New York Law Review

Tag: 2010

  • Matter of Kenneth J. v. Allana L., 15 N.Y.3d 14 (2010): Equitable Estoppel in Paternity Cases

    Matter of Kenneth J. v. Allana L., 15 N.Y.3d 14 (2010)

    A biological father may assert an equitable estoppel defense in paternity and child support proceedings to protect an existing parent-child relationship between the child and another father figure.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a biological father can use equitable estoppel to avoid paternity and child support obligations when another man has acted as the child’s father. The New York Court of Appeals held that under certain circumstances, specifically where another father figure is present in the child’s life, the biological father may assert an equitable estoppel defense. This defense aims to protect the child’s best interests by preventing the disruption of a stable and recognized parent-child relationship. The court emphasized that equitable estoppel could prevent a mother from asserting paternity when it disrupts a beneficial relationship with another father figure.

    Facts

    Allana L. gave birth to A. in 1994 while living with Raymond S., who was listed as A.’s father on her birth certificate. Raymond had other children with Allana, both before and after A.’s birth. When A. was seven, she learned that Raymond might not be her biological father. Allana contacted Kenneth J. in Florida, who spoke briefly with A. Raymond then forbade Kenneth from contacting A. again. In 2006, when A. was 12, Allana filed a petition against Kenneth, seeking a filiation order and child support. Genetic testing indicated a 99.99% probability that Kenneth was A.’s biological father.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court initially heard the case with a Support Magistrate, who ordered genetic testing. After the tests confirmed Kenneth’s likely paternity, the case was transferred to a Family Court judge to address Kenneth’s equitable estoppel defense. The Family Court determined Kenneth was the father and entered an order of filiation. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating equitable estoppel was generally unavailable to avoid child support obligations. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Kenneth could raise an equitable estoppel claim and remanding the case for a hearing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a biological father can assert equitable estoppel as a defense in paternity and child support proceedings when another man has acted as the child’s father?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because equitable estoppel may be invoked by a purported biological father to prevent the child’s mother from asserting biological paternity when the mother has acquiesced in the development of a close relationship between the child and another father figure, and it would be detrimental to the child’s interests to disrupt that relationship.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., stating that equitable estoppel prevents a person from asserting a right after leading another to believe the right would not be asserted, resulting in prejudice. The paramount concern is the child’s best interests. The court distinguished the case from situations where a man misrepresented himself as the father to avoid support obligations. Here, Kenneth argued that it was not in A.’s best interest to disrupt her existing family with Raymond. The court held that Kenneth could raise an equitable estoppel claim to protect the existing parent-child relationship between A. and Raymond. The court stated, “The same best-interests considerations that justify estopping a biological father from asserting his paternity may justify preventing a mother from asserting it.” The court emphasized that equitable estoppel, whether used offensively or defensively, must serve the child’s best interests. The case was remanded to Family Court for a hearing to determine if applying equitable estoppel would be in A.’s best interests, with Raymond joined as a necessary party. The court also noted concerns regarding the Support Magistrate’s failure to advise Kenneth of his right to counsel before genetic testing and counsel’s failure to consult with Kenneth before a hearing.

  • H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521 (2010): Family Court Jurisdiction in Same-Sex Parent Support Cases

    14 N.Y.3d 521 (2010)

    Family Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) to adjudicate a support petition brought by a biological parent seeking child support from their former same-sex partner, based on an assertion of parentage.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the Family Court has jurisdiction to hear a child support petition filed by a biological mother against her former same-sex partner. The mother, H.M., alleged that she and E.T. planned to conceive and raise a child together. E.T. performed the artificial insemination procedure. After the child’s birth, E.T. ended the relationship. H.M. then sought a declaration of parentage and child support in Canada, which was transferred to Family Court in New York under UIFSA. The Court of Appeals held that Family Court does have subject matter jurisdiction because it has the power to determine support obligations of parents, which includes the authority to determine if the respondent is in fact a parent.

    Facts

    H.M. and E.T. were in a romantic relationship from 1989 to 1995, cohabitating for much of that time. They planned to conceive and raise a child together. In 1993, H.M. became pregnant through artificial insemination, performed by E.T. H.M. gave birth in September 1994, with E.T. present and cutting the umbilical cord. Both parties initially participated in the child’s care. Four months after the birth, E.T. ended the relationship, and H.M. moved to Canada with the child. E.T. provided occasional gifts and monetary contributions after the separation.

