New York Law Review

Tag: 2014

  • Webb-Weber v. Community Action for Human Services, Inc., 23 N.Y.3d 448 (2014): Pleading Requirements for Whistleblower Claims

    Webb-Weber v. Community Action for Human Services, Inc., 23 N.Y.3d 448 (2014)

    A plaintiff asserting a claim under New York Labor Law § 740 (2) (a), the whistleblower statute, is not required to specifically identify the law, rule, or regulation the employer allegedly violated, but must identify the employer’s activities, policies, or practices that were reported.

    Summary

    Webb-Weber, former COO of Community Action, sued after being terminated, alleging she was fired for reporting the organization’s policies and practices to public agencies. Community Action moved to dismiss, arguing Webb-Weber failed to identify the specific law, rule, or regulation violated. The Court of Appeals held that while a plaintiff must ultimately prove a violation of law to recover under § 740, the initial pleading only requires identifying the employer’s problematic activities, policies, or practices, not the specific legal provision violated.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Webb-Weber was the chief operating officer for Community Action, a non-profit providing social services. She reported to CEO David Bond. Webb-Weber claimed she was terminated after reporting complaints to public agencies about Community Action’s policies and practices, including:

    1. Falsification of patient medication and treatment records.
    2. Inadequate fire safety.
    3. Mistreatment of Community Action residents.
    4. Deficiencies in patient care and in the facility itself.

    She notified the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities (OPWDD) and the New York City Fire Department. OPWDD conducted a survey and issued a “60-Day Order,” and later placed Community Action under sanctions by the New York State Department of Health. The New York City Fire Department issued three violations.

    Procedural History

    • Supreme Court granted plaintiff’s cross-motion to amend the complaint and partially granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, upholding the Labor Law § 740 claim.
    • The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the § 740 claim because the complaint did not identify a specific law, rule, or regulation violated.
    • The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a complaint asserting a claim under Labor Law § 740 (2) (a) must identify the specific “law, rule or regulation” allegedly violated by the employer.

    Holding

    No, because the plain language of Labor Law § 740 (2)(a) does not impose such a requirement for pleading purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Labor Law § 740 (2) (a) prohibits retaliation against an employee who discloses or threatens to disclose an employer’s “activity, policy or practice.” The Court interpreted this to mean that a plaintiff must show they reported or threatened to report the employer’s “activity, policy or practice,” but need not claim they cited any particular “law, rule or regulation” at that time.

    The court stated, “{m}erely the practice — not the legal basis for finding it to be a violation — appears to be what must be reported.”

    While a plaintiff must ultimately prove an actual violation to recover, the pleading requirements are less stringent. The complaint must identify the activities, policies, or practices so the employer has notice of the alleged conduct. Here, the complaint adequately alleged violations based on the sanctions and violations issued by public bodies due to the plaintiff’s complaints.

    The Court emphasized that on a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be afforded a liberal construction, and the plaintiff’s allegations given every favorable inference, citing Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 (1994). The court noted that the defendant could request a bill of particulars to identify specific laws, rules and regulations allegedly violated.

  • In re Charada T., 24 N.Y.3d 357 (2014): Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence in Sex Offender Civil Management Proceedings

    In re Charada T., 24 N.Y.3d 357 (2014)

    Hearsay evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible in Mental Hygiene Law article 10 proceedings unless supported by an admission from the respondent or extrinsic evidence; however, the admission of such evidence may be deemed harmless error if other admissible evidence sufficiently supports the finding of a mental abnormality.

    Summary

    This case concerns the admissibility of hearsay evidence, specifically regarding an uncharged rape, in a civil management proceeding under Mental Hygiene Law article 10. The Court of Appeals held that while the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony about the uncharged rape without sufficient supporting evidence, the error was harmless because ample other evidence supported the jury’s finding that Charada T. suffered from a mental abnormality. The court emphasized that hearsay, even from presentence reports, requires independent indicia of reliability to be admissible and must not be unduly prejudicial. The decision underscores the careful balance courts must strike between allowing expert testimony and protecting respondents from unreliable or prejudicial information.

