New York Law Review

Tag: 2011

  • Cadichon v. Facelle, 17 N.Y.3d 226 (2011): Enforcing Procedural Rules for Dismissal Based on Neglect to Prosecute

    Cadichon v. Facelle, 17 N.Y.3d 226 (2011)

    A case dismissal for neglect to prosecute requires judicial involvement and a formal order, even when a stipulation sets a deadline for filing a note of issue and includes a 90-day demand, because the demand only serves as a basis for a court’s motion to dismiss, not an automatic dismissal.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action, and a stipulation was executed directing them to file a note of issue by a specific date, coupled with a 90-day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216. When plaintiffs failed to meet the deadline, the case was administratively dismissed without a court order. The Court of Appeals held that the dismissal was improper because CPLR 3216 requires judicial involvement and a formal order, even when a 90-day demand is served. The 90-day demand only provides a basis for the court to consider a dismissal; it does not authorize an automatic dismissal by the clerk’s office. The court emphasized the importance of judicial oversight in such dismissals to ensure fairness and due process.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs commenced a medical malpractice action against multiple defendants in May 2003. After consolidation with another related action in May 2006, a compliance conference order was prepared, setting discovery deadlines. On May 3, 2007, the parties executed a stipulation directing the defendants’ depositions and requiring plaintiffs to file a note of issue by December 27, 2007. A “DEMAND FOR SERVICE AND FILING OF NOTE OF ISSUE” was also served, stating that failure to comply within 90 days “will serve as a basis” for dismissal. Plaintiffs failed to file the note of issue by the deadline.

    Procedural History

    The case was administratively dismissed on December 31, 2007, without notice to the parties or a formal court order. Plaintiffs moved to vacate the dismissal, but Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a case can be properly dismissed for neglect to prosecute under CPLR 3216 when the dismissal is administrative and occurs without a formal court order, even after a 90-day demand to file a note of issue was served.

    Holding

    No, because CPLR 3216 requires judicial involvement and a formal order for dismissal based on neglect to prosecute; the 90-day demand only provides a basis for the court to consider a dismissal, not an automatic dismissal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPLR 3216(a) allows a court to dismiss a case for unreasonable neglect to proceed, but only after a written demand is served pursuant to CPLR 3216(b)(3). The statute requires the demand to state that “default by the party upon whom such notice is served in complying with such demand within said ninety day period will serve as a basis for a motion by the party serving said demand for dismissal.” The Court found that the case was dismissed “ministerially” without any evidence that the trial court made a motion to dismiss the action. The court stated, “That is not what occurred here; there is no evidence in the record that the trial court made a motion to dismiss the action in this case, and it is apparent that the case was dismissed based upon plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the May 3, 2007 stipulation and 90-day demand in doing so.” The court further noted that even though the parties were not diligent in moving the case forward, the dismissal should have been a decision made by the trial court, with notice to the parties, not the Clerk’s Office. The Court referenced the 2008 amendment to CPLR 205(a), which requires the judge to “set forth on the record the specific conduct constituting the neglect, which conduct shall demonstrate a general pattern of delay in proceeding with the litigation,” to highlight the necessity of judicial involvement in dismissals for neglect to prosecute. The Court reiterated that “litigation cannot be conducted efficiently if deadlines are not taken seriously…[and] that disregard of deadlines should not and will not be tolerated” (Andrea v Arnone, Hedin, Casker, Kennedy & Drake, Architects & Landscape Architects, P.C. [Habiterra Assoc.], 5 NY3d 514, 521 [2005]), but maintained that procedural rules must be followed to ensure due process.

  • People v. Bueno, 18 N.Y.3d 160 (2011): Assault on EMT and the Requirement of Intent to Prevent a Lawful Duty

    18 N.Y.3d 160 (2011)

    To be convicted of second-degree assault for attacking an EMT under New York Penal Law § 120.05(3), the assailant must have intended to prevent the EMT from performing a lawful duty, not merely intended to cause injury.

