New York Law Review

Tag: 2012

  • Albany Law School v. NYS Office of Mental Retardation, 19 N.Y.3d 106 (2012): Access to Clinical Records for Disability Advocates

    Albany Law School v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 19 N.Y.3d 106 (2012)

    Mental Hygiene Law §§ 45.09(b) and 33.13(c)(4) grant protection and advocacy organizations access to clinical records of developmentally disabled individuals consistent with the federal Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DD Act), balancing privacy rights with advocacy needs, and actively-involved family members can be considered legal representatives under certain circumstances.

    Summary

    Albany Law School and Disability Advocates, Inc., sought unrestricted access to clinical records of residents at two OPWDD facilities, arguing that Mental Hygiene Law §§ 45.09(b) and 33.13(c)(4) granted them this right. OPWDD countered that these state laws incorporated the access provisions of the federal DD Act, which balances resident privacy with advocacy needs. The New York Court of Appeals held that the state statutes must be read in accordance with federal law and that actively-involved family members can be considered legal representatives if they have sufficient decision-making authority and their designation is appropriately reviewed. The court remitted the case to determine the adequacy of OPWDD’s process for designating and reviewing family members as legal representatives.

    Facts

    Albany Law School and Disability Advocates, Inc. (petitioners), contracted with the New York State Commission on Quality of Care and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities to provide protection and advocacy services to individuals with developmental disabilities. After receiving a complaint about discharge practices at an OPWDD facility and noting concerns about timely transfers to less restrictive settings, the petitioners requested access to the clinical records of all residents at two OPWDD facilities. OPWDD denied unrestricted access, citing the DD Act’s requirements for authorization from the individual or their legal representative.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners filed an Article 78 proceeding and a § 1983 action to compel OPWDD to grant access to the records. Supreme Court sided with OPWDD, holding that the Mental Hygiene Law incorporated the DD Act’s access procedures and that legal representatives could include actively-involved family members. The Appellate Division modified, finding that § 45.09(b) authorized access upon receipt of a complaint but disagreed that actively-involved family members could be legal representatives. Both OPWDD and petitioners were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Mental Hygiene Law § 45.09(b) and § 33.13(c)(4) provide P&A organizations with unqualified access to clinical records or incorporate the federal access provisions of the DD Act?

    2. Whether actively-involved family members can be deemed legal representatives for purposes of the federal and state access provisions?

    Holding

    1. No, because Mental Hygiene Law § 45.09(b) and § 33.13(c)(4) must be read in accord with federal law, which balances privacy with advocacy needs.

    2. Yes, because actively-involved family members can possess sufficient decision-making authority to qualify as legal representatives, pending an assessment of OPWDD’s appointment and review process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the primary consideration in statutory interpretation is legislative intent, as gleaned from the text, context, and legislative history. Although Mental Hygiene Law § 45.09(a) grants the Commission on Quality of Care broad access, § 45.09(b) and § 33.13(c)(4) tie the access rights of P&A organizations to the Commission’s administration of the P&A system “as provided for by federal law.” The court found the legislative history indicated that the amendments were intended to ensure New York’s compliance with the DD Act to maintain federal funding.

    Regarding family members as legal representatives, the court noted that New York law grants actively-involved family members significant powers, such as consenting to major medical procedures and making end-of-life decisions. The court cited 45 CFR 1386.19, which defines a legal representative as “an individual appointed and regularly reviewed by a State court or agency…and having authority to make all decisions on behalf of individuals with developmental disabilities.” While actively-involved family members hold significant decision-making authority, the court remitted the case for further proceedings to examine the nature and adequacy of OPWDD’s process for selecting and reviewing these family members.

    The court emphasized the need to balance the privacy rights of developmentally disabled individuals with the crucial advocacy role of P&A organizations, concluding that New York law parallels federal law in this regard.

  • People v. Williams, 19 N.Y.3d 101 (2012): Post-Release Supervision as Part of Determinate Sentence for Order of Protection Duration

    People v. Williams, 19 N.Y.3d 101 (2012)

    For the purpose of determining the duration of an order of protection issued at sentencing, a “determinate sentence of imprisonment actually imposed” includes the mandatory period of post-release supervision (PRS).

