New York Law Review

Tag: 2013

  • People v. Cantave, 21 N.Y.3d 374 (2013): Cross-Examination on Facts Underlying Conviction Pending Appeal

    People v. Cantave, 21 N.Y.3d 374 (2013)

    A defendant may not be cross-examined in another matter about the underlying facts of a prior conviction that is pending on direct appeal because doing so violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

    Summary

    Cantave was convicted of assault. Prior to his testimony, the People were granted permission to cross-examine him regarding a rape conviction that was pending appeal. He did not testify and was convicted. His rape conviction was reversed and he was acquitted on retrial. The Court of Appeals addressed whether cross-examination regarding a conviction pending appeal violates the Fifth Amendment. The Court held that it does because any testimony elicited during cross-examination could be used against the defendant in a retrial, thus creating a risk of self-incrimination, and that the trial court’s ruling effectively prevented Cantave from testifying entirely.

    Facts

    Cantave was charged with assault stemming from a confrontation with Elbresius. Elbresius claimed Cantave was the aggressor, biting him. Cantave claimed Elbresius attacked him with a gun, which he reported to 911.

    Prior to trial, Cantave had been convicted of rape, which was pending appeal.

    At the assault trial, the People were permitted to cross-examine Cantave about the rape conviction and underlying facts.

    Cantave did not testify.

    Cantave’s rape conviction was reversed and he was acquitted on retrial.

    Procedural History

    Cantave was convicted of third-degree assault in the trial court.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the Sandoval issue was unpreserved and that the admission of the rape conviction was not an abuse of discretion.

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated Cantave’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by allowing the People to cross-examine him about the underlying facts of a rape conviction that was pending appeal.

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant remains at risk of self-incrimination until he exhausts his right to appeal and any testimony elicited during cross-examination could later be used against him at a new trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be liberally construed in favor of the accused, and a defendant who chooses to testify does not automatically waive the right against self-incrimination regarding pending criminal charges.

    The Court found that cross-examination about a conviction pending appeal is analogous to cross-examination about a pending charge, which the Court had previously prohibited in People v. Betts, 70 N.Y.2d 289 (1987). The Court in Betts held that allowing cross-examination about a pending charge “unduly compromises the defendant’s right to testify with respect to the case on trial, while simultaneously jeopardizing the correspondingly important right not to incriminate oneself as to the pending matter.” Id. at 295.

    The Court explained that until a defendant has exhausted his right to appeal a conviction, “he remained at risk of self-incrimination…If defendant testified in the instant case, any testimony elicited on cross-examination about the rape case could later be used against him at a new trial, which is ‘further incrimination to be feared.’”

    The Court noted that while the trial court presumably would have allowed Cantave to invoke his Fifth Amendment right in response to questions about the rape case, “ ‘taking the Fifth’ is highly prejudicial as to both the instant case and the conviction pending appeal” because “[i]t exerts an undeniable chilling effect upon a real ‘choice’ whether to testify in one’s own behalf.” Moreover, a defendant would have to invoke the Fifth Amendment as to both exculpatory and inculpatory questions to protect himself, otherwise he might waive the privilege.

    The Court found that the practical effect of the Sandoval ruling was to prevent Cantave’s testimony entirely.

    The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the 911 call because the tenor and timing of the call did not qualify it as an excited utterance or a present sense impression.

  • K2 Investment Group, LLC v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Company, 21 N.Y.3d 384 (2013): Insurer Waives Policy Exclusions by Wrongfully Denying Defense

    K2 Investment Group, LLC v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Company, 21 N.Y.3d 384 (2013)

    When a liability insurer breaches its duty to defend its insured, the insurer forfeits the right to later rely on policy exclusions to avoid its duty to indemnify the insured for a judgment against them.

    Summary

    K2 Investment Group sued attorney Jeffrey Daniels for legal malpractice after loans they made to Goldan, LLC, where Daniels was a principal, went unpaid due to Daniels’ failure to record mortgages securing the loans. Daniels tendered the claim to his malpractice insurer, American Guarantee, who disclaimed coverage, asserting the allegations were not based on legal services for others. Daniels defaulted, and K2 obtained a judgment exceeding the policy limit. As Daniels’ assignee, K2 sued American Guarantee for breach of contract and bad faith. The New York Court of Appeals held that because American Guarantee breached its duty to defend, it could not later rely on policy exclusions to escape its duty to indemnify Daniels, emphasizing the insurer’s obligation to defend whenever a complaint suggests a reasonable possibility of coverage.

