New York Law Review

Tag: 2013

  • People v. Diaz, 22 N.Y.3d 455 (2013): Establishing Dominion and Control in Drug Possession and Unlawfully Dealing with a Child

    People v. Diaz, 22 N.Y.3d 455 (2013)

    To establish constructive possession of illegal drugs, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the area where the drugs were found. Additionally, a person can be found guilty of unlawfully dealing with a child if they knowingly permit a child to remain in a place where drug-related activity is occurring.

    Summary

    In People v. Diaz, the defendant was found guilty of seventh-degree criminal drug possession and four counts of unlawfully dealing with a child. Police executed a search warrant at her apartment and discovered heroin and drug paraphernalia in her bedroom. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence supported a finding that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the drugs, as they were found in her bedroom, which she leased, and that she knowingly permitted children to remain in a place where drug-related activity was taking place. The court emphasized that the defendant had a sufficient level of control over the premises where the contraband was discovered and was aware of the presence of the drugs, thus supporting the convictions.

    Facts

    Police executed a search warrant at Sandra Diaz’s apartment where she resided with her children and her niece, along with her children’s father, Matías Rivera. Officers found approximately 30 glassine envelopes of heroin, Suboxone pills, and drug paraphernalia in Diaz’s bedroom, mixed with her personal belongings. Diaz was the leaseholder of the apartment. Both Diaz and Rivera were charged with multiple drug-related offenses, including possession with intent to sell and unlawfully dealing with a child. Diaz claimed she was unaware of the drugs. The jury acquitted her of possession with intent to sell but convicted her of lesser-included possessory crimes and unlawfully dealing with a child.

    Procedural History

    Diaz was convicted in the trial court of seventh-degree criminal drug possession and four counts of unlawfully dealing with a child. The Appellate Division affirmed her conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted Diaz leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that Diaz exercised dominion and control over the heroin and drug paraphernalia.
    2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Diaz of unlawfully dealing with a child under Penal Law § 260.20 (1).

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the drugs were found in Diaz’s bedroom, and she was the leaseholder, the jury could reasonably infer dominion and control.
    2. Yes, because sufficient evidence existed demonstrating the presence of drug activity in Diaz’s apartment, and Diaz knew or should have known of the activity and the presence of the children in the residence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that Diaz exercised dominion and control over the narcotics because they were found in her bedroom, and she was the leaseholder of the apartment. The court referenced People v. Manini, stating that dominion and control can be established by a sufficient level of control over the area where the contraband is found. The court also cited People v. Reisman, noting that “generally, possession suffices to permit the inference that the possessor knows what he possesses, especially, but not exclusively, if it is . . . on his premises.”

    Regarding unlawfully dealing with a child, the court held that the evidence supported Diaz’s conviction under Penal Law § 260.20 (1). The statute requires that the defendant knowingly permits a child to enter or remain in a place where drug activity is occurring. The court found that the jury could reasonably conclude that Diaz knew about the drug-related activity and that children were present in the apartment, even though she was not convicted of the related paraphernalia charges. The court noted that the co-defendant, Rivera, was convicted of criminal use of drug paraphernalia, constituting commercial drug-related activity within the apartment. The court found that the evidence established Diaz’s guilt even under her narrower interpretation of the statute.

  • Trump Village Section 3, Inc. v. New York City Department of Finance, 22 N.Y.3d 453 (2013): Real Property Transfer Tax and Mitchell-Lama Cooperative Privatization

    22 N.Y.3d 453 (2013)

    A residential housing cooperative corporation’s termination of participation in the Mitchell-Lama program and amendment of its certificate of incorporation as part of its voluntary dissolution and reconstitution as a cooperative corporation governed by the Business Corporation Law does not constitute a taxable transfer under Tax Law § 1201 (b) and section 11-2102 (a) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York.

    Summary

    Trump Village, a Mitchell-Lama cooperative, sought a declaratory judgment that its exit from the Mitchell-Lama program and reconstitution as a Business Corporation Law (BCL) corporation did not trigger the New York City Real Property Transfer Tax (RPTT). The Department of Finance argued that the reconstitution was effectively a conveyance of real property. The Court of Appeals held that amending the certificate of incorporation was not a taxable event because it did not constitute a conveyance of real property from one entity to another. The RPTT applies to deeds transferring real property interests, and the amendment did not meet this definition.

