New York Law Review

Tag: 2014

  • Biotronik A.G. v. Conor Medsystems Ireland, Ltd., 22 N.Y.3d 799 (2014): Distinguishing General and Consequential Damages for Lost Profits

    22 N.Y.3d 799 (2014)

    Lost profits can be considered general damages in a breach of contract case if they are the direct and probable result of the breach, particularly in exclusive distribution agreements where resale is the essence of the contract.

    Summary

    Biotronik A.G. sued Conor Medsystems Ireland, Ltd. for breach of an exclusive distribution agreement, seeking lost profits. The New York Court of Appeals held that Biotronik’s lost profits constituted general damages, not consequential damages, and were thus recoverable despite a contractual limitation on consequential damages. The court reasoned that the agreement’s structure, where Biotronik’s resale price directly influenced Conor’s transfer price, made the resale integral to the contract. The lost profits were therefore a direct and probable consequence of the breach.

    Facts

    In 2004, Biotronik and Conor entered an agreement granting Biotronik exclusive distribution rights for Conor’s CoStar stent in most of the world outside the US. Biotronik was to use commercial efforts to promote and sell the stents, and assist Conor with regulatory compliance. The price Biotronik paid Conor was a percentage of Biotronik’s net sales of the CoStar stent. Biotronik provided monthly sales forecasts, and Conor could limit the maximum order size. Johnson & Johnson acquired Conor in 2007. In May 2007, Conor recalled the CoStar stent after FDA trials failed. Biotronik sued for breach of contract, seeking lost profits.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied summary judgment on liability but concluded that the lost profits were consequential damages, limiting Biotronik’s recovery. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether lost profits from the breach of an exclusive distribution agreement constitute general or consequential damages when the agreement contains a limitation on consequential damages.

    Holding

    Yes, the lost profits constitute general damages because under the parties’ exclusive distribution agreement, the lost profits were the natural and probable consequence of the breach.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the lost profits were general damages. General damages are the “natural and probable consequence of the breach.” Consequential damages do not “directly flow from the breach.” The court emphasized that lost profits are general damages when the non-breaching party bargained for such profits, and they are the “direct and immediate fruits of the contract.” Here, the resale of stents by Biotronik was the essence of the contract. The agreement calculated the transfer price based on Biotronik’s net sales, demonstrating that both parties depended on the product’s resale for their payments. The court distinguished this situation from cases where lost profits arise from “collateral business arrangements.” The court cited Orester v Dayton Rubber Mfg. Co., 228 NY 134 (1920), and American List Corp. v U.S. News & World Report, 75 NY2d 38 (1989), in which lost profits were treated as general damages. The court stated, “Although the lost profits sought by plaintiff are not specifically identified in the agreement, it cannot be said that defendant did not agree to pay them under the contract, as these profits flow directly from the pricing formula.” The court dismissed the defendant’s argument under UCC 2-715(2)(a) finding that the agreement was more akin to a joint venture than a simple sale. The court concluded that the agreement reflected the defendant’s anticipation and dependence on the resale, making this arrangement “significantly different from a situation where the buyer’s resale to a third party is independent of the underlying agreement.”

  • Landauer, Ltd. v. Joe Monani Fish Co., 22 N.Y.3d 1124 (2014): Enforcing Foreign Judgments Based on Contractual Consent

    22 N.Y.3d 1124 (2014)

    A foreign judgment should be enforced in New York when the defendant contractually agreed to the foreign court’s jurisdiction and had fair notice of the proceedings, even if formal service was technically deficient.

    Summary

    Landauer, a British company, sued Joe Monani Fish Co., a New York company, to enforce a default judgment obtained in England. The contracts between the parties contained a clause granting English courts exclusive jurisdiction. Monani argued improper service and lack of notice. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding that the English judgment was enforceable because Monani had contractually consented to jurisdiction and had actual notice of the English proceedings through its counsel, despite any technical defects in service. This decision emphasizes the importance of contractual forum selection clauses and actual notice in enforcing foreign judgments.

    Facts

    Landauer, a British seafood supplier, and Monani, a New York seafood company, entered into contracts with a clause granting English courts exclusive jurisdiction over disputes. A dispute arose, and Landauer sued Monani in England. Monani did not appear, and Landauer obtained a default judgment. Landauer then sought to enforce the English judgment in New York.

