New York Law Review

Tag: 2010

  • People v. Syville, 15 N.Y.3d 381 (2010): Coram Nobis Relief for Missed Appeal Deadlines Due to Attorney Error

    People v. Syville, 15 N.Y.3d 381 (2010)

    A defendant whose direct appeal is lost due to the unconstitutionally deficient performance of counsel in failing to file a timely notice of appeal may seek relief via a writ of error coram nobis, even after the statutory CPL 460.30 deadline has passed, if the defendant could not reasonably have discovered the error within the one-year grace period.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether coram nobis is available to defendants who missed the CPL 460.30 deadline for filing a late notice of appeal because they were unaware their attorneys failed to file a notice of appeal as requested. The Court held that coram nobis is an appropriate remedy when an attorney fails to file a timely notice of appeal and the defendant could not reasonably have discovered this error within the statutory one-year grace period. This decision recognizes a due process exception to the strict CPL 460.30 time limit, ensuring defendants are not penalized for attorney errors they could not have reasonably detected.

    Facts

    In Syville, the defendant requested his attorney file a notice of appeal after a weapons conviction in November 2004. The attorney mistakenly believed it was premature to file the notice while other charges were pending. The attorney filed a late notice of appeal in March 2006. Syville discovered the error in July 2006, after the one-year CPL 460.30 grace period had passed. In Council, the defendant asked his attorney to file a notice of appeal after his February 2007 conviction and even paid the attorney $2,000 for this service. The attorney neglected to file the notice due to “law office failure.” Council discovered the error more than two years later.

    Procedural History

    In Syville, the Appellate Division denied Syville’s applications for relief under CPL 460.30 and coram nobis. A judge of the Court of Appeals granted Syville leave to appeal. In Council, the Appellate Division denied Council’s coram nobis application, even though the People did not oppose the request. A judge of the Court of Appeals granted Council leave to appeal. Both cases were consolidated for appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who discovers after the expiration of the CPL 460.30 grace period that a notice of appeal was not timely filed due to ineffective assistance of counsel, has recourse through a coram nobis application.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Due Process Clause requires that some avenue for relief be provided when the right to appeal has been lost due solely to the unconstitutionally deficient performance of counsel in failing to file a timely notice of appeal, and coram nobis is the appropriate procedural vehicle in New York.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court recognized that while states are not constitutionally required to grant criminal defendants an appeal as of right, when a state does provide such a right, it must ensure that the appeal is more than a meaningless ritual by affording a right to counsel. “[A] first appeal as of right…is not adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney.” When defense counsel disregards a client’s timely request to file a notice of appeal, the attorney acts in a professionally unreasonable manner, and the defendant’s appellate rights are extinguished. The Court explained that CPL 460.30 eliminated the need for resentencing as a basis to extend the time for timely filing a notice of appeal but also imposed a one-year limit for the filing of a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal. Coram nobis remains available to alleviate a constitutional wrong when a defendant has no other procedural recourse, especially when the alleged constitutional errors do not appear on the trial record, and the defendant could not have brought these errors to the attention of the trial courts. The Court held that, in these specific circumstances, the defendants could pursue their appeals, and remitted both cases to the Appellate Division for further proceedings.

  • Geraci v. Probst, 15 N.Y.3d 343 (2010): Limits on Liability for Republication of Defamatory Statements

    Geraci v. Probst, 15 N.Y.3d 343 (2010)

    A party who makes a defamatory statement is not liable for its subsequent republication by a third party unless the original speaker authorized, requested, or participated in the republication.

    Summary

    Geraci sued Probst for defamation after Probst falsely accused him of receiving a commission on fire truck sales to the Syosset Fire District. At trial, the court admitted a Newsday article republishing the defamatory statement, which appeared years after Probst’s original statement and without his involvement. The Court of Appeals held that the admission of the republication was error because Probst had no connection to the Newsday article. The Court clarified the standard for republication liability, emphasizing that the original defamer must have authorized, requested, or participated in the republication to be held liable for it.