    Facts

    K2 Investment Group and another LLC made loans totaling $2.83 million to Goldan, LLC, expecting mortgages to secure the loans. Jeffrey Daniels, an attorney and a principal of Goldan, failed to record the mortgages. Goldan defaulted on the loans, leading to a lawsuit by K2 against Goldan and its principals, including a legal malpractice claim against Daniels, alleging Daniels acted as their attorney and his failure to record the mortgages deviated from accepted legal practice.

    Procedural History

    Daniels notified American Guarantee, his malpractice insurer, of the claims and forwarded the complaint. American Guarantee disclaimed coverage. Daniels defaulted, resulting in a judgment for K2 exceeding the policy limit. K2, as Daniels’ assignee, sued American Guarantee for breach of contract and bad faith. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to K2 on the contract claim, holding American Guarantee breached its duty to defend. The Appellate Division affirmed. American Guarantee appealed based on a two-justice dissent, and K2 cross-appealed; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an insurer, having breached its duty to defend, can later assert policy exclusions to deny indemnity for a default judgment against its insured.

    Holding

    Yes, because an insurance company that wrongfully disclaims its duty to defend may only litigate the validity of its disclaimer and cannot later rely on policy exclusions to avoid indemnification. By breaching its duty to defend, American Guarantee lost its right to rely on policy exclusions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that American Guarantee breached its broad duty to defend, which arises whenever a complaint suggests a reasonable possibility of coverage. The court quoted Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v Cook, 7 NY3d 131, 137 (2006), stating: “[A]n insurer will be called upon to provide a defense whenever the allegations of the complaint suggest a reasonable possibility of coverage.” Even if the claim seemed doubtful, the insurer was obligated to defend. The court emphasized that insurers who disclaim coverage where coverage may be arguable should seek a declaratory judgment. Quoting Lang v Hanover Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 350, 356 (2004), the court stated that an insurer that disclaims without seeking a declaratory judgment “may litigate only the validity of its disclaimer and cannot challenge the liability or damages determination underlying the judgment.” By breaching its duty to defend, American Guarantee forfeited its right to argue policy exclusions. The Court acknowledged a possible exception for cases involving public policy, such as intentional wrongdoing (citing Hough v USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 93 AD3d 405 (1st Dept 2012)), but found no such public policy concern applicable here. The rejection of a settlement offer below the policy limit does not automatically prove bad faith unless a pattern of conscious indifference to the insured’s potential liability for a large judgment is shown. The court found no evidence American Guarantee knew the malpractice claim’s value exceeded the offer or policy limits.

  • Howard’s Walk, LLC v. BB Real Estate HDFC, 21 N.Y.3d 679 (2013): Scope of Subordination Penalty Under Lien Law § 22

    Howard’s Walk, LLC v. BB Real Estate HDFC, 21 N.Y.3d 679 (2013)

    When a building loan contract is not properly filed under Lien Law § 22, the subordination penalty applies only to the portion of the loan used for construction, not to the entire mortgage amount if it includes funds for land acquisition or refinancing.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of the subordination penalty under New York Lien Law § 22, which applies when a building loan contract is not properly filed. BB Real Estate HDFC obtained a $10 million loan from Banco Popular to refinance existing debt and fund construction. The loan agreement was not properly filed. Howard’s Walk, LLC, a mechanic’s lienor, claimed the entire mortgage should be subordinate to its lien due to the filing failure. The Court of Appeals held that the subordination penalty only applies to the portion of the loan used for construction ($4.5 million), not the portion used for refinancing the original land acquisition ($5.5 million). The rationale was that the statute’s purpose is to protect contractors and suppliers, and subordinating the acquisition portion of the loan would not further that purpose.