    Summary

    Christian Bueno was convicted of second-degree assault for attacking an EMT, William Spinelli, as Spinelli was entering his ambulance after responding to a call. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that Bueno intended to prevent Spinelli from performing a lawful duty as an EMT, even though Spinelli had completed treating a patient at the scene. The dissent argued that the prosecution failed to prove Bueno had the specific intent to prevent Spinelli from performing a lawful duty.

    Facts

    EMTs Spinelli and Aanonsen responded to a call for medical assistance at 190 Butler Street in Brooklyn. Upon arrival, they treated a woman with a hand injury, who declined further treatment. As the EMTs were returning to their ambulance, Bueno, standing nearby, began screaming and threw a beer can at Spinelli. As Spinelli attempted to enter the ambulance, Bueno attacked him, knocking him to the ground and repeatedly punching him. Spinelli sustained injuries, including a deviated septum. Bueno claimed he was the person with the bleeding face who the EMT’s had failed to treat.

    Procedural History

    Bueno was charged with two counts of second-degree assault (one for Spinelli and one for Aanonsen) and two counts of third-degree assault. He was convicted of second-degree assault against Spinelli, and acquitted of all charges related to Aanonsen. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to establish that Bueno acted with the intent to prevent an EMT from performing a lawful duty when he caused physical injury to the EMT, as required for a conviction of second-degree assault under New York Penal Law § 120.05(3).

    Holding

    Yes, because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that Bueno intended to prevent Spinelli from performing a lawful duty as an EMT. The EMT was in uniform and about to enter his ambulance after completing one call, and the jury could reasonably conclude that he was still performing his duties, whether he was on his way to another call or returning to the hospital.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Penal Law § 120.05(3) is intended to protect public servants, like EMTs, who are exposed to a heightened risk of violence while performing their duties. The Court rejected Bueno’s argument that the EMTs’ response was “finished” once they left the apartment, finding it reasonable for the jury to conclude that Spinelli was performing his job duties when he attempted to leave the premises, regardless of whether he was headed to another call or back to the hospital. The Court emphasized that a jury is entitled to infer that a defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of his acts and that intent is rarely proven by an explicit expression. Quoting People v Barnes, 50 NY2d 375, 381 (1980), the court stated: “[c]ompeting inferences to be drawn [regarding the defendant’s intent], if not unreasonable, are within the exclusive domain of the finders of fact, not to be disturbed by us.” The dissent argued that the prosecution failed to prove Bueno had the specific intent to prevent Spinelli from performing a lawful duty, and that the viciousness of the assault did not rationally lead to the conclusion that Bueno had the requisite intent to interfere with Spinelli’s lawful duties. The dissent stated “the People established only that the victim was subjected to an entirely unexplained, senseless assault at the hands of defendant, and that is precisely why the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction under Penal Law § 120.05 (3).”

  • Bordeleau v. State of NY, 18 N.Y.3d 305 (2011): Constitutionality of State Funds to Private Entities for Economic Development

    18 N.Y.3d 305 (2011)

    The New York State Constitution permits the state to allocate funds to public benefit corporations for public purposes, even if those corporations then provide funds to private entities, as long as the primary purpose is public and any private benefit is incidental.

    Summary

    A group of New York taxpayers sued the State, the Urban Development Corporation (UDC), and several private companies, alleging that state appropriations for economic development, specifically loans and grants to private entities, violated the state constitution’s prohibition on gifts of state money to private firms. The plaintiffs challenged appropriations to the UDC and the Department of Agriculture and Markets. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the appropriations were constitutional because funds given to public benefit corporations are permissible and funds used for promoting New York agricultural products serve a predominantly public purpose.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, 50 New York taxpayers, filed suit challenging numerous loans and grants issued by the State to private entities, arguing these were unconstitutional gifts of state money. The challenged appropriations included funds allocated to the UDC for economic development projects, such as semiconductor manufacturing facilities and funds given to the Department of Agriculture and Markets to fund contracts with not-for-profit corporations promoting New York agricultural products, such as apples and grapes.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division modified, reversing the dismissal of the first cause of action. The Court of Appeals granted the defendants leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division erred in reversing the dismissal. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division, dismissing the first cause of action.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether appropriations to the UDC, a public benefit corporation, to fund payments to private entities for public development purposes violate Article VII, § 8 (1) of the New York State Constitution, which prohibits gifts or loans of state money to private corporations?

