New York Law Review

Tag: 2013

  • People v. Williams, 20 N.Y.3d 581 (2013): Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS)

    People v. Williams, 20 N.Y.3d 581 (2013)

    Expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) is admissible to explain a victim’s behavior that might seem unusual, but hypothetical questions must not be tailored to mirror the specific facts of the case to avoid bolstering the victim’s credibility.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) in a case involving multiple sex crime charges. The Court held that while general expert testimony on CSAAS is permissible to explain a victim’s behavior, hypothetical questions mirroring the specific facts of the case improperly bolster the victim’s credibility. However, the Court found the error harmless due to overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The case clarifies the boundaries of expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases, emphasizing the need to avoid implying an expert’s opinion on the victim’s credibility.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with sex crimes against two 12-year-old girls: AW, the daughter of his girlfriend, and PW, the girlfriend’s younger sister who frequently visited. PW reported the abuse to a school official in May 2007. At trial, both AW and PW testified in detail about the alleged sexual acts. A physician testified that the findings from PW’s examination were consistent with her allegations.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was convicted on all counts after a bench trial. The Appellate Division modified the judgment on other grounds, but otherwise affirmed the conviction, finding the expert testimony admissible. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony on CSAAS that included hypothetical questions mirroring the specific facts of the case?

    2. Whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the prosecutor tailored the hypothetical questions to include facts concerning the abuse that occurred in this particular case. Such testimony went beyond explaining victim behavior that might be beyond the ken of a jury, and had the prejudicial effect of implying that the expert found the testimony of this particular complainant to be credible.

    2. No, because defendant’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel is without merit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that expert testimony on CSAAS can be admissible to explain behaviors of a victim that might appear unusual or that jurors may not be expected to understand, particularly why a child may delay reporting sexual abuse. The Court cited People v. Spicola, where it upheld the admission of CSAAS expert testimony to rehabilitate a complainant’s credibility, so long as the expert did not offer an opinion as to whether the victim was actually abused.

    However, the Court found that the expert’s testimony in this case exceeded permissible bounds when the prosecutor asked hypothetical questions mirroring the specific facts of the alleged abuse. The court stated that such testimony “went beyond explaining victim behavior that might be beyond the ken of a jury, and had the prejudicial effect of implying that the expert found the testimony of this particular complainant to be credible—even though the witness began his testimony claiming no knowledge of the case before the court.”

    Despite finding this error, the Court deemed it harmless, stating that “the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming and there was no significant probability that, but for the introduction of the erroneous portion of his testimony, defendant would have been acquitted.” Both victims testified in detail, and PW’s testimony was corroborated by medical evidence.

    The Court did not find merit in the defendant’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. D’Antuono, 22 N.Y.3d 564 (2013): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse and Prior False Allegations

    People v. D’Antuono, 22 N.Y.3d 564 (2013)

    Expert testimony on child sexual abuse is admissible to help jurors understand victims’ unusual behavior, but a complainant’s prior false allegations of sexual abuse are admissible if they suggest a pattern casting substantial doubt on the validity of the charges.

    Summary

    D’Antuono was convicted of sexual misconduct against a child. The Appellate Division reversed, citing errors in admitting expert testimony and precluding testimony of a witness regarding prior false allegations made by the complainant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while general expert testimony on child sexual abuse is permissible, precluding the testimony of a witness regarding the complainant’s prior false allegations of sexual abuse was reversible error, especially given the lack of corroborating evidence. The court reasoned that such testimony was relevant to the complainant’s credibility and the defense’s claim of false accusation.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of sexually abusing his step-granddaughter in 2006 and 2007. The complainant testified that the abuse began in fourth grade while her mother was at work. The mother testified that she discovered the abuse after finding the complainant crying. Sex toys and pornographic videos were found in the defendant’s room. A doctor testified that the complainant’s hymen was intact. The People presented expert testimony on child sexual abuse. Four witnesses testified that the complainant had a poor reputation for honesty. The defense sought to introduce testimony from Martinez, who the complainant had previously accused of sexual abuse, but the trial court disallowed it.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial court erred in precluding Martinez’s testimony and in permitting the prosecutor to adduce testimony from the People’s child abuse expert. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the expert to testify about how an adult sexual abuser may act to gain the compliance of a child victim without using threats or force.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in precluding Martinez’s testimony regarding the complainant’s prior allegations of sexual abuse against him.