    Facts

    Trump Village Section 3, Inc. was incorporated in 1961 as a Mitchell-Lama cooperative. In 2007, Trump Village, with shareholder approval and state permission, terminated its participation in the Mitchell-Lama program. It amended its certificate of incorporation to reconstitute itself as a corporation under the Business Corporation Law (BCL), removing itself from the restrictions of the Private Housing Finance Law.

    Procedural History

    The New York City Department of Finance issued a Notice of Determination to Trump Village for a tax deficiency exceeding $21 million, asserting that the exit from the Mitchell-Lama program constituted a conveyance subject to RPTT. Trump Village sued, seeking a declaration that the RPTT was inapplicable. The Supreme Court ruled for the Department of Finance. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to Trump Village. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a taxable transfer pursuant to Tax Law § 1201 (b) and section 11-2102 (a) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York occurs when a residential housing cooperative corporation terminates its participation in the Mitchell-Lama program and amends its certificate of incorporation as part of its voluntary dissolution and reconstitution as a cooperative corporation governed by the Business Corporation Law?

    Holding

    No, because the amendment of the certificate of incorporation to reconstitute the corporation under the Business Corporation Law does not constitute a conveyance or transfer of real property as required to trigger the Real Property Transfer Tax.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the RPTT, under section 11-2102 (a) of the Administrative Code, is imposed on each “deed” at the time of delivery. A deed is defined as a document conveying real property or an interest therein. The Court rejected the Department of Finance’s argument that the amendment to the certificate of incorporation qualified as a “deed.” The court emphasized the plain language of the statute requires a conveyance from one entity to another. The court stated that doubts concerning a taxing statute’s scope and application are to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer, citing Debevoise & Plimpton v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 80 NY2d 657, 661 (1993).

    Further, the Court reasoned that Trump Village remained the same corporation, merely amending its certificate of incorporation rather than forming a new entity. The Court highlighted that the Private Housing Finance Law provides two options for privatization: conveyance of title or reconstitution via amendment. Trump Village chose the latter. The court dismissed the argument that the amendment radically altered the business, clarifying that the RPTT taxes conveyances, not changes in the corporation’s purpose. The court emphasized that the RPTT would still be collected on the sale of individual apartment shares.

    Finally, the Court distinguished East Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., Inc. v Cuomo, 20 NY3d 161 (2012), noting that it concerned Martin Act disclosure requirements related to shareholder rights and did not support imposing the RPTT in a Mitchell-Lama privatization.

  • Coleson v. City of New York, 20 N.Y.3d 455 (2013): Limits of Municipal Liability Based on Police Assurances

    Coleson v. City of New York, 20 N.Y.3d 455 (2013)

    A municipality can be held liable for negligence in performing a governmental function only where there is an affirmative undertaking by the municipality, which creates justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; vague assurances of protection, without specific details, are insufficient to establish such reliance.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which a municipality can be held liable for the negligent performance of a governmental function, specifically police protection. The plaintiff, a victim of domestic violence, sued the City of New York, alleging that police assurances of protection led her to justifiably rely on them, resulting in her subsequent injury by her husband. The New York Court of Appeals held that the vague assurances provided by the police did not create a special relationship sufficient to impose liability on the City. The court emphasized the need for specific assurances and justifiable reliance for municipal liability to attach.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Coleson, had a history of domestic violence with her husband, Samuel Coleson. Police arrested Samuel, and the court issued an order of protection for the plaintiff. After Samuel’s arrest, a police officer allegedly told the plaintiff that Samuel would be “in prison for a while, not to worry, [she] was going to be given protection.” The officer also contacted the plaintiff later that night, stating that Samuel was being sentenced and that police would “keep in contact.” Subsequently, Samuel was released, and he harmed the plaintiff.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City of New York, alleging negligence. The trial court dismissed the claim. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a triable issue of fact regarding justifiable reliance. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified a question from the Second Circuit regarding municipal liability. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the vague assurances were insufficient to establish justifiable reliance and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of other issues.

