New York Law Review

Tag: 2013

  • People v. Echevarria, Moss, and Johnson, 21 N.Y.3d 158 (2013): Public Trial Rights and Undercover Officer Testimony

    21 N.Y.3d 158 (2013)

    A trial court may close the courtroom to the public during the testimony of undercover officers if the prosecution demonstrates an overriding interest, such as officer safety, that is likely to be prejudiced by an open trial, and the closure is no broader than necessary, and the court considers reasonable alternatives to closure; however, the court need not explicitly state on the record that it considered alternatives.

    Summary

    These consolidated appeals concern courtroom closures during undercover officers’ testimony in buy-and-bust cases. The Court of Appeals held that limited closures comported with Sixth Amendment public trial principles because the officers demonstrated a specific link between their safety concerns and open-court testimony. The Court clarified that while trial courts must consider alternatives to closure, they are not always required to explicitly state this consideration on the record. One case was reversed due to an erroneous jury charge on the agency defense.

    Facts

    In Echevarria, the defendant sold crack cocaine to an undercover officer. The officer testified he remained active in the area, had pending cases, and had been threatened. In Moss, the defendant sold crack cocaine to an undercover officer who continued to work in the area after the arrest. The officer had been threatened and searched by suspects. In Johnson, the defendant sold crack cocaine to an undercover officer who remained active in the area. This officer had been threatened and physically attacked.

    Procedural History

    In all three cases, the trial courts held Hinton hearings to determine if the courtroom should be closed during the undercover officers’ testimony. All three courts ordered closure during the officers’ testimony, sometimes with exceptions for family. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions in all cases. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of prejudice to an overriding interest to justify closing the courtroom during the testimony of the undercover officers.
    2. Whether the trial judge in each case failed to comply with the requirement that courts consider reasonable alternatives to closure.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the officers demonstrated a specific link between their safety concerns and open-court testimony in the particular buy-and-bust case.
    2. No, because the record made no mention of alternatives but was otherwise sufficient to establish the need to close the particular proceeding, therefore it can be implied that the trial court, in ordering closure, determined that no lesser alternative would protect the articulated interest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on Waller v. Georgia, which requires the party seeking closure to advance an overriding interest likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives, and it must make adequate findings to support the closure. The Court found the safety of law enforcement officers constitutes an overriding interest. However, there must be a specific link between the officer’s safety concerns and open-court testimony in the particular case.

    In Moss and Johnson, the officers demonstrated continued activity in the area of arrest, open cases, and prior threats, establishing this link.

    The Court emphasized that while trial courts must consider alternatives to closure, they need not always explicitly discuss them on the record. The Court reaffirmed its holding in People v. Ramos. Quoting Ramos, the court stated that “it can be implied that the trial court, in ordering closure, determined that no lesser alternative would protect the articulated interest” (Ramos, 90 NY2d at 503-504 [emphasis added]). The Court distinguished Presley v. Georgia, noting that in Presley, the record made clear that the trial judge’s exclusion of the public was unwarranted, and the space constraints could have been easily remedied using less intrusive measures.

  • People v. Hardy, 22 N.Y.3d 887 (2013): Harmless Error Analysis and Overwhelming Evidence of Guilt

    People v. Hardy, 22 N.Y.3d 887 (2013)

    The erroneous admission of evidence is harmless error if the proof of the defendant’s guilt is overwhelming and there is no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had the error not occurred.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of murder for stabbing and dismembering his girlfriend’s friend. On appeal, he argued that the admission of prejudicial evidence—specifically, testimony about his statement to police that “this wasn’t his first body,” a threat to “cut her up,” and his history of domestic violence—violated his right to a fair trial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that any errors in admitting the evidence were harmless because the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. The Court emphasized the defendant’s detailed confessions, corroborated by forensic evidence, and the implausibility of the defendant’s alternative explanation.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of murdering his girlfriend’s female friend. The victim was stabbed multiple times and her body was dismembered. During the initial police statement, the defendant allegedly told a detective that “this was not his first body and that there were nine others.” The victim’s nephew testified that the victim told him the defendant had threatened to “cut her up.” A social worker testified about the defendant’s history of domestic violence, as relayed by the defendant’s girlfriend (who had since passed away due to natural causes). The defendant confessed to the crime in three separate statements to the police.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of murder. He appealed, arguing that the admission of the prejudicial evidence violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the New York Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of testimony regarding the defendant’s statement about other bodies, a threat made against the victim, and the defendant’s history of domestic violence, constitutes reversible error requiring a new trial.