    Procedural History

    Landauer moved for summary judgment in lieu of complaint in New York Supreme Court. Monani opposed, arguing improper service. Supreme Court denied the motion, finding improper service. The Appellate Division affirmed, addressing only the service issue. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, granting Landauer’s motion for summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a foreign judgment should be enforced in New York when the defendant had contractually agreed to the jurisdiction of the foreign court and had actual notice of the proceedings, despite alleged defects in service.

    Holding

    Yes, because Monani contractually agreed to the jurisdiction of the English courts and had fair notice of the English lawsuit before the default judgment was entered.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPLR 5305(a)(3), which allows for enforcement of a foreign judgment if the defendant had agreed to submit to the foreign court’s jurisdiction prior to the commencement of proceedings and was afforded fair notice. The Court also cited John Galliano, S.A. v. Stallion, Inc., emphasizing that enforcement is appropriate where a defendant agreed to foreign jurisdiction and was aware of the litigation but failed to appear. The court found that Monani had contracted to litigate disputes in England and, through its counsel, had actual notice of the lawsuit. The court noted that “so long as the exercise of jurisdiction by the foreign court does not offend due process, the judgment should be enforced without ‘microscopic analysis’ of the underlying proceedings.” The Court found that Monani’s president did not deny possessing the contract containing the forum selection clause. The court emphasized that Monani’s counsel knew about the English action before judgment and was negotiating settlement, thus ensuring adequate notice despite any technical defects in service. This actual notice, combined with the contractual agreement, justified enforcement of the English judgment in New York.

  • People v. Santiago, 22 N.Y.3d 736 (2014): Corroboration of Confession & Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    People v. Santiago, 22 N.Y.3d 736 (2014)

    A defendant’s confession must be corroborated by independent evidence that a crime was committed by someone, but need not be evidence that the crime was committed by the defendant, and the failure to renew a motion to dismiss based on lack of corroboration after presenting a defense waives the issue on appeal unless a general motion to dismiss is made after the defense rests and the trial court makes specific findings as to corroboration.

    Summary

    Cheryl Santiago was convicted of manslaughter for the death of her stepdaughter. Her confession to police was a key piece of evidence. She argued her confession lacked sufficient corroboration, that certain letters introduced at trial were improperly redacted, and that her counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a PowerPoint presentation during the prosecutor’s summation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s modification of the conviction from second-degree murder to second-degree manslaughter, finding sufficient corroborating evidence and no ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Facts

    Defendant married Santos Santiago, who had a one-year-old daughter, Justice. Defendant was not fond of Justice. On October 23, 2007, Defendant and Santos quarreled over Justice. That evening, Defendant put Justice to bed. The next morning, Santos left for work, and shortly after, Defendant called him, claiming Justice was not moving. Santos returned to find Justice dead. Defendant initially stated she found Justice lifeless with a plastic bag nearby, but later confessed to placing her hands over Justice’s mouth and nose to quiet her.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was charged with second-degree murder. Her motion to suppress her statements was denied after a Huntley hearing. At trial, the jury found her guilty of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the conviction to second-degree manslaughter, finding the evidence insufficient to prove intent to kill. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s confession was sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence at trial to support a conviction.
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain letters into evidence that were not sufficiently redacted.
    3. Whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when her trial counsel failed to object to a PowerPoint display during the People’s summation.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was independent evidence that a crime occurred, corroborating the defendant’s confession.
    2. No, because defense counsel did not specifically object to the portions of the letters now claimed to be prejudicial, thus failing to preserve the issue for review.
    3. No, because the failure to object to the PowerPoint presentation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness considering counsel is afforded wide latitude in summation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court addressed the corroboration requirement of CPL § 60.50, stating that the additional evidence must show that the charged crime was committed by someone, not necessarily the defendant. The Court cited People v. Lipsky, 57 N.Y.2d 560, 571 (1982), stating that the statute is satisfied by some proof that a crime was committed by someone. Here, the testimony of Dr. Baden, indicating that Justice would not have allowed herself to suffocate from a loose object, provided independent evidence of a crime. The Court noted the general rule that failure to renew a motion to dismiss at the close of all proof constitutes a waiver of any challenge to the denial of a motion to dismiss made at the close of the People’s case. As to the letters, the Court held that because defense counsel did not specifically object to the overtly sexual portions, the argument was unpreserved. The Court also found no ineffective assistance of counsel, as defense counsel had successfully achieved some redactions and the court issued a limiting instruction. Finally, regarding the PowerPoint presentation during summation, the Court found that failing to object to the PowerPoint presentation was not ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel has wide latitude during summation, quoting People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105, 109 (1976), stating counsel is to be afforded the widest latitude by way of comment, denunciation or appeal in advocating his cause.