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a determinate sentence of imprisonment includes the mandatory period of post-release supervision (PRS) when calculating the duration of an order of protection. The defendant argued that the order of protection’s expiration date should not include his PRS period. The Court of Appeals held that the term of PRS is part of the “determinate sentence of imprisonment actually imposed” as defined in CPL 530.13(4), and therefore the order of protection was correctly calculated to include the PRS period. This decision harmonizes the Criminal Procedure Law with the Penal Law’s inclusion of PRS as part of a determinate sentence.

    Facts

    Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree assault. At the initial sentencing, the Supreme Court imposed a 13-year prison term and an order of protection effective for three years from the date of the maximum time of incarceration, resulting in an expiration date of May 22, 2022. The Supreme Court did not mention PRS during sentencing, but the commitment sheet indicated a three-year PRS term. On appeal, the Appellate Division vacated the PRS term because it was not part of the oral pronouncement of the sentence. Subsequently, the defendant moved to amend the order of protection, arguing that it should expire in 2019, three years after his calculated release date (accounting for jail time credit), not including the PRS period.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division modified the original judgment, vacating the three-year PRS term due to the sentencing court’s failure to pronounce it orally and remanding for resentencing. At resentencing, the Supreme Court orally sentenced the defendant to a three-year term of PRS and denied the defendant’s motion to amend the order of protection, agreeing with the People that the PRS extended the order’s duration. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the term “determinate sentence of imprisonment actually imposed” in former CPL 530.13(4) includes the mandatory period of post-release supervision (PRS) for purposes of calculating the duration of an order of protection issued at sentencing.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Penal Law defines a determinate sentence of imprisonment to include a period of post-release supervision (PRS) as part of the sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while former CPL 530.13(4) did not explicitly reference PRS, the Penal Law, specifically sections 70.45(1) and 70.00(6), clearly states that a determinate sentence of imprisonment includes PRS. The Court emphasized that the language of these Penal Law sections is unambiguous: a determinate sentence necessarily includes PRS. To exclude PRS would contradict the Legislature’s intent. The Court noted, “If the Legislature intended PRS to be wholly distinct from a defendant’s determinate sentence, it would not have specified in former section 70.45 of the Penal Law that a “determinate sentence” encompassed PRS “as a part thereof.” Nor would the Legislature have described a “determinate sentence of imprisonment” to “include, as a part thereof, a period of [PRS]” in former section 70.00 (6).” The court also emphasized the importance of including PRS when calculating the maximum expiration date of the determinate sentence to account for potential conditional release and reincarceration during the PRS period. This interpretation harmonizes the statutes, giving effect to the Legislature’s intent to include PRS as an integral component of a determinate sentence.

  • Williams v. State, 19 N.Y.3d 982 (2012): Proximate Cause and Temporal Remoteness in Negligence

    Williams v. State, 19 N.Y.3d 982 (2012)

    A negligent act is not the proximate cause of an injury if the causal connection is too attenuated and speculative, particularly when a significant amount of time has passed between the act and the injury.

    Summary

    This case addresses the limits of proximate cause in negligence claims against the state for the actions of a former psychiatric patient. The New York Court of Appeals held that the State’s alleged negligence in supervising a voluntary patient who left a psychiatric facility was not the proximate cause of injuries the patient inflicted on a claimant nearly two years later. The court emphasized the attenuated and speculative nature of the causal connection, given the passage of time and intervening factors that could have influenced the patient’s mental state.

    Facts

    Tony Joseph, a voluntary patient at Manhattan Psychiatric Center (MPC), left the facility without authorization in July 1993. MPC classified Joseph as “left without consent” (LWOC) rather than “escaped,” meaning the police were not notified. Almost two years later, in July 1995, Joseph attacked Jill Williams, throwing a glass bottle at her, causing serious injury. Williams and her husband sued the State, alleging negligent supervision, pointing to Joseph’s history of violence and the State’s failure to properly classify him as an escapee.

    Procedural History

    The Court of Claims dismissed the claim, finding no proximate cause between the State’s actions and Williams’s injuries. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the State liable and remanding for a trial on damages. The Appellate Division granted the State leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals on a certified question of law. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Court of Claims’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State’s alleged negligence in supervising Joseph and classifying him as LWOC was the proximate cause of Williams’s injuries sustained nearly two years later.