    Holding

    No, because any errors in admitting the evidence were harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt and the lack of a significant probability that the jury would have acquitted him had the evidence been excluded.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the harmless error doctrine, citing People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230 (1975), which states that a non-constitutional error is harmless when “the proof of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to the error, is overwhelming” and there is no “significant probability…that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error.” The Court found overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the defendant’s three detailed confessions to the police, which included specific details about the stab wounds that had not been publicly disclosed. These confessions were corroborated by forensic evidence such as blood stains in the apartment and dismembered body parts found in plastic bags throughout the neighborhood. The Court found the defendant’s explanation that he confessed falsely to protect his girlfriend to be incredible, given her debilitated state and the lack of any discernible motive for her to harm the victim. The Court also noted that limiting instructions were given regarding the “nine bodies” statement. In essence, the court determined that the properly admitted evidence was so compelling that the improperly admitted evidence could not have swayed the jury’s verdict.

  • In re Dashawn W., 21 N.Y.3d 38 (2013): Depraved Indifference Standard in Child Abuse Cases

    In re Dashawn W., 21 N.Y.3d 38 (2013)

    In child protective proceedings, the standard for “circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life” under Social Services Law § 384-b(8)(a)(i) differs from the Penal Law standard, focusing on the risk posed to the child by the parent’s abusive conduct; also, diligent efforts to encourage the parental relationship are not always required before a severe abuse finding.

    Summary

    This case addresses the definition of “depraved indifference to human life” in the context of child abuse under New York Social Services Law and whether diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship are always necessary before a finding of severe abuse. The Court of Appeals held that the depraved indifference standard in child protective proceedings differs from the Penal Law standard and that diligent efforts are not required if they would be detrimental to the child’s best interests. This decision clarifies the legal framework for determining severe abuse in child welfare cases and prioritizes the child’s safety and well-being.

    Facts

    Antoine N. brought his five-month-old son, Jayquan N., to the hospital with a fractured collarbone. Doctors discovered four partially healed fractured ribs. Antoine claimed the collarbone injury occurred when a two-year-old pulled Jayquan’s arms. Medical experts found this explanation implausible. An ACS caseworker found “black linear marks” on Justin N., Antoine’s other child, revealing excessive corporal punishment with an electrical cord. Antoine had a prior child abuse adjudication from 1994 involving similar injuries to another infant son.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) filed petitions alleging abuse and neglect. Family Court determined abuse and neglect but dismissed the severe abuse claim against Antoine, interpreting People v. Suarez as requiring eyewitness testimony. The Appellate Division reversed, finding Antoine’s conduct demonstrated depraved indifference and remanded for a determination on diligent efforts. On remand, Family Court excused diligent efforts, finding them detrimental to the child’s best interests. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the standard for “circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life” in Social Services Law § 384-b(8)(a)(i) is the same as the standard under the Penal Law.
    2. Whether diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship are a prerequisite to a finding of severe abuse under Family Court Act § 1051(e).

    Holding

    1. No, because the depraved indifference standard in child protective proceedings focuses on the risk intentionally or recklessly posed to the child by the parent’s abusive conduct, unlike the Penal Law standard, which requires a more wanton disregard for human life in general.
    2. No, because Social Services Law § 384-b(8)(a)(iv) allows the court to excuse diligent efforts if they are found to be detrimental to the best interests of the child.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Penal Law requires a more extreme form of recklessness demonstrating “wickedness, evil or inhumanity” (quoting Suarez). Social Services Law § 384-b(8)(a)(i) allows for a finding of severe abuse based on either reckless or intentional acts, whereas the Penal Law distinguishes between intentional and depraved indifference crimes. The court emphasized that child abuse inherently involves one-on-one violence, distinguishing it from the Penal Law’s rare circumstances where a single person is endangered. For diligent efforts, the Court found that Family Court Act §§ 1051(e) and 1012(j) import Social Services Law § 384-b(8)(a) in its entirety, including subparagraph (iv), which allows for excusal of diligent efforts when detrimental to the child. The Court noted Antoine’s history of child abuse, his failure to seek prompt medical care for Jayquan, and his unbelievable explanations for the injuries. Family Court properly considered the prior abuse adjudication when determining that efforts to strengthen the parental relationship would be detrimental to Jayquan’s best interests.