    Facts

    Geraci and Probst were former business partners selling fire trucks. Geraci, a Syosset Fire District commissioner, stated he would not profit from sales to the district. Probst sent a letter to the Board of Fire Commissioners claiming Geraci shared a commission from a Syosset rescue vehicle sale, which was false. More than two years after the suit was filed and three years after the letter, Newsday published an article about an investigation into fire apparatus sales, mentioning the allegation of a “hidden commission for Geraci.” Probst had no involvement with the Newsday article.

    Procedural History

    Geraci sued Probst for defamation in Supreme Court. The trial court admitted the Newsday article over Probst’s objection. The jury found for Geraci. The Supreme Court reduced the damages award. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the republication argument unpreserved. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Newsday article republishing Probst’s defamatory statement.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Probst’s statement was defamatory per se.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Probst had no connection to the Newsday article’s republication of the defamatory statement.

    2. No, because Probst’s statement alleged acts constituting a misdemeanor in violation of the General Municipal Law and could damage Geraci’s professional reputation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the republication argument preserved. Citing Schoepflin v. Coffey, 162 N.Y. 12 (1900), the Court reiterated the long-standing rule that a person is not responsible for the voluntary and unjustifiable repetition of a defamatory statement by others without their authority or request. The Court reasoned that each person who repeats the defamatory statement is responsible for the resulting damages. Admission of the Newsday article was erroneous because there was no evidence Probst had any connection to the article. The Court rejected Geraci’s argument that republication was reasonably expected, clarifying that the foreseeability standard in Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531 (1980), and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 576(c), applied only when the original speaker made the statement directly to a reporter or widely disseminated the information, neither of which occurred here. The Court distinguished Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 52 N.Y.2d 422 (1981) to support this holding. As for the defamatory per se instruction, the Court held that Probst’s statement alleged acts constituting a misdemeanor under General Municipal Law § 801(1) and could damage Geraci’s professional reputation, justifying the instruction. The Court noted: “[G]enerally, a written statement may be defamatory ‘if it tends to expose a person to hatred, contempt or aversion, or to induce an evil or unsavory opinion of him in the minds of a substantial number of the community’”.

  • Cusumano v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.3d 319 (2010): Predicate for Firefighter’s Rule Liability

    15 N.Y.3d 319 (2010)

    To recover under General Municipal Law § 205-a, a firefighter must demonstrate injury resulting from negligent noncompliance with a requirement found in a well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear duties.

    Summary

    A firefighter, Nocenzo Cusumano, was injured in a fall on stairs in a City-owned building during a training session. He sued the City under General Municipal Law § 205-a, alleging violations of the NYC Administrative Code relating to safe building maintenance and handrail requirements. The jury found the City liable. The Appellate Division reversed in part, finding one code section inapplicable. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that the improper jury instruction on an inapplicable code provision tainted the entire verdict, even though there was a finding of a violation of a separate code section.

    Facts

    Nocenzo Cusumano, a New York City firefighter, fell down a flight of stairs while attending a training session in a building owned by the City. He claimed he slipped on debris and was unable to grasp the handrail, which he alleged was improperly constructed. He based his claim on several sections of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, including sections concerning safe building maintenance generally and a specific section on interior stair handrail dimensions.

    Procedural History

    Cusumano sued the City under General Municipal Law § 205-a in Supreme Court. The jury found the City liable. The City moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the section of the Administrative Code concerning handrail dimensions did not apply to the stairs in question. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division modified the damages award but agreed that the handrail section was inapplicable. However, the Appellate Division majority found sufficient evidence to support liability based on other code sections. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s error in submitting an inapplicable section of the Administrative Code to the jury requires a new trial, even where the jury also found a violation of other, more general, code sections.