    Holding

    No, because the causal connection between the hospital staff’s alleged negligence in July 1993 and Joseph’s attack on Williams in July 1995—almost exactly two years later—is simply too attenuated and speculative to support liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the causal connection too attenuated and speculative to establish liability. The court reasoned that Joseph was a voluntary patient, and there was no certainty he would have remained in the State’s care in 1995, even if his departure had been prevented in 1993. The court emphasized the significance of the two-year gap, stating that “any number of circumstances arising during the two-year period might have triggered such a change in mental condition.” The court cited the “test of temporal duration,” derived from Pagan v Goldberger, 51 AD2d 508, 511 [2d Dept 1976], and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433, Comment f, noting that a lengthy time lapse allows for many intervening factors, making it difficult to prove causation. Because of the time lapse, the court concluded that the State established, as a matter of law, that its negligence was not a proximate cause of Williams’s injuries, citing Bonomonte v City of New York, 17 NY3d 866 [2011]). The court essentially said that “Experience has shown that where a great length of time has elapsed between the actor’s negligence and harm to another, a great number of contributing factors may have operated, many of which may be difficult or impossible of actual proof”.

  • People v. Pagan, 19 N.Y.3d 91 (2012): Claim of Right and Mistake of Fact Defenses in Robbery

    People v. Pagan, 19 N.Y.3d 91 (2012)

    In a robbery case, a defendant’s claim that they mistakenly believed the property they were taking was theirs is equivalent to a claim of right defense, and neither defense is permissible where the defendant used force to take fungible currency.

    Summary

    Debra Pagan was convicted of attempted robbery in the second degree after an altercation with a cab driver over change. Pagan argued that she mistakenly believed the money she was trying to take from the cab driver was rightfully hers. The New York Court of Appeals held that, in this context, Pagan’s “mistake of fact” defense was indistinguishable from a “claim of right” defense, which is not a valid defense when force is used to take money, especially fungible currency, even if the defendant honestly believes they are entitled to it. The court emphasized the risk of violence inherent in such situations.

    Facts

    Debra Pagan hailed a cab, stating she only had $4, though the minimum fare was $6. The driver agreed to the lower amount. Upon arrival, Pagan gave the driver a $1 bill and a $20 bill, later claiming she was owed $17 in change, despite the driver returning the $1 bill. Pagan then demanded the $20 back and offered $4 from the $16 in change to the driver, who refused, stating she was paying him with his own money. The cab’s security locks were activated, preventing Pagan from leaving. When the driver said he would take her to the police, she put the $16 on the console. As the driver headed to the police precinct, Pagan tried to grab the $16, scratching and biting his hand. She then brandished a knife and demanded the money. Police officers intervened, arresting Pagan.

    Procedural History

    Pagan was indicted on charges including attempted robbery. At trial, she requested a jury instruction on mistake of fact, arguing she believed the money was hers. The trial court denied this, giving instead a negative claim of right instruction. Pagan was convicted of attempted robbery in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for a mistake of fact jury instruction.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in giving a negative claim of right instruction to the jury.
    3. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because under these facts, the mistake of fact defense is equivalent to a claim of right defense, which is not permitted in robbery cases involving the use of force.
    2. No, because the negative claim of right instruction was proper under the circumstances, as the money at issue was fungible currency.
    3. Yes, because the jury could have rationally concluded that the defendant did not have a good faith belief that the bills she tried to take were hers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that robbery involves “forcible stealing,” and while a claim of right is a defense to larceny, it is limited in robbery cases due to the risk of injury. The court stated, “Forcibly taking the property of another, even when one honestly believes it to be one’s own property ‘entails the risk of physical or mental injury to individuals’”. In Pagan’s case, her claim that she mistakenly believed the money was hers was equivalent to a claim of right. The court emphasized that a mistake of fact defense, like a claim of right defense, does not apply when force is used to take money to satisfy a preexisting debt. Regarding the negative claim of right instruction, the court noted that currency is generally considered fungible, and therefore, a defendant cannot have a true claim to specific bills unless they have unique characteristics. The court distinguished this from taking a specific chattel, like a painting, where a good faith belief of ownership might negate larcenous intent. The Court found that the evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that Pagan knew the money was not hers and was attempting to take it by force. The court reasoned that the People disproved the defense by presenting evidence that Pagan negotiated a $4 fare, tried to pay with the driver’s change, scratched and bit the driver, and produced a knife.