    2. Whether appropriations to the State Department of Agriculture and Markets to fund agreements with not-for-profit organizations for the promotion of New York agricultural products violate Article VII, § 8 (1) of the New York State Constitution?

    Holding

    1. No, because Article VII, § 8 (1) permits the granting of public funds to public benefit corporations for a public purpose, and public benefit corporations are considered separate from the State.

    2. No, because such appropriations fulfill a predominantly public purpose, and any private benefit is merely incidental.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the State Constitution permits gifts and loans of money to public benefit corporations like the UDC. The Court noted, “It is well settled that ‘public benefit corporations exist[] independently of the State’” citing Schulz v State of New York, 84 NY2d 231, 246 (1994). The Court emphasized that public benefit corporations are separate from the State, so funds passed to them are not subject to the constitutional prohibition. As for the appropriations to the Department of Agriculture and Markets, the Court applied the principle from Murphy v Erie County, 28 NY2d 80 (1971), stating, “an incidental private benefit will not invalidate a project which has for its primary object a public purpose.” The Court found that promoting New York agriculture serves a public purpose, benefiting the state’s economy. The dissenting judges argued that the majority was undermining the Gift Clause of the New York State Constitution and that the legislature should not be able to do indirectly (through a public corporation) what it could not do directly (giving money to a private enterprise). Judge Smith in his dissent expressed concern over the large amounts of taxpayer money being given to private businesses.

  • In re Johnson City Professional Firefighters, 18 N.Y.3d 32 (2011): Enforceability of No-Layoff Clauses in Public Sector CBAs

    18 N.Y.3d 32 (2011)

    A no-layoff clause in a public sector collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is only enforceable if it is explicit, unambiguous, and comprehensive in its terms, demonstrating a clear intent by the municipality to bargain away its right to eliminate positions for budgetary reasons.

    Summary

    The Village of Johnson City terminated six firefighter positions due to budgetary constraints, triggering a dispute with the firefighters’ union over the interpretation of a “no-layoff” clause in their CBA. The Union sought arbitration, arguing the terminations violated the agreement. The Village argued the clause was not explicit enough to prevent it from abolishing positions. The New York Court of Appeals held that the no-layoff clause was not sufficiently explicit to prevent the Village from eliminating positions for budgetary reasons, rendering the dispute non-arbitrable. The court emphasized that municipalities must clearly and unambiguously agree to limit their ability to make budgetary decisions before such limitations are enforced.

    Facts

    The Village of Johnson City and the Johnson City Professional Fire Fighters, Local 921 IAFF, entered into a CBA effective from June 1, 2006, through May 31, 2011. The CBA contained a clause stating, “The Village shall not lay-off any member of the bargaining unit during the term of this contract.” In May 2009, the Village voted to abolish six firefighter positions, citing budgetary necessity. The Union filed a grievance, arguing that the terminations violated the no-layoff clause.

    Procedural History

    The Union filed a grievance, which was denied by the Village. The Union then sought arbitration. Both parties initiated proceedings in Supreme Court: the Union to enjoin the Village from terminating the firefighters pending arbitration, and the Village to stay arbitration. Supreme Court denied the Village’s application and granted the Union’s application to compel arbitration. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Village appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the no-layoff clause in the CBA was sufficiently explicit to prohibit the Village from abolishing firefighter positions for budgetary reasons, thus making the dispute subject to mandatory arbitration.

