New York Law Review

Tag: 2013

  • People v. Castillo, 22 N.Y.3d 991 (2013): Examining Confidential Informant Testimony for Probable Cause in Search Warrant Applications

    People v. Castillo, 22 N.Y.3d 991 (2013)

    When a search warrant is based on information from a confidential informant, and the warrant application and supporting affidavit alone do not establish probable cause, the court must examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony before the magistrate to determine if probable cause existed and if CPL 690.40(1) was substantially complied with.

    Summary

    Castillo was convicted on drug and weapon charges after a search of his home pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was based on an affidavit from a police officer and the oral deposition of a confidential informant. Castillo moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause and requesting a Darden hearing. The Supreme Court denied the motion without reviewing the informant’s testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that while a Darden hearing was not required, the Supreme Court erred in not reviewing the informant’s testimony to determine if probable cause existed and if the requirements of CPL 690.40(1) were met. The case was remitted for further proceedings.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant for Castillo’s home based on her affidavit and the oral deposition of a confidential informant. The affidavit stated the informant purchased cocaine from Castillo at his home on three occasions. The affidavit did not detail the informant’s reliability or track record. During the warrant application process, the confidential informant testified before the issuing magistrate.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Castillo’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, without reviewing the transcript of the confidential informant’s testimony. Castillo was subsequently convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the denial of a Darden hearing was appropriate. Castillo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Supreme Court erred in failing to examine the transcript of the confidential informant’s testimony before the magistrate to determine if the search warrant was issued upon probable cause.
    2. Whether the Supreme Court erred in failing to determine if the formal requirements of CPL 690.40(1) had been substantially complied with.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because when the search warrant and supporting affidavit do not by themselves establish probable cause, the court must review the transcript of the informant’s testimony to determine if probable cause existed based on the totality of the evidence presented to the magistrate.

    2. Yes, because the suppression court must ensure that there was substantial compliance with CPL 690.40(1) to ensure the regularity of the application process and preservation for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the search warrant and supporting affidavit, standing alone, did not establish probable cause. The affidavit lacked sufficient information to assess the informant’s reliability, failing to demonstrate a proven track record or indicate the informant was under oath. While admissions against penal interest can contribute to probable cause, the informant’s statements lacked sufficient detail and police corroboration. The court distinguished this case from People v. McCann, where the informant provided a detailed, signed statement against their penal interests with the explicit understanding that false statements were a crime.

    Because the warrant application was deficient, the Supreme Court was required to review the transcript of the informant’s testimony to determine if probable cause was established before the magistrate. Furthermore, the court emphasized the importance of complying with CPL 690.40(1), which requires that any examination of a person providing pertinent information be recorded or summarized. This ensures the regularity of the warrant application process and preserves the grounds for issuing the warrant for appellate review. As the court stated, “[t]he suppression court must find that there was substantial compliance with CPL 690.40 (1) in order to provide an ‘assurance of the regularity of the application process and preservation for appellate review of the grounds upon which a search warrant is issued.’” The case was remitted to the Supreme Court to review the transcript and determine if probable cause and compliance with CPL 690.40(1) were established.

  • De La Cruz v. Caddell Dry Dock & Repair Co., 21 N.Y.3d 530 (2013): Defining ‘Public Work’ for Prevailing Wage Laws

    De La Cruz v. Caddell Dry Dock & Repair Co., 21 N.Y.3d 530 (2013)

    A municipal vessel is a public work under Labor Law § 220 and the State Constitution, requiring prevailing wages, if its primary objective benefits the general public.

    Summary

    This case defines what constitutes a “public work” under New York Labor Law § 220 and Article I, § 17 of the New York State Constitution, which mandate prevailing wages for workers on public projects. The plaintiffs, employees of Caddell Dry Dock, sought prevailing wages for their work on New York City vessels, including Staten Island Ferries and fireboats. The Court of Appeals held that a municipal vessel is a “public work” if its primary objective is to benefit the general public, regardless of whether the public directly uses the vessel or has access to it. The court reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the vessels served a public function and thus qualified as public works.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs were employed by Caddell Dry Dock & Repair Co., which repaired and maintained vessels for various companies, including New York City agencies. The vessels serviced included Staten Island Ferry boats, New York City fireboats, and Department of Sanitation garbage barges. The plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to the prevailing wage rate under Labor Law § 220 and Article I, § 17 of the New York State Constitution because the vessels they worked on were “public works.” Caddell argued that the vessels were not public works.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs sued Caddell, seeking enforcement of contractual provisions requiring payment of prevailing wages and supplemental benefits. Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted the defendant’s motion, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing Brukhman v. Giuliani. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipal vessel is a “public work” within the meaning of Labor Law § 220 and Article I, § 17 of the New York State Constitution, thus requiring the payment of prevailing wages to workers involved in its construction, maintenance, or repair.