    Holding

    1. No, because expert testimony regarding the behavior of sexual abusers is permissible as helpful for the jury to understand victims’ unusual behavior, so long as the expert speaks in general terms and does not refer to the specific facts of the case.

    2. Yes, because evidence of a complainant’s prior false allegations of sexual abuse is admissible if the prior allegations “suggest a pattern casting substantial doubt on the validity of the charges” (People v Mandel, 48 NY2d 952, 953 [1979]).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that expert testimony is admissible if it helps to “clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the typical juror” (De Long v County of Erie, 60 NY2d 296, 307 [1983]). Expert testimony on child sexual abuse is admissible to help jurors understand victims’ unusual behavior. However, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the proffered testimony of Martinez should have been permitted. Evidence of a complainant’s prior false allegations of sexual abuse is admissible if the prior allegations “suggest a pattern casting substantial doubt on the validity of the charges” (People v Mandel, 48 NY2d 952, 953 [1979]). The Court noted the lack of corroborating evidence and the acquittal on the top count, indicating the jury’s potential skepticism. Thus, precluding Martinez’s testimony was not harmless error. The Court stated, “These statements opened the door to Martinez’s rebuttal, which, if believed, suggested that the testimony of the complainant and her mother were not credible.”

  • M&T Real Estate Trust v. Doyle, 20 N.Y.3d 533 (2013): Delivery of Deed Requires Acceptance for Deficiency Judgment

    M&T Real Estate Trust v. Doyle, 20 N.Y.3d 533 (2013)

    For the purposes of determining the timeliness of a motion for a deficiency judgment under RPAPL 1371(2), “consummation of the sale by the delivery of the proper deed” occurs only when the grantee accepts the deed, not merely when the grantor presents it.

    Summary

    M&T Real Estate Trust sought a deficiency judgment after foreclosing on commercial mortgages. The defendants argued that M&T’s motion was untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the referee initially mailed the deed to M&T’s attorney. M&T argued that the 90-day period started later, when the referee re-executed and delivered the deed which was then accepted. The New York Court of Appeals held that the 90-day period under RPAPL 1371(2) begins only upon acceptance of the deed by the grantee, reversing the Appellate Division’s decision and reinstating the County Court’s order and judgment.

    Facts

    M&T obtained a foreclosure judgment against James Doyle and Jim Doyle Ford, Inc. At auction, M&T purchased the property and planned to assign the bid to MAT Properties, Inc. The referee executed a deed naming MAT as the grantee and mailed it to M&T’s attorney. Before the deed arrived, M&T’s attorney, learning of a potential higher bidder, told the referee that MAT would not accept the deed and that the documents would be returned, which they were. Later, M&T instructed the referee to record the deed. The referee then re-executed a new deed, which was accepted and subsequently recorded.

    Procedural History

    County Court granted M&T’s motion for a deficiency judgment, holding that the motion was timely because it was filed within 90 days of the re-executed deed. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the 90-day period began with the initial delivery attempt. The Court of Appeals granted M&T leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, for purposes of RPAPL 1371(2), the “consummation of the sale by the delivery of the proper deed of conveyance to the purchaser” occurs when the referee (grantor) first executes and mails the deed, or only when the grantee (or its agent) accepts the deed?

    Holding

    No, the consummation of the sale occurs when the grantee accepts the deed, because acceptance is a necessary component of delivery under New York real property law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Real Property Law § 244, which states that a grant takes effect only from its delivery, and on common law principles requiring both presentment and acceptance for delivery. The court stated, “[t]he delivery of a deed without acceptance is nugatory…An intention to deliver on the one hand and to accept on the other, is necessary to give effect to the instrument.” The court emphasized that no statutory basis exists to treat a referee’s deed differently from other deeds. In this case, M&T’s attorney twice declined to accept the initially delivered deed. The court found this to be “opposing evidence” sufficient to rebut any presumption of delivery in May 2010. Only when the deed was re-executed and then accepted did the transfer occur, making M&T’s motion timely. The court distinguished this case from situations where the grantee accepts and retains the deed without objection, as in Crossland Sav. v Patton. The court emphasized that the key is not merely physical transfer, but the intention to accept the conveyance, quoting Ten Eyck v Whitbeck, “[t]he delivery of a deed is essential to the transfer of title, and there can be no delivery without an acceptance by the grantee”.