  • Simkin v. Blank, 19 N.Y.3d 46 (2012): Mutual Mistake and Marital Settlement Agreements

    19 N.Y.3d 46 (2012)

    A marital settlement agreement will not be reformed based on mutual mistake when the alleged mistake concerns the future value of an asset rather than its existence or ownership at the time of the agreement.

    Summary

    Steven Simkin (husband) sued Laura Blank (wife) seeking to reform their marital settlement agreement after it was discovered that a Madoff investment account, believed to be worth $5.4 million and factored into the agreement, was fraudulent. Husband claimed mutual mistake, asserting both parties were unaware the account was a Ponzi scheme. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the husband failed to state a cause of action for mutual mistake because the account had redeemable value at the time of the agreement, and the subsequent loss was akin to a post-divorce change in asset valuation, not a fundamental mistake about the asset’s existence.

    Facts

    The husband and wife divorced after almost 30 years of marriage. They entered into a detailed settlement agreement in 2006, which was incorporated but not merged into their divorce judgment. The agreement provided the wife with a $6,250,000 distributive payment. At the time of the agreement, the husband held an investment account with Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, believed to be worth $5.4 million. The husband used funds from this account to partially satisfy his payment obligation to the wife.

    Procedural History

    In 2009, after Madoff’s Ponzi scheme was revealed, the husband sued the wife, seeking reformation of the settlement agreement based on mutual mistake and unjust enrichment. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the action. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the husband’s amended complaint adequately states a cause of action for reformation of a marital settlement agreement based on mutual mistake, where the alleged mistake concerns the legitimacy and future value of an investment account rather than its existence or ownership at the time of the agreement.

    Holding

    No, because the alleged mistake regarding the Madoff account’s legitimacy and subsequent loss of value does not constitute a material mistake that undermines the foundation of the settlement agreement. The court emphasized that the account had redeemable value at the time of the agreement, and the loss was akin to a post-divorce change in asset valuation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that marital settlement agreements are judicially favored and should not be easily set aside. Reformation based on mutual mistake requires that the mistake exist at the time the contract is entered into and be substantial, going to the foundation of the agreement. The Court distinguished this case from others where reformation was granted because the mistake rendered a portion of the agreement impossible to perform. The court stated that “[t]he mutual mistake must exist at the time the contract is entered into and must be substantial” (Gould, 81 NY2d at 453).

    The court reasoned that the settlement agreement did not explicitly state an intention to divide the Madoff account equally or proportionally. The agreement provided the wife with a lump-sum payment “in satisfaction of her support and marital property rights.” The court also noted that the husband had previously withdrawn funds from the Madoff account to pay his distributive payment to the wife, indicating that the account had redeemable value at the time of the agreement.

    The court stated that this situation was “more akin to a marital asset that unexpectedly loses value after dissolution of a marriage; the asset had value at the time of the settlement but the purported value did not remain consistent.” The court rejected the husband’s unjust enrichment claim, citing the well-settled principle that recovery on a theory of unjust enrichment is precluded where the parties have a valid and enforceable written contract governing the subject matter.

  • Mount Vernon City School Dist. v. Nova Cas. Co., 19 N.Y.3d 33 (2012): Surety’s Defenses and Lien Law Diversions

    19 N.Y.3d 33 (2012)

    A compensated surety seeking discharge from its obligations under a performance bond must demonstrate that the obligee’s actions materially altered the contract or impaired the surety’s obligation, and the surety cannot assert Lien Law violations if it has not performed under the bond, thus failing to acquire subrogation rights.