    Procedural History

    H.M. filed an application in Ontario, Canada, seeking a declaration of parentage and child support, which was transferred to Family Court, Rockland County, New York, under UIFSA. The Family Court Support Magistrate dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Family Court reversed, ordering a hearing on equitable estoppel. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the dismissal. H.M. appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a support petition brought pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) by a biological parent seeking child support from her former same-sex partner.

    Holding

    Yes, because Family Court has jurisdiction to determine the support obligations of parents, which inherently includes the authority to ascertain in certain cases whether a respondent is, in fact, a child’s parent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Family Court, as the designated UIFSA tribunal in New York, must apply the procedural and substantive law generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in the state. The Court emphasized that Family Court has constitutional and statutory jurisdiction over proceedings to determine the support of dependents (except those incidental to marital actions in Supreme Court). Family Court Act § 413(1)(a) states that “the parents of a child…are chargeable with the support of such child.” The court stated, “Family Court indisputably has jurisdiction to determine whether an individual parent—regardless of gender—is responsible for the support of a child.” Furthermore, statutory jurisdiction carries with it ancillary jurisdiction necessary to fulfill the court’s core function. Because H.M. asserted that E.T. is the child’s parent and therefore chargeable with support, the case falls within Family Court’s Article 4 jurisdiction. The court did not address whether the case also falls under Article 5. The Court rejected the dissent’s argument that Family Court lacks the authority to grant equitable relief necessary to declare E.T. a parent. The court emphasized that Family Court and Supreme Court have coextensive authority over child support matters. The relevant statutes, Family Court Act § 413 and Domestic Relations Law § 240, can be enforced in a manner that does not disadvantage litigants in Family Court.

  • Debra H. v. Janice R., 14 N.Y.3d 576 (2010): Parental Rights of Same-Sex Civil Union Partners

    Debra H. v. Janice R., 14 N.Y.3d 576 (2010)

    New York will recognize parentage created by a civil union in Vermont, allowing a partner in the civil union to seek visitation and custody of a child born to the other partner during the civil union.

    Summary

    Debra H. sought visitation and custody of M.R., a child born to her civil union partner, Janice R., through artificial insemination. The New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed its prior holding in Alison D., stating that, generally, only biological or adoptive parents have standing to seek visitation. However, the Court recognized Debra H. as M.R.’s parent based on comity, as Vermont law considers both partners in a civil union to be parents of a child born to either partner during the union. The case was remitted for a best-interest hearing to determine visitation and custody.

    Facts

    Janice R. is the biological mother of M.R., conceived through artificial insemination. Janice R. and Debra H. entered into a civil union in Vermont before M.R.’s birth. Janice R. repeatedly refused Debra H.’s requests to adopt M.R. After their separation, Janice R. initially allowed Debra H. supervised visits but later cut off all communication. Debra H. then sought joint legal and physical custody of M.R.

    Procedural History

    Debra H. filed a proceeding in Supreme Court seeking custody and visitation. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Debra H., invoking equitable estoppel. Janice R. appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, citing Alison D., stating that only biological or adoptive parents have standing. Debra H. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether New York should recognize a non-biological, non-adoptive individual as a parent based on equitable estoppel, thus allowing them to seek visitation and custody.
    2. Whether, under the principles of comity, New York should recognize Debra H. as M.R.’s parent because of her status as a civil union partner under Vermont law, thereby granting her standing to seek visitation and custody.