    Issue(s)

    Whether vague assurances of protection made by a police officer to a victim of domestic violence, without specific details as to the type or extent of protection, can create a special relationship sufficient to impose liability on the municipality for the victim’s subsequent injury.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff’s reliance on the vague assurances of protection was not justifiable in the absence of a specific undertaking by the police. Liability requires an “affirmative undertaking” that creates justifiable reliance (Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255, 260 [1987]).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the police officer’s statement that the plaintiff would be given “protection” was too vague to create justifiable reliance. The court emphasized that there was no indication as to the type of protection to be provided, and the plaintiff did not inquire about the specifics. The court distinguished the case from situations where police made specific assurances, such as remaining in the vicinity or providing immediate assistance. The court cautioned against imposing liability based on vague promises, as it could deter police from communicating with victims. The dissent argued that the majority opinion discourages police from making any meaningful communication or action that could be construed as creating a special relationship. Quoting the dissent, statements such as, “It’s going to be okay,” or “We’ll send him away so he doesn’t hurt you again” will undoubtedly be utilized in potential civil suits as examples of assurances that the police made that had no “actual basis.” The court cited Dinardo v City of New York, 13 NY3d 872 (2009), reiterating that only an “affirmative undertaking” that creates justifiable reliance can justify holding a municipality liable for negligence in performing a governmental function. The court distinguished this case from De Long v. County of Erie, 60 NY2d 296 (1983), where a 911 operator’s assurance that help would be there “right away” played a role in the victim’s decision to remain home. The court effectively narrowed the scope of potential municipal liability in domestic violence cases, requiring specific and concrete assurances of protection before a special relationship can be established.

  • Sierra v. 4401 Sunset Park, LLC, 22 N.Y.3d 108 (2013): Notice of Disclaimer Must Be Sent Directly to Insured

    Sierra v. 4401 Sunset Park, LLC, 22 N.Y.3d 108 (2013)

    Under New York Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2), when an insurer disclaims liability, it must provide written notice of the disclaimer directly to the insured party, even if that party is an additional insured under a policy obtained by a contractor, and notice to the insured’s own insurance carrier is insufficient.

    Summary

    4401 Sunset Park, LLC, and Sierra Realty Corp. (collectively, “Sunset Park”) contracted with LM Interiors Contracting, LLC (“LM”). Their contract required LM to obtain liability insurance naming Sunset Park as additional insureds, which LM did through Scottsdale Insurance Company (“Scottsdale”). Sunset Park also had their own insurance with Greater New York Mutual Insurance Company (“GNY”). After an LM employee was injured, he sued Sunset Park, who then notified GNY. GNY notified Scottsdale, who disclaimed coverage but only notified GNY, not Sunset Park. The court held that Scottsdale’s disclaimer was ineffective because it failed to notify Sunset Park directly, as required by Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2).

    Facts

    Sunset Park owned and managed an apartment building and contracted with LM for renovations.
    The contract mandated LM to maintain liability insurance naming Sunset Park as additional insureds; LM obtained a policy from Scottsdale.
    Sunset Park also had their own liability insurance policy with GNY.
    An LM employee, Juan Sierra, was injured at the worksite on August 18, 2008.
    Sunset Park did not notify either GNY or Scottsdale of the accident immediately.
    Juan Sierra sued Sunset Park on November 30, 2008, prompting Sunset Park to notify GNY.
    GNY then notified Scottsdale of the claim on January 6, 2009, requesting a response regarding defense and indemnification.
    Scottsdale disclaimed liability on February 2, 2009, citing a failure to provide timely notice of the occurrence, but only notified GNY, not Sunset Park.

    Procedural History

    Sunset Park filed a third-party claim against LM and Scottsdale, asserting Scottsdale’s duty to defend and indemnify them.
    The Supreme Court granted summary judgment against Scottsdale.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, finding Scottsdale failed to comply with Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) by not notifying the additional insureds.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2), an insurer’s disclaimer of liability is effective when notice is provided to the additional insured’s own insurance carrier but not directly to the additional insured themselves.