    Facts

    Charada T. had been convicted of three violent sex offenses. While incarcerated, the State initiated an article 10 proceeding to determine if he was a detained sex offender requiring civil management. A presentence report mentioned a fourth alleged rape, which Charada T. never admitted to and was never charged with. The State’s expert, Dr. Harris, testified about this uncharged rape, relying on the presentence report. Charada T. had a history of disciplinary issues in prison and had been expelled from sex offender treatment programs. Dr. Harris concluded Charada T. suffered from a mental abnormality predisposing him to commit sex offenses. Charada T.’s expert, Dr. Greif, agreed on some diagnoses but disagreed on whether those disorders prevented Charada T. from controlling his behavior.

    Procedural History

    The State commenced an article 10 proceeding in Supreme Court. Charada T. moved to preclude Dr. Harris from testifying about the uncharged rape, but the motion was denied. The jury found that Charada T. suffered from a mental abnormality, and the Supreme Court committed him to a secure treatment facility. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred by admitting hearsay testimony about an uncharged rape in an article 10 proceeding when that testimony was not supported by an admission from the respondent or extrinsic evidence.

    2. Whether the admission of such hearsay testimony, if erroneous, constituted harmless error.

    3. Whether the respondent preserved his argument that statements contained in sex offender treatment evaluations constituted unreliable hearsay that should have been excluded at trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because hearsay evidence about uncharged crimes requires an admission from the respondent or extrinsic evidence to be considered reliable, and no such evidence was present here.

    2. Yes, because despite the error, there was sufficient admissible evidence for the jury to find that the respondent suffered from a mental abnormality.

    3. No, because the respondent’s trial counsel made only a general, pro forma objection to Dr. Harris’s testimony about the treatment evaluations, and never pursued the objection or provided any explanation or basis for it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in Matter of State of New York v Floyd Y., requiring that hearsay evidence be reliable and that its probative value outweigh its prejudicial effect. The Court found that the hearsay evidence regarding the uncharged rape, based solely on the presentence report, lacked sufficient indicia of reliability because Charada T. never admitted to the crime and there was no extrinsic evidence to support the allegation. While acknowledging presentence reports can bear some reliability, the Court clarified they are not inherently reliable enough to sustain admission of testimony about uncharged crimes on their own. However, the Court concluded that the error was harmless because Dr. Harris’s testimony on the uncharged rape was limited and the State’s case primarily relied on the respondent’s three rape convictions, disciplinary record, and failure to complete sex offender treatment. The Court stated that there was “no reasonable possibility” that, had this testimony been excluded, the jury would have reached a different verdict. Regarding the sex offender treatment evaluations, the Court held that the respondent failed to preserve his argument for appeal. The court emphasized that “Counsel’s general objection did not adequately alert the trial court to the hearsay arguments that respondent now raises on appeal, and these claims are therefore beyond our review.”

  • Matter of State of New York v. John S., 24 N.Y.3d 331 (2014): Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence in Civil Management of Sex Offenders

    Matter of State of New York v. John S., 24 N.Y.3d 331 (2014)

    In Mental Hygiene Law Article 10 proceedings, hearsay evidence is admissible if it is reliable and its probative value in helping the jury evaluate an expert’s opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; records of sex offenses that resulted in neither acquittal nor conviction require close scrutiny for reliability.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of hearsay evidence, specifically concerning prior sex offenses, in a civil proceeding under Mental Hygiene Law Article 10 to determine if John S. was a detained sex offender requiring civil management. The Court held that hearsay evidence related to John S.’s prior indictments for rape and robbery met due process requirements and was admissible. However, hearsay about an uncharged rape was deemed unreliable and should have been excluded, although its admission was considered harmless error. The court also addressed the unsealing of records related to dismissed charges.

    Facts

    In 1968, John S. pleaded guilty to rape and robbery charges stemming from attacks on women near City College. These convictions were later vacated due to his mental incompetence at the time of the plea. In 1978, after being released on parole, John S. committed another rape for which he was convicted. In 1996, while on parole, he committed another rape. Prior to his scheduled release, the Attorney General filed a petition under Article 10 to have him declared a detained sex offender requiring civil management. The petition included an evaluation by Dr. Trica Peterson, who diagnosed John S. with antisocial personality disorder.