    Facts

    BB Real Estate HDFC obtained a $10 million loan from Banco Popular in 2007. The loan was intended to refinance an existing mortgage on the property and to finance construction. The loan agreement was a “building loan contract” as defined by Lien Law § 22. Banco Popular failed to properly file the building loan contract and related documents as required by Lien Law § 22. Howard’s Walk, LLC, a mechanic’s lienor who performed work on the property, filed a notice of lien. Howard’s Walk argued that Banco Popular’s entire $10 million mortgage should be subordinate to its mechanic’s lien due to the bank’s failure to properly file the building loan contract.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court ruled that the entire $10 million mortgage was subordinate to the mechanic’s liens. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, holding that only the portion of the loan attributable to construction ($4.5 million) was subject to the subordination penalty, reversing the lower courts’ decisions regarding the remaining $5.5 million.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the subordination penalty of Lien Law § 22 applies to the entire amount of a mortgage securing a building loan contract that includes funds both for construction and for acquisition of the land, or only to the portion of the loan used for construction.

    Holding

    No, because the subordination penalty in Lien Law § 22 only applies to the portion of the loan used for construction, not to the portion used for land acquisition or refinancing of the original acquisition debt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the primary purpose of Lien Law § 22 is to protect contractors, laborers, and material suppliers by ensuring they have access to information about the funds available for the improvement of real property. The Court stated that “the aim of the statute is to give notice to potential contractors and suppliers regarding the amount of funds available for a project.” Subordinating the portion of the loan used for land acquisition or refinancing would not further this purpose, as those funds are not directly related to the construction work. The Court distinguished Atlantic Bank of N.Y. v Forrest House Holding Co., 234 A.D.2d 491 (2d Dept 1996), noting it did not address the specific situation where a portion of the loan was used for acquisition. The Court found persuasive the reasoning in Yankee Bank for Fin. & Sav., FSB v Task Assoc., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 64 (N.D.N.Y. 1990), which held that the lender retained its priority interest up to the amount expended on the purchase of the property. The Court emphasized that a contrary rule would lead to an unfair and unintended windfall for the lienors, stating, “It is one thing to subordinate the construction portion of the loan; it is another to hand the lienors a substantial sum that has nothing to do with the improvements they supplied.” Judge Graffeo dissented in part, arguing that the plain language of Lien Law § 22 dictates that the entire mortgage interest is subject to the subordination penalty when the building loan contract is not properly filed, regardless of whether the funds were used for construction or acquisition. Graffeo cited the language that “the interest of each party to such contract in the real property affected thereby, is subject to the lien and claim” to support the argument that the entire mortgage is affected. She also noted the difficulty of separating acquisition and construction costs after the fact, arguing it creates confusion and uncertainty.

  • Greater New York Taxi Assn. v. New York City Taxi and Limousine Com’n, 21 N.Y.3d 285 (2013): State’s Interest in Regulating Transportation

    Greater New York Taxi Assn. v. New York City Taxi and Limousine Com’n, 21 N.Y.3d 285 (2013)

    A state law regulating taxicabs in a city does not violate the Municipal Home Rule Clause if the state has a substantial interest in the regulation, such as ensuring accessible transportation for visitors and residents, and the law bears a reasonable relationship to that interest.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of the HAIL Act, which regulates taxi and livery services in New York City. The Act aimed to increase accessible vehicles and improve service in underserved areas. Plaintiffs, including medallion owners, challenged the Act, arguing it violated the Municipal Home Rule Clause and other constitutional provisions. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the HAIL Act addresses a substantial state concern and bears a reasonable relationship to that concern, and therefore is constitutional.

    Facts

    The HAIL Act (Laws of 2011, ch. 602, as amended) was enacted to address mobility deficiencies in New York City, including a lack of accessible vehicles and limited yellow cab service in outer boroughs. The Act created a “HAIL License Program,” allowing livery vehicles to accept street hails in underserved areas, while preserving yellow cabs’ exclusive right to street hails in Manhattan’s central business district and airports. It mandated a percentage of accessible vehicles and provided grants for their purchase. The Act also allowed the issuance of new medallions restricted to accessible vehicles.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs, including medallion owners and their representatives, challenged the HAIL Act in court, seeking a declaration that it was unconstitutional and an injunction against its implementation. The Supreme Court granted plaintiffs’ motions, nullifying the Act and declaring it violated the Municipal Home Rule, Double Enactment, and Exclusive Privileges Clauses. The defendants appealed directly to the Court of Appeals on constitutional grounds.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the HAIL Act violates the Municipal Home Rule Clause of the New York Constitution by regulating matters of purely local concern without a home rule message from the City.

    2. Whether the HAIL Act violates the Double Enactment Clause of the New York Constitution by repealing, diminishing, impairing, or suspending a power in a statute of local governments without proper reenactment.