    Holding

    No, because Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) requires an insurer to provide written notice of a disclaimer of liability directly to the insured, and notice to the insured’s own insurance carrier does not satisfy this requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the explicit language of Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2), which mandates written notice of disclaimer “to the insured.” The court reasoned that GNY, as another insurer, was not an insured under Scottsdale’s policy, and therefore, notice to GNY was insufficient. It stated that while GNY notified Scottsdale on behalf of Sunset Park, this didn’t make GNY Sunset Park’s agent for receiving a disclaimer notice. The court noted the potential for conflicting interests between GNY and Sunset Park, especially regarding coverage disputes or policy limits. Because Sunset Park had their own interests at stake, they were entitled to direct notice. The court cited Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co. v Chubb Indem. Ins. Co., 105 AD3d 523, 524 [1st Dept 2013], stating that the obligation is “to give timely notice of disclaimer to the mutual insureds . . . not to . . . another insurer.” The court distinguished cases cited by Scottsdale, such as Excelsior Ins. Co. v Antretter Contr. Corp., 262 AD2d 124 [1st Dept 1999], noting that where those cases suggest notice to an additional insured’s carrier is sufficient, they should not be followed, as they undermine the statute’s clear requirement of direct notice to the insured.

  • Andrucki v. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 21 N.Y.3d 865 (2013): Sufficiency of Personal Injury Notice of Claim for Wrongful Death Action

    21 N.Y.3d 865 (2013)

    A notice of claim for personal injuries served on the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is sufficient notice for a subsequent wrongful death action if the injured party dies from those injuries after the notice is served but before the lawsuit begins.

    Summary

    George Andrucki served a notice of claim on the Port Authority for personal injuries resulting from asbestos exposure. He then filed suit, but died before the 60-day waiting period mandated by Unconsolidated Laws § 7107 expired. His widow, as administratrix, amended the complaint to include a wrongful death claim without serving a new notice of claim. The Port Authority moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing failure to comply with conditions precedent. The Court of Appeals held that the original notice was sufficient because it fulfilled the purpose of enabling the Port Authority to investigate the claim and estimate potential liability, and the addition of the death was a formality under these circumstances.

    Facts

    George Andrucki was exposed to asbestos while working on the Port Authority’s World Trade Center in the early 1970s. Decades later, in April 2010, he was diagnosed with mesothelioma. On October 4, 2010, Andrucki and his wife served a “Notice of Claim for Personal Injury from Asbestos” on the Port Authority, detailing his exposure and resulting injuries. Andrucki died on November 27, 2010.

    Procedural History

    Andrucki filed a lawsuit against multiple defendants, including the Port Authority, on October 5, 2010, one day after serving the notice of claim. After Andrucki’s death, his widow amended the complaint to include a wrongful death claim and filed a supplemental summons on January 18, 2011, to add the Port Authority as a defendant in the lawsuit. The Port Authority moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the conditions precedent by not serving a new notice of claim for the wrongful death action. Supreme Court denied the motion and entered a default judgment against the Port Authority. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that a new notice of claim was required. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a notice of claim for personal injuries is sufficient to support a wrongful death action against the Port Authority when the injured party dies from the injuries after the notice is served, but before the lawsuit is properly commenced (i.e., after the 60-day waiting period)?