    Holding

    1. No, because parentage under New York law derives from biology or adoption, as affirmed in Alison D.
    2. Yes, because comity should be extended to recognize parentage created by a civil union in Vermont, allowing Debra H. to seek visitation and custody in a best-interest hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reaffirmed its holding in Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991), which established that only biological or adoptive parents have standing to seek visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 70. The Court rejected the argument that equitable estoppel could be invoked to grant standing to a non-biological, non-adoptive individual, finding that parentage under New York law derives from biology or adoption. The Court distinguished Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D., 7 N.Y.3d 320 (2006), which addressed paternity by estoppel for child support purposes, stating it did not overrule or erode Alison D. The Court emphasized the importance of a bright-line rule to provide certainty for parents and children. The Court stated that any change in the meaning of “parent” under the law should come from legislative enactment. As the Court stated, “Alison D., in conjunction with second-parent adoption, creates a bright-line rule that promotes certainty in the wake of domestic breakups otherwise fraught with the risk of disruptive . . . battle[s] over parentage.“

    However, the Court addressed the unique circumstance of the Vermont civil union. Under Vermont law, partners in a civil union have the same rights and responsibilities as spouses in a marriage, including those related to children born during the union. Citing Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006), the Court recognized that Vermont law would consider Debra H. a parent of M.R. because the child was born during the civil union. The Court then invoked the doctrine of comity, which allows one state to defer to the laws and policies of another. The Court reasoned that recognizing Debra H. as M.R.’s parent due to the Vermont civil union would not conflict with New York’s public policy, given that New York allows second-parent adoption for same-sex couples. The Court stated, “New York will accord comity to recognize parentage created by an adoption in a foreign nation… We see no reason to withhold equivalent recognition where someone is a parent under a sister state’s law.” Accordingly, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to Supreme Court for a best-interest hearing to determine visitation and custody, with Debra H. recognized as M.R.’s parent under New York law for the purpose of standing.

  • People v. McBride, 14 N.Y.3d 440 (2010): Warrantless Home Entry Based on Exigent Circumstances

    14 N.Y.3d 440 (2010)

    Exigent circumstances, such as a reasonable belief that someone inside a residence is in imminent danger, can justify a warrantless entry into a home, even if the police had time to obtain a warrant previously.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that police officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s apartment was justified by exigent circumstances. Although the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant for armed robbery and several days to obtain a warrant, they entered the apartment after a woman inside appeared distressed and unresponsive, leading them to believe she was in danger. The Court emphasized that the ultimate inquiry is whether an urgent need justified the entry, but also noted that obtaining a warrant would have been more prudent.

    Facts

    A man robbed a Cosi restaurant at gunpoint. An employee, Mangual, identified defendant McBride, a former employee, from a photo array. Mangual gave police a detailed physical description of the defendant. Police learned McBride was on parole and obtained his address. Three days after the robbery, at 11 PM, five officers went to McBride’s apartment. Hearing voices inside, they knocked and identified themselves, but no one answered. Some officers went to the fire escape, peered into a window, and saw a man lying on the floor. The police demanded the occupants open the door. A woman, Mitchell, eventually opened the door, appearing shaken and unable to speak clearly.

    Procedural History

    McBride was indicted for robbery. He pleaded guilty to attempted robbery after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, arguing the police unlawfully entered his home and the lineup was suggestive. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police violated McBride’s Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure when they entered his apartment without a warrant.

    Holding

    No, because exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that warrantless entries are presumptively unreasonable, citing Payton v. New York. However, exigent circumstances can justify a warrantless entry to effectuate an arrest, provided probable cause exists. Factors indicating exigent circumstances include the gravity of the offense, whether the suspect is armed, probable cause to believe the suspect committed the crime, strong reason to believe the suspect is on the premises, likelihood of escape, and the peacefulness of the entry, citing United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez. Here, the crime was a violent armed robbery. There was strong reason to believe McBride was inside. The Court deferred to the lower courts’ factual findings that the police only entered after Mitchell opened the door and appeared to be in distress. The Court distinguished People v. Levan, noting that the police did not create the exigency. The Court noted it would have been more prudent to obtain a warrant but the presence of exigent circumstances ultimately legitimized the entry. The Court also found the lineup was not unduly suggestive, as the gray hooded sweatshirt worn by McBride was a “generic and common article of clothing.”

  • Howard S. v. Lillian S., 14 N.Y.3d 431 (2010): Limits on Discovery of Marital Fault in Equitable Distribution

    Howard S. v. Lillian S., 14 N.Y.3d 431 (2010)

    In equitable distribution cases, discovery into marital fault is only permissible in egregious cases that shock the conscience of the court, and adultery alone typically does not meet this high standard.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the limited circumstances under which marital fault can be considered in equitable distribution in a divorce proceeding under New York law. The husband sought liberal discovery regarding the wife’s adultery, arguing it constituted egregious fault. The Court of Appeals held that adultery, even with its consequences like concealing the child’s paternity, does not constitute egregious conduct justifying extensive discovery or altering the equitable distribution of marital assets. The court emphasized that only truly exceptional, outrageous conduct should warrant consideration of fault in asset division.

