New York Law Review

Tag: 2010

  • People v. Correa, 15 N.Y.3d 213 (2010): Supreme Court’s Concurrent Jurisdiction Over Misdemeanor Offenses

    15 N.Y.3d 213 (2010)

    The Supreme Court of New York possesses concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over the trial of unindicted misdemeanor offenses.

    Summary

    Defendant appealed her conviction for attempted aggravated harassment, arguing the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction because she was prosecuted via misdemeanor information instead of an indictment or superior court information (SCI). The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that even if the case was tried in Supreme Court, that court possesses concurrent jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses. The Court also found that the defendant’s claim regarding the transfer of her case to Supreme Court was akin to an improper venue claim, which was waived by failing to raise it at trial, and that the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally sufficient.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated harassment in the second degree after a nonjury trial. She appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the case was prosecuted via a misdemeanor information, not an indictment or superior court information (SCI).

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction in a divided decision. One of the Appellate Division dissenters granted the defendant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Supreme Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a misdemeanor case prosecuted on a misdemeanor information, absent an indictment or superior court information?
    2. Whether the transfer of the defendant’s case from the New York City Criminal Court to the Supreme Court was impermissible because court rules were not in effect on the date of her conviction?
    3. Whether the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally sufficient?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Supreme Court possesses concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over the trial of unindicted misdemeanor offenses.
    2. No, because the alleged transfer error is the equivalent of an improper venue claim, which is waived if not timely raised.
    3. No, because the defendant’s challenge to the jurisdictional sufficiency of the accusatory instrument lacks merit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that even assuming the defendant’s case was tried in Supreme Court, she was not entitled to reversal on jurisdictional grounds. The Court relied on the principle that Supreme Court possesses concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over the trial of unindicted misdemeanor offenses. The court reasoned that the transfer of the case, even if improper, was analogous to a venue issue, not a jurisdictional one, and therefore was waived because the defendant did not object at trial.

    The Court emphasized that “venue issues—which relate only to the proper place of trial, rather than to the power of the court to hear and determine the case—are waivable.” Because the defendant failed to object to the transfer in the trial court, the Court of Appeals declined to consider the claim. Finally, the Court briefly dismissed the defendant’s challenge to the jurisdictional sufficiency of the accusatory instrument, finding it without merit.

  • Adams v. Genie Industries, Inc., 14 N.Y.3d 535 (2010): Proving Defective Design in Product Liability

    14 N.Y.3d 535 (2010)

    To establish a design defect claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the product was not reasonably safe at the time of manufacture, considering the likelihood of harm, the feasibility of a safer design, and whether the utility of the product outweighed its risks.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, injured when a personnel lift tipped over, sued Genie Industries alleging defective design due to the lack of interlocked outriggers. The jury found Genie liable for defective design and negligence. Genie appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of a design defect and error in submitting a post-sale negligence claim to the jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the evidence supported the jury’s finding of a design defect, and any error in submitting the post-sale negligence claim was harmless. The court also clarified the rule regarding appeals after stipulations to additur or remittitur.

    Facts

    Genie Industries sold a personnel lift to the plaintiff’s employer in 1986. The lift included detachable outriggers intended to stabilize the lift during use, accompanied by a warning label stating that all outriggers must be installed before operating. In 1997, while using the lift to perform maintenance work approximately 12 feet above the ground, the plaintiff was injured when the lift tipped over because the outriggers were not in use and had been lost.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued Genie Industries, alleging negligence and defective design. The trial court submitted questions to the jury, who found Genie liable. The trial court denied Genie’s motion to set aside the verdict but granted the plaintiff’s motion for additur, increasing damages for pain and suffering. The Appellate Division affirmed. Genie stipulated to the additur and was granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Genie, by stipulating to the additur ordered by the trial court, waived its right to appeal other issues in the case.
    2. Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the personnel lift was defectively designed.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the question of Genie’s post-sale negligence.