    Holding

    No, because the no-layoff clause was not explicit, unambiguous, and comprehensive enough to clearly demonstrate that the Village had agreed to relinquish its right to eliminate positions for budgetary reasons.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the no-layoff clause was not arbitrable. The court relied on the principle that a job security provision in a public sector CBA is only enforceable if it is “explicit,” the CBA extends for a “reasonable period of time,” and the CBA “was not negotiated in a period of a legislatively declared financial emergency between parties of unequal bargaining power” (citing Matter of Burke v Bowen, 40 NY2d 264, 266, 267 [1976]). The court distinguished the case from Matter of Board of Educ. of Yonkers City School Dist. v Yonkers Fedn. of Teachers, 40 NY2d 268 (1976), where the clause explicitly protected workers from position abolition due to budgetary constraints. Here, the court found the term “layoff” to be ambiguous and undefined in the CBA, open to multiple interpretations. Because the clause did not explicitly prohibit the Village from abolishing positions due to budgetary necessity, it was not considered explicit, unambiguous, and comprehensive, and therefore not arbitrable. The court stated, “Absent compliance with these requirements, a municipality’s budgetary decisions will be routinely challenged by employees, and its ability to abolish positions or terminate workers will be subject to the whim of arbitrators.” The dissenting judges argued that the no-layoff clause was sufficiently explicit and that public policy favors arbitration of labor disputes under the Taylor Law.

  • Gronski v. County of Monroe, 18 N.Y.3d 374 (2011): Landowner Liability When Control Is Shared

    18 N.Y.3d 374 (2011)

    A landowner’s duty to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition extends to situations where the landowner retains or exercises control over the property, even when an independent contractor is also responsible for operations.

    Summary

    John Gronski, an employee of Metro Waste, was injured at a recycling center owned by Monroe County but operated by Metro Waste. A bale of paper fell on him due to allegedly improper stacking. Gronski sued the County, arguing negligence. The County moved for summary judgment, claiming it relinquished control to Metro Waste. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ grant of summary judgment, holding that a question of fact existed regarding the County’s control over the facility, based on the agreement between the County and Metro Waste and the County’s actual conduct. The County’s retained rights and visible presence raised a triable issue as to whether it exercised sufficient control to owe Gronski a duty of care.

    Facts

    Metro Waste operated a recycling center owned by Monroe County under an operations and maintenance agreement. The agreement assigned responsibility for repair, maintenance, and safety to Metro Waste. However, the County retained the right of access, the right to determine authorized users, access to records, termination rights, and approval of Metro Waste’s annual program manual. Gronski was injured when an improperly stacked bale of paper fell on him. An OSHA investigation cited Metro Waste for regulatory violations related to unsecured stacking.

    Procedural History

    Gronski sued the County, alleging negligence. The Supreme Court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the County had relinquished control to Metro Waste, like an out-of-possession landlord. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County relinquished sufficient control over the recycling center to Metro Waste, such that the County owed no duty of care to Gronski for unsafe conditions on the premises.

    Holding

    No, because a question of fact exists as to whether and to what extent the County exercised control over the property, based on the agreement and the County’s conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the out-of-possession landlord standard, as no leasehold was created. Landowners owe a duty of care to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition based on their exercise of control. The Court distinguished Butler v. Rafferty, noting that the County, unlike the cotenant in Butler, had supervisory rights and access to the facility. The agreement vested the County with ultimate approval authority over Metro Waste’s operating procedures. County personnel conducted regular tours and inspections. The Court emphasized that focusing solely on the written agreement, as the lower courts did, was error; the County’s actual conduct was also relevant. The Court cited Ritto v. Goldberg, emphasizing that a landlord’s intervention in a tenant’s business operations can create a question of fact as to control, even with a lease transferring possession. Viewing the evidence favorably to Gronski, the Court found a triable issue of fact as to whether the County exercised sufficient control to owe him a duty of care to prevent the dangerous condition. The dissent argued that the County did not intervene to the point of inducing reliance by Metro Waste or its employees, and emphasized the agreement’s comprehensive assignment of responsibility to Metro Waste. The majority countered that reliance is not a distinct element required in all control analyses, especially without a leasehold.