    Facts

    The husband and wife married in 1997. The wife had one child from a prior relationship who was adopted by the husband. They had three children together. The youngest child was conceived during an extramarital affair by the wife, a fact she concealed from the husband. In 2007, the wife allegedly began another affair. The husband confronted her, but she denied it and suggested collaborative law. Later, a DNA test revealed the husband was not the youngest child’s father. The husband then commenced a divorce action based on cruel and inhuman treatment and adultery and a fraud claim, alleging he relied on the wife’s representations of fidelity to his financial detriment.

    Procedural History

    The husband sued for divorce and fraud; the wife counterclaimed for abandonment. The Supreme Court denied the wife’s motion to dismiss the fraud claim but limited damages to collaborative law process fees, also denying the husband’s cross-motion for liberal discovery based on egregious fault. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding no egregious fault and limiting fraud damages. One Justice dissented, advocating for liberal discovery. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether adultery, and its associated conduct (concealing a child’s paternity), constitutes “egregious conduct” warranting consideration of marital fault in equitable distribution under Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d)?

    2. Whether the husband is entitled to liberal discovery regarding the wife’s alleged marital fault for purposes of equitable distribution?

    Holding

    1. No, because adultery, even with the consequence of concealing the child’s paternity, does not constitute egregious conduct in this context.

    2. No, because liberal discovery on issues of marital fault is not permitted in the absence of egregious conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on O’Brien v. O’Brien, stating that marital fault is generally not considered in equitable distribution except in egregious cases that shock the conscience. The Court reasoned that marriage is an economic partnership, and asset division should reflect that partnership, not moral judgments. Adultery, though a ground for divorce, does not automatically constitute egregious conduct. The Court emphasized that egregious conduct must fall “well outside the bounds of the basis for an ordinary divorce action.” The court provided examples of egregious conduct such as attempted bribery of a trial judge or vicious assault of a spouse in the presence of children. The Court found that the wife’s actions, while causing distress, did not rise to the level of outrageous or conscience-shocking conduct required to warrant consideration of marital fault. Permitting broad discovery based on claims of adultery would open the door to abuse and harassment and encourage disadvantageous settlements. The Court also stated, “Absent these types of extreme circumstances, courts are not in the business of regulating how spouses treat one another.” While full disclosure is generally favored, Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d) specifically governs equitable distribution, and the Court interpreted this more specific section to limit consideration of marital fault.

  • Nation v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.3d 454 (2010): Retroactive Application of Professional Disciplinary Rules

    Nation v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.3d 454 (2010)

    A statute or regulation is not considered to operate retroactively when applied to future actions, even if those actions are based on past conduct, particularly when the law serves a remedial purpose such as ensuring public safety.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) properly applied Administrative Code § 26-124 (c) to an engineer, Leon St. Clair Nation, who had submitted falsified documents. The Commissioner barred Nation from submitting any documents to DOB for two years, followed by a three-year probationary period, based on Nation’s prior misconduct. The Court held that this was not an improper retroactive application of the law because the law regulated future professional eligibility and served a public safety purpose by preventing the filing of false information.

    Facts

    Leon St. Clair Nation, a licensed engineer, submitted digitally altered photographs to the DOB in 2004 and attested to a falsified photograph in 2005. In 2006, he submitted a false application for alterations to a nonexistent second floor. The DOB initiated administrative proceedings to revoke Nation’s professional certification privileges due to these falsified submissions.

    Procedural History

    The Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) recommended rescinding Nation’s certification privileges. The DOB Commissioner adopted this recommendation and, relying on Administrative Code § 26-124 (c), barred Nation from filing any documents with DOB for two years, followed by a three-year probation. Nation challenged this determination via a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division upheld the revocation of certification privileges but vacated the penalty imposed under Administrative Code § 26-124 (c), deeming it a retroactive application of the law. The Court of Appeals granted DOB leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Administrative Code § 26-124 (c) was improperly applied retroactively when the Commissioner of the DOB barred an engineer from submitting documents based on past falsifications, where the law was enacted after the misconduct occurred.