    Holding

    1. No, because Genie is not appealing the additur itself, but rather the underlying finding of liability. The court reexamined and rejected a broader application of a prior rule that would have barred the appeal.
    2. Yes, because the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that the lift was not reasonably safe due to the absence of interlocked outriggers.
    3. Yes, but the error was harmless because the post-sale negligence claim was essentially a duplicate of the design defect claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the right to appeal, the Court of Appeals reevaluated its prior holdings, specifically the rule established in Batavia Turf Farms v. County of Genesee, clarifying that a stipulation to damages does not forfeit all other appellate claims. The court reasoned that barring a party from raising legitimate appellate issues due to an unrelated agreement on damages is unfair and may operate as a trap. Thus, Genie was permitted to appeal the liability finding.

    On the design defect claim, the court applied the standard from Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., requiring the plaintiff to show the product was not reasonably safe due to the likelihood of harm and the feasibility of a safer design. The court found sufficient evidence: expert testimony demonstrated the technological feasibility and minimal cost of interlocked outriggers in 1986; a former Genie employee testified about proposing the idea; and evidence showed Genie had purchased a competitor’s lift with interlocked outriggers. This evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that the absence of interlocked outriggers rendered the product “not reasonably safe.” The court emphasized, “It will be for the jury to decide whether a product was not reasonably safe in light of all the evidence presented by both the plaintiff and defendant.”

    Regarding the post-sale negligence claim, the court acknowledged that, generally, a seller’s duty after a sale is to warn of newly discovered risks. Since the trial court had already determined Genie’s warning label was adequate, submitting the post-sale conduct to the jury was erroneous. However, this error was deemed harmless because the post-sale negligence claim was duplicative of the design defect claim, and no new evidence was presented that uniquely pertained to the post-sale period. “Plaintiff presented no evidence of any facts that came to Genie’s attention after the sale that might have triggered a new duty; plaintiff merely asserted that Genie should have recalled or retrofitted the personnel lift for the same reasons that it should not have sold it in the first place—principally, because the outriggers were not interlocked.”

  • People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546 (2010): Guilty Pleas and Collateral Consequences

    14 N.Y.3d 546 (2010)

    Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) registration and the terms and conditions of probation are collateral, not direct, consequences of a guilty plea; therefore, a trial court need not address them at the plea hearing.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a guilty plea is rendered involuntary if the defendant is not informed during the plea colloquy about the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) requirements or potential probation conditions. Two defendants, Gravino and Ellsworth, claimed their pleas were involuntary due to this lack of information. The Court held that SORA registration and probation terms are collateral consequences, not direct, and thus, the trial court’s failure to mention them does not invalidate the plea’s voluntariness. This decision clarifies the scope of information required for a knowing and voluntary guilty plea under New York law.

    Facts

    Tara Gravino pleaded guilty to third-degree rape. The judge did not inform her that she would be required to register as a sex offender under SORA. Prior to sentencing, Gravino sought to withdraw her plea due to a conflict of interest with her attorney, which was denied. Robert Ellsworth pleaded guilty to course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree, with a split sentence of jail time and probation. The judge did not mention any specific probation conditions during the plea colloquy. Ellsworth later learned from a probation officer that he would be forbidden from associating with children under 18, including his own. He moved to withdraw his plea, which was ultimately withdrawn by his attorney after considering an alternative sentence.

    Procedural History

    Gravino appealed, arguing her guilty plea was involuntary because she wasn’t informed about SORA registration. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, stating the SORA registration requirement did not detract from the plea’s voluntariness. Ellsworth also appealed, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary because he wasn’t informed about probation conditions restricting contact with his children. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding that his plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Both cases were then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether SORA registration is a direct consequence of a guilty plea that must be disclosed to the defendant for the plea to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

    2. Whether specific probation conditions restricting contact with a defendant’s children are direct consequences of a guilty plea that must be disclosed to the defendant for the plea to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

    Holding

    1. No, because SORA registration is a remedial statute designed to prevent future crime, not a penal consequence of the conviction.

    2. No, because the specific terms and conditions of probation are individualized and not automatically determined at the time of the plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between direct and collateral consequences of a guilty plea, citing People v. Ford and People v. Catu. Direct consequences have a “definite, immediate and largely automatic effect” on a defendant’s punishment. Collateral consequences, on the other hand, are “peculiar to the individual and generally result from the actions taken by agencies the court does not control.” SORA registration, the court reasoned, is not a penal statute but a remedial one, designed to protect the public, not to punish the offender. The court also stated that SORA risk-level determination is not part of the sentence but rather a collateral consequence of a conviction, further supporting the distinction. As for probation conditions, the court stated that it is not possible for courts to foresee every potential probation condition that might be recommended in the presentence report, therefore, the court’s failure to inform defendants of specific conditions does not invalidate their plea.