  • People v. Delamota, 18 N.Y.3d 107 (2011): Limits on the Ledwon Rule and Unduly Suggestive Identification Procedures

    People v. Delamota, 18 N.Y.3d 107 (2011)

    The rule in People v. Ledwon, which holds that a conviction cannot stand when based solely on inherently contradictory testimony from a single witness, does not apply when inconsistencies arise from multiple witnesses or when a witness provides a credible explanation for discrepancies; furthermore, using a translator with a pre-existing relationship with the defendant during a photo array can render the identification unduly suggestive, warranting suppression.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery. The victim, Hernandez, identified him in a photo array and lineup. At trial, discrepancies emerged between Hernandez’s description of the robber and the description given to the police shortly after the crime. Also, Hernandez’s son, Juan Jr., served as translator during the photo array, and it was later revealed that Juan Jr. knew the defendant, a fact not disclosed initially. The New York Court of Appeals held that the discrepancies in testimony did not warrant reversal under People v. Ledwon because the inconsistencies did not arise from a single witness and the victim provided a reason for the differences in description. However, the Court found the identification procedure unduly suggestive due to Juan Jr.’s involvement and ordered a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing.

    Facts

    Juan Hernandez was robbed at knifepoint in his apartment building. His son, Juan Jr., called 911 and provided a description of the robber. Detective Koch interviewed Hernandez, with Juan Jr. translating. Hernandez described the robber, but the description did not match the defendant, Delamota, who was later identified as the perpetrator. Juan Jr. later told the detective that he had heard neighborhood gossip that “Sebastian” was the robber. Detective Koch then showed Hernandez a photo array containing Delamota’s picture, and Hernandez identified him, with Juan Jr. translating. Delamota had a functionally impaired left arm. At trial, Juan Jr. admitted to knowing Delamota for a long time prior to the robbery.

    Procedural History

    Delamota was indicted for robbery and weapon possession. He moved to suppress the identifications, arguing undue suggestiveness. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, defense counsel moved to reopen the suppression hearing after Juan Jr.’s revelation. The motion was denied. Delamota was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding the identification procedure unduly suggestive and ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People’s proof was legally insufficient under People v. Ledwon due to conflicting testimony regarding the perpetrator’s appearance.

    2. Whether the victim’s identification should have been suppressed because his son participated in the photo array, having known the defendant prior to the identification procedure.

    Holding

    1. No, because the conflicting testimony came from multiple witnesses, not a single witness, and the victim provided a rational explanation for the discrepancies.

    2. Yes, because Juan Jr.’s participation as a translator, combined with his prior knowledge of Delamota, created an unduly suggestive identification procedure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court clarified the narrow scope of the Ledwon rule. The Court stated, “Ledwon applies in rare cases where the charged crime is established by only one witness who provides inherently contradictory testimony at trial.” Because discrepancies arose from multiple witnesses (the victim and the detective), Ledwon did not apply. The Court emphasized that it is the jury’s role to weigh conflicting evidence. The victim’s trial testimony was not internally inconsistent, and he offered an explanation for the differing description he allegedly gave to the detective. The court noted it is up to the Appellate Division to review the weight of the evidence.

    Regarding the identification procedure, the Court found that the trial court erred in denying Delamota’s motion to reopen the Wade hearing. Juan Jr.’s role as translator, coupled with his undisclosed prior relationship with Delamota, created an unduly suggestive situation. “In our view, the suggestiveness cannot be attributed to the victim’s son, but to the detective’s decision to utilize him as the interpreter notwithstanding the possible risks that were involved in this practice.” The Court reasoned that the detective should have used a neutral Spanish interpreter and therefore ordered a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing to determine if the victim’s in-court identification had an independent basis.