  • Gelman v. Buehler, 20 N.Y.3d 534 (2013): Unilateral Partnership Dissolution When Agreement Lacks Definite Term or Particular Undertaking

    Gelman v. Buehler, 20 N.Y.3d 534 (2013)

    Under New York Partnership Law § 62(1)(b), a partnership formed by oral agreement is dissolvable at will by any partner if the agreement does not specify a ‘definite term’ or a ‘particular undertaking’.

    Summary

    Gelman and Buehler, business school graduates, formed an oral partnership to create a search fund, solicit investments, acquire a business, increase its value, and eventually sell it for profit. Buehler later withdrew, and Gelman sued for breach of contract. The New York Court of Appeals held that Buehler’s withdrawal did not constitute a breach because the oral agreement lacked a ‘definite term’ or a ‘particular undertaking’ as required by Partnership Law § 62(1)(b), making the partnership dissolvable at will. The Court emphasized that the agreement’s objectives were too uncertain and lacked a specific termination date.

    Facts

    Geoffrey Gelman and Antonio Buehler, recent business school graduates, orally agreed to form a partnership in 2007. Buehler proposed raising $600,000 to establish a search fund to identify a business with growth potential. The plan involved soliciting further investment, acquiring the target business, and managing it to increase its value until a profitable sale (the “liquidity event”). Gelman agreed, and they anticipated the business plan would take four to seven years. Buehler later demanded majority ownership, which Gelman refused, leading to Buehler’s withdrawal.

    Procedural History

    Gelman sued Buehler for breach of contract. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, finding no definite term or specific objective. The Appellate Division modified, reinstating the breach of contract claim, reasoning that the “liquidity event” constituted a definite term and the business acquisition and expansion was a specific undertaking. Two justices dissented. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and dismissed the breach of contract claim.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the oral partnership agreement between Gelman and Buehler contained a “definite term” within the meaning of Partnership Law § 62(1)(b).
    2. Whether the oral partnership agreement between Gelman and Buehler specified a “particular undertaking” within the meaning of Partnership Law § 62(1)(b).

    Holding

    1. No, because the alleged temporal framework of the agreement was too flexible and lacked a specific or reasonably certain termination date.
    2. No, because the objectives of raising money, identifying a business, and increasing its value were too amorphous and uncertain to constitute a “particular undertaking.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that Partnership Law § 62(1)(b) allows a partner to dissolve a partnership if the agreement lacks a “definite term or particular undertaking.” The Court found that a “definite term” requires an identifiable termination date, while a “particular undertaking” necessitates a specific objective achievable at a future time. Applying these standards, the Court determined that Gelman’s complaint lacked a fixed period for the partnership’s operation. The alleged sequence of events—raising money, identifying a business, raising more money, operating the business to increase its value, and selling it for profit—was deemed too uncertain to satisfy the statutory requirement. The Court distinguished the case from *St. Lawrence Factory Stores v Ogdensburg Bridge & Port Auth.*, where the agreement identified the specific purpose of developing a retail factory outlet center on a defined property. The Court quoted examples of objectives found to be inadequate, such as the “ ‘development, packaging, production and distribution of theatrical feature films . . . while also involved … in television development and production’ ” and partnerships to acquire, manage, and resell real estate. Because the agreement lacked a definite term or particular undertaking, the partnership was dissolvable at will, and Buehler’s withdrawal did not breach the contract. The Court emphasized that the “error in the Appellate Division’s rationale was that it equated “definite term” with the liquidity event—a possible future occurrence from which an identifiable termination date was not ascertainable at the outset of the partnership.”

  • People v. DeProspero, 21 N.Y.3d 527 (2013): Duration of Search Warrant Authority After Initial Execution

    People v. DeProspero, 21 N.Y.3d 527 (2013)

    The authority of a search warrant does not necessarily lapse upon the completion of a prosecution related to the initial seizure; its validity is measured by the persistence of the probable cause that justified its issuance.

    Summary

    DeProspero pleaded guilty to predatory sexual assault after the denial of his motion to suppress evidence found on a digital camera memory card seized from his residence under a warrant. He argued that the warrant’s authority had lapsed by the time of the forensic examination that revealed the incriminating images, as a prior conviction based on a single image found on his computer had already concluded. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the warrant’s validity persisted because the probable cause for its issuance remained, irrespective of the prior conviction. The court emphasized that the warrant authorized further analysis and examination and the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy.