    Procedural History

    The State moved to unseal records related to the 1968 charges, which was granted. John S. moved to preclude expert testimony about these charges, arguing presumption of innocence, inadmissible hearsay, and prejudice. Supreme Court allowed experts to testify about the facts underlying the 1968 indictments and an uncharged 1978 rape. The jury found John S. suffered from a mental abnormality, and he was committed to a secure treatment facility. The Appellate Division affirmed. John S. appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08(c) supersedes CPL 160.50, thereby allowing the unsealing and disclosure of records related to criminal charges that were terminated in favor of the accused.

    2. Whether the hearsay evidence related to the 1968 charges met the standard for admissibility outlined in Matter of State of New York v Floyd Y, considering that the charges resulted in neither acquittal nor conviction.

    3. Whether the hearsay evidence related to the uncharged 1978 rape was properly admitted, considering that there was no conviction or admission of guilt for that offense.

    4. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that John S. suffers from a mental abnormality that qualifies him for civil management under Article 10.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the plain language of Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08(c) allows for broad disclosure of records related to the alleged commission of a sex offense, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.”

    2. Yes, because documentary evidence supporting the 1968 charges provided sufficient reliability, and its probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the experts’ opinions substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect.

    3. No, because the hearsay about the uncharged 1978 rape was unreliable and should not have been introduced at trial, as the allegations were not substantiated through extrinsic evidence or an admission by the respondent. However, the error was harmless.

    4. Yes, because the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, as the State’s experts explained how John S.’s sex crimes were a result of his antisocial personality disorder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08(c) clearly supersedes any inconsistent provisions of state law, including CPL 160.50. The statute contemplates broad disclosure of records relating to the alleged commission of a sex offense, regardless of whether those offenses resulted in a conviction. As for the admissibility of hearsay evidence, the Court relied on its decision in Floyd Y., which held that hearsay evidence is admissible if it is reliable and its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. The Court found that the hearsay evidence related to the 1968 charges was reliable, as it was based on complaints from five different victims and documentary sources. The Court found it was harmless error to admit hearsay about the uncharged 1978 rape because the State’s case rested primarily on admissible evidence of John S.’s other offenses and behaviors. Finally, the Court found that the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that John S. suffers from a mental abnormality, as the State’s experts explained how his sex crimes were a result of his antisocial personality disorder. The Court noted that the jury was entitled to credit the expert testimony that John S. has a predisposition to commit sex offenses and has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The court stated, "Factfinders in article 10 trials cannot comprehend or evaluate the testimony of an expert without knowing how and on what basis the expert formed an opinion."

  • CDR Créances S.A.S. v. Cohen, 23 N.Y.3d 307 (2014): Establishing Fraud on the Court to Strike Pleadings

    CDR Créances S.A.S. v. Cohen, 23 N.Y.3d 307 (2014)

    To demonstrate fraud on the court warranting the striking of a party’s pleadings, the non-offending party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the offending party acted knowingly to hinder the fact-finder’s fair adjudication of the case.

    Summary

    Plaintiff CDR Créances S.A.S. sought to recover funds from defendants Maurice and Leon Cohen, alleging a conspiracy to conceal assets related to a loan agreement. After years of litigation marked by discovery abuses and alleged perjury, plaintiff moved to strike defendants’ pleadings based on fraud on the court. The New York Court of Appeals held that to strike pleadings, clear and convincing evidence is required that the offending party knowingly tried to hinder the fair adjudication of the case. The Court affirmed the lower courts’ decision to strike the pleadings of Maurice and Leon Cohen, but vacated the judgment against Sonia Cohen, finding insufficient evidence of her involvement in the fraudulent scheme. The court emphasized dismissal is an extreme remedy that should be exercised with restraint.

    Facts

    Société de Banque Occidentale (SDBO), plaintiff’s predecessor, partnered with SNC Coenson International et Cie (SNC), controlled by Maurice Cohen, to develop a Flatotel hotel in Paris. SDBO also agreed to finance the New York Flatotel project through a loan agreement with Euro-American Lodging Corporation (EALC), another Cohen-controlled entity. Disputes arose, and SDBO alleged EALC was diverting funds. French courts ordered EALC to repay the loan and unpaid taxes. Plaintiff then pursued actions in New York, alleging the Cohens conspired to conceal assets and avoid repayment of the loan.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff commenced actions in 2003 and 2006 alleging conspiracy and fraud. Supreme Court initially struck defendants’ answers for discovery violations, but the Appellate Division reversed. Following remand and further discovery, Maurice and Leon Cohen were indicted in federal court for tax evasion and conspiracy to commit fraud on the New York court. After the Cohens’ conviction, plaintiff again moved to strike pleadings based on fraud. Supreme Court granted the motion, striking defendants’ answers and entering default judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erroneously applied a preponderance of the evidence standard to the plaintiffs motion to strike under CPLR 3126, and whether the evidence presented was sufficient to demonstrate fraud on the court warranting the striking of pleadings and entry of default judgment.