  • People v. Ippolito, 20 N.Y.3d 607 (2013): Agent’s Authority and Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument

    People v. Ippolito, 20 N.Y.3d 607 (2013)

    An instrument is not forged when an agent, acting under a valid power of attorney, signs the principal’s name, even without indicating the principal-agent relationship, because the agent is authorized to execute the instrument.

    Summary

    Gerard Ippolito, an accountant with power of attorney for Katherine M. L., was convicted of grand larceny and criminal possession of a forged instrument (CPFI) for allegedly stealing from her. The prosecution argued that Ippolito committed forgery by signing Katherine M. L.’s name on checks without indicating he was acting as her agent under a power of attorney (POA). The New York Court of Appeals reversed the CPFI convictions related to the checks, holding that because Ippolito had the authority to sign Katherine M. L.’s name, the checks were not forged. The court affirmed the remaining convictions, finding the defendant failed to preserve his objection to the judge’s response to a juror question.

    Facts

    Katherine M. L. granted Gerard Ippolito a durable general power of attorney, giving him broad authority over her financial affairs. Ippolito opened an escrow account into which Katherine M. L.’s income was deposited. He then allegedly stole over $696,000 by writing checks to Katherine M. L., endorsing them in her name, and depositing the funds into his own accounts. Ippolito did not indicate on the checks that he was signing as an agent under the POA.

    Procedural History

    Ippolito was indicted on multiple counts of grand larceny and CPFI. He was convicted by a jury on most counts. The Appellate Division reversed the CPFI convictions related to the checks, vacated the restitution order, and otherwise affirmed. The dissenting Justice granted the People leave to appeal, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Ippolito permission to appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an agent with power of attorney commits forgery when signing the principal’s name on a check without indicating the principal-agent relationship.
    2. Whether the trial judge committed reversible error by answering a juror’s question without first consulting with counsel.

    Holding

    1. No, because the agent was authorized to sign the principal’s name by virtue of the power of attorney.
    2. No, because Ippolito’s counsel failed to object to the judge’s action at trial, thus failing to preserve the issue for appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a person is guilty of CPFI when they utter or possess a forged instrument with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud. An instrument is “forged” when it is “falsely made, completed, or altered.” A written instrument is “falsely made” if it purports to be an authentic creation of its ostensible maker, but the ostensible maker, if real, did not authorize the making or drawing of the instrument. The court distinguished this case from People v. Shanley, where an attorney falsely acknowledged that his client had personally signed a mortgage satisfaction. Here, Ippolito had the power to sign Katherine M. L.’s name, and the checks were not forgeries because Ippolito’s actions were authorized by the POA. The court cited precedent stating that the writing of the principal’s name alone is sufficient to bind the principal, even if the agent doesn’t add their own name as agent. Addressing the juror question, the court found that Ippolito’s attorney failed to object when the judge answered the question without consulting the parties, thereby failing to preserve the issue for appellate review. The court noted, “Counsel must be afforded an opportunity to suggest a meaningful response to any jury question arising during deliberations.” However, because the objection was not timely, the court declined to reverse the remaining convictions.

  • People v. Monroe, 21 N.Y.3d 876 (2013): Withdrawing Guilty Plea Based on Misunderstanding of Sentencing

    21 N.Y.3d 876 (2013)

    When a guilty plea is induced by a specific promise or representation regarding the length of a sentence, and that promise is later undermined by subsequent events, the defendant may be entitled to withdraw the plea.