    Facts

    A warrant was issued on May 4, 2009, to search DeProspero’s residence based on probable cause that he was downloading child pornography. During the warrant’s execution on May 5, 2009, digital media devices were seized. A preliminary examination of DeProspero’s computer revealed one pornographic image, leading to a conviction for possessing a sexual performance by a child in September 2009. After serving his sentence and the expiration of the appeal period, DeProspero requested the return of his seized property in December 2009. The prosecutor learned that the seized devices had not yet been forensically examined. A subsequent forensic examination in January 2010 revealed numerous still-frame images depicting DeProspero engaged in sexual acts with a child, leading to the predatory sexual assault charge.

    Procedural History

    DeProspero moved to suppress the evidence found during the January 2010 forensic examination, arguing the search warrant’s authority had lapsed. The County Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the authority of a search warrant lapses after the completion of a prosecution related to the initial seizure, such that a subsequent forensic examination of seized property requires fresh judicial authorization.

    Holding

    No, because the continued validity of a search warrant and any assumption of custody it authorizes is not necessarily tied to the pendency of any particular prosecution. The duration of a warrant’s authority is more appropriately measured by the persistence of the cause for its issue.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects legitimate expectations of privacy against unwarranted intrusion by the state. After the execution of the valid warrant, DeProspero lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the seized items, which were to be retained for further analysis. The court rejected DeProspero’s argument that this expectation was restored after his September 2009 conviction. The court stated, “It is manifest that the continued validity of a search warrant and any assumption of custody it authorizes is not necessarily tied to the pendency of any particular prosecution.” The court emphasized that the probable cause justifying the warrant’s issuance persisted, making the January 2010 examination valid. Furthermore, the court noted that CPL 690.55(2) does not tie the warrant to a specific prosecution. The court also suggested that even if DeProspero’s claim were based on property rights rather than privacy expectations, it would fail because of the warrant’s continued validity and the potential for forfeiture of the seized items. The court acknowledged that while there is no specific time limit on how long property may be held following a lawful seizure, due process requires that the state not retain property beyond the exhaustion of any legitimate law enforcement purpose. However, such a claim was not supported by the facts of this case.

  • Marinaccio v. Kieffer Enterprises, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 501 (2013): Standard for Punitive Damages in Intentional Tort Cases

    Marinaccio v. Kieffer Enterprises, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 501 (2013)

    Punitive damages in tort cases require more than just intentional conduct; they necessitate a showing of malice, fraud, evil motive, or a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others implying criminal indifference to civil obligations.

    Summary

    Marinaccio sued Kieffer Enterprises, Inc. (KEI) for trespass and nuisance, alleging intentional diversion of stormwater onto his property causing significant damage. The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages against KEI. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the punitive damages award, holding that while KEI’s actions were intentional and caused considerable damage, the evidence did not demonstrate the requisite malice or wanton disregard necessary to justify punitive damages. The court emphasized that compliance with regulations and engagement of experts, even if ultimately unsuccessful, negated a finding of criminal indifference to civil obligations.

    Facts

    KEI, developing a residential subdivision, diverted water into a ditch that was mistakenly believed to be on KEI’s property but was actually on Marinaccio’s land, without his permission. The mitigation pond was insufficient, leading KEI to install drainage pipes that routed water onto Marinaccio’s property, creating a large flooded wetland. Marinaccio complained to KEI, but was ignored. The flooding caused mosquitos and frogs, which Marinaccio feared, to proliferate on his property. However, Marinaccio refused to allow the Town to clean the ditch on his property which would have alleviated the flooding.