    The dissenting opinion argued that SORA registration is a direct consequence, as it is a mandatory result of certain convictions, and it has significant consequences for the registrant. They further argued that restricting contact with one’s children is a direct consequence that the defendant should be informed of.

    The majority acknowledged that non-disclosure may be relevant if a defendant can show they pleaded guilty in ignorance of a consequence that, although collateral, was of such great importance that they would have made a different decision had that consequence been disclosed.

  • Hurrell-Harring v. State, 15 N.Y.3d 8 (2010): Right to Counsel Requires Actual Representation, Not Just a Nominal Appointment

    15 N.Y.3d 8 (2010)

    The State’s obligation under Gideon v. Wainwright to provide legal representation to indigent defendants requires actual assistance of counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding, and a pattern of merely nominal attorney-client pairings due to systemic deficiencies can constitute a denial of this right actionable in a pre-conviction civil proceeding.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs, indigent criminal defendants in five New York counties, sued the State, alleging systemic deficiencies in the provision of legal representation. They claimed violations of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel due to lack of representation at arraignments and ineffective assistance. The Court of Appeals held that while claims of ineffective assistance are not generally actionable in a pre-conviction civil proceeding, allegations of complete or constructive denial of counsel at critical stages, stemming from systemic issues like inadequate funding, can state a valid claim for injunctive relief to ensure basic compliance with Gideon v. Wainwright.

    Facts

    Twenty plaintiffs, all indigent defendants in criminal cases in Washington, Onondaga, Ontario, Schuyler, and Suffolk counties, filed suit alleging that the State’s system for providing indigent defense was deficient. Key factual allegations included:

    • Ten plaintiffs were unrepresented at arraignment.
    • Eight of the unrepresented plaintiffs were jailed because they couldn’t afford bail.
    • Appointed attorneys were often unavailable, unresponsive, and missed court appearances.
    • Attorneys sometimes waived important rights without consulting clients.
    • Inadequate funding and staffing of indigent defense providers contributed to the problem.

    Procedural History

    The State moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were nonjusticiable. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that ineffective assistance claims could only be raised post-conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the action but narrowing its scope to claims of complete or constructive denial of counsel, rather than ineffective assistance.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a claim for systemic deficiencies in indigent legal representation is justiciable in a pre-conviction civil proceeding.
    2. Whether allegations of lack of representation at arraignment and nominal representation due to systemic issues state a claim for denial of the right to counsel under Gideon v. Wainwright.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the court has the power to ensure compliance with Gideon v. Wainwright
    2. Yes, because allegations, taken as true, state a claim for constructive denial of the right to counsel by reason of insufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate of Gideon.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel at every critical stage of a criminal proceeding. While Strickland v. Washington provides the standard for evaluating ineffective assistance claims (deficient performance and prejudice), it presumes that the State has met its basic obligation to provide counsel. The Court distinguished between claims of ineffective assistance (challenging attorney performance) and claims of complete or constructive denial of counsel (challenging the State’s foundational obligation to provide representation). The Court explained:

    “The questions properly raised in this Sixth Amendment-grounded action, we think, go not to whether ineffectiveness has assumed systemic dimensions, but rather to whether the State has met its foundational obligation under Gideon to provide legal representation.”

    Allegations of unrepresented defendants at arraignment, where liberty interests are often adjudicated, state a claim for denial of counsel. Similarly, allegations that appointed attorneys were uncommunicative, made no efforts on clients’ behalf, and waived rights without authorization suggest nominal representation, raising questions about the State’s compliance with Gideon. The Court cited United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), noting that prejudice is presumed when there is an actual or constructive denial of counsel. While acknowledging that systemic relief may require legislative action and funding, the Court emphasized its obligation to provide a remedy for violations of fundamental constitutional rights. The dissent argued that the claims were merely repackaged ineffective assistance claims and that pre-conviction intervention was inappropriate. The majority rejected that stance, explaining that the plaintiffs do not seek relief within the context of their own criminal cases, and therefore allowing plaintiffs to proceed on their claims “would [not] impede the orderly progress of [the] underlying criminal actions,” asserting that even if plaintiffs’ claims are found to be meritorious after trial they would not be entitled to a vacatur of their criminal convictions.