    Holding

    Yes, because the original notice of claim adequately fulfilled the purpose of providing the Port Authority with the information necessary to investigate the claim and assess potential liability. The subsequent death of the claimant, under these specific circumstances, did not necessitate a new notice of claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on its prior decision in Holmes v. City of New York, which held that an administrator could benefit from a notice of claim filed by the deceased prior to death, reasoning that the wrongful death action was a continuation of the original personal injury claim. The Court acknowledged the Port Authority’s argument that, because the notice of claim requirement was a condition of waiving sovereign immunity, strict compliance was required. However, the Court distinguished this case from cases like Lepkowski v. State of New York and Kolnacki v. State of New York, where the notices of claim were deficient in providing the required information about the time, place, and nature of the claim. Here, Andrucki’s notice provided sufficient detail regarding his asbestos exposure and resulting injuries to allow the Port Authority to investigate. The Court stated, “It is hard to see how a later notice adding the information that the claimant had died of his disease could have been necessary to an investigation.” The Court also distinguished Luciano v. Fanberg Realty Co. and Lyons v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., noting that those cases involved failures to comply with the core time requirements of the statute, while the difference between a “personal injury” and “wrongful death” label was a mere formality in this instance. The Court emphasized that the notice of claim requirement’s purpose is to enable investigation and liability assessment. As the original notice served this purpose, a new one was unnecessary. The Court of Appeals also noted the desirability of consistent interpretations with New Jersey, the other state overseeing the Port Authority, whenever possible.

  • People v. Grubstein, 22 N.Y.3d 501 (2013): Post-Conviction Relief and Right to Counsel Claims

    22 N.Y.3d 501 (2013)

    A defendant alleging deprivation of the right to counsel during a guilty plea is not automatically barred from raising this claim in a post-conviction motion (CPL 440.10), even if the issue wasn’t raised on direct appeal.

    Summary

    Grubstein pleaded guilty to misdemeanor DWI in 2008 without counsel and was not advised of his right to appeal. In 2010, a subsequent DWI charge was elevated to a felony due to the prior conviction. Grubstein moved to withdraw his 2008 plea, arguing an invalid waiver of counsel. The Town Court granted the motion, but the Appellate Term reversed, stating the claim should have been raised on direct appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the failure to raise a right to counsel claim on direct appeal does not automatically bar its assertion in a CPL 440.10 motion, especially when the deprivation of counsel may have prevented a proper appeal.

    Facts

    In 2008, Grubstein pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated (DWI) in Tuxedo Town Court. He was not represented by an attorney during these proceedings. The Town Court did not advise him of his right to appeal the conviction. Grubstein did not file an appeal. In 2010, Grubstein was arrested and charged with another DWI. Due to the 2008 conviction, the 2010 charge was elevated to a felony under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (1) (c) (i). Grubstein then moved in the Town Court to withdraw his 2008 guilty plea.

    Procedural History

    The Tuxedo Town Court granted Grubstein’s motion to withdraw his 2008 guilty plea, finding that his waiver of counsel was not knowing or intelligent. The People appealed this decision. The Appellate Term reversed the Town Court’s order, holding that Grubstein should have raised the issue on direct appeal, as there were sufficient facts in the record to evaluate his claims. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal the Appellate Term’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who pleaded guilty pro se and was allegedly deprived of the right to counsel, is barred from raising that claim in a motion under CPL 440.10 due to failure to raise it on direct appeal.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant who was allegedly deprived of the right to counsel when pleading guilty pro se is not automatically barred from raising that claim in a CPL 440.10 motion due to the failure to raise it on direct appeal. The failure to appeal must be “unjustifiable,” and a violation of the right to counsel that impaired the defendant’s ability to pursue appellate relief should normally be a sufficient justification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that applying the procedural bar in CPL 440.10(2)(c) could be unfair when the defendant claims deprivation of the right to counsel. The Court stated, “A defendant who has wrongly been deprived of a lawyer can hardly be blamed for failing to follow customary legal procedures.” The Court emphasized that Section 440.10(2)(c) only applies when the failure to appeal is “unjustifiable.” Furthermore, the Town Court failed to advise Grubstein of his right to appeal, which is required by 22 NYCRR 671.5 when a defendant appears pro se. The Court referenced prior cases involving the writ of error coram nobis, the predecessor to CPL Article 440, stating that procedural barriers to post-conviction relief are relaxed when a violation of the right to counsel is claimed. Quoting People v. Hannigan, 7 NY2d 317, 318 (1960), the Court noted that “ ‘Judicial interference with the right to counsel guaranteed to defendant by law may warrant the extraordinary remedy of coram nobis, even though the error appears on the face of the record.’ ” The Court concluded that Grubstein was not barred from raising his right to counsel claim in a CPL article 440 motion and remitted the case to the Appellate Term to consider the remaining issues.