  • People v. Guarnan, 22 N.Y.3d 678 (2014): Defining “Forcible Touching” in New York Law

    People v. Guarnan, 22 N.Y.3d 678 (2014)

    In New York, “forcibly touches” under Penal Law § 130.52 encompasses any intentional bodily contact involving the application of some level of pressure to the victim’s sexual or intimate parts, when done with the requisite criminal intent.

    Summary

    Defendant was arrested for rubbing his exposed penis against another man’s buttocks in a subway station. He was charged with forcible touching, among other offenses. Defendant argued that the information was jurisdictionally defective because “rubbing” does not constitute the requisite “forcible touching” under Penal Law § 130.52. The Court of Appeals held that the act of rubbing, when accompanied by the intent to degrade or abuse, or for the purpose of gratifying the actor’s sexual desire, and involving the application of some pressure, does constitute forcible touching. The court affirmed the Appellate Term’s order upholding the conviction.

    Facts

    A police officer observed Luis Guarnan rubbing his exposed penis against another man’s buttocks in a subway station. The victim confirmed he did not consent to the contact. The accusatory instrument stated that Guarnan intentionally and for no legitimate purpose, forcibly touched the sexual and other intimate parts of the victim for the purpose of degrading and abusing him, and for the purpose of gratifying Guarnan’s sexual desire. The victim swore to his lack of consent in a supporting deposition.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with third-degree sexual abuse, forcible touching, and public lewdness. The defendant moved to suppress identification evidence and statements, which was denied. He pleaded guilty to forcible touching. The Appellate Term affirmed the judgment, finding the information sufficient. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the factual allegation that the defendant “rubbed” his groin and exposed penis against the victim’s buttocks establishes the kind or level of force required by Penal Law § 130.52 to constitute forcible touching.

    Holding

    Yes, because, when done with the relevant mens rea, any bodily contact involving the application of some level of pressure to the victim’s sexual or intimate parts qualifies as a forcible touch within the meaning of Penal Law § 130.52.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the factual allegations in a misdemeanor complaint must provide “reasonable cause” to believe the defendant committed the charged offense. An information must set forth “nonhearsay allegations which, if true, establish every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof.” The Court stated that the examples in the statute, “squeezing, grabbing or pinching,” signal a low threshold for the forcible component of the crime. The Court found that the legislature intended a broad construction of “forcibly touches”, noting the crime was enacted as part of the Sexual Assault Reform Act of 2000, in response to public sexual attacks. The court rejected the argument that forcibly touching should be limited to contact that compresses and is painful or physically discomforting.

    The court stated that to be guilty of third-degree sexual abuse, the actor must subject another person to sexual contact without the latter’s consent, for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party. Because third-degree sexual abuse criminalizes nonconsensual sexual touching for purposes of either party’s sexual gratification, the People are not required to plead or prove whether the touching is for the actor’s or the recipient’s sexual gratification.

    The People argued that “force” is commonly defined as “strength or energy exerted or brought to bear.” “Rub” means to move along the surface of a body with pressure, or to subject to the action of something moving especially back and forth with pressure and friction. “Since the use of ‘pressure’ or ‘friction’ obviously brings strength or energy to bear, the act of ‘rubbing’ qualifies as a forcible touch.”

    The court agreed with the People and concluded that “forcibly touches” is not restricted in the way defendant advocates, and the allegation in the information met the test.

    The legislative history of the crime of forcible touching indicates the legislature meant for “forcibly touches” to cover contact beyond only that which compresses and is painful or physically discomforting.

  • People v. Flinn, 22 N.Y.3d 600 (2014): Valid Waiver of Antommarchi Right by Counsel

    People v. Flinn, 22 N.Y.3d 600 (2014)

    A defendant’s right to be present during bench conferences with prospective jurors (Antommarchi right) can be waived both implicitly by the defendant’s conduct and explicitly by defense counsel, even when the waiver is stated outside the defendant’s immediate hearing.