    Holding

    Yes, in part, because clear and convincing evidence showed Maurice and Leon Cohen acted knowingly to hinder the fair adjudication of the case, but no, as to Sonia Cohen, because there was insufficient evidence to justify the default against her.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that CPLR 3126 allows a court to strike pleadings for failure to comply with discovery orders. Beyond this, a court has inherent power to address conduct undermining the judicial system. Fraud on the court involves willful, deceitful conduct that obstructs the judicial process. Federal courts apply a clear and convincing evidence standard when determining whether actions constitute fraud on the court. The Court of Appeals adopted this standard, requiring the non-offending party to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the offending party acted knowingly to hinder the fact finder’s fair adjudication of the case. The Court emphasized that dismissal is an extreme remedy to be exercised with restraint and is most appropriate where the conduct is particularly egregious. Here, Maurice and Leon Cohen engaged in a systematic effort to mislead the court through perjury, witness tampering, and falsification of documents, all aimed at concealing their involvement in the diversion of funds. “When a party lies to the court and [its] adversary intentionally, repeatedly, and about issues central to the truth-finding process, it can fairly be said that [the party] has forfeited [the] right to have [the] claim decided on the merits.” However, the evidence against Sonia Cohen was insufficient to demonstrate her direct participation in the fraudulent scheme. The Court modified the Appellate Division’s order to vacate the judgment against Sonia Cohen, but otherwise affirmed the striking of pleadings and entry of default judgment against Maurice and Leon Cohen.

  • People v. Rancharla, 23 N.Y.3d 296 (2014): Establishing a Criminal Enterprise

    People v. Rancharla, 23 N.Y.3d 296 (2014)

    To establish enterprise corruption, the prosecution must prove the existence of a criminal enterprise with a structure, continuity, and criminal purpose extending beyond individual criminal acts, but direct evidence of communications or planning among enterprise members is not essential; awareness and participation in the overarching criminal design are sufficient.

    Summary

    Rancharla and Barone, officers of Testwell Laboratories, were convicted of enterprise corruption for falsifying test results. The Appellate Division vacated these convictions, finding insufficient evidence of a criminal enterprise. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division applied an incorrect legal standard. The Court found sufficient evidence to establish a criminal enterprise based on the structure of Testwell Laboratories and the continuous, interrelated nature of the fraudulent testing schemes, and remitted the case for a reassessment of the weight of the evidence.

    Facts

    Testwell Laboratories, a materials testing company, and its officers, Rancharla (president) and Barone (vice-president), were indicted for engaging in a pattern of criminal activity. This activity included falsifying concrete mix-design reports, improper steel inspections, false certifications of inspectors, and alteration of compressive/flexural strength test data. Rancharla signed blank mix-design reports later fraudulently certified by employees. Barone directed employees to alter testing data to conceal inconsistencies. These activities spanned numerous construction projects.

    Procedural History

    Rancharla and Barone were jointly tried and convicted on multiple counts, including enterprise corruption. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by vacating the enterprise corruption convictions, citing insufficient proof of a criminal enterprise. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and remitted the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division applied the correct legal standard in reviewing the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting the defendants’ convictions for enterprise corruption under Penal Law article 460, particularly regarding the elements of a “criminal enterprise” as defined in People v. Western Express Intl., Inc.