    Summary

    Mount Vernon City School District contracted with DJH Mechanical for HVAC work, secured by a performance bond from Nova Casualty. When the School District paid $214,000 to the Department of Labor (DOL) on behalf of DJH for an unrelated debt, Nova claimed this was an improper diversion of trust funds under New York Lien Law, discharging their surety obligation when DJH defaulted. The Court of Appeals held that Nova, as a non-performing surety, lacked standing to assert Lien Law violations and failed to demonstrate how the payment materially prejudiced their obligation. Additionally, the Court found the contract language insufficient to award the School District attorneys’ fees incurred in the litigation itself.

    Facts

    In 2003, Mount Vernon City School District (School District) contracted with DJH Mechanical Associates, Inc. (DJH) for HVAC work. The contract required DJH to obtain a performance bond, which it secured from Nova Casualty Company (Nova). During the project, the School District received a notice from the Department of Labor (DOL) to withhold $863,197.40 from payments to DJH due to wage violations on a prior project. Later, DOL directed the School District to remit $214,000 to DOL to satisfy DJH’s debt, which the School District did with DJH’s authorization. DJH failed to complete the work, and the School District terminated the contract. Nova disclaimed liability under the bond.

    Procedural History

    The School District sued Nova for breach of contract. Nova moved for summary judgment, arguing the School District violated the Lien Law by diverting trust funds. Supreme Court denied summary judgment to both parties. After a jury trial on liability, the Supreme Court held that the payment to DOL did not excuse Nova’s performance, but denied the School District’s claim for attorneys’ fees. Both parties appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the School District’s payment of $214,000 to DOL on behalf of DJH constituted an improper diversion of trust funds under Article 3-A of the Lien Law, thereby discharging Nova’s obligations under the performance bond.

    2. Whether the School District is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees incurred in prosecuting the breach of contract action against Nova, based on the terms of the construction contract and performance bond.

    Holding

    1. No, because Nova, as a non-performing surety, lacks standing to assert Lien Law violations and failed to demonstrate that the payment materially prejudiced its obligations.

    2. No, because the contract language does not contain an "unmistakably clear" intention to provide for attorneys’ fees incurred in litigation between the School District and Nova over the bond.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that while a surety can assert affirmative defenses based on an obligee’s noncompliance with the bond terms or material contract alterations, this principle is modified for compensated sureties in construction contracts. A compensated surety must demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the obligee’s actions. Here, Nova failed to show how the $214,000 payment materially altered the contract or impaired its obligations. Since Nova did not perform by funding completion of the work, it was not subrogated to the rights of Article 3-A trust beneficiaries and lacked standing to raise Lien Law violations. The Court emphasized that the $214,000 represented earned funds due to DJH and was neither excessive nor premature, thus not increasing Nova’s risk of loss. The Court stated, "[I]t is incumbent on the surety seeking to be discharged to demonstrate that an obligee’s act has so prejudiced it that its obligation is impaired." Regarding attorneys’ fees, the Court reiterated the general rule that fees are incidents of litigation and require an "unmistakably clear" agreement for recovery. The Court found the contract language insufficient, as it did not explicitly cover fees incurred in litigation arising from Nova’s breach, differentiating between fees for completing the project and those for suing the surety. The Court referenced Hooper Assoc. v AGS Computers, stating, "[T]he court should not infer a party’s intention to waive the benefit of the rule unless the intention to do so is unmistakably clear from the language of the promise."

  • People v. Bedessie, 19 N.Y.3d 147 (2012): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on False Confessions

    People v. Bedessie, 19 N.Y.3d 147 (2012)

    Expert testimony on the phenomenon of false confessions is admissible in a proper case, but the expert’s testimony must be relevant to the specific defendant and interrogation at issue.

    Summary

    Khemwattie Bedessie was convicted of sexually abusing a four-year-old boy. Before trial, she sought to introduce expert testimony on false confessions, arguing that her confession was coerced. The trial court denied this request, finding the testimony irrelevant and potentially usurping the jury’s role. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while expert testimony on false confessions can be admissible, the proposed expert’s testimony was not relevant to Bedessie’s specific circumstances, as it focused on factors not present in her case and made speculative arguments. The court emphasized the importance of relevance and connection to the specific facts when admitting such expert testimony.