    3. Whether the HAIL Act violates the Exclusive Privileges Clause of the New York Constitution by granting exclusive privileges to the livery industry.

    Holding

    1. No, because the HAIL Act addresses a substantial state concern and bears a reasonable relationship to that concern.

    2. No, because it has not been demonstrated that the Act “repealed, diminished, impaired or suspended” any power in “a statute of local governments.”

    3. No, because the licensing provisions apply to a broad class of drivers and owners, not a single entity, and do not grant an exclusive privilege.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Municipal Home Rule Clause allows the legislature to act on local matters if there is a substantial state interest and the law bears a reasonable relationship to that interest. The Court found that the HAIL Act addresses a substantial state interest because it benefits all New Yorkers, including visitors, and promotes efficient transportation in the State’s largest city. The Act’s stated purpose explicitly mentions the public health, safety, and welfare of residents and visitors traveling to, from, and within New York City. The court noted the lack of accessible taxis impacted people with disabilities, preventing them from relying on the street hail system.

    The Court further reasoned that the Act bears a reasonable relationship to that state concern by implementing provisions such as the issuance of HAIL licenses and the earmarking of a percentage of those licenses for accessible vehicles. The Court rejected the argument that delegating authority to the Mayor to issue medallions or establish grant programs violated the City’s separation of powers or budgeting authority. It found that these provisions were implementation devices that advanced legitimate goals of the law.

    Regarding the Double Enactment Clause, the court stated that the Act did not repeal, diminish, impair or suspend any power in a statute of local governments, and regarding the Exclusive Privileges Clause, the court found that the Act did not grant exclusive privileges to the livery industry because the licensing provisions applied to a broad class and did not exclude others from obtaining a license if they met the requirements. “The licensing provisions apply to a class consisting of close to 60,000 livery vehicle drivers and owners… [I]n order to qualify, all one needs to do is obtain a TLC license, operate a livery vehicle for one year and maintain good standing with the TLC.”

  • Chenango Forks Central School District v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board, 21 N.Y.3d 256 (2013): Enforceability of Past Practices Under the Taylor Law

    Chenango Forks Central School District v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board, 21 N.Y.3d 256 (2013)

    A long-standing practice, known to both the employer and employees, can constitute a binding past practice under New York’s Taylor Law, requiring the employer to bargain before discontinuing it, even if it’s not explicitly mentioned in the collective bargaining agreement.

    Summary

    Chenango Forks Central School District unilaterally terminated its practice of reimbursing Medicare Part B premiums to retirees. The Union filed an improper practice charge with PERB, arguing this violated the Taylor Law. An arbitrator found no contractual obligation for the reimbursement. PERB ultimately ruled that the reimbursement was a binding past practice, despite not being in the CBA, because it was unequivocal, uninterrupted, and created a reasonable expectation among employees. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that PERB reasonably determined the arbitrator’s decision wasn’t binding and substantial evidence supported PERB’s finding of a binding past practice.

    Facts

    The Chenango Forks Central School District reimbursed Medicare Part B premiums for retirees 65 or older. Initially, this was required by their health insurance plan. In 1988, they switched plans, and the subsequent CBA in 1990 didn’t mandate this reimbursement, but the District continued it. The 2001-2004 and 2004-2007 CBAs were also silent on this issue. In June 2003, the District announced termination of this reimbursement due to costs.

    Procedural History

    The Union filed a contract grievance and an improper practice charge with PERB. The ALJ initially dismissed the charge pending the grievance outcome. After an arbitrator found no contractual obligation, the Union reopened the PERB charge. The ALJ then found the District violated Civil Service Law § 209-a (1) by unilaterally discontinuing the benefit. PERB affirmed, finding a binding past practice. The Appellate Division confirmed PERB’s determination. The School District appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether PERB should have deferred to the arbitrator’s finding that there was no past practice.

    2. Whether PERB’s decision that the Medicare Part B premium reimbursement constituted a binding past practice was supported by substantial evidence.

    3. Whether continued Medicare Part B premium reimbursement absent a contractual requirement constitutes an unconstitutional gift of public funds.

    Holding

    1. No, because the arbitrator’s findings relating to past practice fell outside the scope of his authority, and any determination by the arbitrator with respect to past practice under the Taylor Law was repugnant to that statute.