    Holding

    Yes, because a municipal vessel is a public work if its primary objective is to benefit the general public.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term “public work” extends beyond structures attached to land and includes items that are “situated” or “used” for the public benefit. The Court emphasized the legislative intent to ensure social justice in the State’s dealings with laborers and mechanics, requiring a liberal interpretation of Labor Law § 220. The Court distinguished Brukhman v. Giuliani, stating that it was not dispositive on the issue of whether a vessel is a “public work,” noting that the critical factor is whether the primary purpose or objective of the project is public. The court established a three-prong test to determine whether a project is subject to prevailing wage requirements: (1) a public agency must be party to a contract involving laborers; (2) the contract must concern a project involving construction-like labor paid for by public funds; and (3) the work product’s primary objective must be for public use or benefit. Applying this test, the Court found that vessels like Staten Island Ferries and fireboats serve the general public, even if the public does not directly use the fireboats. As Justice Holmes stated, “whether a work is public or not does not depend upon its being attached to the soil”.

  • Cunningham v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 20 N.Y.3d 513 (2013): GPS Tracking of Employee’s Car and Workplace Exception

    Cunningham v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 20 N.Y.3d 513 (2013)

    A public employer’s warrantless GPS tracking of an employee’s car is a search, subject to constitutional reasonableness, and must be reasonably limited in scope to work-related activities to be permissible.

    Summary

    The New York State Department of Labor suspected an employee, Cunningham, of falsifying time records and attached a GPS device to his car without a warrant to track his movements. The Court of Appeals held that while the GPS tracking constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the New York Constitution, it fell within the workplace exception to the warrant requirement. However, the Court found the search unreasonable in its scope because it tracked Cunningham’s movements 24/7, including evenings, weekends, and vacation time, which was excessively intrusive. As a result, evidence obtained solely from the GPS tracking was suppressed, and the case was remanded for a redetermination of the appropriate penalty.

    Facts

    The New York State Department of Labor began investigating Cunningham, the Director of Staff and Organizational Development, for alleged unauthorized absences and falsified time records. After Cunningham evaded an investigator, the Department referred the matter to the Office of the State Inspector General. The Inspector General attached a GPS device to Cunningham’s car without his knowledge while it was parked near his office. The device tracked all of the car’s movements for a month, including evenings, weekends, and vacation time. The department then used the GPS data to support disciplinary charges against Cunningham, alleging discrepancies between his reported work hours and his car’s location.

    Procedural History

    The Department of Labor brought disciplinary charges against Cunningham. A Hearing Officer sustained 11 charges, four of which relied on GPS evidence. The Commissioner of Labor affirmed the Hearing Officer’s determination and terminated Cunningham’s employment. Cunningham filed a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the termination. The Appellate Division confirmed the Commissioner’s determination. Cunningham appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless GPS tracking of a public employee’s vehicle by their employer constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution when the tracking occurs 24/7, including during non-work hours and vacation time, even if a reasonable suspicion of misconduct exists.

    Holding

    No, because while the GPS tracking of an employee’s car falls under the workplace exception to the warrant requirement, the search was unreasonable in its scope due to its excessively intrusive nature of tracking Cunningham’s movements 24/7 for a month. The evidence obtained solely from the GPS data should be suppressed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle and tracking its movements constitutes a search under both the Fourth Amendment and the New York Constitution, citing People v. Weaver and United States v. Jones. However, the Court found that the “workplace exception” to the warrant requirement, as established in O’Connor v. Ortega and Matter of Caruso v. Ward, applied in this case because the employer had a reasonable suspicion of employee misconduct. The Court reasoned that tracking the location of an employee’s car during working hours is analogous to other workplace searches deemed permissible without a warrant.

    Despite the applicability of the workplace exception, the Court determined that the scope of the search was unreasonable. The GPS tracking was deemed “excessively intrusive” because it monitored Cunningham’s movements at all times, including evenings, weekends, and during his vacation. The court stated, “The search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.” The Court emphasized that the State failed to make a reasonable effort to limit the tracking to business hours, despite having the ability to remove the device. The Court held that, “Where an employer conducts a GPS search without making a reasonable effort to avoid tracking an employee outside of business hours, the search as a whole must be considered unreasonable.”