    Facts

    Khemwattie Bedessie, a teacher’s assistant, was accused of sexually abusing a four-year-old boy. The boy disclosed the abuse to his mother, who reported it to the authorities. Detective Bourbon interviewed Bedessie after advising her of her Miranda rights. Bedessie initially denied the allegations but then confessed to three incidents of sexual abuse. She later gave a videotaped confession detailing the events. Bedessie recanted her confession at trial, claiming Detective Bourbon coerced her into confessing by threatening her with jail and promising to let her go home to her sick mother if she confessed.

    Procedural History

    Bedessie was indicted on multiple counts, including rape and sexual abuse. She moved to suppress her confession as involuntary, which the trial court denied after a Huntley hearing. Before trial, Bedessie sought to introduce expert testimony on false confessions, which the trial court denied. The jury convicted Bedessie on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying Bedessie’s request to introduce expert testimony on the phenomenon of false confessions.

    Holding

    No, because the proposed expert testimony was not relevant to the specific facts of Bedessie’s case and the circumstances of her interrogation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the growing recognition of the phenomenon of false confessions. Citing People v. Lee, the Court reiterated that the admissibility of expert testimony lies within the trial court’s discretion, guided by whether it would aid the jury. While expert testimony can “invade the jury’s province” to some degree, this alone is not grounds for exclusion. The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bedessie’s request. The expert’s report contained extraneous information, speculation, and conclusions unsupported by the facts. For instance, the expert discussed day-care sexual abuse cases and the suggestibility of young children, which was irrelevant to Bedessie’s claim that she was coerced into confessing. The court noted that “[w]hile electronic recording of interrogations should facilitate the discovery of false confessions and is becoming standard police practice, the neglect to record is not a factor or circumstance that might induce a false confession.” Furthermore, the expert did not proffer testimony that Bedessie exhibited personality traits linked to false confessions. The expert also made speculative claims about interrogation techniques without linking them to established research or Bedessie’s specific allegations. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the expert’s proffer was not relevant to Bedessie and her interrogation, making the testimony inadmissible. The Court emphasized that “While the expert may not testify as to whether a particular defendant’s confession was or was not reliable, the expert’s proffer must be relevant to the defendant and interrogation before the court.”

  • Corsello v. Verizon New York, Inc., 18 N.Y.3d 777 (2012): Inverse Condemnation and Statute of Limitations

    Corsello v. Verizon New York, Inc., 18 N.Y.3d 777 (2012)

    A property owner can bring an inverse condemnation claim against an entity with eminent domain power for a permanent physical occupation of their property, and a statute barring claims related to attachments of wires or cables to a building precludes a statute of limitations defense.

    Summary

    The Corsellos sued Verizon for attaching a terminal box to their apartment building without compensation, enabling Verizon to provide phone service to other buildings. The Corsellos claimed inverse condemnation, unjust enrichment, trespass, and deceptive trade practices. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Corsellos stated a valid inverse condemnation claim, which was not time-barred due to Real Property Law § 261. However, the Court found the General Business Law § 349 claim time-barred and the unjust enrichment claim legally insufficient. The Court also upheld the denial of class certification, finding that individual issues predominated.

    Facts

    The Corsellos owned an apartment building in Brooklyn. Verizon’s predecessor attached a terminal box to the building, which connected Verizon’s “Block Cable” to “Station Connection wires,” providing telephone service to multiple buildings, not just the Corsellos’. The Corsellos alleged that Verizon never disclosed their right to compensation and falsely implied it had a right to attach the box. A Verizon representative allegedly told William Corsello in 1986 that Verizon “had a right” to put the box on the wall.

    Procedural History

    The Corsellos sued Verizon, seeking damages and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and similarly situated building owners. The Supreme Court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim but upheld the other claims. It later denied class certification. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order, dismissing the inverse condemnation claim as time-barred, reinstating the unjust enrichment claim, and affirming the General Business Law claim. It also affirmed the denial of class certification. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the inverse condemnation claim but dismissing the other two claims. It affirmed the denial of class certification.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the attachment of a telecommunications box to a building constitutes a taking for which an inverse condemnation claim may be brought.