  • Zakrzewska v. The New School, 14 N.Y.3d 469 (2010): Employer Liability for Supervisory Harassment Under the NYCHRL

    14 N.Y.3d 469 (2010)

    Under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), an employer is vicariously liable for discriminatory acts of managerial or supervisory employees, regardless of the employer’s awareness or preventative efforts; the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense available under Title VII does not apply.

    Summary

    Dominika Zakrzewska sued The New School, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation by her supervisor, KwangWen Pan, under the NYCHRL. The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the applicability of the Faragher-Ellerth defense to NYCHRL claims. The Court of Appeals held that the plain language of the NYCHRL imposes vicarious liability on employers for discriminatory acts by supervisors, precluding the Faragher-Ellerth defense. The NYCHRL’s emphasis on strict liability for supervisory actions reflects a legislative intent to provide greater protection against discrimination than federal law.

    Facts

    Dominika Zakrzewska, a student at The New School, worked at the Print Output Center where KwangWen Pan was allegedly her immediate supervisor. Zakrzewska claimed Pan subjected her to sexually harassing emails and conduct from January 2004 to May 2005. After she complained, Pan allegedly retaliated by covertly monitoring her internet usage. Zakrzewska filed suit against Pan and The New School asserting sexual harassment and retaliation claims under the NYCHRL.

    Procedural History

    The District Court initially considered whether the Faragher-Ellerth defense applied and concluded the School would be entitled to judgment if it did. However, the court then determined that the plain language of the NYCHRL precluded the defense. The District Court denied the School’s motion for summary judgment, and then certified an interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit then certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the applicability of the Faragher-Ellerth defense under the NYCHRL.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affirmative defense to employer liability articulated in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) applies to sexual harassment and retaliation claims under section 8-107 of the New York City Administrative Code?

    Holding

    No, because the plain language of NYCHRL § 8-107(13)(b) imposes vicarious liability on employers for the discriminatory acts of managerial or supervisory employees, regardless of the employer’s awareness or preventative efforts, precluding the application of the Faragher-Ellerth defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while state and local civil rights statutes are generally interpreted consistently with federal precedent when substantively and textually similar, the NYCHRL contains specific provisions regarding employer liability that differ from federal law. Section 8-107(13)(b) creates a scheme where employers are liable for discriminatory acts by employees exercising managerial or supervisory responsibility, or when the employer knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take corrective action. The court highlighted that even where an employer has anti-discrimination policies, they serve only to mitigate civil penalties and punitive damages, not liability itself, unlike the Faragher-Ellerth defense. The legislative history of the NYCHRL supports this interpretation, indicating an intent to impose strict liability for the acts of managers and supervisors. The court stated that the NYCHRL “creates vicarious liability for the acts of managerial and supervisory employees even where the employer has exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any discriminatory actions and even where the aggrieved employee unreasonably has failed to take advantage of employer-offered corrective opportunities.” The court distinguished Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, noting that the issue of strict liability under § 8-107(13) was not raised or considered in that case. The Court emphasized that policy considerations are best left to the legislature, and it is bound to apply the plain language of the statute. The court rejected the argument that strict liability would impede deterrence, deferring to the legislative judgment on this matter.

  • People v. Rivera, 15 N.Y.3d 208 (2010): Trial Court Error in Rejecting Partial Verdict and Ordering Further Deliberation

    People v. Rivera, 15 N.Y.3d 208 (2010)

    A trial court commits reversible error when, after a jury announces a partial verdict in open court, the court refuses to accept that verdict and orders the jury to resume deliberations on all counts, including those already decided.

    Summary

    Rivera was convicted of multiple offenses. During deliberations, the jury indicated they had reached a verdict on some counts but were deadlocked on others. The trial court directed the jury to announce its partial verdict, which included acquittals on some counts. The court then refused to accept the partial verdict and ordered the jury to continue deliberating on all counts. The next day, the jury convicted Rivera on nearly all counts. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court violated Criminal Procedure Law § 310.70 and impinged on Rivera’s right to a jury trial by rejecting the partial verdict and ordering further deliberations. This action created a coercive environment, potentially influencing the jury to alter its prior decisions.