    Holding

    Yes, because the erroneous jury instruction, coupled with expert testimony linking the general code sections to the specific, inapplicable section, made it impossible to determine the basis of the jury’s verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the Administrative Code section concerning handrail dimensions for “interior stairs” did not apply to the stairs where the firefighter fell, as those stairs did not serve as a required exit. The court reasoned that because expert testimony had linked the violation of the general maintenance code sections to the violation of the specific handrail dimension code, it could not be assumed that the jury viewed the handrail testimony in a vacuum. The court noted testimony that the City violated the general code sections because it violated the specific handrail section. The Court stated that Supreme Court’s erroneous submission of section 27-375 (f) to the jury, coupled with the expert testimony, renders it impossible to discern the basis of the jury’s verdict. The Court declined to address whether the general maintenance sections could form an independent basis for liability under General Municipal Law § 205-a, as the City had only objected to the applicability of those sections to the extent they were interwoven with the inapplicable handrail section. Chief Judge Lippman, in concurrence, argued the court should have addressed whether section 27-127 was a sufficient independent predicate, arguing that Appellate Division case law and legislative intent favored a broader interpretation of section 205-a to protect firefighters. He stated, “a plaintiff need only establish a `practical or reasonable connection’ between the statutory or regulatory violation and the claimed injury”.

  • Jones v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 14 N.Y.3d 282 (2010): Direct vs. Derivative Injury in Fraudulent Inducement Claims

    Jones v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 14 N.Y.3d 282 (2010)

    In a fraud action where a plaintiff claims fraudulent inducement of an investment, the plaintiff must demonstrate a direct injury distinct from a derivative injury shared by all investors to recover damages.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs, former limited partners in Lipper Convertibles, LP, sued PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the fund’s auditor, alleging PwC fraudulently misrepresented the fund’s financial health, inducing their investments. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the fraud claim because the plaintiffs failed to prove a direct injury to their initial investment distinct from the derivative injury suffered by all limited partners due to the fund’s overall losses. The court emphasized that plaintiffs’ claimed damages were tied to the fund’s losses and the Trustee’s action sought the same damages, requiring a showing of direct, date-of-investment injuries.

    Facts

    Lipper Convertibles, a hedge fund, was managed by Lipper Holdings. PwC audited the fund’s financial statements from 1995 to 2000. Between 1997 and 2001, the plaintiffs invested over $120 million, relying on PwC-audited statements showing consistent growth. These statements fraudulently overstated the fund’s assets. In 2002, the fraud was discovered after the fund’s portfolio manager resigned. The fund had overvalued its assets, leading to a $400 million write-down. The SEC investigated, finding PwC’s audits did not comply with GAAP. A Trustee was later appointed to pursue claims against culpable parties.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs sued PwC, alleging fraud, among other claims. PwC moved to dismiss, arguing the injury was derivative and subject to the Trustee’s action. The Supreme Court initially denied the motion concerning direct claims like fraud in the inducement. After discovery, PwC moved for summary judgment, asserting plaintiffs couldn’t prove a distinct injury. The Supreme Court granted PwC’s motion, finding only derivative injuries. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a direct injury from PwC’s alleged fraud that induced their initial investment, distinct from any derivative injury suffered as limited partners due to the fund’s overall losses.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiffs’ claimed damages were attributable to their pro rata share of the partnership’s losses after their investments, making their injury derivative, not direct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that investors can bring direct claims for fraud in the inducement. However, the critical issue was whether the plaintiffs proved a direct injury. The court cited Reno v. Bull, stating that a plaintiff may only recover the actual pecuniary loss sustained as a direct result of the fraud. Referencing Sager v. Friedman, the court noted that damages are to compensate for what was lost because of the fraud, not for potential gains. The court distinguished this case from Hotaling v. Leach & Co., where the measure of damages was the price paid for a fraudulently induced bond. Here, the plaintiffs could have presented portfolio valuations showing the overvaluation on the date of their investments, which they failed to do. Furthermore, the Trustee’s claims sought the same damages, requiring the plaintiffs to demonstrate distinct date-of-investment injuries. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs’ injury was the diminution in value of their partnership interests at liquidation, attributable to their share of the partnership’s losses after their investments. “Plaintiffs cannot recover their pro rata share of the partnership injury and also recover that same injury under the direct fraud action.”