  • Raynor v. Landmark Chrysler, 16 N.Y.3d 57 (2011): Mandatory Aggregate Trust Fund Deposits for Non-Schedule Awards

    Raynor v. Landmark Chrysler, 16 N.Y.3d 57 (2011)

    The 2007 amendments to Workers’ Compensation Law § 27(2) require private insurance carriers to deposit the present value of permanent partial disability awards into the Aggregate Trust Fund (ATF), regardless of whether the injury occurred before or after the amendment’s effective date, provided the award is made after July 1, 2007.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the 2007 amendments to New York’s Workers’ Compensation Law mandate private insurance carriers to deposit the present value of non-schedule permanent partial disability awards into the ATF, even if the injury occurred before the amendments’ effective date. The Court of Appeals held that the amended statute requires such deposits for awards made after July 1, 2007, regardless of when the injury occurred. The Court reasoned that the statute’s plain language and lack of exceptions indicate the legislature’s intent for broad application. The Court rejected arguments of retroactivity, unconstitutional taking, and due process violations.

    Facts

    Claimant Randy Raynor injured his lower back on December 14, 2004, while working for Landmark Chrysler. On June 25, 2008, a workers’ compensation law judge determined that Raynor was permanently partially disabled. The judge directed Landmark Chrysler’s insurance carrier, Erie Insurance Company of New York, to deposit the present value of all unpaid benefits ($196,865.73) into the ATF. Erie Insurance challenged this directive, arguing that mandatory deposits should only apply to awards made under the amended section 15(3)(w) for injuries occurring after the amendment’s effective date.

    Procedural History

    The Workers’ Compensation Board upheld the determination, requiring the deposit of the present value into the ATF. The carrier sought full Board review, raising constitutional arguments. The full Board affirmed the decision, stating the statute’s plain language required the deposit and the statute was not impermissibly retroactive or unconstitutional. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the amended Workers’ Compensation Law § 27(2) requires private insurance carriers to deposit the present value of a permanent partial disability award into the ATF when the award is made after the amendment’s effective date, but the injury occurred before.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain language of the amended Workers’ Compensation Law § 27(2) mandates that if any award made on or after July 1, 2007, requires payment for permanent partial disability, the Board shall compute the present value and require payment into the ATF, regardless of when the injury occurred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the plain language of the statute, stating, “As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof.” The Court noted that the legislature specifically chose the date of the award as the trigger for the deposit requirement, not the date of the injury. The court rejected the argument that the statute was impermissibly retroactive, stating, “ ‘A statute is not retroactive . . . when made to apply to future transactions merely because such transactions relate to and are founded upon antecedent events.’ ” The Court distinguished Burns v. Varriale, noting that while ascertaining the present value of future benefits can be speculative, the use of actuarial tables as mandated by Workers’ Compensation Law § 27(5) makes the calculation sufficiently reliable for the purposes of the deposit requirement. The Court dismissed the carrier’s constitutional arguments, finding no violation of the Takings Clause because the statute doesn’t increase the amount owed or appropriate the carrier’s assets. Similarly, the Court found no Contracts Clause violation because the amendment only made mandatory what was previously discretionary. The Court found a rational basis for treating private insurers differently from the State Insurance Fund and self-insurers, justifying the differential treatment under the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, the Court rejected the Due Process argument, finding that the carrier had sufficient procedural protections and that the statute served a rational legislative purpose. The Court concluded, “It is for the Legislature to limit the statute, if it so desires.”

  • People v. Guay, 17 N.Y.3d 578 (2011): Dismissal of Hearing-Impaired Juror & Judicial Discretion

    People v. Guay, 17 N.Y.3d 578 (2011)

    A trial court has discretion to dismiss a prospective juror for cause if the record supports a determination that the juror’s hearing impairment would unduly interfere with their ability to serve, especially when no reasonable accommodation is requested or apparent.

    Summary

    Defendant Dean Guay was convicted of rape and sexual abuse of his seven-year-old daughter. During jury selection, a prospective juror indicated he had difficulty hearing. The trial court dismissed the juror for cause over defense counsel’s objection, citing concerns that the juror’s hearing impairment would prevent him from understanding the testimony of child witnesses, who tend to speak softly. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the juror because the record supported the determination that the hearing impairment would have unduly interfered with the juror’s ability to serve, and no reasonable accommodation was requested.