  • People v. Rudolph, 22 N.Y.3d 497 (2013): Court’s Duty to Determine Youthful Offender Status

    People v. Rudolph, 22 N.Y.3d 497 (2013)

    A sentencing court has a mandatory duty to determine whether an eligible youth should receive youthful offender status, regardless of whether the defendant requests it or waives the right to be considered for it.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a sentencing court “must” determine whether an eligible youth should be treated as a youthful offender (YO), even if the defendant doesn’t request it or attempts to waive the right. Defendant Rudolph, a 17-year-old, pleaded guilty to felony drug possession and purportedly waived his right to appeal. The prosecutor stated YO treatment was off the table due to the crime’s severity. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s affirmance, overruling its prior decision in People v. McGowen. The Court reasoned that the statute’s use of “must” reflects a policy choice that a YO determination is required in every eligible case, emphasizing the value of a judicial assessment of a young person’s potential for rehabilitation.

    Facts

    Defendant Rudolph, 17 years old at the time, was charged with felony drug possession. He pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance. During the plea, the prosecutor stated that youthful offender treatment was not an option due to the crime’s seriousness, to which neither the defendant nor the court responded. At sentencing, the court did not address Rudolph’s eligibility for youthful offender status.

    Procedural History

    The County Court sentenced Rudolph to five years in prison plus two years of post-release supervision. On appeal, Rudolph argued that the sentencing court erred by not considering him for youthful offender treatment. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating Rudolph waived his right by failing to request YO consideration. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a sentencing court is required to determine if an eligible youth should receive youthful offender status, even if the defendant does not request it or attempts to waive the right.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 720.20(1) mandates that the court “must” determine whether an eligible youth is a youthful offender, reflecting a policy choice that this determination be made in every eligible case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals interpreted CPL 720.20(1), which states that upon conviction of an eligible youth, the court “must” determine whether the youth is a youthful offender. The Court found this mandatory language reflects a deliberate policy choice by the legislature. The Court reasoned that while defendants can typically waive rights, the opportunity for a fresh start without a criminal record, based on a judge’s assessment of rehabilitation potential, is too valuable to be sacrificed in plea bargaining. The court acknowledged potential concerns about prosecutors being less willing to offer plea bargains but noted that prosecutors can still oppose YO treatment and, in unusual situations, bargain for the right to withdraw consent to the plea if YO treatment is granted. The court explicitly overruled People v. McGowen, which had held that a defendant waives the right to YO status by not requesting it. The court limited the holding’s impact to cases still on direct review, preventing collateral attacks on already final sentences. The court clarified that the decision does not allow defendants to withdraw their guilty pleas, as the plea was not rendered unknowing or involuntary by the court’s interpretation of the statute.

  • People v. Brinson, 20 NY3d 492 (2013): Double Jeopardy and Resentencing for Postrelease Supervision

    People v. Brinson, 20 N.Y.3d 492 (2013)

    Resentencing a defendant to include mandatory postrelease supervision (PRS) after the original determinate sentence was served, but while the defendant is still incarcerated serving an aggregated sentence, does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the defendant lacks a legitimate expectation of finality until the entire aggregated sentence is completed.

    Summary

    Defendants Brinson and Blankymsee were resentenced to include mandatory postrelease supervision (PRS) after their original sentences omitted it. They argued this violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, as they had already served their determinate sentences. The New York Court of Appeals held that the resentencing did not violate double jeopardy because the defendants were still serving their aggregated sentences under Penal Law § 70.30. The Court reasoned that defendants do not have a legitimate expectation of finality in their sentences until their entire aggregated sentence is completed. This decision clarifies when resentencing for PRS is permissible without violating double jeopardy protections.

    Facts

    Christopher Brinson was arrested on December 8, 1998, and sentenced on July 14, 2000, to a determinate term of 10 years for second-degree robbery, an indeterminate term of 3 to 6 years for third-degree robbery, and an indeterminate term of 2 to 4 years for fourth-degree grand larceny. The indeterminate terms ran concurrently but consecutively to the determinate term. On April 28, 2010, he was resentenced to include five years of PRS on the determinate count.