    Procedural History

    Marinaccio sued KEI and the Town for trespass and nuisance, seeking damages. The trial court denied KEI’s motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim. The jury awarded compensatory damages against both the Town and KEI, and punitive damages against KEI. KEI appealed the punitive damages award. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision regarding punitive damages.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages against KEI for intentional diversion of stormwater onto Marinaccio’s property, constituting trespass and nuisance.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not demonstrate malice, fraud, evil motive, or a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others implying criminal indifference to civil obligations, which is required to justify punitive damages in tort cases.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the strict standard for awarding punitive damages, stating that it requires “spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton.” While KEI’s actions resulted in damage to Marinaccio’s property, KEI complied with planning and development laws, worked with the Army Corps of Engineers, and hired experts. This, even if ultimately unsuccessful in preventing damage, demonstrated that KEI’s actions could not be considered wanton or malicious. The court acknowledged that KEI should have ensured the Town obtained an easement from Marinaccio, making them liable for trespass and nuisance. However, “something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages.” The court found that KEI’s behavior, while not ideal, did not rise to the level of moral turpitude required for punitive damages. The court distinguished between volitional acts and those demonstrating a purposeful or grossly indifferent causing of injury. Punitive damages are awarded to punish and deter behavior involving moral turpitude, and KEI’s behavior did not meet this threshold. The court quoted Prozeralik v Capital Cities Communications, 82 NY2d 466, 479 (1993) stating that “[s]omething more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages”.

  • People v. McGee, 20 N.Y.3d 513 (2013): Sufficiency of Evidence and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    People v. McGee, 20 N.Y.3d 513 (2013)

    A defendant is not entitled to reversal of a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise sufficiency arguments that are not clear-cut and dispositive.

    Summary

    McGee was convicted as an accomplice of reckless endangerment and attempted murder. The prosecution argued McGee drove the getaway car while his codefendant fired shots at civilians and a police officer. McGee appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient and his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain arguments. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was sufficient evidence to corroborate McGee’s admission and that his counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise arguments that were not clearly dispositive in his favor. The court emphasized that the defense counsel mounted a vigorous defense and that strategic reasons existed for the challenged omissions.

    Facts

    McGee drove a Chevy Equinox while Carr fired shots at civilians and homes. During a high-speed chase, McGee swerved the car, allowing Carr to shoot at Officer Clark. Carr fired two or three shots at Clark, with one bullet hitting the patrol car. McGee and Carr abandoned the vehicle and were apprehended while fleeing on foot. A handgun was found nearby with Carr’s DNA on it.

    Procedural History

    McGee and Carr were jointly tried and convicted of reckless endangerment and attempted murder. McGee appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing insufficient evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. McGee then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support McGee’s conviction.
    2. Whether McGee was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to move to dismiss the indictment based on certain sufficiency of evidence claims and other strategic decisions.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was ample independent evidence that a crime was committed, and McGee’s statement was not the only evidence connecting him to the crime.
    2. No, because the arguments not raised by defense counsel were not clear-cut and dispositive in McGee’s favor, and there may have been strategic reasons for counsel’s actions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 60.50 only requires “some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” to corroborate a confession. Here, eyewitness testimony and police accounts provided ample independent evidence of the crimes. The court emphasized that a failure to make a significant argument can only lead to a finding of ineffective assistance “when the error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial as to compromise a defendant’s right to a fair trial” (People v. Caban, 5 N.Y.3d 143, 152 [2005]).

    The court found that the sufficiency arguments McGee claimed his attorney should have raised were not clear-cut and dispositive. The court referenced People v. Cabassa, 79 N.Y.2d 722 (1992) to show precedent existed that undermined the argument that there was insufficient evidence of intent to kill or a shared purpose. The court also noted that the attempt to distance McGee from Carr’s actions may have been a strategic decision, even though it ultimately failed. The court noted, “a reviewing court must avoid confusing true ineffectiveness with mere losing tactics and according undue significance to retrospective analysis” (People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712 [1998]).

  • White v. Farrell, 20 NY3d 486 (2013): Damages for Buyer Breach of Real Estate Contract

    White v. Farrell, 20 N.Y.3d 486 (2013)

    The proper measure of damages for a buyer’s breach of a real estate contract is the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property at the time of the breach; the price obtained on a later resale is competent evidence of fair market value.

    Summary

    The Farrells sued the Whites for breach of contract after the Whites backed out of an agreement to purchase the Farrells’ lakefront property for $1.725 million. The Farrells sought damages for the difference between the contract price and the eventual sale price to a third party ($1,376,550), plus consequential damages. The New York Court of Appeals clarified that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the fair market value at the time of the breach. The resale price is evidence of the fair market value. The court reversed the lower court’s decision, which had granted summary judgment to the Whites based solely on the testimony of the Farrell’s real estate agent that the market value at the time of breach equaled the contract price. The case was remanded for a determination of the property’s fair market value at the time of the breach.