    Facts

    Defendant and his brother allegedly broke into an apartment, terrorized the occupants, and stole money and property. The victims called the police, who apprehended the defendant and his brother near a delicatessen. At trial, the jury was presented with 11 counts, including robbery, weapons possession, burglary, larceny, and unlawful imprisonment.

    Procedural History

    The jury initially returned a partial verdict, acquitting Rivera on some counts and convicting him on one. The trial court refused to accept this verdict and ordered further deliberations. The next day, the jury convicted Rivera on almost all counts. The Appellate Division modified the judgment regarding sentencing but affirmed the trial court’s refusal to accept the partial verdict. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated Criminal Procedure Law § 310.70 and impinged on the defendant’s right to a trial by jury when it refused to accept the jury’s partial verdict, which had been announced in open court, and ordered the jury to continue deliberations on all counts.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court’s actions contravened CPL 310.70 and potentially coerced the jury, infringing on the defendant’s fundamental right to a trial by jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the language of CPL 310.70, which provides two options when a jury reports reaching a verdict on some but not all counts: accept the partial verdict and continue deliberations on the remaining counts, or refuse to accept a partial verdict and order deliberations on the entire case. Here, the trial court initially chose the first option by directing the jury to announce their partial verdict. However, by then refusing to accept that announced verdict, the court implicitly signaled that the verdict was incorrect, potentially influencing the jury’s subsequent deliberations. The court reasoned that this created a coercive environment, undermining the secrecy and independence of jury deliberations, which are critical to a fair trial. The Court emphasized, “If the trial court finds out where the jury stands on a particular count and then orders the jury to deliberate further on that count, the trial court effectively, even though inadvertently, inserts itself into the jury’s deliberations.” The court emphasized the importance of ensuring that “jury deliberations should be confidential and free from outside interference, and has the potential to render a defendant’s right to a trial by jury meaningless.” The court noted that a trial court can only reject an announced verdict if it is legally defective or repugnant, neither of which applied in this case. By vacating the convictions on counts that were part of the initial partial verdict of acquittal, the Court reinforced the importance of respecting the jury’s initial findings and preventing judicial interference in the deliberation process.

  • City of New York v. Maul, 14 N.Y.3d 499 (2010): Predominance of Common Questions in Class Action Certification

    City of New York v. Maul, 14 N.Y.3d 499 (2010)

    A class action may be certified where common questions of law or fact predominate over individual issues, even if individualized inquiries are still necessary for certain aspects of the case.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a class action was properly certified for developmentally disabled children in New York City’s foster care system, alleging failures by the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) and the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (OMRDD) to provide legally mandated services. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that common questions of law and fact predominated, despite the individualized needs of each class member. The Court emphasized that the agencies’ alleged systematic delays and failures in referrals and placements created common issues suitable for class action treatment, even if individual inquiries were needed to determine specific placements.

    Facts

    The City of New York initiated an action against OMRDD, alleging failures to properly place and care for developmentally disabled children referred by ACS. Intervenor plaintiffs, developmentally disabled children in or formerly in ACS care, joined the suit, claiming ACS and OMRDD failed to place them in appropriate, least restrictive settings. They asserted ACS delayed referrals to OMRDD, submitted incomplete referral packets, and failed to adequately plan for permanency, causing them to age out of the foster care system without necessary services. Plaintiffs also alleged OMRDD improperly denied nonresidential services to foster children and maintained unreasonably long waiting lists for placements.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court granted intervenor status to the plaintiffs and certified the class action. ACS’s motion for partial summary judgment, arguing mootness because some plaintiffs received placements, was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed class certification, finding plaintiffs’ claims not entirely moot due to an exception and that CPLR Article 9 requirements were met. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion in affirming the Supreme Court’s order granting class action certification, specifically regarding the predominance of common questions of law or fact over individual issues as required by CPLR 901(a)(2)?