    Summary

    William Monroe pleaded guilty to conspiracy based on a judge’s representation that it would extend his minimum prison term by only 1.5 years, running concurrently with his existing sentences. Subsequently, Monroe’s original drug sentences were reduced under the Drug Law Reform Act, which effectively doubled the gap between the minimum terms of incarceration to three years. Monroe sought to withdraw his conspiracy plea, arguing it was unknowing due to the changed sentencing landscape. The New York Court of Appeals held that Monroe’s plea was induced by the judge’s specific representation and that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea.

    Facts

    In 2005, William Monroe pleaded guilty to drug offenses and was sentenced to concurrent indeterminate terms of 4.5 to 9 years. While incarcerated, he was indicted on conspiracy and drug charges. In 2007, Monroe pleaded guilty to conspiracy in exchange for a 6-to-12-year indeterminate sentence, meant to run concurrently. At the plea hearing, the judge stated this would effectively add 1.5 years before parole eligibility, which Monroe acknowledged understanding. Monroe was making progress in prison programs and expected parole at his earliest eligibility date.

    Procedural History

    Monroe applied for resentencing on his initial drug convictions under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 (DLRA). The resentencing court granted his application in 2010, reducing his indeterminate sentences to determinate sentences of three years, followed by post-release supervision. Consequently, Monroe moved to vacate his conspiracy plea, arguing it was unknowing because the DLRA resentencing altered the basis on which he entered the plea. The Supreme Court denied his motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ rulings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant should be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea when the plea was induced by a specific representation about the length of the sentence, and subsequent changes to other sentences undermine the basis of that representation.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s plea to the conspiracy count was induced by the judge’s specific representation regarding the length of the sentence, and it cannot be said that the defendant would have pleaded guilty absent this assurance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Monroe’s guilty plea was directly influenced by the judge’s assurance that the conspiracy sentence would only extend his minimum incarceration by 1.5 years. The subsequent reduction of his original drug sentences under the DLRA significantly altered the sentencing landscape, effectively negating the benefit Monroe anticipated from the plea bargain. The court cited People v. McConnell, stating that “when a guilty plea has been induced by an unfulfilled promise either the plea must be vacated or the promise honored, but . . . the choice rests in the discretion of the sentencing court.” Given that Monroe demonstrably aimed for the earliest possible release, the court found it improbable he would have pleaded guilty without the judge’s specific representation. The court remitted the case to the Supreme Court, granting the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea. This decision emphasizes the importance of accurate and reliable sentencing information when accepting guilty pleas, particularly when the sentence is part of a plea agreement. It also underscores that unforeseen changes in related sentences can invalidate the foundation of a guilty plea, requiring the court to allow its withdrawal.

  • City of Yonkers v. Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, 21 N.Y.3d 608 (2013): Interpreting “In Effect” in Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements

    City of Yonkers v. Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 21 N.Y.3d 608 (2013)

    When a statute grants an exception for collectively negotiated agreements “in effect,” that exception does not extend to agreements that have expired, even if their terms are continued under the Triborough Law; the legislature must explicitly invoke the Triborough doctrine for it to apply.

    Summary

    The City of Yonkers and the Yonkers Fire Fighters Union had a CBA that expired in June 2009. The CBA provided firefighters with the option to enroll in noncontributory retirement plans. In response to a fiscal crisis, the state enacted Article 22 of the Retirement and Social Security Law, which required new firefighters to contribute to their pensions. An exception was carved out for agreements “in effect.” The Union argued that the CBA was still “in effect” due to the Triborough Law, which requires employers to continue the terms of an expired agreement. The Court of Appeals held that the exception did not apply to expired agreements, and the firefighters hired after the CBA expiration date were required to contribute to their pensions, as the legislature did not explicitly invoke the Triborough doctrine.