    Facts

    Dean Guay sexually abused his seven-year-old daughter, Jane, during a week-long summer camp trip. Guay confessed to police, admitting to crawling into bed with Jane and sexually assaulting her. Prior to trial, during jury selection, a prospective juror (venire member 1405) indicated he had difficulty hearing. The trial court noted the juror had trouble hearing instructions and questions. The prosecutor moved to dismiss the juror for cause, arguing the hearing impairment could cause him to miss critical parts of Jane’s testimony.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the People’s motion to dismiss the hearing-impaired juror for cause. Guay was convicted on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction with a modification regarding post-release supervision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed a hearing-impaired prospective juror for cause, or whether the court was obligated to accommodate the juror’s hearing impairment.

    Holding

    No, because the record supported the trial court’s determination that the juror’s hearing impairment would unduly interfere with his ability to be a trial juror, and no reasonable accommodation was requested or apparent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that jury service is a civil right and a privilege protected by the State Constitution. However, this right must be balanced against the accused’s constitutional rights to a fair trial. Judiciary Law § 510 requires jurors to be able to understand and communicate in English. The court cited People v. Guzman, 76 N.Y.2d 1 (1990), emphasizing that a hearing impairment does not automatically disqualify a person from jury service, and reasonable accommodations should be considered if they allow the juror to fulfill their duties without interfering with the defendant’s rights. However, Guzman also recognizes the trial court’s discretion in determining whether an auditory problem would unduly interfere with a juror’s ability to perform their functions. The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion here because the juror had difficulty hearing, the court observed nonverbal cues indicating a lack of comprehension, and the court was concerned about the juror’s ability to understand a soft-spoken child witness. Significantly, no specific accommodation beyond sitting in the front row was requested by the juror or the defense. The Court stated, “[a]s with most juror qualification questions, [this determination must] be left largely to the discretion of the trial court, which can question and observe the prospective juror…during the voir dire.” The Court also noted, “[i]t is imperative that the privilege and duty of jury service be made available to all eligible individuals—regardless of disability—who are capable of performing this civic function. For this reason, a judge should endeavor to make a reasonable and tactful inquiry of any prospective juror who appears to have a hearing impairment and consider offering to provide an assistive amplification device or some other appropriate accommodation available in our court system.”

  • U.S. Electronics, Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 912 (2011): Establishes Standard for Vacating Arbitration Awards Based on Evident Partiality

    U.S. Electronics, Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 912 (2011)

    To vacate an arbitration award based on “evident partiality” under the Federal Arbitration Act, a court must find that a reasonable person would conclude that the arbitrator was partial to one party; mere appearance of bias or attenuated relationships are insufficient.

    Summary

    U.S. Electronics, Inc. (USE) sought to vacate an arbitration award favoring Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., claiming the arbitration panel’s chairman, William Sessions, had failed to disclose relationships creating bias. USE argued that Sessions’ son, a Congressman, publicly supported a merger beneficial to Sirius and was politically aligned with a director of USE’s competitor. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision upholding the award, adopting the Second Circuit’s “reasonable person” standard. The court found USE’s claims of bias too tenuous and speculative to justify vacating the award, as the alleged relationships were attenuated and lacked a direct connection to the arbitration.

    Facts

    USE had a nonexclusive distribution agreement with Sirius. A dispute arose, leading to arbitration where Sirius prevailed. USE sought to vacate the award, alleging “evident partiality” by the arbitration panel’s chairman, William Sessions. USE based its claim on two points: (1) Sessions’ son, Congressman Peter Sessions, had publicly advocated for a merger between Sirius and XM Satellite Radio, Inc. (XM), and (2) Sessions’ son was a political ally of Congressman Darrell Issa, the director of Directed Electronics, Inc. (DEI), a competitor of USE. USE argued these connections created bias affecting the impartiality of the arbitration.

    Procedural History

    The lower court upheld the arbitration award. The Appellate Division affirmed, but imposed a “clear and convincing evidence” standard for proving prejudice, which the Court of Appeals rejected. The Court of Appeals then affirmed, but clarified the appropriate standard for “evident partiality.”