    Lawrence Blankymsee was sentenced on May 20, 2004, as a second felony offender, to seven concurrent prison terms, including determinate sentences of five years for two counts of loaded firearm possession and indeterminate sentences for other crimes. On October 20, 2010, he was resentenced to include five years of PRS on the determinate sentences for firearm possession.

    Procedural History

    In separate appeals, the Appellate Division affirmed the resentences, holding that the defendants did not have a legitimate expectation of finality in their determinate sentences because they had not completed their properly aggregated sentences before resentencing. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the imposition of mandatory postrelease supervision (PRS) at resentencing violates the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause when the defendant has completed the determinate sentence for the count subject to PRS, but is still incarcerated serving an aggregate sentence calculated under Penal Law § 70.30.

    Holding

    No, because the defendants do not have a legitimate expectation of finality in their sentences until they have completed their aggregated sentences under Penal Law § 70.30.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same crime, preventing a sentence from being increased once the defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of the sentence. However, defendants are presumed to know that a determinate sentence without PRS is illegal, and courts have the authority to correct illegal sentences. The Court emphasized that this opportunity to correct illegality is not without end, stating, “there must be a temporal limitation on a court’s ability to resentence a defendant since criminal courts do not have perpetual jurisdiction over all persons who were once sentenced for criminal acts.” That temporal limitation occurs once the sentence is served and the appeal is completed, or the time for such appeal has expired.

    The Court relied on Penal Law § 70.30, which establishes the methodology for calculating a defendant’s multiple terms of imprisonment. In People v. Buss, 11 NY3d 553 (2008), the Court held that under Penal Law § 70.30, consecutive and concurrent sentences are merged or aggregated and thus “made into one.” Therefore, the Court concluded that defendants Brinson and Blankymsee would only have a legitimate expectation of finality upon completion of their respective aggregated sentences. Until that time, resentencing for the purpose of correcting their illegal determinate sentences does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.

  • Kowalski v. St. Francis Hosp. & Health Ctrs., 20 N.Y.3d 483 (2013): Hospital’s Duty to Restrain Intoxicated Patients

    Kowalski v. St. Francis Hosp. & Health Ctrs. , 20 N.Y.3d 483 (2013)

    A hospital generally does not have a duty to prevent an intoxicated patient who is not suicidal and who voluntarily seeks treatment from leaving the premises, as doing so could constitute false imprisonment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a hospital and its emergency room doctor did not owe a duty to an intoxicated patient to prevent him from leaving the hospital after he voluntarily sought treatment. The patient, who had a high blood-alcohol content but was alert and able to walk, removed his IV and stated his intention to leave. The doctor declined to call the police. The court reasoned that absent statutory authority or common-law principles permitting restraint (such as the patient posing an immediate danger to himself or others), preventing the patient from leaving would infringe on his liberty and expose the hospital to liability for false imprisonment. The court emphasized that Mental Hygiene Law § 22.09 governs the retention of intoxicated individuals and does not allow for involuntary retention of individuals who come to the hospital voluntarily.

    Facts

    Plaintiff was brought to St. Francis Hospital’s emergency room seeking admission to its detoxification facility, “Turning Point.” He had a prior admission for suicidal thoughts a month earlier. On this visit, he showed severe signs of intoxication (blood alcohol content of .369%) but was alert and able to walk. He was accepted into the Turning Point program. Four hours later, while waiting for transport to Turning Point, he removed his IV, stated he was leaving, and ignored a nurse’s request to wait for a ride. The nurse informed the doctor, who notified security but did not call the police. Plaintiff left and was hit by a car shortly after.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued the hospital and doctor for negligence and medical malpractice. The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the defendants, finding they lacked authority to confine the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a hospital and emergency room doctor have a duty to prevent an intoxicated patient, who voluntarily seeks treatment but is not suicidal or an immediate danger to himself or others, from leaving the hospital.