    Summary

    Flinn was convicted of attempted murder. Prior to jury selection, the trial judge informed the defendant that he was welcome to attend bench conferences. Defense counsel later stated, outside of the defendant’s hearing, that Flinn had waived his right to be present at these conferences. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Flinn implicitly waived his Antommarchi right by not attending the conferences after being informed he was welcome, and explicitly waived it through his counsel’s statement. The Court reasoned that attorneys can waive this right on behalf of their clients.

    Facts

    The trial judge informed Flinn that he was welcome to attend bench conferences during jury selection.
    During a bench conference, defense counsel stated that Flinn had waived his right to attend these conferences.
    Flinn did not attend any of the bench conferences during voir dire.

    Procedural History

    Flinn was convicted of attempted murder in the trial court.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant validly waived his right under People v. Antommarchi to be present during bench conferences at which prospective jurors were questioned on voir dire, both implicitly through his actions and explicitly through his counsel’s statement made outside his hearing.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant implicitly waived his right by choosing not to attend the bench conferences after being informed he was welcome, and explicitly waived it through his counsel’s statement to the court. The Court has repeatedly held that counsel can waive a client’s Antommarchi right.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that Flinn implicitly waived his right, similar to the situation in People v. Williams, because he was informed he was “welcome to attend” the bench conferences and chose not to. The Court reasoned that the critical point was that Flinn understood he was free to attend if he wanted to.

    Regarding the explicit waiver, the Court relied on prior holdings in cases like People v. Velasquez and People v. Keen, stating that a lawyer may waive the Antommarchi right of their client. The Court dismissed the argument that the waiver was invalid because the lawyer’s statement was made outside Flinn’s hearing, emphasizing that lawyers are trusted to explain rights to their clients and accurately report the outcome of those discussions to the court. The Court stated, “[T]he premise of Velasquez and Keen is that a lawyer may be trusted to explain rights to his or her client, and to report to the court the result of that discussion.”

  • People v. Thomas, 24 N.Y.3d 1115 (2014): Admissibility of Confession Obtained Through Deception

    People v. Thomas, 24 N.Y.3d 1115 (2014)

    A confession is involuntary and inadmissible when obtained through police deception that creates a substantial risk the defendant might falsely incriminate themselves.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s confession was involuntary and inadmissible because it was obtained through police deception. The police falsely told the defendant his girlfriend was alive and needed his help to receive proper medical treatment, implying he could be responsible for her death if he withheld information. The Court found this deception created a substantial risk that the defendant would falsely incriminate himself, thus rendering the confession involuntary. Because the Appellate Division’s reversal was based on a mixed question of law and fact, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.

    Facts

    The defendant’s girlfriend was found dead of a heroin overdose in his mother’s residence. The defendant was arrested for violating an order of protection. After being given Miranda warnings, he initially denied involvement in her death, claiming she was already intoxicated when she arrived. Later, detectives falsely told him his girlfriend was alive but needed his help to receive appropriate medical treatment and that withholding information about drug use could harm her. Based on this deception, the defendant confessed to injecting her with heroin. This confession was recorded.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the confession, finding the police deception was not egregious enough to render the confession involuntary. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the deception created an implied threat that the defendant could be held responsible for his girlfriend’s death if he didn’t confess, and thus, the confession was involuntary. The prosecution appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in finding the defendant’s confession involuntary based on the interrogating officer’s deception, considering the totality of the circumstances.

    Holding

    No, because the Appellate Division’s determination that the defendant’s will was overborne was a factual one, or one involving mixed questions of law and fact, beyond the review power of the Court of Appeals.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Appellate Division correctly applied the “totality of the circumstances” test to determine voluntariness, as established in People v. Guilford, 21 NY3d 205, 208 (2013). The Appellate Division properly considered the interrogating officer’s deception. The Court found that the false prospect of being penalized for remaining silent, raised by the interrogators, was incompatible with a finding that the defendant’s confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Division concluded that the deception, implying the defendant could be held responsible for his girlfriend’s death if he didn’t confess, created a substantial risk the defendant would falsely incriminate himself. The Court of Appeals noted that a voluntariness determination by the Appellate Division on the facts ordinarily implicates a mixture of factual and legal elements resistant to the Court’s review. The Court dismissed the appeal because the Appellate Division’s finding was based on a mixed question of law and fact, preventing further review.