  • Ramos v. SimplexGrinnell LP, 22 N.Y.3d 145 (2013): Agency Deference and Statutory Interpretation in Prevailing Wage Cases

    Ramos v. SimplexGrinnell LP, 22 N.Y.3d 145 (2013)

    When interpreting a statute, a court will not give an administrative agency more deference than the agency itself claims, and a party’s agreement to pay prevailing wages pursuant to a statute binds it to pay those wages for all work activities ultimately deemed covered by the statute, regardless of the parties’ initial understanding.

    Summary

    This case addresses the extent to which a court should defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, particularly when the agency limits its interpretation to prospective application. It also clarifies whether a contractual agreement to pay prevailing wages requires payment for all work ultimately deemed covered by the statute, or only for work the parties initially understood to be covered. The Court of Appeals held that courts should not give an agency more deference than it claims for itself and that an agreement to comply with a statute means complying with its correct interpretation, regardless of the parties’ initial understanding.

    Facts

    A dispute arose over whether workers engaged in testing and inspection of fire protection equipment were covered by New York’s “prevailing wage” statute. The Department of Labor’s Commissioner issued an opinion letter stating that the workers were covered but that this opinion would apply prospectively only. A lawsuit was filed, and the Second Circuit sought clarification from the New York Court of Appeals regarding the deference owed to the Department of Labor’s decision and the scope of the prevailing wage agreement.

    Procedural History

    The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially ruled against the plaintiffs. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals then certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals. The New York Court of Appeals accepted the certified questions for review and decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. What deference, if any, should a court pay to an agency’s decision, made for its own enforcement purposes, to construe section 220 of the New York Labor Law prospectively only, when the court is deciding the meaning of that section for a period of time arising before the agency’s decision?

    2. Does a party’s commitment to pay prevailing wages pursuant to New York Labor Law section 220 bind it to pay those wages only for work activities that were clearly understood by the parties to be covered by section 220, or does it require the party to pay prevailing wages for all the work activities that are ultimately deemed by a court or agency to be “covered” by that portion of the statute?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Court will not give the agency more deference than it is asking for.

    2. It requires the party to pay prevailing wages for all the work activities that are ultimately deemed by a court or agency to be “covered” by that portion of the statute, because an agreement to comply with a statute is an agreement to comply with it as correctly interpreted, regardless of whether the parties knew the correct interpretation when contracting.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the first issue, the Court emphasized that deference to an administrative agency hinges on the agency’s own assessment of whether its legal interpretation merits deference. Since the Department of Labor, in its amicus brief, renounced any claim to deference in this specific litigation, the Court held that it would not grant the agency more deference than it requested. The Court explicitly limited its holding, leaving open the possibility that the agency could seek deference in its own enforcement actions.

    As to the second issue, the Court adopted the Second Circuit’s “at least as plausible” reading of the statute. It reasoned that an agreement to comply with a statute inherently implies compliance with the statute as correctly interpreted. This is especially true when the statute mandates a contractual clause agreeing to comply, as in Labor Law § 220(2). The Court concluded that the legislature intended parties to comply with the law’s correct interpretation, regardless of any prior misunderstandings.

    The court reasoned that “An agreement to comply with a statute is an agreement to comply with it as correctly interpreted, whether or not the correct interpretation was known to the parties at the time of contracting.” The Court further noted that the legislative intent behind Labor Law § 220(2) was to ensure compliance with the law as correctly understood, not as the parties may have misunderstood it.

  • Grace v. Law, 22 N.Y.3d 203 (2013): Impact of Failure to Appeal on Legal Malpractice Claims

    Grace v. Law, 22 N.Y.3d 203 (2013)

    A client’s failure to pursue an appeal in the underlying action bars a legal malpractice action only where the client was likely to have succeeded on appeal.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a client’s failure to appeal an adverse ruling in an underlying case precludes a subsequent legal malpractice claim against their attorney. The New York Court of Appeals held that the failure to appeal bars the legal malpractice action only if the client was likely to have succeeded on appeal. This decision establishes a “likely to succeed” standard, requiring courts to determine the potential outcome of the unpursued appeal when evaluating the malpractice claim. The Court reasoned that this standard balances fairness and efficiency by allowing appellate courts to correct errors while preventing premature malpractice suits.