    Holding

    No, because the Appellate Division weighed the statutory criteria and acted within its discretion in determining that common questions predominated under CPLR 901(a)(2). Although individual circumstances exist, the allegations of systematic delays and failures in providing services by ACS and OMRDD create common issues that predominate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in determining that common questions predominated. The Court highlighted four common allegations: (1) ACS’s failure to make timely referrals to OMRDD; (2) submission of incomplete or outdated referral packets; (3) failure to meet permanency planning obligations, causing children to age out of foster care; and (4) OMRDD’s failure to provide timely services and placement on lengthy waiting lists. These allegations, if proven, would demonstrate a de facto policy of delaying services. The Court distinguished this case from others involving systemic failure, noting the narrower, more discrete common questions present. The Court emphasized that class action certification is appropriate even if individual questions remain after the common issues are resolved, stating, “[I]t is ‘predominance, not identity or unanimity,’ that is the linchpin of commonality.” The Court also pointed to the flexibility afforded to trial courts under CPLR Article 9, including the ability to create subclasses or decertify the class if necessary. The court cited federal jurisprudence, noting that similar claims had been certified as class actions at the federal level, such as in Baby Neal for & by Ranter v Casey and Marisol A. v Giuliani.

  • People v. Zona, 14 N.Y.3d 486 (2010): Good Faith Claim of Right Defense in Larceny

    People v. Zona, 14 N.Y.3d 486 (2010)

    A defendant in a larceny case is entitled to a jury instruction on the good faith claim of right defense if there is any reasonable view of the evidence, viewed most favorably to the defendant, that he honestly believed he had a right to the property, regardless of whether that belief was reasonable.

    Summary

    Defendant, a deputy sheriff, was convicted of petit larceny for taking tires and other items from a Sheriff’s Department surplus warehouse after being told by a superior officer that he could take what he wanted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the good faith claim of right defense. The Court reasoned that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the defendant honestly believed he had permission to take the property, regardless of whether that belief was reasonable. This case clarifies that subjective good faith, not objective reasonableness, is the critical inquiry for the claim of right defense.

    Facts

    Defendant, a deputy sheriff, was instructed by Undersheriff Larson to move property from a surplus warehouse. Larson told defendant and other deputies that they could take what they wanted from the warehouse. Defendant took five new tires, a boat, and a filing cabinet. He traded the tires for credit towards new tires for his own vehicle. Later, after learning Larson may not have had authority to give the items away, defendant returned the boat and filing cabinet and attempted to repurchase the tires.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was indicted for petit larceny. The trial court denied defendant’s request to instruct the jury on the good faith claim of right defense. The jury convicted defendant. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial, finding a reasonable view of the evidence supported the defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the good faith claim of right defense, where the defendant claimed he took the property based on a superior officer’s permission.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was a reasonable view of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, that the defendant had a good faith belief that he had the right to take the property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated the applicable rule: “In determining whether to instruct a jury on a claimed defense, the court must view the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the defendant.” The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s claim that he honestly believed his superior officer had the authority to give him the property. The court emphasized that subjective good faith, not reasonableness, is the test. The court also rejected the argument that a defendant must prove prior ownership or possession to assert the claim of right defense, stating that the defense requires only a good faith belief “that the property was appropriated under a claim of right” (Penal Law § 155.15 [1]). The court noted that inconsistencies in the evidence are for the jury to resolve and do not relieve the trial court of its obligation to instruct the jury on a defense if supported by the evidence. Quoting People v. Butts, 72 N.Y.2d 746, 750 (1988), the court stated that even “inconsistency in claimed defenses or even between a defendant’s testimony and a defense ‘should not deprive [the] defendant of the requested charge’ if the charge would otherwise be warranted by the evidence”. The dissent argued that the defendant’s actions, such as lying about how he obtained the tires and attempting to conceal his actions, demonstrated that he knew his actions were illegal and therefore could not have had a good faith belief in his right to take the property.

  • H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521 (2010): Family Court Jurisdiction Over Same-Sex Partner Support Petitions

    H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521 (2010)

    Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a support petition brought by a biological parent against a former same-sex partner under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) where the petitioner alleges the respondent is a parent chargeable with the child’s support.

    Summary

    H.M. filed a support petition against E.T., her former same-sex partner, alleging they planned to conceive and raise a child together, with E.T. performing the artificial insemination. After the child’s birth, E.T. ended the relationship. H.M. sought child support in Canada, which was transferred to Family Court in New York under UIFSA. E.T. moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was initially granted, then reversed by the Family Court, and later reinstated by the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Family Court has jurisdiction to determine if E.T. is a parent chargeable with the child’s support under Article 4 of the Family Court Act.