    Facts

    The City of Yonkers and the Yonkers Fire Fighters Union entered into a CBA, extended to June 30, 2009.
    The CBA provided firefighters the option of enrolling in one of two noncontributory retirement plans.
    In 2009, the state enacted Article 22 of the Retirement and Social Security Law, requiring new firefighters to contribute 3% of their salaries toward their pensions.
    Section 8 of the law provided an exception for members of an employee organization to join a special retirement plan pursuant to a CBA “in effect” on the effective date of the act, but not upon termination of such agreement.
    After the CBA expired, the City required firefighters hired after June 30, 2009, to pay 3% of their wages toward retirement benefits.
    The Union filed an improper practice charge, arguing the City erred in failing to apply the CBA to firefighters hired after the termination date, relying on Section 8 and the Triborough Law.

    Procedural History

    PERB referred the matter to arbitration.
    The City commenced a proceeding for a permanent stay of arbitration, arguing it was barred by Civil Service Law § 201(4) and Retirement and Social Security Law § 470.
    Supreme Court rejected the argument and dismissed the proceeding.
    The Appellate Division reversed, granting the petition for a stay, holding that the CBA was no longer “in effect” and the exception in Section 8 was inapplicable.
    The Court of Appeals granted the Union leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an expired CBA, whose terms are continued under the Triborough Law, is considered “in effect” for purposes of the exception provided in Section 8 of the 2009 legislation enacting Article 22 of the Retirement and Social Security Law.

    Holding

    No, because the legislature did not intend to apply the exception to agreements that had expired and could only be deemed to continue through the Triborough Law; if the legislature intended to invoke the Triborough doctrine, it would have made that explicit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Public employers cannot negotiate retirement benefits not expressly provided under state law.
    Civil Service Law § 201(4) and Retirement and Social Security Law § 470 prohibit negotiation of benefits provided by a public retirement system.
    The Triborough Law requires an employer to continue the terms of an expired CBA while negotiating a new agreement, preserving the status quo.
    However, Article 22 of the Retirement and Social Security Law prohibits noncontributory plans unless the Section 8 exception applies.
    The Court rejected the Union’s argument that Section 8 extends to CBAs that have expired but are deemed to remain in effect because of the Triborough Law, noting that the legislature did not explicitly invoke the Triborough doctrine and expressly stated that eligibility to join a CBA’s retirement plan “shall not apply upon termination of such agreement” (L 2009, ch 504, part A, § 8).
    The Court cited the Governor’s Program Bill Memorandum, which stated that Section 8 ensures members of an employee organization eligible to join a special retirement plan could continue to enroll after the bill’s enactment “until the date on which such agreement terminates” (Governor’s Program Bill Mem, Bill Jacket, L 2009, ch 504 at 9).
    The Court reasoned that under the Union’s interpretation, a union could ensure the continuation of noncontributory pension benefits by refusing to agree on a new CBA.
    The Court also rejected the Union’s argument that Section 8 would violate the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, stating that there were no contractual obligations to impair because the contract was no longer in effect.
    The court distinguished the language of tier 6 (L 2012, ch 18, § 80), stating that the express references to “unexpired” CBAs were included in 2012 to be more plain and avoid disputes.

  • People v. Handy, 20 N.Y.3d 663 (2013): Entitlement to Adverse Inference Charge for Destroyed Evidence

    People v. Handy, 20 N.Y.3d 663 (2013)

    When a defendant in a criminal case, acting with due diligence, demands evidence that is reasonably likely to be of material importance, and that evidence has been destroyed by the State, the defendant is entitled to an adverse inference charge.

    Summary

    Handy, a jail inmate, was convicted of assaulting a deputy sheriff. A video camera recorded part of the initial altercation leading to the assault, but the video was destroyed before trial pursuant to jail policy. Handy requested an adverse inference charge, arguing the video’s destruction prejudiced his defense. The trial court denied the request for the counts related to the initial altercation, but granted it for a later count. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Handy was entitled to an adverse inference charge because he requested potentially material evidence with reasonable diligence, and the State destroyed it. This decision emphasizes the State’s responsibility to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence and provides a remedy when that duty is breached.