    2. Yes, because the School District’s knowledge of the payments was shown by managerial oversight, and the Union and bargaining unit employees’ knowledge was established by testimony given at the hearing.

    3. No, because the reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums does not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds if the Union has a right under the Taylor Law to such reimbursement because it is a binding past practice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that PERB’s decision was legally permissible, rational, and supported by substantial evidence. PERB did not need to defer to the arbitrator’s decision because the arbitrator’s authority was limited to contract interpretation, and any statements regarding past practice under the Taylor Law were dicta and potentially repugnant to the statute. The Court cited Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. (Bordansky) (4 PERB ¶ 3031 [1971]), which outlines when PERB should defer to arbitration. The Court reasoned that the arbitrator’s statement regarding the voluntariness of the District’s conduct did not align with the Taylor Law’s criteria for establishing a past practice. The court referenced Matter of County of Nassau (24 PERB ¶ 3029 [1991]), establishing the test for a binding past practice: “the practice was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a period of time sufficient under the circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among the affected [bargaining] unit employees that the [practice] would continue.” The Court also dismissed the School District’s argument that the reimbursement was an unconstitutional gift of public funds, as the Taylor Law provides the statutory permission for such practices that constitute terms and conditions of employment.

  • Horn v. New York Methodist Hospital, 22 N.Y.3d 952 (2013): Jury Instructions and Burden of Proof in Medical Malpractice

    Horn v. New York Methodist Hospital, 22 N.Y.3d 952 (2013)

    In a medical malpractice action, a jury charge, when taken as a whole, must not improperly alter the causation standard or reduce the plaintiff’s burden of proof; specifically, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a trial court’s jury instructions in a medical malpractice case improperly reduced the plaintiff’s burden of proof regarding causation. The plaintiff, Marguerite Horn, suffered injuries due to a perforated esophagus during an intubation procedure. The defendants argued that the jury charge on the “loss-of-chance” theory lowered the burden of proof. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the jury charge, viewed in its entirety, properly conveyed the standard of causation and the plaintiff’s burden to prove the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury.

    Facts

    Marguerite Horn, an 83-year-old woman, was rushed to the hospital after being found unresponsive. Dr. Martin, the emergency room physician, attempted to intubate her. During these attempts, Dr. Martin inserted the tube into Horn’s esophagus and observed subcutaneous emphysema. It was later discovered that Horn’s esophagus had been perforated during the intubation. Surgical repair failed, leaving Horn unable to eat or drink orally for the remaining three years of her life, requiring a feeding tube and constant care from her husband.

    Procedural History

    The jury found Dr. Martin solely liable and awarded the plaintiffs $1,000,000.00 ($500,000 for the decedent’s pain and suffering, and $500,000 for the husband’s loss of consortium). The Appellate Division affirmed the verdict, but reduced the loss of consortium damages to $200,000. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court’s jury instructions improperly reduced the plaintiffs’ burden of proof. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court improperly reduced the plaintiff’s burden of proof by instructing the jury that the defendants’ actions may be considered a cause of the injuries if the defendants’ actions or omissions deprived the decedent of a substantial possibility of avoiding the consequences of having a permanent feeding tube?

    Holding

    No, because the jury charge, when taken as a whole, properly instructed the jury on the plaintiffs’ burden of proof and the proper standard for causation in a medical malpractice case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendants’ challenge to the loss-of-chance theory of liability was not properly preserved because the defendants did not specifically argue against the theory itself at trial, but rather argued that the facts of the case did not support the charge. Addressing the preserved argument regarding the burden of proof, the court emphasized that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must demonstrate that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury. The court noted that the trial court explicitly instructed the jury on the plaintiffs’ burden of proof and recited the proximate cause charge directly from the Pattern Jury Instructions (PJI). Specifically, the court cited the PJI language: “An act or omission is regarded as a cause of an injury if it was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. That is, if it had such an effect in producing the injury that reasonable people would regard it as a cause of the injury.” The Court concluded that, considering the jury charge in its entirety, there was no improper alteration of the causation standard or reduction of the plaintiff’s burden of proof. The Court reasoned that a proper jury charge, viewed as a whole, provides sufficient guidance to the jury, even if isolated portions might be subject to criticism.

  • Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Smith, 21 N.Y.3d 287 (2013): Home Rule Clause and State Laws of Statewide Concern

    Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Smith, 21 N.Y.3d 287 (2013)

    When the legislature enacts a law of statewide impact on a matter of substantial state concern, the Home Rule section of the State Constitution does not require an examination into the reasonableness of the distinctions the legislature has made among different localities.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge to amendments to the Wicks Law, which governs public construction contracts in New York. The 2008 amendments created a tiered system of contract thresholds, with higher thresholds for counties within and around New York City. Plaintiffs argued this violated the Home Rule provision of the New York State Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the Home Rule provision does not apply when the legislature acts on a matter of substantial state concern, even if the law differentiates among localities. The Court also addressed claims relating to apprenticeship requirements imposed by the amended law, finding that certain claims related to out-of-state contractors should be reinstated.

    Facts

    The Wicks Law requires public entities to obtain separate specifications for plumbing, electrical, and HVAC work on construction contracts exceeding a certain threshold. In 2008, the legislature amended the Wicks Law, raising the threshold but establishing different thresholds for different counties: $3 million in New York City counties, $1.5 million in Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester, and $500,000 in the remaining counties. Several plaintiffs challenged the law alleging the tiered system violated the Home Rule provision of the New York Constitution, among other claims.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reinstated the complaint to the extent it sought declaratory relief, declaring the 2008 legislation valid. Two Appellate Division Justices dissented, arguing that the tiered classification of counties was not rational. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the 2008 amendments to the Wicks Law, which created a tiered system of contract thresholds among counties, violate the Home Rule provision of the New York State Constitution.

    2. Whether the apprenticeship requirements imposed by the 2008 legislation unlawfully discriminate against out-of-state contractors in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

    Holding

    1. No, because the manner of bidding on public construction contracts is a matter of substantial state concern, and therefore the Home Rule provisions do not prevent the state from acting by special law.

    2. The Court did not make a final ruling, instead determining the lower court improperly dismissed the constitutional claims. The Court held that the plaintiffs’ allegations sufficiently alleged that the second sentence of Labor Law § 222 (2) (e) unconstitutionally excludes out-of-state contractors from some public construction work in New York and that the lower court must consider the claims.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Home Rule provision, while seemingly prohibiting special laws relating to local governments’ property, affairs, or government, cannot be read to create an impossible dichotomy between state and local power. Quoting Chief Judge Cardozo in Adler v. Deegan, “The Constitution . . . will not be read as enjoining an impossible dichotomy.” Instead, there is an area of concurrent jurisdiction where the state legislature can act on matters of substantial state concern, even if those actions affect local governments. The Court cited Article IX, § 3 (a) (3) of the Constitution, which states that the legislature’s power is not restricted in relation to matters other than the property, affairs, or government of a local government.

    The Court distinguished City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. (PBA I), where the Court struck down a law that interfered in a dispute between New York City and a union. The Court noted that in PBA I, the legislation lacked a reasonable relationship to a substantial state interest because it was purely parochial. Here, the Court found the Wicks Law amendments addressed a substantial state concern (public bidding on construction contracts) and that the plaintiffs’ argument asked the court to engage in a “freestanding reasonableness analysis” of the geographical disparity, which was not the intention of PBA I.

    Regarding the apprenticeship provisions, the Court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged that out-of-state contractors were excluded from certain public construction work due to the requirement to participate in New York State-approved apprenticeship programs. The Court pointed to a Department of Labor regulation requiring apprenticeship programs to have a permanent facility in New York State, with limited exceptions for federally funded projects. The Court remanded the case back to the lower court to determine the issue of whether the statute facially discriminated against out-of-state contractors.

  • People v. Hampton, 21 N.Y.3d 277 (2013): Judge Substitution on Legal Questions After Oral Argument

    People v. Hampton, 21 N.Y.3d 277 (2013)

    Judiciary Law § 21 does not bar a substitute judge from deciding a question of law presented in a motion argued orally before another judge, provided a transcript or recording is available and the substitute judge demonstrates familiarity with the proceedings without undue prejudice.

    Summary

    Grady Hampton was convicted of murder and weapon possession. After the verdict, the trial judge recused himself due to a conflict of interest. Defense counsel moved for a trial order of dismissal or to set aside the verdict, arguing that Judiciary Law § 21 barred a substitute judge from deciding the motion because it was initially argued orally before the recused judge. The substitute judge denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Judiciary Law § 21 does not prevent a substitute judge from deciding a purely legal question, like legal sufficiency, where a transcript exists and the new judge is familiar with the case.