    Facts

    H.M. and E.T. were in a romantic relationship from 1989 to 1995, cohabitating for much of that time.
    In 1990, they planned to conceive and raise a child together, discussing conception methods and child-rearing.
    In 1993, H.M. became pregnant via artificial insemination performed by E.T.
    H.M. gave birth in September 1994; E.T. was present and cut the umbilical cord, and they shared expenses.
    E.T. ended the relationship four months after the child’s birth, and H.M. moved to Canada with the child.
    An attempted reconciliation failed in 1997, though E.T. occasionally provided gifts and monetary contributions for the child.

    Procedural History

    2006: H.M. filed a parentage and support application in Ontario, Canada.
    Under UIFSA, the application was transferred to Family Court, Rockland County.
    Family Court Support Magistrate dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
    Family Court reversed the dismissal and ordered a hearing on equitable estoppel.
    The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    H.M. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a support petition brought under UIFSA by a biological parent seeking child support from her former same-sex partner.

    Holding

    Yes, because Article 4 of the Family Court Act establishes the public policy of obligating individuals, regardless of gender, to provide support for their children, and Family Court has jurisdiction to determine whether an individual is responsible for the support of a child.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, but it has the power granted to it by the State Constitution or by statute. The Constitution grants Family Court jurisdiction over proceedings to determine “the support of dependents.” Family Court Act § 413(1)(a) states that “the parents of a child under the age of twenty-one years are chargeable with the support of such child.”

    The court emphasized that statutory jurisdiction carries with it ancillary jurisdiction necessary to fulfill its core function. Since Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to ascertain the support obligations of a female parent, it also has the inherent authority to ascertain in certain cases whether a female respondent is, in fact, a child’s parent.

    The court noted that Family Court and Supreme Court have coextensive authority in child support matters. The relevant statutes, Family Court Act § 413 and Domestic Relations Law § 240, establish statewide child support guidelines applicable to all child support proceedings.

    The court concluded that because H.M. asserts that E.T. is the child’s parent and is therefore chargeable with the child’s support, this case falls within Family Court’s Article 4 jurisdiction.

  • H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521 (2010): Limits on Family Court Jurisdiction to Order Child Support

    H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521 (2010)

    Family Court’s jurisdiction is limited by statute; it cannot compel child support from an individual lacking a biological or legal parental connection to the child based solely on equitable principles where no statutory basis exists for such an order.

    Summary

    H.M. petitioned for child support from her former same-sex partner, E.T., under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). The child was conceived during their relationship but E.T. ended the relationship when the child was three months old. The New York Court of Appeals held that Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order E.T. to pay child support because E.T. had no biological or legal relationship to the child. Family Court’s jurisdiction is limited and it cannot grant equitable relief to create a support obligation where none exists under the Family Court Act.

    Facts

    H.M. and E.T. were formerly same-sex partners. H.M. gave birth to a child conceived during their relationship. E.T. ended the relationship with H.M. when the child was three months old. H.M. then filed a petition seeking to compel E.T. to pay child support for the child.

    Procedural History

    H.M. filed a support petition in Family Court under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). The Family Court granted the petition and ordered E.T. to pay child support. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Family Court lacked jurisdiction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, but on reargument, adhered to its original determination and reversed the Family Court’s order, dismissing the petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to order a person to pay child support when that person has no biological or legal parental connection to the child.

    Holding

    No, because Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks the equitable power to create a parental obligation for child support purposes where no such obligation exists under the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, possessing only the powers granted to it by statute or the State Constitution. The Court emphasized that Family Court has no general equity jurisdiction and cannot grant equitable relief. The Court analyzed Family Court Act § 413 (1) (a), which states that “the parents of a child…are chargeable with the support of such child.” The Court noted that “parent” typically denotes more than responsibility for conception and birth, encompassing natural, adoptive, or legally recognized guardians. The Court found that E.T. had no such legal connection to the child, as she was not a biological parent, adoptive parent, or legal guardian. Allowing the Family Court to compel child support in this situation would be an unauthorized exercise of equitable power. The dissent argued that the majority’s reading of Article 4 was too broad and inconsistent with the Family Court’s limited subject matter jurisdiction.