    Facts

    Handy, an inmate, was involved in an altercation with Deputy Saeva after refusing to hand over non-regulation sandals and boxer shorts. Saeva claimed Handy initiated the fight, injuring Saeva’s hand. Deputy Schliff intervened to escort Handy away, and Schliff alleges that Handy kicked him, resulting in a thumb injury. A video camera recorded a portion of the initial altercation with Saeva. The video was destroyed per jail policy after 30 days, before Handy was indicted. Handy requested the video’s preservation, but the request was not specifically focused on video of the November incidents until trial.

    Procedural History

    Handy was charged with three counts of assault. He was acquitted of assaulting Saeva but convicted of assaulting Schliff. The trial court granted an adverse inference charge for one count, but not for the counts related to the initial altercation with Saeva. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, stating Handy’s claim that the video was exculpatory was speculative. The Court of Appeals reversed, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is entitled to an adverse inference charge when they requested evidence reasonably likely to be material, and that evidence was destroyed by the State?

    Holding

    Yes, because under New York law of evidence, a permissive adverse inference charge should be given where a defendant, using reasonable diligence, has requested evidence reasonably likely to be material, and where that evidence has been destroyed by agents of the State.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals declined to address the constitutional issues or align itself directly with Arizona v. Youngblood, focusing instead on the evidentiary question of whether an adverse inference charge was warranted. The court adopted the approach taken in Cost v. State, emphasizing that such a charge is appropriate when the defendant diligently requests material evidence that the State destroys. The court reasoned that an adverse inference charge mitigates the harm to the defendant caused by the loss of evidence, without necessarily terminating the prosecution. Moreover, the rule incentivizes the State to preserve evidence. The court stated, “[A]t least as important, the rule gives the State an incentive to avoid the destruction of evidence. It is surely desirable to raise the consciousness of State employees on this subject.” The Court analogized the adverse inference charge to a “missing witness” instruction. The Court found that the video, though directly relevant to the assault on Saeva (count one), was also relevant to the subsequent assault on Schliff (count two) because it would shed light on whether Handy was a violent aggressor. Therefore, the court concluded that Handy was entitled to the adverse inference charge for all counts. The dissent is not noted because there was none.

  • People v. Adams, 20 N.Y.3d 608 (2013): Disqualification of Prosecutor Due to Appearance of Impropriety

    People v. Adams, 20 N.Y.3d 608 (2013)

    A public prosecutor should be removed only to protect a defendant from actual prejudice arising from a demonstrated conflict of interest or a substantial risk of an abuse of confidence; however, in rare situations, the appearance of impropriety itself is a ground for disqualification when the appearance is such as to discourage public confidence in government and the system of law.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of aggravated harassment for sending offensive text messages to a City Court Judge, his neighbor and ex-paramour. He argued the District Attorney should have been disqualified due to a conflict of interest because the prosecutor gave undue weight to the victim’s wishes, as she was a judge. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that while no actual impropriety occurred, the appearance of impropriety was unacceptably great because the District Attorney’s office refused to offer a reduced charge because the complainant was a sitting judge who demanded that the matter go to trial, rather than because a trial was, in its own disinterested judgment, appropriate. This created the appearance that the prosecutor did not exercise pretrial prosecutorial discretion in an evenhanded manner.

    Facts

    Defendant sent vulgar text messages to the complainant, a Rochester City Court Judge, who was also his neighbor and former lover. He was charged with aggravated harassment. All Rochester City Court Judges recused themselves. The defense unsuccessfully sought a plea deal. The defense moved to disqualify the Monroe County District Attorney, arguing a conflict of interest and actual prejudice, alleging that the DA was giving undue weight to the wishes of the victim because of her position as judge. The District Attorney’s office denied the allegation, but did not specifically rebut the claim that it consistently offered to accept pleas to a reduced charge in comparable cases, or offer an example of any circumstance when it had refused to offer a plea to a violation or agree to dispose of the case by ACD in a comparable misdemeanor case.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was charged in Rochester City Court. The City Court denied the motion to disqualify the District Attorney, but assigned new defense counsel. Defendant renewed the motion in County Court, which was also denied. Defendant was convicted in City Court. The County Court affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the District Attorney’s office should have been disqualified from prosecuting the defendant because there was an appearance of impropriety due to the complainant’s position as a judge?