    Facts

    Defendant Hampton shot and killed Kareem S., who was giving Hampton’s girlfriend, Nikki G., a ride. Hampton was jealous because Nikki had a past affair with Kareem. Witnesses saw Hampton before and after the shooting, and one overheard him admitting to the crime, stating Nikki “tested his manhood.” Cell phone records contradicted Hampton’s initial statements to police. Hampton’s first trial resulted in a hung jury. At the second trial, after the close of evidence, the defense moved for a trial order of dismissal which the court reserved decision on.

    Procedural History

    Hampton was convicted in the Supreme Court, Nassau County. After the jury verdict, the trial judge recused himself and the case was reassigned to Acting Supreme Court Justice Palmieri. Palmieri denied Hampton’s motion for a trial order of dismissal or to set aside the verdict. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Judiciary Law § 21 bars a substitute judge from deciding a motion for a trial order of dismissal or to set aside a verdict that was initially argued orally before the original judge, who recused himself.
    2. Whether there was legally sufficient evidence to support Hampton’s convictions for murder and weapon possession.

    Holding

    1. No, because the motion involved a purely legal question (legal sufficiency), a transcript of the prior proceedings was available, the substitute judge demonstrated familiarity with the case, and no undue prejudice to the defendant resulted.
    2. Yes, because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crimes proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in People v. Thompson, which held that Judiciary Law § 21 does not prevent the substitution of a judge in a jury trial if the substitute indicates familiarity with the proceedings and no undue prejudice occurs. The Court also cited Plunkett v. Emergency Med. Serv. of N.Y. City, which held that a successor judge can consider a motion to set aside a verdict if purely legal questions are involved, all discussion was recorded, and the successor judge is not called upon to weigh conflicting testimony or assess credibility.

    The Court emphasized that a motion for a trial order of dismissal or to set aside a verdict based on legal sufficiency presents a pure question of law, requiring the court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and determine whether a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. “A verdict is legally sufficient when, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the People, there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]).

    The Court found that Justice Palmieri reviewed and was familiar with the prior proceedings, as evidenced by his decision. The Court further concluded that Hampton failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the substitution. Finally, assessing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, the Court found that the testimony of multiple witnesses and the cell site evidence were legally sufficient to support Hampton’s convictions. The Court rejected Hampton’s argument that one witness’s testimony was incredible as a matter of law, noting that inconsistencies in testimony are for the jury to resolve.

  • People v. Sanchez, 21 N.Y.3d 216 (2013): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Due to Potential Conflict of Interest

    People v. Sanchez, 21 N.Y.3d 216 (2013)

    A potential conflict of interest arising from an attorney’s prior representation of a witness only requires reversal if the conflict “operates” on or “affects” the defense; the defendant bears the burden of proving such effect.

    Summary

    Defendant Nicholas Sanchez appealed his robbery conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest. Legal Aid, his trial counsel, had previously represented a potential suspect, DeJesus, in an unrelated case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while a potential conflict existed, Sanchez failed to demonstrate that the conflict actually affected his defense. The defense strategy focused on misidentification and third-party culpability by implicating Montero, not DeJesus, and did not betray any professional obligations to either client.

    Facts

    Freddy Pénalo, a taxi driver, was robbed by two passengers, one of whom displayed a handgun. A taxi cam captured images during the robbery. Detectives identified Nicholas Sanchez as the gunman in the photographs. During the investigation, Sanchez’s brother mentioned a rumor that “Macho” (Franklin DeJesus) was involved. A fingerprint in the taxi matched Elvis Montero. Legal Aid had previously represented DeJesus in an unrelated robbery case where he was acquitted.