    Holding

    No, because absent legal authority to restrain the patient, the hospital and doctor had no duty to prevent him from leaving. To do so would have exposed them to liability for false imprisonment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the fundamental right of individuals in a free society to come and go as they please, subject to limited exceptions. It noted that common law permitted restraint only in extreme circumstances where a person’s mental state posed an immediate danger to themselves or others, citing Warner v. State of New York, 297 NY 395, 401 (1948). Mental Hygiene Law § 22.09 governs the retention of intoxicated individuals. While it allows for emergency retention of those brought against their will if they pose a likelihood of harm to themselves or others (manifested by suicidal threats or attempts at serious bodily harm), it makes no provision for involuntary retention of individuals who voluntarily seek treatment. The court stated, “A patient cannot be confined simply because he was having suicidal thoughts a month ago.” The court rejected the argument that a duty to restrain flowed from the common-law duty of care, stating, “there can be no duty to do that which the law forbids. To restrain plaintiff on these facts would have exposed defendants to liability for false imprisonment.” The court also dismissed the significance of the doctor’s failure to call the police, stating the police lacked the authority to force the plaintiff to return based on the known facts. The dissent argued the Mental Hygiene Law was not implicated and the defendants failed to follow their own protocols; however, the majority stated there was no causal connection between the alleged protocol departures and the plaintiff’s injury.

  • People v. Leach, 21 N.Y.3d 970 (2013): Establishing a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

    People v. Leach, 21 N.Y.3d 970 (2013)

    A defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained from a search must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched, showing both a subjective expectation of privacy and that society recognizes that expectation as reasonable.

    Summary

    Defendant Leach sought to suppress a gun found in his grandmother’s apartment, arguing an illegal search. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ denial of the suppression motion, holding that Leach failed to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the specific bedroom where the gun was found. The court emphasized that the grandmother testified the room was reserved for other visiting grandchildren, and Leach had his own separate bedroom. Because there was record support for the lower courts’ finding that Leach lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court of Appeals upheld the denial of the motion to suppress.

    Facts

    Two shooters, identified as Tawond Leach and his brother, fired at an SUV occupied by three brothers. The victims identified the Leach brothers, noting they grew up together. Defendant Leach allegedly used a silver gun. The police arrested the Leach brothers at their grandmother’s apartment. A loaded silver gun was recovered from a bedroom in the apartment.

    Procedural History

    Leach was charged with attempted murder, attempted assault, reckless endangerment, and weapon possession. He moved to suppress the gun as evidence. The Supreme Court denied the motion. Leach was convicted on several counts. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant met his burden of establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the guest bedroom of his grandmother’s apartment, such that the search yielding the gun violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

    Holding

    No, because there was record support for the lower courts’ determination that the defendant failed to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the guest bedroom, given the grandmother’s testimony that the room was reserved for other grandchildren and the defendant had his own separate bedroom.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reiterated that a defendant seeking to suppress evidence must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched area. This requires showing a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. Citing People v. Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 108 (1996), the court stated: “A legitimate expectation of privacy exists where defendant has manifested an expectation of privacy [a subjective component] that society recognizes as reasonable [an objective component].” The Court deferred to the lower courts’ factual findings if supported by the record. In this case, the grandmother’s testimony indicated that the defendant had his own bedroom, and the guest bedroom was specifically for other visiting grandchildren. The record was silent as to whether the defendant ever used the guest bedroom. The Court acknowledged that a contrary finding might have been reasonable but emphasized the availability of record support to uphold the lower courts’ determination. The court essentially found that the defendant failed to prove that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a space that his grandmother explicitly stated was for other family members, even though the space was within her home. This case turns on the specific facts regarding access and control of the premises searched.

  • People v. Jones, 22 N.Y.3d 452 (2013): Admissibility of Lineup Identification After Illegal Arrest

    People v. Jones, 22 N.Y.3d 452 (2013)

    Evidence obtained following an illegal arrest is admissible if the connection between the illegal conduct and the discovery of the evidence is sufficiently attenuated.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a lineup identification should be suppressed as the product of an illegal arrest. The defendant was initially arrested without probable cause for disorderly conduct, but a subsequent conversation between the arresting officer and a detective, who had independently gathered substantial evidence linking the defendant to a robbery, provided probable cause for the defendant’s detention. The Court held that the lineup identification was admissible because the taint of the illegal arrest was sufficiently attenuated by the intervening discovery of the detective’s independent evidence. The Court considered the temporal proximity of the arrest and identification, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.