    Facts

    The Farrells contracted to sell their Skaneateles, NY lakefront property to the Whites for $1.725 million in June 2005. The contract was contingent on a satisfactory home inspection, resolution of construction-related items, and attorney approval. An addendum removed contingencies in exchange for the Farrells completing enumerated tasks, including drainage system work and a $10,000 credit. The Whites terminated the contract in July 2005, citing unresolved drainage issues. The Farrells sent a time-is-of-the-essence letter, but the Whites did not attend the scheduled closing. The Whites purchased another property on Skaneateles Lake for $1.7 million in August 2005.

    Procedural History

    The Whites sued the Farrells to recover their $25,000 down payment. The Farrells counterclaimed for breach of contract. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the Whites, determining the Farrells suffered no actual damages because their real estate agent testified the property’s market value at the time of breach equaled the contract price. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted the Farrells leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the proper measure of damages for a buyer’s breach of a real estate contract is (1) the difference between the contract price and a subsequent lower sale price, or (2) the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property at the time of the breach.

    Holding

    No, the proper measure of damages is not always the difference between the contract price and a subsequent lower sale price. Yes, because the proper measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property at the time of the breach. The resale price is evidence of the fair market value.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that a seller’s damages are always the difference between the contract price and a later, lower selling price. The Court affirmed the established rule in New York and most jurisdictions is that damages are measured by the difference between the contract price and the fair market value at the time of the breach. The Court noted the resale price is competent evidence of fair market value at the time of breach, particularly when the resale occurs soon after the breach under similar market conditions. The Court emphasized that damages are properly ascertained as of the date of the breach, and the injured party has a duty to mitigate damages. Regarding the real estate agent’s testimony, the Court found that fair market value is a question of fact. In this case, there was conflicting evidence, including the subsequent sale price. The Court remanded the case for a determination of fair market value, considering the resale price, mitigation efforts, and costs to remedy property deficiencies. The court stated, “This is not to say that resale price is irrelevant to the determination of damages; in fact, the resale price, in a particular case, may be very strong evidence of fair market value at the time of the breach. This is especially true where the time interval between default and resale is not too long, market conditions remain substantially similar, and the contract terms are comparable.”

  • R-J Taylor General Contractors, Inc. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 20 N.Y.3d 473 (2013): Applying Prevailing Wage Laws to Public Entities

    R-J Taylor General Contractors, Inc. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 20 N.Y.3d 473 (2013)

    Prevailing wage laws apply only to construction contracts entered into by specific public entities enumerated in the statute; volunteer fire departments, absent explicit statutory inclusion or agency relationship, are not subject to these laws.

    Summary

    R-J Taylor General Contractors, Inc. contracted with the Bath Volunteer Fire Department (BVFD) for the construction of a new firehouse. The New York State Department of Labor (DOL) determined that the project was subject to prevailing wage laws. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that BVFD, a not-for-profit fire corporation, did not fall under the definition of a public entity as contemplated by Labor Law § 220. The Court clarified that the prevailing wage law applies only to contracts involving the state, a public benefit corporation, a municipal corporation, or a commission appointed pursuant to law. The Court rejected the argument that the BVFD was the “functional equivalent” of a municipal corporation, emphasizing the need for explicit statutory inclusion.

    Facts

    The Bath Volunteer Fire Department (BVFD), a not-for-profit fire corporation, decided to build a new firehouse after the Village of Bath declined to do so. BVFD obtained its own financing, acquired land, and hired R-J Taylor General Contractors, Inc. (Taylor) as the general contractor in September 2006. Taylor then hired subcontractors. The Department of Labor (DOL) issued an opinion letter stating the project was a public work subject to prevailing wage laws, halting construction until BVFD agreed to indemnify Taylor and its subcontractors against any liability for not paying prevailing wages. Construction then resumed and was completed.

    Procedural History

    An administrative hearing was held to determine if the prevailing wage law applied. The Hearing Officer determined it did, based on the Erie County test. Petitioners commenced an Article 78 proceeding for review. The Appellate Division confirmed the determination and dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals granted petitioners’ motion for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prevailing wage requirement of Labor Law § 220 applies to a construction contract entered into by the Bath Volunteer Fire Department, a not-for-profit fire corporation not explicitly listed as a public entity in the statute.