    Holding

    Yes, because applying the law to bar the engineer from submitting future documents based on past falsifications is not an improper retroactive application, as the law regulates future professional eligibility and serves a public safety purpose.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the Commissioner properly applied Administrative Code § 26-124 (c). The Court relied on Matter of Miller v. DeBuono, which established that a statute is not retroactive when it applies to future transactions, even if those transactions relate to antecedent events. The Court emphasized that § 26-124 (c) regulates future professional eligibility by allowing the Commissioner to refuse documents from individuals who have knowingly or negligently submitted falsified materials. The purpose of the code provision is to promote public safety by preventing the repeated filing of false information. The Court stated, “[W]here the requirements for engaging in specified professional activity are changed to govern future professional eligibility, a statute does not operate retroactively in any true sense even though its application may be triggered by an event which occurred prior to its effective date.” The Court distinguished the case from scenarios involving truly retroactive laws, which are disfavored unless explicitly stated. Because the law aimed to regulate future conduct, its application was deemed prospective, not retroactive. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Commissioner’s determination did not shock the conscience, given Nation’s repeated submission of false materials.

  • Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. King, 14 N.Y.3d 410 (2010): Application of Borrowing Statute to Assigned Debt

    Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. King, 14 N.Y.3d 410 (2010)

    When a nonresident assignee of a cause of action accruing outside of New York brings suit in New York, the borrowing statute, CPLR 202, requires the action to be timely under the statute of limitations of both New York and the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued; the court must also borrow the tolling provisions of the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued.

    Summary

    Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, as assignee of Discover Bank, sued Jared King in New York to recover on a credit card debt. The credit card agreement contained a Delaware choice-of-law clause. King argued that Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations barred the action under New York’s borrowing statute (CPLR 202). The New York Court of Appeals held that CPLR 202 applied, requiring consideration of Delaware’s statute of limitations and its tolling provisions. Because the cause of action accrued in Delaware and Delaware’s tolling statute did not apply to King, a nonresident, the action was time-barred.

    Facts

    Jared King, while a resident of Connecticut, opened a credit card account with Greenwood Trust Company (later Discover Bank) in 1989. The agreement had a Delaware choice-of-law provision. King canceled the card in 1999 and made no payments after December 1998. In August 2000, Discover assigned King’s debt to Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC. Portfolio sued King in New York in 2005, asserting breach of contract and account stated.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Portfolio. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Portfolio’s claim was time-barred under the borrowing statute.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York’s borrowing statute, CPLR 202, requires application of Delaware’s statute of limitations and tolling provisions to a debt collection action brought in New York by an assignee of a Delaware corporation against a New York resident, where the cause of action accrued in Delaware.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPLR 202 mandates that when a nonresident sues on a cause of action accruing outside New York, the action must be timely under the limitations periods of both New York and the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued. Moreover, in determining whether the action would be barred in the other state, the court must also borrow that state’s tolling provisions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that choice-of-law provisions generally apply to substantive issues, while statutes of limitations are procedural. Therefore, the Delaware choice-of-law clause did not automatically incorporate Delaware’s statute of limitations. However, CPLR 202 dictates that the statute of limitations of both New York and the state where the cause of action accrued must be considered. Since Discover Bank sustained the economic injury in Delaware, the cause of action accrued there. As such, Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations applied. The court then addressed Delaware’s tolling statute, which tolls the statute of limitations when a defendant is out of state. However, the court interpreted Delaware law as intending its tolling provision to apply only where the defendant had a prior connection to Delaware, meaning the defendant would at some point return to the state or be subject to service there. Since King had no prior connection to Delaware, the tolling provision did not apply. The court noted that its holding was consistent with the purpose of CPLR 202, “namely, to prevent forum shopping by nonresidents attempting to take advantage of a more favorable statute of limitations in this state.” Because the action was time-barred in Delaware, it was also time-barred in New York. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment to Portfolio, but noted that it could not grant summary judgment to King because King did not cross-move for that relief.