    Holding

    Yes, the Appellate Division applied an incorrect legal standard because it improperly required direct evidence of a leadership structure, overall planning, and communications among the defendants to establish the existence of a criminal enterprise. The evidence presented was sufficient to support a jury’s rational conclusion that the defendants operated a criminal enterprise. Therefore, the Court of Appeals remitted the case for a proper assessment of the weight of the evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in its legal analysis. The Court emphasized that to prove enterprise corruption, it is necessary to distinguish mere patterns of criminal conduct from patterns demonstrably designed to achieve the purposes and promote the interests of organized, structurally distinct criminal entities. The Court stated that the Testwell Group had a “continuity of existence, criminal purpose and structure exceeding the individual crimes committed under the association’s auspices or for its purposes.” The Court highlighted the interrelated illegal schemes covering hundreds of construction projects as evidence of this continuity. Further, direct proof of communications or concerted activity was not essential; the jury could infer awareness and participation from the pattern of criminal activity and the involvement of individuals at various levels of Testwell Laboratories. As the Court noted, “the overall pattern of criminal activity and the involvement of various individuals at all levels of Testwell Laboratories’ corporate structure allowed the jury to infer that Rancharla and Barone, as high-level corporate officers, were aware of, participated in and directed others to commit crimes in furtherance of the Testwell Group’s objectives.” The Court emphasized that defendants need not be privy to every crime, only aware of the general structure, knowledge of the overarching design, and engagement in a requisite pattern of criminal activity.

  • Empire Center v. NY State Teachers’ Retirement System, 23 N.Y.3d 440 (2014): FOIL and Disclosure of Retiree Names

    Empire Center for N.Y. State Policy v. New York State Teachers’ Retirement Sys., 23 N.Y.3d 440 (2014)

    Under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), the names of retirees receiving benefits from public employee retirement systems are subject to disclosure, while their home addresses remain exempt.

    Summary

    The Empire Center sought disclosure of the names of retired members from the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System and the Teachers’ Retirement System of the City of New York under FOIL. The retirement systems refused, citing Public Officers Law § 89(7), which protects the home addresses of retirees. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that the statute explicitly exempts only home addresses, not the names, of retirees. The Court distinguished its prior decision in Matter of New York Veteran Police Assn., clarifying that it only applied to requests for both names and addresses, not names alone.

    Facts

    The Empire Center for New York State Policy, a “think tank,” requested the names of retired members from two retirement systems under FOIL.
    The retirement systems denied the request, citing Public Officers Law § 89(7).
    The Empire Center then filed Article 78 proceedings to compel disclosure.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court dismissed both petitions.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decisions.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s orders.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Public Officers Law § 89(7) exempts the names of retirees from disclosure under FOIL, or only their home addresses.

    Holding

    No, because Public Officers Law § 89(7) explicitly exempts only the home addresses of retirees, not their names. The statute differentiates between “retirees” and “beneficiaries,” exempting both the name and address of the latter, but only the address of the former.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court’s reasoning hinged on the plain language of Public Officers Law § 89(7), which states that “Nothing in this article shall require the disclosure of the home address … of a retiree,” but does not similarly restrict the disclosure of a retiree’s name. The court emphasized the contrast between the treatment of retirees and “beneficiaries,” for whom both name and address are protected.

    The Court distinguished its prior ruling in Matter of New York Veteran Police Assn. v New York City Police Dept. Art. I Pension Fund, where it had appeared to deny a request for names and addresses of retirees. The Court clarified that the Veteran Police case only addressed the denial of a request for both names and addresses. Since the Empire Center only sought the names, the prior ruling was not controlling.

    The Court also addressed the retirement systems’ argument that disclosing names could lead to an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(b). The Court dismissed this concern as speculative, noting that the Empire Center was not seeking the information for solicitation or fund-raising purposes, which would trigger the privacy exemption. The Court stated that the privacy exemption could be reconsidered if future FOIL requests raised similar privacy concerns, particularly if they involved solicitation.

    The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the specific language of the statute and cautioned against reading its prior decisions too broadly, stating, “Our decisions are not to be read as deciding questions that were not before us and that we did not consider.”

  • People v. Washington, 23 N.Y.3d 228 (2014): Duty to Inform DWI Suspect of Attorney’s Contact

    People v. Washington, 23 N.Y.3d 228 (2014)

    When an attorney contacts the police on behalf of a DWI suspect before a chemical test is administered, the police must inform the suspect of the attorney’s communication, unless doing so would unduly interfere with the test’s administration.

    Summary

    Defendant was arrested for DWI after a fatal car accident. While she was being processed, her attorney contacted the police, requesting that they not question or test her. The police, without informing her of the attorney’s call, obtained her consent for a breathalyzer test and administered it. The New York Court of Appeals held that the police violated her limited right to counsel under People v. Gursey. The Court reasoned that because the attorney contacted the police before the breathalyzer was administered, the police were obligated to inform the defendant of the communication so she could decide whether to consult with counsel.