    Facts

    A woman was robbed in her apartment building. The victim and a neighbor described the perpetrator as a tall, dark-skinned man in his early thirties, with a large build. The neighbor added that the perpetrator was known as “Izz.” A detective learned that “Izz” was also known as “Michael Wright,” and that Wright’s physical attributes matched the descriptions given by the witnesses. Several days later, a store employee who had seen the man leaving the building identified the defendant to a sergeant. The sergeant located the defendant, who identified himself as “Michael Wright” but could not produce identification. The sergeant arrested the defendant for disorderly conduct because he was allegedly blocking the sidewalk. The sergeant also suspected the defendant was involved in the robbery. After the arrest, the sergeant contacted the detective, who informed him about the photograph of the suspect in his case folder.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of burglary and robbery. The Appellate Division held the appeal in abeyance and remitted the matter for a Dunaway hearing to determine the legality of the arrest. The hearing court found that the arrest was illegal but that the detective’s independently gathered evidence attenuated the taint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the lineup identification must be suppressed as the product of an illegal arrest, or whether the taint of the illegal arrest was sufficiently attenuated by intervening events such that the identification was admissible.

    Holding

    No, the lineup identification was admissible because the taint of the illegal arrest was attenuated because the detective possessed sufficient independent evidence to establish probable cause for the defendant’s arrest, which was discovered shortly after the illegal arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the initial arrest was illegal because it was made without probable cause. However, the Court emphasized that evidence discovered subsequent to an illegal arrest is not automatically subject to the exclusionary rule. Instead, the People must show that the evidence was obtained independently of the illegal conduct. To determine whether attenuation exists, the Court must consider “’the temporal proximity of the arrest and [the evidence at issue], the presence of intervening circumstances and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct’” (People v. Bradford, 15 N.Y.3d 329, 333 (2010), quoting People v. Conyers, 68 N.Y.2d 982, 983 (1986)).

    The Court found that the detective had gathered detailed descriptions of the perpetrator from two witnesses, learned of the perpetrator’s street name, and discovered that the street name was associated with an individual whose physical description matched the witnesses’ descriptions. The detective also had a photograph of the suspect. This evidence was obtained independently of the illegal arrest. The sergeant’s conversation with the detective shortly after the arrest, which revealed the existence of this independent evidence, constituted an intervening circumstance that attenuated the taint of the illegal arrest.

    The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the disorderly conduct charge was a pretext for an illegal investigation, noting that there was record support for the Appellate Division’s finding that the police did not exploit the illegal arrest. The Court further stated that “a police officer is entitled to rely on a name given him by a fellow officer as part of his investigation” (People v. Ketcham, 93 N.Y.2d 416, 420 [1999]).

  • People v. Greenberg, 21 N.Y.3d 439 (2013): Sufficiency of Evidence for Fraudulent Transactions

    People v. Greenberg, 21 N.Y.3d 439 (2013)

    In a civil fraud case brought by the Attorney General, summary judgment is inappropriate where sufficient evidence exists to raise a question of fact regarding a defendant’s knowledge and participation in a fraudulent transaction.

    Summary

    The New York Attorney General sued Maurice Greenberg and Howard Smith, former officers of AIG, alleging fraud related to a sham reinsurance transaction with GenRe. The Attorney General claimed the transaction was designed solely to inflate AIG’s insurance reserves and boost its stock price. After a federal class action settlement, the Attorney General pursued only equitable relief, including potential bans on participation in the securities industry and serving as officers or directors of public companies. The Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence existed to raise a question of fact regarding Greenberg’s and Smith’s knowledge of the fraud, precluding summary judgment. The Court also determined that the possibility of additional equitable relief beyond a prior SEC settlement remained open for consideration.

    Facts

    Maurice Greenberg and Howard Smith were former CEO and CFO, respectively, of AIG. The Attorney General alleged that Greenberg and Smith participated in a fraudulent reinsurance transaction between AIG and GenRe. The transaction purportedly transferred no real risk but was designed to inflate AIG’s reported insurance reserves. The Attorney General asserted the scheme aimed to create a false impression of AIG’s financial health to investors.