  • People v. Acevedo, 15 N.Y.3d 828 (2010): Limits on Resentencing Authority Under the Drug Law Reform Act

    People v. Acevedo, 15 N.Y.3d 828 (2010)

    A court resentencing a defendant under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) does not have the authority to modify the original sentencing court’s determination regarding whether sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.

    Summary

    Acevedo was convicted of drug and weapon offenses and sentenced to consecutive terms for the drug and weapon charges. Subsequently, he sought resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) of 2004. The resentencing court reduced his drug sentence but maintained the original sentencing court’s directive that the weapon possession sentences run consecutively to the drug sentences. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the DLRA allows for alteration of the existing sentence as authorized by law, but does not empower a resentencing court to alter the consecutive or concurrent nature of the original sentences. The court clarified that DLRA resentencing does not constitute imposing an “additional term of imprisonment” allowing modification of the original sentencing structure.

    Facts

    Acevedo was convicted in County Court on November 7, 1997, of multiple drug and weapon offenses. He received sentences that included an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. The sentencing court ordered the sentences for the weapon possession convictions to run consecutively to the drug convictions.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division affirmed Acevedo’s convictions and sentences. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. In 2005, Acevedo moved for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) of 2004, arguing for a reduced sentence on the drug felony and for concurrent sentences on the weapon charges. The County Court reduced the drug sentence but declined to change the consecutive nature of the weapon sentences. The Appellate Division affirmed the resentence. The Court of Appeals granted Acevedo leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court, when granting a defendant’s application for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act, has the authority to modify the conditions of a sentence by changing its terms from consecutive to concurrent.

    Holding

    No, because the purpose of the DLRA is to ameliorate harsh sentences, not to grant resentencing courts the power to modify the original sentencing court’s determinations regarding consecutive or concurrent sentences.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that reliance on Penal Law § 70.25 (1) and Matter of Murray v. Goord was misplaced. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the DLRA is to address the severity of the Rockefeller Drug Laws by allowing for a reduced sentence. However, reducing a sentence under the DLRA does not constitute imposing an “additional term of imprisonment” under Penal Law § 70.25 (1), which would trigger the court’s discretion to determine whether sentences should run concurrently or consecutively. The court distinguished the DLRA proceeding from a typical resentencing, stating that the DLRA proceeding is designed to “effect an alteration of the existing sentence as authorized by law.” The Court cited People v. Vaughan, stating that “a court that resentences a defendant pursuant to the 2004 DLRA does not possess the authority, conferred by Penal Law § 70.25 (1), to determine whether the sentence is to be served concurrently or consecutively with respect to other sentences.”

  • American Standard, Inc. v. Oakfabco, Inc., 14 N.Y.3d 402 (2010): Determining Assumption of Liability in Business Acquisitions

    14 N.Y.3d 402 (2010)

    When a business is sold “subject to all debts, liabilities, and obligations connected with or attributable to such business and operations,” the buyer assumes tort liabilities arising from the business’s pre-sale activities, even if the injury occurs post-sale, unless the agreement explicitly limits such assumption.

    Summary

    American Standard sold its Kewanee Boiler division to OakFabco. The purchase agreement stated OakFabco would acquire the assets subject to all liabilities connected to the boiler business. Years later, tort claims arose from asbestos in boilers manufactured before the sale, with injuries occurring after the sale. American Standard sought a declaratory judgment that OakFabco assumed these liabilities. The New York Court of Appeals held that OakFabco did assume these liabilities, based on the agreement’s broad language indicating a complete transfer of the business and its associated obligations.

    Facts

    In 1970, American Standard, Inc. sold its Kewanee Boiler division to Kewanee Boiler Corp., now OakFabco, Inc. The asset purchase agreement stated OakFabco would acquire substantially all assets of the Kewanee Boiler business. The agreement specified that the purchase was “subject to all debts, liabilities, and obligations connected with or attributable to such business and operations.” The agreement defined “Kewanee Liabilities” as “all the debts, liabilities, obligations and commitments (fixed or contingent) connected with or attributable to Kewanee existing and outstanding at the Closing Date.” Subsequently, numerous tort claims arose due to asbestos in Kewanee boilers, with some injuries occurring after the sale but attributable to boilers manufactured and sold before the sale.