  • People v. Perkins, 15 N.Y.3d 201 (2010): Admissibility of Photographic Identification After Defendant Obstructs Lineup

    People v. Perkins, 15 N.Y.3d 201 (2010)

    A defendant forfeits the right to exclude photographic identification evidence when the defendant’s own misconduct, such as refusing to participate in a lineup, makes a corporeal identification impossible.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of a photographic identification when a defendant obstructs a police lineup. The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant forfeits the right to exclude photographic identification evidence if their own misconduct thwarts a corporeal lineup. In this case, the defendant refused to cooperate with a lineup, leading the police to show the victim a photographic array, from which the victim identified the defendant. The court reasoned that the defendant should not benefit from their own wrongdoing, and the photographic identification was admissible to ensure a fair trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was suspected of involvement in an armed robbery where the victim was shot. Based on information received, police created a photographic array including the defendant’s picture. The victim identified the defendant from the array. When the defendant was arrested and a lineup was scheduled, the defendant refused to participate, kicking, spitting, and cursing. As a result, a traditional lineup was impossible. The detective took a photograph of the defendant and photos of the proposed fillers and showed the victim the array of photos; the victim identified the defendant’s picture.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court held a Wade hearing and denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the victim’s lineup identification made months later, as well as the victim’s prospective in-court identification. The court deferred ruling on the admissibility of the photographic identification. At trial, the trial court ruled the photographic identification admissible. The defendant was convicted of attempted murder and robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who obstructs a corporeal lineup, forfeits the right to exclude evidence of a photographic identification made necessary by that obstruction?

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant should not be able to benefit from their own misconduct by preventing a corporeal lineup and then objecting to the introduction of a photographic identification that resulted from their actions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while New York law generally excludes pretrial photographic identifications due to concerns about distortion and potential prejudice (jury inferring prior arrests), this rule does not apply when a defendant’s misconduct prevents a corporeal lineup. Citing the principle that “the law will not allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong,” the court held that the defendant forfeited the right to rely on the exclusionary rule. The court emphasized that the detective’s testimony clarified that the photograph shown to the victim was taken on the day of the aborted lineup, mitigating any potential prejudice. The trial court also reasonably concluded that a later lineup identification might be viewed as less reliable than an identification closer to the crime. This ruling balances the need to protect defendants from unfair identification procedures with the need to ensure that they do not benefit from obstructing justice. As the Court stated in People v. Geraci, 85 NY2d 359, 366 (1995), “the maxim that the law will not allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong…creat[es] a forfeiture dictated by sound public policy”.

  • In re Estate of Hyde, 15 N.Y.3d 183 (2010): Surrogate Court’s Discretion in Allocating Attorney’s Fees

    In re Estate of Hyde, 15 N.Y.3d 183 (2010)

    Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (SCPA) § 2110 grants the trial court discretion to allocate responsibility for payment of a fiduciary’s attorney’s fees for which the estate is obligated to pay—either from the estate as a whole or from shares of individual estate beneficiaries.

    Summary

    This case addresses the discretion of the Surrogate’s Court in allocating attorney’s fees in estate litigation. The Renzes, non-objecting beneficiaries of two trusts (Hyde and Cunningham), sought to have trustee counsel fees deducted solely from the shares of the objecting beneficiaries (the Whitneys). The Surrogate’s Court, relying on a prior interpretation of SCPA 2110, ordered fees disbursed from the corpus of each trust generally, impacting the Renzes. The Court of Appeals reversed, overruling its prior holding in Matter of Dillon, and held that SCPA 2110 grants the Surrogate’s Court discretion to allocate attorney’s fees either from the estate generally or from individual beneficiaries’ shares, based on a multi-factored assessment.