    Holding

    Yes, because the record provides an objective basis to question whether the prosecutor exercised pretrial prosecutorial discretion in an evenhanded manner, based on the merits of the case or other legitimate prosecutorial concerns, thus creating an appearance of impropriety.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the general rule that a public prosecutor should be removed only to protect a defendant from actual prejudice or a substantial risk of an abuse of confidence, citing Matter of Schumer v Holtzman, 60 NY2d 46, 55 (1983). However, it recognized the rare exception where the appearance of impropriety is so significant that it discourages public confidence in the government and the system of law, citing People v Zimmer, 51 NY2d 390, 396 (1980).

    The Court found that while no actual impropriety occurred, there was an unacceptable appearance of impropriety. The District Attorney’s office appeared to refuse a reduced charge because the complainant was a sitting judge who wanted a trial, not based on the merits of the case. The Court emphasized that the charges were not unique and involved a common scenario in harassment cases. The original defense counsel’s affidavit stated that the District Attorney’s office took a much harder stance than usual in similar cases and that the District Attorney’s office seemed constrained in how they could handle this matter due to the position of the complainant.

    The Court found the District Attorney’s office’s response, consisting of conclusory denials without providing examples of comparable cases, failed to dispel the appearance of inappropriate disparate treatment. As the Court stated, “Defendant’s original counsel from the Public Defender’s office, who had represented defendants in cases involving this District Attorney’s office for more than a decade, averred that he had never before seen the office take such a hard-line position in a case involving comparable charges and a similar defendant.” Because of this failure to dispel the appearance of impropriety, the Court concluded that disqualification was required.

  • People v. Hanley, 20 N.Y.3d 601 (2013): Preservation Requirement for Merger Doctrine Claims

    People v. Hanley, 20 N.Y.3d 601 (2013)

    A defendant must preserve a merger argument (that a kidnapping count should merge with another offense) by raising it in the trial court; otherwise, the appellate court will not review the claim.

    Summary

    Hanley pleaded guilty to kidnapping, weapon possession, and reckless endangerment after threatening a woman with a gun. On appeal, he argued that the kidnapping charge should have merged with the reckless endangerment charge. The New York Court of Appeals held that Hanley’s claim was not preserved because he failed to raise it in the trial court, and the merger doctrine does not fall under the “mode of proceedings” exception to the preservation rule. The Court reasoned that the merger doctrine is a judicially-created concept based on fairness, not a fundamental constitutional right.

    Facts

    Kirk Hanley, a college student with a history of mental health issues, planned a school shooting. He acquired a handgun and ammunition and went to City College. He revealed his plan to a female acquaintance, showing her the gun and suicide notes. She alerted a school employee, who called the police. When police approached, Hanley brandished the gun, grabbed a woman, pointed the gun at her head, and threatened to kill her. He eventually released the hostage and was taken into custody.

    Procedural History

    Hanley was indicted on charges including kidnapping, weapon possession, and reckless endangerment. He pleaded guilty to all charges after the court promised a specific prison sentence. On appeal to the Appellate Division, he argued that the kidnapping charge should have merged with the reckless endangerment charge. The Appellate Division refused to address the merger argument because it was not raised at trial and there was no trial record. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant charged with kidnapping and another offense must preserve the argument that the kidnapping count merged with the other crime to have that argument reviewed on appeal.

    Holding

    No, because the merger doctrine is a judicially devised concept premised on fundamental fairness and does not implicate any fundamental constitutional concerns that strike at the core of the criminal adjudicatory process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the merger argument was unpreserved. The Court reiterated the general rule that claims of error not preserved by objection in the trial court will not be considered on appeal. The “mode of proceedings” exception is a narrow one, applying only to fundamental flaws affecting jurisdictional matters or constitutional rights at the heart of the process.

    The merger doctrine was created to prevent overcharging in kidnapping cases, where any restraint could technically constitute kidnapping, potentially inflating sentences. As the court explained, the doctrine aims to prevent a “ ‘conviction for kidnapping based on acts which are so much the part of another substantive crime that the substantive crime could not have been committed without such acts’ ” (People v. Bussey, 19 N.Y.3d 231, 237 [2012], quoting People v. Cassidy, 40 N.Y.2d 763, 767).