    Procedural History

    American Standard initiated a declaratory judgment action against OakFabco to determine liability for the asbestos-related tort claims. The Supreme Court held that OakFabco assumed these liabilities. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s declaration and enjoined OakFabco from relitigating the issue. OakFabco appealed, and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the language in the asset purchase agreement, specifically the phrase “liabilities…existing and outstanding at the Closing Date,” includes tort claims arising from pre-sale activities where the injury occurred post-sale.

    Holding

    Yes, because the agreement’s intent was to transfer the entire Kewanee Boiler business and all related obligations to OakFabco, encompassing liabilities for injuries arising from boilers manufactured pre-sale, even if the injury manifested post-sale.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the agreement’s stated purpose: the sale of substantially all assets of the Kewanee Boiler business “subject to all debts, liabilities, and obligations connected with or attributable to such business and operations.” The court reasoned that this broad language indicated an intent to transfer all obligations related to the business. While OakFabco argued the phrase “liabilities . . . existing and outstanding at the Closing Date” limited their assumption, the court found this interpretation inconsistent with the overall intent of the agreement. The court distinguished this case from Grant-Howard Assoc. v General Housewares Corp., noting that the agreement in that case contained explicit limitations on the assumption of liabilities, unlike the broad transfer of obligations in this case. The court highlighted a specific clause in the agreement relating to warranty, service, repair, and return obligations, stating it would be “absurd” to interpret this clause to exclude claims arising after the closing date. This clause demonstrated the parties’ intent to cover future claims related to pre-sale products. The court concluded that OakFabco assumed liabilities for claims brought by tort claimants injured after the closing date by boilers installed before that date. However, the court vacated the Appellate Division’s injunction against OakFabco relitigating the issue, stating that parties should generally be allowed to take any position in litigation with a good-faith argument. While the court’s decision may preclude relitigation, an injunction was unnecessary.

  • People v. Kadarko, 14 N.Y.3d 426 (2010): Preserving Error Related to Jury Note Disclosure

    People v. Kadarko, 14 N.Y.3d 426 (2010)

    To preserve a claim of error relating to the disclosure of a jury note, defense counsel must object to the procedure employed by the trial court after being given notice of the contents of the note and knowledge of the court’s intended response.

    Summary

    Kadarko was convicted of robbery. During jury deliberations, the jury sent a note indicating their division on each of the alleged robberies. The trial judge informed counsel of the note’s contents but withheld the specific numerical breakdown until after giving an Allen charge. Defense counsel did not object to this procedure. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a mode of proceedings error. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that while the trial court’s initial withholding of the numerical breakdown may have been error, it was not a mode of proceedings error because the court later corrected itself, and defense counsel failed to object.

    Facts

    Kadarko was indicted for robbing food deliverymen on five occasions. During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court indicating their division on each robbery charge.

    Procedural History

    The trial court informed counsel of the contents of the jury note but withheld the specific numerical breakdown. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which was denied. After giving an Allen charge, the court showed counsel the complete note. The jury convicted Kadarko on one count, leading to a mistrial on the remaining counts. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding a mode of proceedings error. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial judge committed a mode of proceedings error when he initially failed to inform counsel of the verbatim contents of the jury’s note, including the numerical divisions, and whether the defendant preserved the error for appeal.

    Holding

    No, because the judge informed counsel of the note’s contents, defense counsel voiced no objection to the procedure, and the court later corrected itself by revealing the entire note without objection. The error, if any, was not preserved for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. O’Rama and People v. Kisoon, where the trial courts completely failed to provide counsel with meaningful notice of the jury’s note or an opportunity to respond. Here, the trial judge informed counsel of the contents of the note and the decision to withhold the numbers temporarily. The court emphasized that defense counsel failed to object to the procedure before or after the entire note was revealed. The Court cited People v. Starling, noting that when defense counsel is given notice of the contents of a jury note and knows the substance of the court’s intended response, counsel must object to preserve the claim for appellate review. The Court stated that while the initial withholding of information “may have been error, it was not a mode of proceedings error and the court later corrected itself, without objection or request for further instruction by either party.” The failure to object constituted a failure to preserve the issue for appeal.