael M. 5. Supreme Court determined Michael M. was a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement and ordered him committed. 6. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. 7. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented was legally sufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Michael M. had such an inability to control his behavior that he was likely to be a danger to others and commit sex offenses if not confined to a secure treatment facility.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence presented only demonstrated that Michael M. experienced “difficulty” controlling his sexual urges, which does not meet the statutory requirement of an “inability” to control them, as required for confinement under Mental Hygiene Law Article 10.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the statutory distinction between a “mental abnormality” involving “serious difficulty” in controlling conduct (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03[i]) and a “dangerous sex offender requiring confinement” characterized by an “inability” to control behavior (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03[e]). The Court found that the State’s evidence, including expert testimony, demonstrated only that Michael M. was struggling with his urges, not that he was incapable of controlling them. Dr. Etu’s testimony indicated Michael M. was “having difficulty” warding off urges but also described “tools” Michael M. used to control those urges. The Court also noted that the events leading to the revocation of SIST—job loss, eviction, program discharge—did not demonstrate an increased inability to control his sexual conduct. The Court quoted the statute noting the distinction between sex offenders who have difficulty controlling their sexual conduct and those who are unable to control it. The former are to be supervised and treated as “outpatients” and only the latter may be confined. The Court stated, “The testimony in this case tended to show only that respondent was struggling with his sexual urges, not that he was unable to control himself.” The Court concluded that the State failed to meet the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Michael M. was likely to be a danger to others if not confined.

  • People v. Jones, 24 N.Y.3d 62 (2014): Overruling Crimmins on Review of Discretion in Newly Discovered Evidence

    24 N.Y.3d 62 (2014)

    The New York Court of Appeals can review lower courts’ discretionary denials of motions to vacate judgments based on newly discovered evidence (CPL 440.10[1][g]) to determine if there was an abuse of discretion, overruling the prior limitations set forth in People v. Crimmins.

    Summary

    Jones, convicted of rape, murder, and attempted robbery in 1981, sought to vacate his conviction based on newly discovered mtDNA evidence that excluded him as the source of hairs found at the crime scene. The lower courts summarily denied his motion without a hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed, explicitly overruling its prior holding in People v. Crimmins, which had held that such discretionary denials were not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the Appellate Division abused its discretion by not holding a hearing, given the significant DNA evidence and the People’s failure to present admissible evidence rebutting Jones’s claims.

    Facts

    In 1980, a woman was raped and a man was murdered in an apartment building. The rape victim identified Jones as the perpetrator. At trial, the victim’s testimony was the primary evidence against Jones. In 2008, Jones sought DNA testing of evidence from his trial, including a baseball cap found at the scene. mtDNA testing excluded Jones as the source of three hairs from the cap. DNA testing of fingernail scrapings from the victim also excluded Jones as a contributor. The rape victim was a heroin addict and admitted to using heroin on the day she identified the defendant in the lineup.

    Procedural History

    A jury convicted Jones in 1981. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. In 2008, Jones moved for DNA testing under CPL 440.30(1-a). After receiving mtDNA results, Jones moved to vacate his conviction under CPL 440.10(1)(g). Supreme Court summarily denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that even assuming the reliability of the mtDNA evidence, Jones hadn’t established a legal basis for a new trial. A dissenting Justice of the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Court of Appeals has the power to review the Appellate Division’s summary denial of a motion to vacate a judgment based on newly discovered evidence under CPL 440.10(1)(g)?

    2. Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion in affirming the Supreme Court’s summary denial of Jones’s motion to vacate his conviction without a hearing, given the mtDNA evidence excluding him as a contributor?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Court of Appeals’ power to review discretionary orders extends to determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion as a matter of law, which constitutes a reviewable question of law.

    2. Yes, because the significant DNA evidence favorable to Jones, coupled with the People’s failure to proffer admissible evidence in opposition, entitled Jones to a hearing on his motion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court overruled People v. Crimmins, which had held that the Court of Appeals lacked the power to review discretionary denials of CPL 440.10(1)(g) motions. The Court reasoned that CPL 450.90(1) grants the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review adverse orders from intermediate appellate courts. While the Court cannot weigh facts in non-capital cases, it can determine whether the lower courts abused their discretion as a matter of law, which is a reviewable legal question. The Court emphasized that forensic DNA testing has become a reliable means of connecting individuals to crimes and exonerating the wrongfully convicted. The Court found that Jones presented admissible evidence (the mtDNA report) supporting his claim, while the People’s opposition consisted of inadmissible hearsay. The Court stated: “[W]here… there is significant DNA evidence favorable to the defendant and the People proffer no admissible evidence in opposition to that evidence, defendant is, at the very least, entitled to a hearing on his motion.” In a concurring opinion, Judge Abdus-Salaam argued that CPL 440.30(5) mandates a hearing when the motion alleges a legal basis for relief and the statutory conditions for summary denial are not met.

  • People v. Reid, 24 N.Y.3d 615 (2014): Limits on Search Incident to Arrest Based on Officer’s Intent

    24 N.Y.3d 615 (2014)

    A search cannot be justified as incident to arrest if the arrest would not have occurred without the search, even if probable cause for an arrest existed prior to the search.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a search of a driver was not a valid search incident to arrest because the arresting officer testified that he would not have arrested the driver for driving while intoxicated (DWI), despite having probable cause, if the search had not revealed a switchblade knife. The court reasoned that the search must be incident to an actual arrest, not merely to probable cause for an arrest that never would have happened otherwise. The discovery of the knife was the sole reason for the arrest. Therefore, the evidence was suppressed.

    Facts

    Officer Merino observed defendant Graham Reid driving erratically, crossing double lines and failing to signal. Upon stopping the vehicle, Merino noted Reid’s watery eyes, disheveled clothing, an odor of alcohol, and plastic cups in the console. Reid gave an inconsistent answer about when he consumed alcohol. These observations provided probable cause for a DWI arrest. Merino asked Reid to step out of the car and conducted a pat-down, discovering a switchblade knife. Reid was then arrested for possession of the weapon.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Reid’s motion to suppress the knife, arguing the search was incident to arrest. Reid pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the officer’s subjective intent was irrelevant as long as probable cause to arrest for DWI existed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a search can be justified as incident to arrest when the officer testifies that he would not have made an arrest but for the discovery of evidence during the search, despite having probable cause to arrest prior to the search.

    Holding

    No, because the search must be incident to an actual arrest, not merely to probable cause that could have led to an arrest but did not.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed, distinguishing the case from precedents where the officer’s subjective motive was deemed irrelevant if the arrest was objectively justified by probable cause. The court emphasized that the “search incident to arrest” doctrine requires that an arrest has already occurred or is about to occur. Here, the officer explicitly stated he would not have arrested Reid for DWI had he not found the knife. Citing Knowles v. Iowa, the court stated that the justification for the “incident to arrest” exception—officer safety and preservation of evidence—does not apply where no arrest would have been made absent the search. The court stated, “A search must be incident to an actual arrest, not just to probable cause that might have led to an arrest, but did not”. The court found that extending the logic of cases like Whren v. United States and Devenpeck v. Alford was inappropriate because those cases address the validity of a stop or arrest based on objective justification, regardless of subjective motive. The dissent argued that the majority’s decision was an improper departure from established precedent regarding the irrelevance of an officer’s subjective intent when probable cause for an arrest exists. The dissent contended that the majority misapplied Knowles, which involved a citation rather than an arrest, and created an unworkable exception to the search incident to arrest doctrine.