    Holding

    No, because BVFD is not one of the public entities enumerated in Labor Law § 220, nor was it acting as an agent on behalf of a covered public entity at the time the contract was executed. The Court emphasized that the “functional equivalent” test was rejected in Matter of New York Charter School Assn. v Smith.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Labor Law § 220 specifically enumerates the types of public entities to which the prevailing wage law applies: the state, a public benefit corporation, a municipal corporation, or a commission appointed pursuant to law. The BVFD, as a fire corporation defined by the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law, does not fall into any of these categories. The Court rejected the argument that BVFD could be deemed the “functional equivalent” of a municipal department, citing Matter of New York Charter School Assn. v Smith, (15 NY3d 403 [2010]), where it rejected the same argument regarding charter schools. The Court stated: “Had the legislature intended to include volunteer fire corporations under the statute, it could easily have done so.” The service agreements between the BVFD and the Village of Bath were deemed insufficient to trigger the prevailing wage requirement because they pertained to emergency services, not the construction of a new firehouse, stating, “The service agreements do not include any provision contemplating the work involved here: the construction of a new firehouse.” Therefore, the service agreements are not a contract for public work within the meaning of the prevailing wage law. Because the first prong of the Erie County test (public entity) was not met, the Court did not need to address the second prong (public work).

  • People v. Vasquez, 20 N.Y.3d 461 (2013): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and CPL 710.30 Notice

    People v. Vasquez, 20 N.Y.3d 461 (2013)

    A defense counsel’s failure to object to the admission of identification testimony not included in a CPL 710.30 notice does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless the error was egregious, prejudicial, and resulted in a likelihood of a different outcome.

    Summary

    Vasquez was convicted of attempted robbery after a victim identified him to police both before and after his arrest. The prosecution’s CPL 710.30 notice only mentioned the pre-arrest identification. Vasquez argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony regarding the post-arrest identification, claiming a violation of CPL 710.30. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that even if counsel erred, it was not egregious or prejudicial enough to constitute ineffective assistance, especially given the other strong evidence against Vasquez. The court emphasized that a showing of prejudice, while not indispensable under the state constitution, is significant in evaluating such claims.

    Facts

    The victim was approached by Vasquez, who asked for money and pointed a knife at him. The victim fled into a store and called 911. Officer Herbert responded and the victim pointed out Vasquez as the perpetrator. After arresting Vasquez but before taking him to the station, Herbert asked the victim if he was sure Vasquez was the man, and the victim confirmed. At trial, the victim could not identify Vasquez in court but testified he had pointed out the robber to the police. The victim also testified that the robber threw a knife near a tree. Herbert recovered a knife from that location. Vasquez admitted to asking the victim for change just before the arrest.

    Procedural History

    Vasquez was convicted of attempted robbery. He appealed, arguing a CPL 710.30 violation and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the CPL 710.30 issue unpreserved and any error harmless, also holding that defense counsel provided meaningful representation. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether defense counsel’s failure to object to testimony regarding a post-arrest identification, not included in the CPL 710.30 notice, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Holding

    No, because even assuming the failure to object was an error, it was not so egregious and prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, considering the other evidence presented against him.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that even if the CPL 710.30 notice was deficient, and even if a successful motion to preclude the post-arrest identification testimony could have been made, the failure to make such a motion did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The court emphasized that counsel’s performance should not be second-guessed with hindsight. Additionally, the court noted the presence of other substantial evidence against Vasquez, including the victim’s initial identification, the recovery of the knife from the described location, and Vasquez’s admission to asking the victim for money. The court stated, “[A]n argument [for preclusion] could have been made, but not an argument ‘so compelling that a failure to make it amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel’” (People v Carter, 7 N.Y.3d 875, 877 [2006]). While prejudice is not indispensable under the state constitution for an ineffective assistance claim, its absence is significant here, where the alleged error was a single, non-egregious mistake. The court also pointed out that the trial court could have allowed a late notice and suppression hearing under CPL 710.30(2) if “good cause” was shown, which might have mitigated any initial error. The court noted the People’s argument that the point-out and post-arrest conversation were part of the same continuum, lessening the impact of the omission from the CPL 710.30 notice.