    Procedural History

    Sanchez was convicted of first-degree robbery in Supreme Court. Legal Aid’s motion to set aside the verdict based on newly discovered evidence (DeJesus’s alleged jailhouse confession) was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the potential conflict of interest arising from Legal Aid’s prior representation of DeJesus, a possible suspect in the robbery, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel requiring reversal of Sanchez’s conviction.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the potential conflict actually affected the presentation of his defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished between actual and potential conflicts of interest. An actual conflict, where an attorney simultaneously represents clients with opposing interests, requires automatic reversal if not waived. A potential conflict requires reversal only if it “operates” on or “affects” the defense. The Court stated, “the requirement that a potential conflict have affected, or operated on, or borne a substantial relation to the conduct of the defense—three formulations of the same principle—is not a requirement that [the] defendant show specific prejudice.” Here, a potential conflict existed because Legal Aid had previously represented DeJesus and possessed privileged information. However, Sanchez failed to demonstrate that the potential conflict impacted his defense. His attorney reasonably focused on Montero, whose fingerprint was found in the taxi, as the likely perpetrator and argued misidentification. The defense strategy did not betray any professional obligation owed to DeJesus. The Court emphasized that the defendant bears a “heavy burden” to show that a potential conflict actually operated on the defense. The court also noted that a Gomberg inquiry was not required because DeJesus was not a co-defendant. The Court permitted Sanchez to raise the issue again in a CPL article 440 proceeding to develop the factual record further.

  • Manhattan Telecom. Corp. v. H & A Locksmith, Inc., 21 N.Y.3d 200 (2013): CPLR 3215(f) Deficiency Does Not Create Jurisdictional Defect

    Manhattan Telecom. Corp. v. H & A Locksmith, Inc., 21 N.Y.3d 200 (2013)

    A failure to comply with CPLR 3215(f)’s requirement to submit proof of facts constituting the claim when seeking a default judgment is a procedural error, not a jurisdictional defect, and does not render the judgment a nullity.

    Summary

    Manhattan Telecom sued several corporations and Ariq Vanunu, alleging unpaid telephone services based on a written agreement. The complaint stated Vanunu was an officer in the corporations but did not allege he signed the agreement individually. All defendants defaulted, and a default judgment was entered. Vanunu moved to vacate, citing excusable default and meritorious defenses. The Supreme Court denied the motion based on inexcusable delay. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the default judgment a nullity because plaintiff failed to provide evidence of Vanunu’s personal liability. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that failure to comply with CPLR 3215(f) is a procedural defect, not a jurisdictional one, and therefore does not render the judgment a nullity.

    Facts

    Manhattan Telecom. Corp. (plaintiff) sued H & A Locksmith, Inc., other corporate entities, and Ariq Vanunu (defendant). The suit alleged that plaintiff provided telephone services to the defendants based on a written agreement, and the defendants failed to pay for those services. The complaint mentioned that Vanunu was a principal officer in all the corporate defendant entities. The written agreement was not attached to the complaint, and the complaint did not explicitly state that Vanunu signed the agreement in his individual capacity.

    Procedural History

    All defendants, including Vanunu, defaulted, and a default judgment was entered against them on November 28, 2008. Vanunu moved to vacate the judgment on November 5, 2009, claiming excusable default and meritorious defenses. The Supreme Court denied Vanunu’s motion, finding his delay in defending himself inexcusable. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, finding that the default judgment was a nullity because the plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating Vanunu’s personal liability for the claims. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, certifying the question of whether its order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plaintiff’s failure to submit “proof of the facts constituting the claim” as required by CPLR 3215(f) when seeking a default judgment constitutes a jurisdictional defect that renders the default judgment a nullity.

    Holding

    No, because a failure to comply with CPLR 3215(f) is a procedural error, not a jurisdictional defect that deprives the court of the power to enter judgment. The error can be corrected through means provided by law, such as an application for relief from the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals clarified the meaning of “jurisdiction,” explaining that it pertains to the fundamental power of a court to adjudicate a matter. A lack of jurisdiction means the court lacks the power to rule on the matter, not merely that elements of a cause of action are missing. The Court emphasized the distinction between a court committing an error by not complying with CPLR 3215(f) and a court usurping a power it does not have. The former is a procedural defect correctable under CPLR 5015, while the latter would render the judgment a nullity. The court cited Lacks v. Lacks, 41 N.Y.2d 71 (1976), explaining that “Lack of jurisdiction’ should not be used to mean merely ‘that elements of a cause of action are absent’ but that the matter before the court was not the kind of matter on which the court had power to rule.” The court further supported its holding by referencing Wilson v. Galicia Contr. & Restoration Corp., 10 N.Y.3d 827 (2008), where it refused to set aside a default judgment based on a CPLR 3215(f) argument because the party failed to preserve the argument. The Court reasoned that if the defect were truly jurisdictional, preservation would not matter.