    The Court reasoned that although the merger doctrine is based on fairness and prevents excessive punishment, it is not jurisdictional and does not implicate fundamental constitutional concerns. Therefore, it does not qualify as a mode of proceedings error. The Court noted the consistent view among the Appellate Divisions that a merger claim must be raised at the trial court level. Because Hanley failed to raise the merger argument in Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals could not review it.

    The Court emphasized the importance of preservation to allow the trial court to address the issue in the first instance, developing a factual record if necessary. The court considered that defendant offered no justification for deviating from the established view, concluding that the preservation rule applies to a merger claim in a kidnapping prosecution.

  • Amazon.com, LLC v. New York State Dept. of Taxation and Finance, 20 N.Y.3d 586 (2013): Upholding “Internet Tax” Based on Affiliate Solicitation

    Amazon.com, LLC v. New York State Dept. of Taxation and Finance, 20 N.Y.3d 586 (2013)

    A state tax on online retailers with no physical presence in the state is constitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause if the retailer has agreements with in-state residents who solicit business on their behalf for a commission, creating a sufficient nexus for taxation.

    Summary

    Amazon and Overstock challenged New York’s “Internet tax” arguing it violated the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. The law presumes online retailers solicit business in New York if they have commission-based agreements with New York residents who refer customers, resulting in over $10,000 in sales. The court upheld the statute, finding it constitutional on its face. The court reasoned that the in-state solicitation by affiliates creates a substantial nexus, and the presumption of solicitation is rational and rebuttable. The plaintiffs failed to prove the statute facially unconstitutional.

    Facts

    Amazon and Overstock, online retailers with no physical presence in New York, used “Associates” or “Affiliates” programs. These programs involved compensating New York residents for placing links on their websites that directed users to the retailers’ sites. If a customer made a purchase through the link, the resident received a commission. New York amended its Tax Law to include a provision (the “Internet tax”) presuming that sellers were soliciting business through independent contractors if they had such agreements with New York residents, and the cumulative gross receipts from these referrals exceeded $10,000 during the preceding four quarters.

    Procedural History

    Amazon and Overstock separately sued the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, alleging that the Internet tax was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaints. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the facial challenges but reinstated the as-applied challenges. The plaintiffs then withdrew their as-applied challenges, and appealed the ruling on the facial challenges to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Internet tax violates the Commerce Clause by imposing an undue tax burden on interstate commerce.
    2. Whether the Internet tax violates the Due Process Clause by creating an irrational and irrebuttable presumption of solicitation of business within the state.

    Holding

    1. No, because active, in-state solicitation that produces a significant amount of revenue qualifies as demonstrably more than a “slightest presence” satisfying the substantial nexus requirement of the Commerce Clause.
    2. No, because there is a rational connection between compensating residents for referrals that result in purchases and the presumption that those residents will actively solicit other New Yorkers, and because the presumption is rebuttable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the statute was constitutional on its face under both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause.
    Regarding the Commerce Clause, the court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s emphasis on physical presence in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota as establishing the limits of state taxing authority. However, the court distinguished the case by finding that the New York statute addressed active solicitation by in-state residents. The court stated, “Active, in-state solicitation that produces a significant amount of revenue qualifies as ‘demonstrably more than a ‘slightest presence’ under Orvis.” The court noted that vendors are not required to pay these taxes out-of-pocket; they are collecting taxes that are unquestionably due.

    Regarding the Due Process Clause, the court found a rational connection between compensating residents for referrals and the presumption that they will actively solicit other New Yorkers. The court reasoned, “It is plainly rational to presume that, given the direct correlation between referrals and compensation, it is likely that residents will seek to increase their referrals by soliciting customers.” The court also found that the presumption was rebuttable. The Department of Taxation and Finance provided a method for rebutting the presumption through contractual prohibition of solicitation and annual certification by the affiliates.

    The court emphasized that plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the statute was facially unconstitutional. The court stated, “We will not strain to invalidate this statute where plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing that it is facially invalid.”