    Facts

    John Grace retained attorneys (the Brenna defendants, later replaced by the Law defendants) to sue the Veterans Administration (VA) for medical malpractice related to delayed eye treatment. The Law defendants later withdrew due to a conflict of interest, and the Brenna defendants resumed representation. The underlying action faced summary judgment motions. The District Court dismissed claims against Dr. Boghani and the University of Rochester as time-barred and dismissed claims against the VA based on Dr. Boghani’s status as an independent contractor. The remaining claim against the VA was discontinued based on advice from counsel. Grace then sued the Brenna and Law defendants for legal malpractice, alleging a failure to timely sue Dr. Boghani and the University.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied motions for summary judgment by both the Law and Brenna defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the defendants failed to prove Grace was likely to succeed on appeal in the underlying action, therefore their negligence could have caused the damages. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, certifying the question of whether the order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a client must pursue an appeal in an underlying action before maintaining a legal malpractice claim against their attorney?
    2. What standard should govern whether failure to appeal an underlying action bars a subsequent legal malpractice claim?

    Holding

    1. No, because the failure to appeal bars the legal malpractice action only where the client was likely to have succeeded on appeal in the underlying action.
    2. The “likely to succeed” standard is the proper standard, because it is the most efficient and fair for all parties.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court adopted the “likely to succeed” standard, holding that a client need not pursue an appeal before suing for legal malpractice unless they were likely to win on appeal. The Court reasoned that this standard promotes efficiency by allowing appellate courts to correct errors, and fairness by preventing premature malpractice suits. The Court rejected the argument that this standard requires undue speculation, noting that courts already assess hypothetical outcomes in malpractice cases. The Court distinguished the proposed “nonfrivolous/meritorious appeal” standard, stating that it would require nearly every client to pursue an appeal. Applying the “likely to succeed” standard, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding insufficient evidence to determine that Grace would have succeeded on appeal by demonstrating that Dr. Boghani was a VA employee, rather than an independent contractor. The Court quoted Davis v. Klein, 88 N.Y.2d 1008, 1009-1010 (1996) stating “In order to establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the plaintiff would have succeeded on the merits of the underlying action but for the attorney’s negligence”.

  • People v. McLean, 22 N.Y.3d 127 (2013): Police Can Rely on Attorney’s Statement of Discontinuance

    People v. McLean, 22 N.Y.3d 127 (2013)

    When police are told by a suspect’s lawyer that the lawyer no longer represents him, they may question the suspect without violating his right to counsel.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that police did not violate a defendant’s right to counsel when they questioned him after his attorney stated he no longer represented him. McLean, previously represented by Kouray for a robbery charge, provided information about a murder in exchange for a plea deal. Years later, after Baker implicated McLean in the murder, detectives spoke with Kouray, who stated he no longer represented McLean. Subsequently, the detectives questioned McLean, who provided a new statement implicating himself in the murder. The Court of Appeals found that the police reasonably relied on Kouray’s statement and were not required to take further steps to ascertain the status of the attorney-client relationship.

    Facts

    In 2003, McLean, represented by attorney Kouray, offered information about a murder to get a lighter sentence on a robbery charge. He provided a statement to Detective Sims in Kouray’s presence. In 2006, after Antoan Baker implicated McLean in the murder, Detective Sims contacted Kouray to inquire if he still represented McLean. Kouray stated he did not. Detectives then interviewed McLean in prison, after administering Miranda warnings, about the murder. McLean provided a new, more incriminating statement.