    Issue(s)

    Whether the arbitration award should be vacated for “evident partiality” under 9 USC § 10(a)(2) based on the arbitrator’s alleged indirect relationships with parties interested in the outcome of the underlying dispute.

    Holding

    No, because the alleged relationships were too attenuated and speculative to create “evident partiality” requiring vacatur of the arbitration award; a reasonable person would not conclude the arbitrator was biased.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals adopted the Second Circuit’s “reasonable person” standard for determining evident partiality, holding that vacatur is warranted “where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration.” The court emphasized that the moving party bears a heavy burden of proof. It rejected the Appellate Division’s imposition of a “clear and convincing evidence” standard. The court distinguished the facts from situations involving direct personal or business relationships. The court reasoned that Congressman Sessions’ son’s endorsement of the Sirius-XM merger had no bearing on the breach of contract matter. Moreover, the purported connection between Chairman Sessions and Congressman Issa was deemed too tenuous to impute bias. The court stated, “the interest or bias . . . must be direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain, or speculative.” The court emphasized that absent a showing of a direct connection, the allegations amounted to speculation, which is insufficient to vacate an arbitration award.

  • Wilinski v. 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 1 (2011): Clarifying ‘Falling Object’ Liability Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Wilinski v. 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 1 (2011)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1) liability for falling objects is not categorically barred simply because the injured worker and the base of the falling object were at the same level; the key inquiry is whether the injury resulted from a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.

    Summary

    Antoni Wilinski, a demolition worker, was injured when unsecured metal pipes toppled onto him after being struck by debris from a nearby wall demolition. The pipes and Wilinski were on the same floor level. He sued under Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6). The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Wilinski on the § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the accident was not elevation-related because the pipes and Wilinski were at the same level. The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the “same level” is not a categorical bar to recovery. The Court emphasized that the central question is whether the injury stemmed from inadequate protection against risks involving a significant elevation differential, remanding for a determination of whether a safety device was required here.

    Facts

    Antoni Wilinski was demolishing brick walls at a warehouse owned by 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp. Two unsecured, 10-foot metal plumbing pipes stood vertically on the same floor where Wilinski worked. Earlier that day, Wilinski expressed concern about the pipes being unsecured during the demolition. No safety measures were taken. Debris from the wall demolition struck the pipes, causing them to fall four feet and hit Wilinski, causing injuries.

    Procedural History

    Wilinski sued, alleging violations of Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6). The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Wilinski on the § 240(1) claim and denied the defendant’s motion. The Appellate Division modified, denying Wilinski’s § 240(1) summary judgment motion and dismissing the § 240(1) claim, relying on Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether the Appellate Division’s modification was proper.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) categorically bars recovery for injuries caused by a falling object when the injured worker and the base of the object are at the same level.

    Holding

    No, because Misseritti does not establish a categorical “same level” exclusion; the critical inquiry is whether the injury resulted from a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals clarified its prior holdings regarding Labor Law § 240(1), stating that its jurisprudence centers on providing adequate protection from reasonably preventable, gravity-related accidents. The court distinguished Misseritti, emphasizing that the lack of a causal nexus between the injury and the failure of a device prescribed by § 240(1), not the “same level,” was the basis for the Misseritti decision. The Court stated that the “same level” rule ignores the nuances of a § 240(1) analysis. The Court also distinguished the case from other cases, noting that the pipes were not themselves the target of demolition and should have been secured. Citing Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., the Court reiterated that “the single decisive question is whether plaintiffs injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.” Here, the height differential between the pipes and Wilinski was not de minimis. The Court remanded the case for a factual determination of whether the injuries were proximately caused by the lack of a required safety device. Regarding the § 241(6) claim, the Court upheld the Appellate Division’s interpretation of 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(b)(3), stating that the plaintiff need not show that the pipes fell due to wind pressure or vibration. The court also found the defendants failed to show they complied with 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(c) regarding continuing inspections.