    Facts

    Charlotte Hyde created a testamentary trust (Hyde Trust). Nell Pruyn Cunningham created an inter vivos trust (Cunningham Trust). Mary Renz and Louis Whitney were income beneficiaries and presumptive remaindermen of both trusts. The Whitneys (Louis Whitney and his children) objected to the trustees’ accountings in both trusts, alleging failure to diversify assets. The Renzes, along with other beneficiaries, did not object. The Renzes filed an acknowledgment as non-objectors and sought to have future trustee counsel fees paid exclusively from the objecting beneficiaries’ shares.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court dismissed the Whitneys’ objections. Citing Matter of Dillon, the court ordered trustee counsel fees to be disbursed from the corpus of each trust generally. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether SCPA 2110 grants the Surrogate’s Court discretion to allocate responsibility for payment of a fiduciary’s attorney’s fees for which the estate is obligated to pay—either from the estate as a whole or from shares of individual estate beneficiaries.

    Holding

    Yes, because SCPA 2110 provides the trial court with discretion to disburse funds from any beneficiary’s share in the estate—and not exclusively from “the estate generally.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court overruled its prior interpretation of SCPA 2110 in Matter of Dillon, which had mandated that attorney’s fees be paid from the estate generally. The Court found that Dillon ignored the plain meaning of the statute and departed from prior jurisprudence emphasizing fairness. The Court noted the statute’s unambiguous language allowing disbursement from any beneficiary’s share. It cited the principle that statutes should be construed to avoid unjust or unreasonable results. The Court emphasized that trustee should have “an opportunity to prove their expenses and the circumstances under which they were incurred,” and at that point, “it would be for the court to determine on the facts of the case what part, if any, of such expenditures should be allowed to the [trustees] and charged against the life tenant and what part against the corpus of the estate” (Ungrich, 201 NY at 420). The Court directed the Surrogate’s Court to undertake a multi-factored assessment when allocating fees, including: whether the objecting beneficiary acted solely in their own interest or the common interest; the possible benefits to individual beneficiaries; the extent of participation; the good or bad faith of the objector; justifiable doubt regarding fiduciary conduct; the portions of interest held by non-objectors relative to objectors; and the future interests affected by reallocation.

  • DDJ Management, LLC v. Rhone Group L.L.C., 15 N.Y.3d 147 (2010): Justifiable Reliance on Misrepresentations in Fraud Claims

    DDJ Management, LLC v. Rhone Group L.L.C., 15 N.Y.3d 147 (2010)

    A plaintiff alleging fraud is justified in relying on a defendant’s representations where the plaintiff took reasonable steps to protect itself, such as obtaining written warranties, even if hindsight suggests the fraud could have been detected earlier.

    Summary

    DDJ Management and other companies loaned $40 million to American Remanufacturers Holdings, Inc. (ARI). After ARI failed to repay, DDJ sued Rhone Group and Quilvest, alleging they defrauded DDJ by presenting false financial statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that DDJ had presented enough evidence that a jury could find justifiable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations, reversing the Appellate Division’s dismissal. Even though there were some warning signs, DDJ obtained representations and warranties of accuracy. The Court emphasized that obtaining such warranties demonstrated a reasonable effort to protect themselves, creating a jury question as to the justifiability of their reliance.

    Facts

    DDJ and other plaintiffs loaned $40 million to ARI, a remanufacturer of automobile parts, in March 2005.
    ARI’s financial statements, presented to DDJ, allegedly inflated earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA).
    Internal emails suggested manipulation of earnings.
    Plaintiffs were first solicited in July 2004 and received presentations containing misleading information.
    Plaintiffs received drafts of the audit report for 2003 and unaudited financial statements for 2004.
    The 2004 statements showed increased inventory value, low cash on hand, and improved profitability in December, which could have raised concerns.
    Plaintiffs insisted on representations and warranties in the loan agreement attesting to the accuracy of the financial statements.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed most of the claims but allowed the fraud claim to stand.
    The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the fraud claim, stating the plaintiffs did not examine ARI’s books and records and could not claim reasonable reliance.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether plaintiffs presented enough evidence that a jury could find justifiable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations, despite not conducting an independent audit or detailed questioning, given that they obtained written representations and warranties as to the accuracy of the financial statements?