    2. Whether Real Property Law § 261 saves the inverse condemnation claim from being time-barred.

    3. Whether the claim under General Business Law § 349 is barred by the statute of limitations.

    4. Whether the plaintiffs stated a valid claim for unjust enrichment.

    5. Whether the lower courts abused their discretion in denying class certification.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the complaint alleges facts from which a continuous and permanent occupation of the plaintiff’s property—a de facto taking—could be found.

    2. Yes, because Real Property Law § 261 precludes a statute of limitations defense based on the attachment of wires or cables to a building.

    3. Yes, because the alleged deception occurred more than three years before the suit was brought, and no subsequent deceptive act was alleged to justify equitable estoppel.

    4. No, because an unjust enrichment claim is not available where it duplicates or replaces a conventional tort claim.

    5. No, because the courts were justified in finding that common questions of law or fact did not predominate and that the claims of the representative parties were not typical of the class.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that inverse condemnation is a means for a landowner to recover just compensation when their property has been taken without formal condemnation proceedings. The Court rejected Verizon’s argument that inverse condemnation is only available when an entity chooses to exercise its eminent domain power. The Court clarified that a continuous, permanent trespass could constitute a de facto taking. Regarding the statute of limitations, the Court held that Real Property Law § 261 prevents a lapse-of-time defense. It emphasized that the statute aims to protect property owners from losing remedies due to the passage of time when a company unlawfully attaches wires or cables to their property. The Court determined that the General Business Law claim was time-barred because the injury occurred when the plaintiffs refrained from demanding payment or removal of the box, which was more than three years before the suit. The Court stated that the unjust enrichment claim was duplicative of the trespass and taking claims. Lastly, the Court found no abuse of discretion in denying class certification. Evidence submitted by Verizon cast doubt on the existence of a uniform policy of attaching apparatus to buildings furtively and without consent. Verizon presented evidence specific to the plaintiffs’ building, suggesting that individual issues predominated over common ones. The Court quoted United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) in defining inverse condemnation as “the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted.”

  • People v. Ingram, 18 N.Y.3d 948 (2012): Appellate Review Limited to Issues Decided by Trial Court

    18 N.Y.3d 948 (2012)

    An appellate court’s review is limited to issues decided by the trial court and cannot resolve a case on a theory the trial court did not reach.

    Summary

    Defendant Ingram appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed, but on a different legal theory than the trial court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division exceeded its review power by deciding the case on an issue not decided by the suppression court. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its memorandum.

    Facts

    A police officer approached Ingram and asked for his name. Ingram provided a false name. The officer then inquired further after realizing Ingram had given a false name, leading to the discovery of incriminating evidence. Ingram moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that the police encounter was unlawful.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Ingram’s suppression motion, finding the police officer’s initial request for information and the subsequent inquiry permissible under the first level of police intrusion as defined in People v. De Bour. Ingram appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the suppression motion, but reasoned that while the initial request was permissible under the first level of De Bour, the second inquiry was justified by a founded suspicion of criminal activity, placing it under the second level of De Bour. Ingram appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion on a legal theory (founded suspicion) not reached or decided by the trial court.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Appellate Division’s review power is limited to issues decided by the trial court, and it cannot affirm on a ground the trial court did not address or explicitly rejected.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 470.15 (1), which precludes the Appellate Division from reviewing an issue either decided in an appellant’s favor or not decided by the trial court. Referencing People v. Concepcion and People v. LaFontaine, the Court emphasized that an appellate court cannot affirm a lower court’s decision on a rationale that the lower court explicitly rejected or did not reach. The Court reasoned that the Appellate Division exceeded its authority by resolving the suppression application on a De Bour second-level theory of founded suspicion when the trial court only addressed the encounter under the first-level inquiry. The dissent argued that the trial court had not explicitly rejected the second-level De Bour justification and that remitting the case would be a pointless exercise, as the trial court would likely adopt the Appellate Division’s reasoning on remand.

  • Ryan v. Kellogg Partners Institutional Services, 19 N.Y.3d 1 (2012): Enforceability of Oral Agreements for Bonuses

    19 N.Y.3d 1 (2012)

    An oral agreement for a guaranteed bonus is enforceable, even for an at-will employee, if the agreement is supported by consideration and capable of being performed within one year, and an employee can recover attorney fees if the unpaid bonus qualifies as “wages” under Labor Law § 190(1).