    Procedural History

    McLean was indicted for murder. His motion to suppress the 2006 statement was denied, and he pleaded guilty. His direct appeal, arguing a violation of his right to counsel, was initially rejected due to an insufficient record. McLean then moved to set aside his conviction under CPL 440.10, again arguing a right to counsel violation. The County Court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police violated McLean’s right to counsel when they questioned him after his attorney told them that he no longer represented him.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police had a reasonable basis to believe that the attorney-client relationship had ceased when McLean’s attorney explicitly stated he no longer represented him.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the principle established in People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325 (1968) and People v. West, 81 N.Y.2d 370 (1993), which generally prohibits questioning a defendant in the absence of counsel once an attorney has entered the proceeding, unless the defendant affirmatively waives his right to counsel in the attorney’s presence. However, the Court distinguished the present case from West, where police failed to make any inquiry regarding the status of the attorney-client relationship. Here, the police specifically asked Kouray if he still represented McLean, and Kouray responded in the negative.

    The Court reasoned that the police are not required to take all imaginable steps to protect a defendant’s right to counsel. The court stated: “Where they follow the rules laid down in our cases — rules that are, in general, highly protective of the attorney-client relationship — they need do no more.” The Court found that by inquiring with Kouray and receiving an unequivocal answer, the police discharged their burden to ascertain the status of the representation. This decision emphasizes the importance of direct inquiry with the attorney of record and provides a clear standard for police conduct in such situations. The Court indicated that its holding does not mean that “the right to counsel is interminable” as stated in West. It clarified that the outcome would be different if police had reason to believe the attorney-client relationship had ended, which in this case, they did.

  • People v. Green, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013): Speedy Trial Rights After Appellate Reversal

    People v. Green, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013)

    When a conviction is reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial, the statutory speedy trial clock starts running from the date the order occasioning the retrial becomes final, and the mere passage of time during an adjournment is not automatically excludable from the speedy trial calculation.

    Summary

    Green was convicted of assault, but the conviction was reversed on appeal due to an improper jury charge. After the People’s application for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied, the case was adjourned. Due to a clerical error, the case was not calendared, and the prosecution was not present. Over 90 days after the denial of leave to appeal, Green moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Criminal Court granted the motion, but the Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that the time was not automatically excludable and the People failed to justify the delay.

    Facts

    Defendant Green was convicted of assault in the third degree in October 2006. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction in March 2010 and remanded the case for a new trial due to an improper jury charge. The People sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. On May 10, 2010, the case was adjourned to June 21, 2010, while the People’s leave application was pending. The Court of Appeals denied leave on May 14, 2010. Due to a clerical error, Green’s case was not calendared for June 21, 2010, and no prosecutor was present. The District Attorney’s office discovered the error in July and scheduled a new date of August 23, 2010. The People had not declared themselves ready for trial before this point.

    Procedural History

    Green was convicted of assault in Criminal Court. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The People’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Criminal Court granted Green’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals granted Green leave to appeal and then reversed the Appellate Term, reinstating the Criminal Court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the period between May 10, 2010, and August 23, 2010, was automatically excludable from the speedy trial calculation under CPL 30.30(4)(a) as a reasonable period of delay resulting from an appeal, when the People did not provide any justification for the delay after their leave to appeal was denied.

    Holding

    No, because the mere lapse of time following the denial of leave to appeal does not automatically constitute a reasonable period of delay resulting from an appeal under CPL 30.30(4)(a), and the People provided no justification for any delay to be added to the 90-day speedy trial period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 30.30(1)(b) requires the People to be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of a criminal action involving a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of more than three months. CPL 30.30(5)(a) states that when a conviction is reversed and remanded, the action commences on the date the order occasioning the retrial becomes final. The Court noted that CPL 30.30(4)(a) excludes a “reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to…appeals…and the period during which such matters are under consideration by the court.” The Court distinguished its holding from the Appellate Division case, People v. Vukel, which held that an adjournment pending leave to appeal was excludable. The Court reasoned that allowing the People to delay retrial for the duration of an adjournment, even after leave to appeal is denied, would be inconsistent with the intent of CPL 30.30, which is to discourage prosecutorial inaction. To the extent that Vukel holds otherwise, the Court stated that “it should not be followed.” The Court agreed with the Criminal Court that the People had not justified any reasonable period of delay under CPL 30.30(4)(a) to be added to the 90-day period under CPL 30.30(1)(b).