    Facts

    Jonai Washington struck and killed a pedestrian while driving. Police officers noted she admitted to consuming four beers earlier. She failed field sobriety tests and was arrested for driving while intoxicated. At police headquarters, she was read a chemical test authorization form and signed it, consenting to a breathalyzer test.
    Meanwhile, her family contacted an attorney who then called the Sheriff’s Department and was transferred to a sergeant at police headquarters. The attorney stated he represented Washington and asked the police not to question or test her. This call occurred before the breathalyzer test began, but Washington was not informed of the attorney’s call before the test was initiated.

    Procedural History

    Washington was indicted for manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, and DWI. She moved to suppress the breathalyzer results, arguing a violation of her right to counsel. The Supreme Court granted the motion, suppressing the results. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the police violated Washington’s right to counsel by failing to inform her of her attorney’s contact before the breathalyzer test and that the People failed to show that providing such notice would have interfered with the administration of the test. The dissenting justice granted the People leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police are required to inform a DWI suspect that an attorney has contacted them on their behalf before administering a chemical test, even if the suspect has already consented to the test.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statutory right to legal consultation applies when an attorney contacts the police before a chemical test is performed, and the police must alert the suspect to the presence of counsel, whether the contact is made in person or telephonically, unless doing so would unduly interfere with the administration of the test. The suspect could have revoked her consent prior to administration of the test after conferring with counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Gursey, which recognized a limited right to counsel in DWI cases based on the implied consent law. While Gursey primarily addressed situations where the suspect *personally* requests counsel, the Court extended its reasoning to situations where counsel intervenes on the suspect’s behalf *before* the chemical test is administered. The Court reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 grants a driver a qualified right to refuse a chemical test, and advice from counsel may be sought to inform that decision. The Court stated that the police must advise the accused that a lawyer has made contact on the accused’s behalf. Once so informed, the accused may choose to consult with counsel or forgo that option and proceed with the chemical test.

    The Court emphasized that the right to counsel is not absolute and cannot be used to unduly delay the administration of the chemical test, referencing the time-sensitive nature of blood alcohol content evidence. However, because the police failed to inform Washington of her attorney’s contact *before* the breathalyzer was administered, and the People did not demonstrate that providing such notice would have been unreasonable, the Court held that her right to counsel was violated, and suppression of the test results was warranted. The operative point is the actual performance of the procedure and, until it occurs, legal assistance may be sought “if such access does not interfere unduly” with the administration of the chemical test.

  • Village of Herkimer v. County of Herkimer, 23 N.Y.3d 814 (2014): Discounting Future Contract Damages to Present Value

    Village of Herkimer v. County of Herkimer, 23 N.Y.3d 814 (2014)

    When calculating damages for breach of contract involving future payments, the damages should be discounted to present value to account for the time value of money, unless the contract explicitly states otherwise.

    Summary

    The Village of Herkimer withdrew from a county self-insurance plan and disputed the withdrawal fee assessed by the County of Herkimer. The Court of Appeals held that the withdrawal fee, representing the Village’s share of the plan’s future liabilities, should have been discounted to its present value as of the date it was due (December 31, 2005). The Court reasoned that failing to discount the future payments would give the County an impermissible windfall, as the fee was intended to cover benefits paid out over many years. The case was remitted to determine an appropriate discount rate.

    Facts

    Herkimer County administered a workers’ compensation self-insurance plan. The Village of Herkimer was a participant. The plan allowed participants to withdraw at the end of any calendar year by giving notice and paying an equitable share of the outstanding liabilities. In 2005, the County terminated the plan and created an “Abandonment Plan,” offering members the option to remain and pay annual assessments or withdraw and pay a lump sum withdrawal fee based on the final annual estimate prior to abandonment. The Village initiated a lawsuit challenging the Plan. The County counterclaimed for breach of contract, seeking the withdrawal liability. The 2005 Reserve Analysis estimated the Plan’s outstanding liabilities as of December 31, 2005, to be $18.4 million on an undiscounted basis, with the Village’s share calculated at approximately $1.6 million.