    Holding

    Yes, because plaintiffs made a significant effort to protect themselves by obtaining representations and warranties to the effect that nothing in the financials was materially misleading. Whether plaintiffs were justified in relying on the warranties they received is a question to be resolved by the trier of fact.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court addressed the rule that a party cannot claim fraud if the facts represented are not peculiarly within the party’s knowledge, and the other party could have known the truth with ordinary intelligence.
    The court distinguished cases where plaintiffs were excessively lax in protecting themselves, willingly assuming the business risk.
    Where a plaintiff takes reasonable steps to protect itself, it is justified in accepting a written representation rather than making its own inquiry. The court noted a scarcity of cases where obtaining a written representation failed to justify reliance.
    The Court highlighted the fact-intensive nature of determining reasonable reliance.
    Federal cases applying New York law support the notion that obtaining representations and warranties is a sufficient step to establish reliance.
    Citing JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Winnick, the court emphasized that plaintiffs bargained for a provision deeming each loan request a representation that the borrower complied with debt covenants.
    Even though there were hints that might have put plaintiffs on guard, the plaintiffs obtained representations and warranties. The court declined to hold, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs were required to do more.
    The court addressed the argument that the warranties were given only by ARI and could not support a claim against Rhone and Quilvest. The Court clarified that if the plaintiffs can prove that Rhone and Quilvest knew the financial statements gave an untrue picture of ARI’s financial condition, they can recover against Rhone and Quilvest.

  • Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 15 N.Y.3d 235 (2010): UDC Act’s Blight and Civic Project Determinations

    15 N.Y.3d 235 (2010)

    The Empire State Development Corporation’s (ESDC) findings of blight and determination that the condemnation of petitioners’ property qualified as a “land use improvement project” or, alternatively, a “civic project” under the New York State Urban Development Corporation Act (UDC Act) are entitled to deference if rationally based.

    Summary

    This case concerns the legality of the Empire State Development Corporation’s (ESDC) use of eminent domain to acquire private property for Columbia University’s expansion in West Harlem. The New York Court of Appeals held that ESDC’s determination that the area was blighted and the project served a public purpose as a “land use improvement project” and as a “civic project” under the UDC Act was rationally based and entitled to deference. The Court emphasized the limited role of the judiciary in reviewing blight determinations and rejected claims of bad faith and procedural due process violations.

    Facts

    Parminder Kaur and others owned commercial properties in West Harlem. The ESDC sought to condemn these properties for Columbia University’s expansion project, which included constructing new buildings, creating open spaces, and improving infrastructure. The ESDC based its decision on studies indicating blight and the project’s potential public benefits. Columbia University would exclusively underwrite the costs of the project and not seek financial assistance from the government. Various business groups sought documents related to the project and filed CPLR article 78 petitions.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court ordered the release of certain documents. The Appellate Division affirmed this order, questioning the relationship between ESDC and its consultant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order regarding document disclosure. The Appellate Division initially ruled against ESDC on the public use issue, but the Court of Appeals reversed, upholding ESDC’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether ESDC’s exercise of eminent domain to acquire the petitioners’ property for the development of a new Columbia University campus was supported by a sufficient public use, benefit, or purpose as a land use improvement project?
    2. Whether ESDC’s exercise of eminent domain to acquire the petitioners’ property for the development of a new Columbia University campus was supported by a sufficient public use, benefit, or purpose as a civic project?
    3. Whether the statutory term “substandard or insanitary area” is void for vagueness?
    4. Whether the petitioners were denied procedural due process?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because ESDC’s finding of blight was rationally based and thus the project qualified as a “land use improvement project.”
    2. Yes, because ESDC’s determination that the project qualified as a “civic project” was also rationally based.
    3. No, because the UDC Act provides adequate meaning to the term “substandard or insanitary area.”
    4. No, because petitioners had a meaningful opportunity to be heard and were not prejudiced by any alleged FOIL violation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the judiciary’s role in reviewing blight findings is limited, deferring to the legislature’s and administrative agencies’ determinations unless there is no room for reasonable difference of opinion. The Court cited Matter of Goldstein v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 13 NY3d 511 (2009), reaffirming that removing urban blight is a constitutionally sanctioned predicate for eminent domain. The Court found that ESDC considered a wide range of factors to find blight and that the Appellate Division improperly conducted a de novo review.