    Summary

    Daniel Ryan left his job at a brokerage firm to join Kellogg Partners, allegedly based on an oral promise of a $175,000 salary and a $175,000 guaranteed bonus. After joining, Ryan signed an employment application and received an employee handbook stating his employment was at-will and that benefits were not guaranteed. Kellogg failed to pay the bonus, and later fired Ryan. Ryan sued for breach of contract and violation of New York Labor Law. The jury found in favor of Ryan on the breach of contract claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the oral agreement was enforceable because it was supported by consideration and capable of being performed within a year, and the bonus constituted “wages” under the Labor Law, entitling Ryan to attorney’s fees.

    Facts

    Daniel Ryan was recruited by Kellogg Partners, a new broker-dealer, in early 2003. Ryan stated he wanted a $350,000 package to change jobs. Kellogg’s managing partner allegedly agreed to a $175,000 salary and a $175,000 guaranteed bonus. Ryan accepted the offer and started on July 14, 2003. Prior to starting, on June 21, 2003, Ryan signed an employment application acknowledging his at-will employment status and lack of guaranteed compensation. On February 18, 2004, he signed a receipt for Kellogg’s employee handbook, reiterating the at-will nature of his employment. Kellogg did not pay the bonus. In February 2004, Kellogg’s managing partner allegedly asked Ryan to defer the bonus to 2004, which Ryan reluctantly agreed to. Ryan was fired on February 8, 2005, after rejecting a $20,000 bonus offer. Kellogg filed a negative U-5 form alleging Ryan was terminated for cause, namely insubordination and disparagement.

    Procedural History

    Ryan sued Kellogg for failure to pay wages and breach of contract. The Supreme Court held a jury trial, which found Kellogg had breached an oral agreement to pay Ryan a guaranteed bonus, but did not find that the failure to pay was willful. Kellogg moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, arguing the oral agreement was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds and related provisions of the General Obligations Law. Supreme Court denied Kellogg’s motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. Kellogg appealed to the Court of Appeals based on a two-Justice dissent.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statements in the employment application and employee handbook negated Ryan’s expectation of, or entitlement to, a guaranteed bonus.

    2. Whether the oral agreements regarding the bonus were unenforceable because they were not in writing, as required by the General Obligations Law.

    3. Whether Ryan was entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to Labor Law § 198(1-a).

    Holding

    1. No, because the employment application and employee handbook only confirmed Ryan’s at-will status and did not explicitly negate the possibility of a guaranteed bonus.

    2. No, because the oral agreements were supported by consideration and capable of being performed within one year, and therefore did not fall within the scope of the Statute of Frauds.

    3. Yes, because Ryan’s bonus was expressly linked to his labor, making it “wages” under Labor Law § 190(1), entitling him to attorney’s fees.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the employment application and employee handbook only addressed Ryan’s at-will status, not whether he was entitled to the promised bonus. The Court distinguished the case from others where written contracts or handbooks explicitly vested discretion in the employer regarding bonus amounts. The Court found that Ryan’s testimony, which the jury clearly believed, established that the bonus was a guaranteed part of his compensation package. As such, the signed documents did not bar Ryan’s recovery.

    The Court addressed Kellogg’s Statute of Frauds defense, noting that the oral agreement was supported by consideration (Ryan leaving his old job and continuing to work at Kellogg) and could be performed within one year. Therefore, the General Obligations Law sections requiring a signed writing did not apply. The court noted that “[a]s long as (an) agreement may be fairly and reasonably interpreted such that it may be performed within a year (of its making), the Statute of Frauds will not act as a bar however unexpected, unlikely, or even improbable that such performance will occur during that time frame”.

    Finally, regarding attorney’s fees, the Court distinguished Truelove v. Northeast Capital & Advisory, where the bonus was discretionary and not directly linked to the employee’s performance. Here, Ryan’s bonus was tied to his work as a floor broker, making it “wages” under the Labor Law. The court noted “[u]nlike the situation in Truelove, Ryan’s bonus was “expressly link[ed]” to his “labor or services personally rendered” namely, his work as a floor broker for Kellogg.” Thus, Kellogg’s failure to pay entitled Ryan to attorney’s fees.