    Procedural History

    The County prevailed on summary judgment as to liability on its breach of contract counterclaim against the Village. A jury trial on damages resulted in a verdict for the County for the full undiscounted amount ($1,617,528). The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that discounting was inappropriate. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a municipality’s liability upon withdrawing from a county self-insurance fund, representing its share of the plan’s future liabilities, should be discounted to present value.

    2. Whether pre-verdict interest should be calculated from December 31, 2005, when the withdrawal payment became due.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the withdrawal fee reflected benefits to be paid in the future and, therefore, should have been discounted to its current value as of the date it was due.

    2. Yes, because the cause of action for breach of contract existed on December 31, 2005, when the Village owed the withdrawal fee, even though the exact amount was not calculated until later.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that discounting future damages to present value accounts for the time value of money. The Court noted that while discounting is common in personal injury and wrongful death cases, the principle applies equally to contract damages representing future losses. The Court rejected the County’s argument that the $1.6 million was a liquidated sum due upon withdrawal, finding instead that it represented the Village’s share of the Plan’s estimated aggregate future losses. The Court emphasized that the 2005 actuarial report itself stated that the total liability did not reflect the fact that future benefits would be paid over time and interest could be earned if the liabilities were prefunded. To require the Village to pay the undiscounted amount would give the County an impermissible windfall. The Court found that the terms of the contract, defined by the statutes, the Abandonment Plan, and the 2005 Reserve Analysis, encompassed future damages, making discounting appropriate. Regarding pre-verdict interest, the Court held that it should be calculated from the date of the breach (December 31, 2005), rejecting the Village’s arguments that the accrual date should be delayed until the release of the 2005 Reserve Analysis or the assertion of the County’s counterclaims. The Court distinguished the case from precedents requiring a demand for payment to trigger interest accrual for municipal debts, finding that those precedents aimed to prevent opportunistic creditors, a concern not present in this case. As the Court stated, “[p]reverdict interest “shall be computed from the earliest ascertainable date the cause of action existed” (CPLR 5001 [b]).” The case was remitted to determine an appropriate discount rate. The Court noted that “[i]n the interest of minimizing additional costs to taxpayers and conserving judicial resources, the parties might well consider the wisdom of compromise going forward.”

  • People v. Smart, 23 N.Y.3d 213 (2014): Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Through Witness Tampering

    People v. Smart, 23 N.Y.3d 213 (2014)

    A defendant forfeits the right to confront a witness when the defendant’s misconduct is a significant cause of the witness’s decision not to testify, even if the witness also has a lawful basis, such as the Fifth Amendment, for refusing to testify.

    Summary

    Floyd Smart was convicted of burglary based, in part, on grand jury testimony of Jane Doe, an accomplice who later refused to testify at trial, invoking her Fifth Amendment rights. The prosecution argued Smart forfeited his confrontation rights by intimidating Doe. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly admitted Doe’s grand jury testimony because Smart’s actions significantly contributed to Doe’s decision not to testify, regardless of her Fifth Amendment privilege. This decision reinforces the principle that defendants cannot benefit from their own misconduct in preventing witnesses from testifying.

    Facts

    Smart, along with Robert Verstreate and Jane Doe, planned a burglary. Doe waited in the car while Smart and Verstreate entered the house. The homeowner arrived, and Doe sounded the horn to alert Smart and Verstreate. The three were arrested, and Doe cooperated with authorities, testifying before the grand jury and receiving transactional immunity. Doe was later released and absconded. Prior to trial, the prosecution sought to introduce Doe’s grand jury testimony, alleging Smart had tampered with her. Jailhouse phone recordings revealed Smart threatening Doe and urging his mother to help her avoid testifying.

    Procedural History

    The County Court held a Sirois hearing to determine the admissibility of Doe’s grand jury testimony. The court granted the People’s motion to admit Doe’s testimony. Smart was convicted at trial. He moved to set aside the verdict, which was denied. The Appellate Division modified the sentence but otherwise affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting Doe’s grand jury testimony when Doe invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege and the defendant claimed her unavailability was not a direct result of his actions.