    The Court rejected the argument that ESDC acted in bad faith by hiring AKRF, noting that a second consultant, Earth Tech, reached similar conclusions. The Court also found the project qualified as a “civic project” because it would provide educational facilities and other public benefits. The Court stated, “[t]he advancement of higher education is the quintessential example of a ‘civic purpose’.”

    The Court also rejected the argument that petitioners were denied procedural due process, emphasizing they had access to documents and a meaningful opportunity to comment on the project. The Court held that even if there was a FOIL violation, it did not rise to the level of a due process violation because the petitioners were not prejudiced. “To establish that a FOIL violation rose to the level of a due process violation, petitioners ‘must show that the withholding of the [documents] . . . caused [them] prejudice’.”

  • Jones v. Town of Carroll, 15 N.Y.3d 141 (2010): Establishing Vested Rights for Landfill Expansion

    Jones v. Town of Carroll, 15 N.Y.3d 141 (2010)

    A landowner with a pre-existing, permitted landfill operation has a vested right to expand that operation on the entire parcel, even if only a portion was actively used before a restrictive zoning ordinance was enacted, provided they demonstrate an intent to use the entire parcel for that purpose.

    Summary

    Donald and Carol Jones were granted a special use variance in 1989 to operate a construction and demolition (C&D) landfill on their 50-acre property. They obtained a DEC permit for a small portion of the land. In 2005, the Town of Carroll enacted a zoning law restricting landfill expansion. The Joneses sued, arguing their prior variance established a right to use the entire parcel. The New York Court of Appeals held that because landfill operations are akin to mining, where the land itself is a resource, the Joneses had a vested right to use the entire property as a landfill, contingent upon continued DEC approval, as their actions demonstrated an intent to use the whole parcel for that purpose before the restrictive zoning law was enacted. The 2005 local law could not extinguish their legal right.

    Facts

    In 1984, Donald and Carol Jones purchased 50 acres in the Town of Carroll. In 1989, the Town granted them a special use variance for a C&D landfill on the entire property, subject to DEC regulation. Subsequently, the Joneses obtained a DEC permit to operate the landfill on a portion of the land (initially two acres, later expanded to three). The landfill operated as an active business. The Joneses dedicated areas around the landfill for related purposes, purchased heavy equipment, employed a dozen people, developed expansion plans, and discussed future operations with investors.

    Procedural History

    In 2005, the Town enacted a zoning law restricting landfill expansion. The Joneses sued, seeking a declaration that the new law did not apply to their property. Supreme Court initially granted summary judgment to the Joneses. The Appellate Division modified, denying summary judgment and vacating the declaration, finding the law applicable since the DEC permit covered only three acres and the remaining acreage was merely a contemplated future expansion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a landowner with a special use variance for a landfill on their entire property, but with a DEC permit covering only a portion, has a vested right to utilize the entire property for landfill operations, thereby precluding the application of a subsequently enacted zoning law restricting landfill expansion.