  • People v. Thompson, 22 N.Y.3d 687 (2014): Limits on Prosecutorial Influence on Grand Jury Discretion

    People v. Thompson, 22 N.Y.3d 687 (2014)

    While prosecutors advise grand juries, they cannot use their influence to undermine the grand jury’s independent discretion to hear witnesses requested by the defendant, although not every misstep warrants dismissal of an indictment.

    Summary

    Thompson was convicted of second-degree murder. He appealed, arguing that the prosecutor committed misconduct before the grand jury by discouraging them from hearing a witness he requested. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while the prosecutor’s actions were not ideal, they did not rise to the level of impairing the integrity of the grand jury proceedings because the grand jury ultimately exercised its discretion in the matter. The Court emphasized that the grand jury is an independent body and the prosecutor’s role as legal advisor does not give them the power to control the grand jury’s decisions, but requires a showing of pervasive misconduct to warrant dismissal of an indictment.

    Facts

    Thompson was arrested for the murder of Rasheem Williams. In a prior grand jury proceeding on weapons charges, a witness, Jane Doe, gave a description of the shooter somewhat consistent with Thompson, but stated she did not see the shooter’s face due to fear from anonymous threats. Subsequently, another witness, James Doe, came forward, identifying Thompson as the shooter. The People presented murder charges to a second grand jury. Thompson testified and requested the grand jury call Jane Doe as a witness, claiming she would exonerate him. The prosecutor questioned the relevance of Jane Doe’s testimony.

    Procedural History

    The grand jury indicted Thompson on murder and weapons charges. Thompson moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court denied the motion. Thompson was convicted at trial. He appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s comments regarding the defendant’s requested witness impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceedings.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecutor’s comments, while not ideal, did not prevent the grand jury from exercising its independent discretion in deciding whether to hear from the witness, and the grand jury was not misled into thinking that they had no choice but to agree with the prosecutor.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized the importance of the grand jury as an independent body. It stated that under CPL 190.50, the grand jury has the power to subpoena witnesses, even those not called by the People. While the prosecutor is the legal advisor to the grand jury, due process requires fair dealing and candor. However, the Court emphasized that a grand jury proceeding is not a mini-trial, but an investigation to determine if sufficient evidence exists to accuse someone of a crime. Here, the prosecutors allowed Thompson to submit his request to call the witness directly to the grand jurors, and told the grand jurors they could vote to hear from the witness. The Court acknowledged the lead prosecutor forcefully contended that the witness’s testimony would be irrelevant. However, the lead prosecutor clarified that, despite her objections, the grand jurors had the right to call the witness based on their own belief regarding the relevance of the potential witness’s testimony. The Court pointed to the grand jurors’ assertive conduct as evidence that the prosecutors did not undermine the grand jurors’ independence. A grand juror repeatedly expressed skepticism regarding the prosecutor’s assertions and the grand jurors voted to hear from witnesses proffered by another defendant. The court held that the remedy of dismissing an indictment due to prosecutorial misconduct is an exceptional remedy, available only in rare cases, requiring a showing of pervasive bias and misconduct. Here, the Court found that the prosecutors did not commit pervasive misconduct, nor were they motivated by bias or a desire to deceive the grand jury. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Hill, 5 N.Y.3d 772 (2005), because the prosecutors did not hide the full extent of Thompson’s offer of proof, and the prosecutors’ conduct was justified by a concern for the safety of a prior witness. Thus, the Court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.

  • Morris v. Pavarini Construction, 22 N.Y.3d 668 (2014): Scope of Construction Safety Regulations for Unfinished Forms

    Morris v. Pavarini Construction, 22 N.Y.3d 668 (2014)

    Labor Law § 241(6) and Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-2.2(a), which require bracing of ‘forms’ at construction sites, apply not only to completed forms used for pouring concrete but also to individual form walls during the assembly process, ensuring worker safety from potential collapse.