    Holding

    Yes, the trial court did not err because the People presented clear and convincing evidence that Smart’s misconduct was a significant cause of Doe’s decision not to testify, thus forfeiting his right to confront her, even if she also had a valid Fifth Amendment claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed that a defendant forfeits their right to confrontation if they procure a witness’s unavailability through violence, threats, or chicanery. The court emphasized that the People must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in misconduct aimed at preventing the witness from testifying and that those misdeeds were a significant cause of the witness’s decision not to testify. The Court found that Smart’s threats to Doe, his attempts to persuade her to leave town, and his mother’s actions at his behest, all demonstrated a clear intent to prevent Doe from testifying. The court reasoned that Doe’s subsequent invocation of her Fifth Amendment right did not negate the forfeiture, as Smart’s misconduct significantly contributed to her unavailability. The Court stated, “[W]here it has been shown that the defendant procured the witness’s unavailability through violence, threats or chicanery,” the defendant “may not assert either the constitutional right of confrontation or the evidentiary rules against the admission of hearsay in order to prevent the admission of the witness’s out-of-court declarations”. The Court distinguished this case from *People v. Hamilton*, noting that in *Hamilton*, there was no evidence the defendant threatened the witness, unlike in Smart’s case, where ample evidence of threats and attempts to dissuade Doe from testifying existed. The Court concluded that allowing a defendant to benefit from their misconduct would undermine the integrity of the proceedings and incentivize witness tampering.

  • People v. McCray, 23 N.Y.3d 193 (2014): Limits on Accessing Confidential Mental Health Records in Criminal Trials

    People v. McCray, 23 N.Y.3d 193 (2014)

    A trial court does not abuse its discretion by withholding confidential mental health records of a complainant in a rape case if there is no reasonable possibility that disclosing the withheld materials would lead to the defendant’s acquittal.

    Summary

    McCray was convicted of rape. Prior to trial, he requested the complainant’s mental health records to undermine her credibility. The trial court conducted an in camera review, disclosing some records but withholding others. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision, finding no abuse of discretion. The Court reasoned that most undisclosed documents were cumulative or irrelevant, and the potential impact of the remaining records, including a past accusation of sexual assault against the complainant’s father, was too remote to warrant disclosure given the complainant’s confidentiality interests. The Court emphasized that the jury was already aware of the complainant’s significant mental health issues.

    Facts

    McCray and the complainant met in April 2009 and went on a date in May 2009. After visiting friends, they went to an abandoned house. The complainant later called 911, reporting that McCray had beaten and raped her. Police observed blood on her clothes and face, and hospital records confirmed abrasions, bruises, and lacerations. McCray claimed the sex was consensual and that the complainant demanded money afterward, leading to a fight. The complainant had significant mental health issues, including bipolar disorder, Tourette’s, and PTSD, which was disclosed to the jury.

    Procedural History

    The trial court reviewed the complainant’s mental health records in camera and disclosed 28 pages to the defense, withholding the rest. McCray was convicted of rape. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding no error in withholding the records. Two dissenting justices argued that the undisclosed records could significantly impact the complainant’s credibility. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by withholding the complainant’s confidential mental health records after an in camera review, where the defendant argued the records were necessary to challenge the complainant’s credibility.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court could reasonably conclude that there was no more than a remote possibility that disclosing the withheld records would lead to McCray’s acquittal, outweighing the complainant’s legitimate interest in confidentiality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court framed the issue as a Brady violation, considering whether the withheld evidence was material. The test of materiality is whether there is a “reasonable possibility” that the verdict would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed. However, because confidential mental health records were involved, the trial court had discretion in deciding whether to disclose them. The Court found most undisclosed documents to be cumulative or of little relevance, as the jury already knew of the complainant’s significant mental health problems. Addressing the undisclosed records of the complainant’s prior accusation of sexual assault against her father, the court acknowledged this gave them some pause. However, it distinguished the prior accusation as being far removed in time and different in nature from the current accusation against McCray. Further, the court noted that there was no indication that the complainant fabricated the accusation against her father. The court concluded that it was almost impossible for a jury to think that the complainant’s accusation in this case was an honest but mistaken one. The court balanced McCray’s interest in obtaining the records against the complainant’s interest in confidentiality, ultimately concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court noted, “In sum, the issue here is whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding defendant’s interest in obtaining the records to be outweighed by the complainant’s interest in confidentiality; and defendant’s interest could be outweighed only if there was no reasonable possibility that the withheld materials would lead to his acquittal.”