    Holding

    Yes, because the operation of a landfill is similar to mining, where the land itself is a resource, and the landowners demonstrated an intent to use the entire parcel for that purpose before the restrictive zoning law was enacted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its precedents in Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise, Buffalo Crushed Stone, Inc. v. Town of Cheektowaga, and Glacial Aggregates LLC v. Town of Yorkshire, which addressed vested rights in mining operations. The Court extended the rationale of those cases to landfills, noting that landfills, like mines, involve the consumption of the land itself. The Court reasoned that landowners can reasonably be expected to hold land in reserve for future landfill expansion. The court stated, “As opposed to other nonconforming uses in which the land is merely incidental to the activities conducted upon it…the use of property as a landfill, like a mine, is unique because it necessarily envisions that the land itself is a resource that will be consumed over time.”

    The Court emphasized that the Town had previously acknowledged the suitability of the entire parcel for landfill use by granting the variance. The Joneses’ actions, such as purchasing equipment and developing expansion plans, further demonstrated their intent to use the entire property for landfill operations. The court concluded that limiting the vested right to the area covered by the DEC permit would be unreasonable. “The fact that the DEC permit covered only a limited area is not determinative of plaintiffs’ rights over the remaining 47 acres of the parcel… Instead, the factors to examine are whether the operation of a C & D landfill was a lawful use on the property prior to the enactment of the 2005 zoning law and whether plaintiffs’ activities before that time manifested an intent to utilize all of their property in a manner consistent with that purpose.”

  • Schneider v. Finmann, 15 N.Y.3d 306 (2010): Estate’s Right to Sue Attorney for Negligent Tax Planning

    15 N.Y.3d 306 (2010)

    An estate’s personal representative can bring a legal malpractice claim against an attorney for negligent estate tax planning that financially harmed the estate.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an estate can sue its attorney for negligence in estate tax planning. The New York Court of Appeals held that an estate’s personal representative has sufficient privity with the estate’s attorney to bring a legal malpractice claim when the attorney’s negligence in tax planning caused financial harm to the estate. The court reasoned that the personal representative “stands in the shoes” of the decedent and that minimizing the estate’s tax burden is a central task entrusted to the estate planning attorney. This ruling balances the need to protect attorneys from limitless liability with the estate’s right to recover losses caused by attorney negligence.

    Facts

    Saul Schneider retained the defendants as his attorneys for estate tax planning from 2000 until his death in 2006. In April 2000, Schneider purchased a $1 million life insurance policy. He transferred ownership of this policy multiple times between himself and entities he controlled. Ultimately, the policy was back in his name at the time of his death in October 2006. As a result, the insurance proceeds were included in his gross taxable estate.

    Procedural History

    Schneider’s estate sued the attorneys for legal malpractice, alleging their negligent advice regarding the life insurance policy transfers led to increased estate tax liability. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, and the Appellate Division affirmed, citing a lack of privity between the estate and the attorneys. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating the estate’s claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the personal representative of an estate can bring a legal malpractice claim against an attorney for negligent estate tax planning that resulted in increased estate tax liability, despite the traditional requirement of strict privity.

    Holding

    Yes, because privity, or a relationship sufficiently approaching privity, exists between the personal representative of an estate and the estate planning attorney when the alleged negligence directly caused financial harm to the estate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals departed from the strict privity requirement in this specific context. The court noted that strict privity is a minority rule and that several jurisdictions have relaxed this requirement to allow estates to bring malpractice claims. The court adopted the reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court, stating that the estate essentially “‘stands in the shoes’ of a decedent” and thus can pursue the claim on the estate’s behalf (Belt v Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 SW3d 780, 787 [Tex 2006]). The court emphasized that estate planning attorneys know that minimizing the estate’s tax burden is a key part of their role. Permitting the estate to sue aligns with EPTL 11-3.2 (b), which allows a personal representative to maintain an action for “injury to person or property” after death. The court explicitly maintained the strict privity requirement for beneficiaries and other third parties to prevent “uncertainty and limitless liability.” The court distinguished between suits by the estate and suits by beneficiaries, quoting Estate of Spivey v Pulley, 138 AD2d 563, 564 (2d Dept 1988), clarifying that privity is required absent “fraud, collusion, malicious acts or other special circumstances”.