    Summary

    Glenford Morris, a carpenter, was injured at a construction site when a large form wall fell on his hand. He sued the construction manager and owner, alleging violations of Labor Law § 241(6), predicated on a violation of Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-2.2(a), requiring forms to be braced. The defendants argued the regulation only applied to completed forms. After a framed-issue hearing, the Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the claim, granting summary judgment to Morris. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the regulation could apply to individual form walls during assembly, based on expert testimony regarding the necessity of bracing for safety during this phase.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Glenford Morris, a carpenter, was working at a construction site in Manhattan when a large, flat form wall fell and injured his hand. He sued Pavarini Construction (the construction manager) and Vornado Realty Trust (the building owner). The object that fell was a component of a concrete form under construction. Morris argued that the unbraced form wall violated Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-2.2(a), which requires forms to be braced to maintain their position and shape.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the § 241(6) claim. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the claim. The Court of Appeals initially reversed and remitted for a framed-issue hearing to determine whether the regulation applied only to completed forms (9 N.Y.3d 47 (2007)). Following the hearing, the Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the § 241(6) claim. The Appellate Division then reversed, granting summary judgment to the plaintiff (98 A.D.3d 841 (2012)). The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-2.2(a), requiring that forms be braced, applies to individual form walls during the assembly process, or only to completed forms used for pouring concrete.

    Holding

    Yes, because the expert testimony established that bracing is essential for maintaining the stability and position of form walls during assembly, protecting workers from the risk of collapse, and therefore the regulation can sensibly be applied to a wall component.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Labor Law § 241(6) is intended to ensure worker safety at construction sites, and mandates compliance with the Commissioner of Labor’s rules. 12 NYCRR 23-2.2(a) requires that “forms” be “braced or tied together so as to maintain position and shape.” The court noted that the expert testimony established that bracing is necessary to prevent form walls from collapsing due to wind, vibrations, or accidental contact during assembly. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that subdivision (b) of the regulation, concerning inspections during concrete pouring, limited the bracing requirement to completed forms. The court explained that the inspection requirement during concrete placement acknowledges the particular vulnerability of forms during that stage, but does not negate the need for bracing during assembly. To interpret the regulation otherwise would diminish protections for workers during form assembly, undermining the legislative intent to ensure worker safety. The court emphasized that “the testimony adduced at the framed-issue hearing establishes that the object that fell on plaintiff was a back wall panel, which was a component of a form under assembly at the time of the injury, and that the back wall is the type of component which can be subjected to the requirements of 12 NYCRR 23-2.2 (a).”

  • People v. Thomas, 22 N.Y.3d 636 (2014): Involuntary Confessions and Coercive Interrogation Tactics

    People v. Thomas, 22 N.Y.3d 636 (2014)

    A confession is involuntary and inadmissible if obtained through coercive interrogation tactics that undermine the defendant’s free will and create a substantial risk of false incrimination, even if the confession is potentially truthful.

    Summary

    Adrian Thomas was convicted of murdering his infant son. The key evidence was his confession obtained during a lengthy police interrogation involving false assurances, threats, and misrepresentations. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the confession was involuntary as a matter of law. The court emphasized that the police tactics, including threats to arrest Thomas’s wife and false claims that his confession was needed to save his son’s life, overbore Thomas’s will and created a substantial risk of a false confession. This case underscores the importance of voluntariness in confessions and the limits on police deception during interrogations.

    Facts

    Wilhelmina Hicks found her four-month-old son, Matthew, unresponsive. Matthew was rushed to the hospital and treated for possible sepsis. A treating physician suspected blunt force trauma and notified authorities. Police escorted Adrian Thomas, Matthew’s father, to the police station for questioning after removing his other children from the home. During a 9.5-hour interrogation, officers repeatedly told Thomas that Matthew’s injuries were accidental and that he could go home if he cooperated. They falsely stated that his wife blamed him and threatened to arrest her if he didn’t take responsibility. After Matthew was declared brain dead, police continued to pressure Thomas, claiming his disclosure was needed to save the child’s life. They suggested specific scenarios of how the injuries might have occurred, which Thomas eventually adopted in his confession. Thomas demonstrated how he allegedly threw the child on the mattress.

    Procedural History

    Thomas moved to suppress his confession, arguing it was involuntary. The trial court denied the motion. He was convicted of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Thomas’s confession was voluntary, considering the totality of the circumstances, including the interrogators’ use of deception, threats, and false assurances.

    Holding

    No, because the police employed coercive tactics that overbore Thomas’s will, creating a substantial risk of false incrimination, rendering the confession involuntary as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas’s confession was voluntary. The court focused on several key factors:

    1. Coercive Deception: The police repeatedly misrepresented that Thomas’s confession was necessary to save his son’s life, even after the child was brain dead. This false claim exploited Thomas’s paternal instincts, making his right to remain silent seem valueless.