    Procedural History

    The Attorney General initiated a civil suit against AIG, Greenberg, and Smith. AIG settled the case. A federal class action lawsuit was also settled. The Attorney General withdrew claims for damages and pursued only equitable relief. The Supreme Court denied summary judgment to both sides. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of summary judgment to Greenberg and Smith. Greenberg and Smith appealed to the Court of Appeals from that portion of the Appellate Division order. The Attorney General did not appeal the denial of their own motion for summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence of Greenberg’s and Smith’s knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the AIG-GenRe transaction is sufficient to raise an issue of fact for trial.
    2. Whether, on the present record, the Attorney General is barred as a matter of law from obtaining any equitable relief.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there is sufficient evidence for trial that both Greenberg and Smith participated in a fraud, and the credibility of their denials is for a fact finder to decide.
    2. No, because it cannot be said as a matter of law that no equitable relief may be awarded, as the SEC settlement may not provide all possible remedies, and the availability of further relief should be determined by the lower courts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on evidence summarized in other decisions, including United States v. Ferguson, to conclude that sufficient evidence existed to raise a factual question regarding Greenberg’s and Smith’s participation in the fraud. The Court emphasized that credibility determinations are the province of the fact finder. Regarding equitable relief, the Court rejected Greenberg’s and Smith’s argument that the SEC settlement precluded any further equitable remedies. The Attorney General sought additional relief, including bans on participation in the securities industry and serving as officers or directors of public companies. While the Court acknowledged potential arguments against such broad lifetime bans, it held that the lower courts should determine the availability and appropriateness of any further equitable relief in the first instance. The Court stated, “[T]hat question, as well as the availability of any other equitable relief that the Attorney General may seek, must be decided by the lower courts in the first instance.”

  • Applewhite v. Accuhealth, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 412 (2013): Governmental Function & Special Duty in Municipal Emergency Response

    Applewhite v. Accuhealth, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 412 (2013)

    When a municipality provides ambulance service through EMTs responding to a 911 call, it performs a governmental function and can only be liable if it owed a “special duty” to the injured party.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a municipality is liable for negligence when its EMTs respond to a 911 call. Tiffany Applewhite suffered anaphylactic shock, and her mother called 911. EMTs arrived but were not paramedics with advanced life support (ALS) capabilities. Tiffany’s mother allegedly requested the EMTs take her to a nearby hospital, but they waited for an ALS ambulance. Tiffany suffered brain damage. The New York Court of Appeals held that providing ambulance service is a governmental function, requiring a “special duty” for liability. The Court found triable issues of fact as to whether the EMTs assumed a special duty to Tiffany, precluding summary judgment for the City.

    Facts

    In 1998, Tiffany Applewhite experienced anaphylactic shock after a nurse administered medication. Her mother called 911 when Tiffany’s breathing worsened. Two EMTs from the New York City Fire Department arrived in a basic life support ambulance because no ALS ambulance was available. One EMT performed CPR while the other called for an ALS ambulance. Tiffany’s mother allegedly asked the EMTs to transport Tiffany to a nearby hospital. Paramedics from a private hospital arrived in an ALS ambulance, administered epinephrine, intubated her, gave her oxygen, and transported her to Montefiore Hospital. Tiffany survived but suffered serious brain damage.

    Procedural History

    Tiffany and her mother sued the nurse, her employer (Accuhealth), and the City of New York. The claims against Accuhealth and the nurse were resolved. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing governmental immunity and lack of proximate cause. Supreme Court granted the City’s motion. The Appellate Division reversed, finding triable issues on special duty and proximate cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City was exercising a governmental or proprietary function when the EMTs initiated emergency care.

    Whether the City voluntarily assumed a “special relationship” with the plaintiffs beyond the duty owed to the general public.

    Holding

    Yes, the City was exercising a governmental function because providing ambulance service by EMTs responding to a 911 call is a core governmental responsibility.

    Yes, because the allegations raised a question of fact as to whether the EMTs assumed an affirmative duty and whether the mother justifiably relied on their actions, precluding summary judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that police and fire protection are quintessential governmental functions. Emergency medical services are a critical government duty. The court distinguished this case from medical services provided in hospital settings, which are akin to private, proprietary conduct. The Court stated that emergency medical services are “undertaken for the protection and safety of the public pursuant to the general police powers.” The court stated that “publicly-employed, front-line EMTs and other first responders, who routinely place their own safety and lives in peril in order to rescue others, surely fulfill a government function…because they exist ‘for the protection and safety of the public’ and not as a ‘substitute for…private enterprises’.”

    To establish a special duty, the plaintiff must prove: ” ‘(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking.’ ”

    The Court found a question of fact as to whether the EMTs assumed an affirmative duty by deciding to await ALS paramedics rather than transport Tiffany to the nearby hospital, after being asked to take her to the hospital by her mother. The court also found a question of fact concerning justifiable reliance. The Court stated, “Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to show how the EMTs’ statements or “conduct deprived [plaintiffs] of assistance that reasonably could have been expected from another source”.

    The court also cited public policy concerns. The cost of tort recoveries would be excessive for taxpayers, and liability could dissuade municipalities from maintaining emergency services.