    2. Threats: The threat to arrest Thomas’s wife, who was at the hospital with their child, was a coercive tactic designed to pressure him to speak against his penal interest. The court stated, “It was not consistent with the rule of Garrity and Avant to threaten that if defendant continued to deny responsibility for his child’s injury, his wife would be arrested and removed from his ailing child’s bedside.”

    3. False Assurances: The police repeatedly assured Thomas that the injuries were accidental, that he would not be arrested, and that he could go home if he cooperated. These assurances were contradicted by the interrogation’s underlying goal of obtaining a murder confession.

    The court emphasized that these tactics, combined with Thomas’s vulnerability, created a coercive environment that rendered his confession involuntary. The Court cited Rogers v. Richmond, stating that coerced confessions are inadmissible regardless of their potential truthfulness. The court also found that the misrepresentations raised a substantial risk of false incrimination, as every inculpatory fact in Thomas’s confession was suggested to him by the interrogators. The Court concluded that the confession should not have been admitted at trial, warranting a new trial.

  • QBE Insurance Corp. v. Jinx-Proof, Inc., 23 N.Y.3d 1106 (2014): Effective Disclaimer of Coverage Despite Confusing Language

    QBE Insurance Corp. v. Jinx-Proof, Inc., 23 N.Y.3d 1106 (2014)

    An insurance company’s disclaimer of coverage is effective if it sufficiently apprises the insured of the grounds for disclaimer, even if the disclaimer contains some contradictory or confusing language.

    Summary

    QBE Insurance Corp. issued a liability policy to Jinx-Proof, Inc. that contained an assault and battery exclusion. After a patron sued Jinx-Proof for injuries sustained from an employee’s intentional act, Jinx-Proof notified QBE. QBE sent two letters disclaiming coverage for the assault and battery claims but also mentioned defending the matter under the liquor liability portion of the policy, reserving rights for assault and battery allegations. QBE then sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Jinx-Proof. The New York Court of Appeals held that QBE’s disclaimer was effective because the letters specifically and consistently stated the policy excluded assault and battery coverage, sufficiently apprising Jinx-Proof of the basis for the disclaimer despite some confusing language.

    Facts

    • QBE Insurance Corp. issued a liability policy to Jinx-Proof, Inc. with an assault and battery exclusion.
    • In December 2007, a patron of Jinx-Proof’s bar sued for injuries allegedly caused by an employee throwing a glass at her face.
    • Jinx-Proof notified QBE of the lawsuit in January 2008, which included claims of negligence and intentional acts.
    • QBE sent two letters to Jinx-Proof disclaiming coverage for the assault and battery claims but also mentioning defending under the liquor liability portion, reserving rights.

    Procedural History

    • QBE commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Jinx-Proof.
    • The Supreme Court granted QBE’s motion for summary judgment.
    • The Appellate Division modified the order, declaring that QBE was not obligated to defend Jinx-Proof, and otherwise affirmed.
    • Jinx-Proof appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an insurance company’s disclaimer of coverage is effective when the disclaimer letters contain some contradictory or confusing language but specifically state that the policy excludes coverage for the relevant claims.

    Holding

    Yes, because the letters specifically and consistently stated that Jinx-Proof’s insurance policy excludes coverage for assault and battery claims, which was sufficient to apprise Jinx-Proof that QBE was disclaiming coverage on that ground, regardless of any contradictory or confusing language.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the clarity of the disclaimer regarding the assault and battery exclusion. The court stated, “Although the letters contained some contradictory and confusing language, the confusion was not relevant to the issue in this case. The letters specifically and consistently stated that Jinx-Proofs insurance policy excludes coverage for assault and battery claims.” This specific disclaimer was sufficient to inform Jinx-Proof that QBE was disclaiming coverage based on the exclusion. The court cited Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v Jiminez, 7 AD3d 652, 653 (2d Dept 2004), to support the principle that a disclaimer can be effective even with a reservation of rights. The court also declined to consider Jinx-Proof’s argument about potential coverage under the liquor liability portion of the policy, as this argument was not raised in the lower courts and was based on information outside the record. The court emphasized that neither party submitted the liquor liability portion of the policy to the motion court, making the argument “unreviewable” and “based on pure speculation.” This case clarifies that the key requirement for an effective disclaimer is clear communication of the grounds for denial, even if other parts of the communication are less clear.