New York Law Review

Tag: 2010

  • People v. Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 198 (2010): Double Jeopardy and Resentencing After Release

    People v. Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 198 (2010)

    The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a court from resentencing a defendant to add a mandatory term of post-release supervision (PRS) after the defendant has served the determinate term of imprisonment and been released from confinement.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether it is permissible to impose post-release supervision (PRS) at resentencing for defendants who have already completed their prison terms and been released. The New York Court of Appeals held that resentencing to add PRS after a defendant has completed their original sentence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court reasoned that once a defendant is released from prison after serving their court-ordered sentence, they have a legitimate expectation of finality in that sentence, and adding PRS constitutes an impermissible second punishment. The Court reversed the Appellate Division orders in four cases and affirmed one case where prohibition was sought, discharging the defendants from PRS.

    Facts

    Five defendants were originally sentenced to determinate prison terms but did not have PRS formally pronounced as part of their sentences. After the defendants served their prison terms and were released, the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) initiated resentencing proceedings under Correction Law § 601-d to add PRS. Some defendants had signed DOCS certificates acknowledging PRS before release. Defendant Williams had PRS mentioned during his plea, but it was not formally pronounced at sentencing. Defendant Rodriguez did not object at resentencing.

    Procedural History

    In *People v. Williams*, *People v. Hernandez*, *People v. Lewis*, and *People v. Rodriguez*, the sentencing courts resentenced the defendants to include PRS. The Appellate Division affirmed these resentencings. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. In *Matter of Echevarria v. Marks*, the Appellate Division dismissed Echevarria’s Article 78 petition seeking to prevent resentencing, and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a court from resentencing a defendant to add a mandatory term of PRS after the defendant has served the determinate term of imprisonment and been released from confinement.

    2. Whether the resentencing courts retained jurisdiction to modify the original judgments when the defendants had completed their original sentences.

    3. Whether Rodriguez preserved his double jeopardy claim for review.

    4. Whether Echevarria properly sought a writ of prohibition to prevent resentencing.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because after release from prison, a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence arises, and the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents reformation to attach a PRS component to the original completed sentence.

    2. No, because the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant from being resentenced to a more severe punishment after serving the sentence of imprisonment and being released into the community, the resentencing courts did not retain jurisdiction.

    3. Yes, because Rodriguez’s double jeopardy claim implicates a fundamental mode of proceedings, it is reviewable absent preservation.

    4. No, because the record in this case does not indicate that the judge had considered whether it was appropriate to impose a term of PRS.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while courts have the inherent authority to correct illegal sentences, this power is limited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. CPL 440.40 does not limit the court’s ability to correct its own errors. Penal Law § 70.85 specifies a court may decline to impose PRS during resentencing only when the People issue the statutorily required consent. CPL 380.30 requires that sentences must be imposed “without unreasonable delay” (CPL 380.30 [1]), and there was no violation of the statute here. After reviewing federal precedent, the court found it persuasive and concluded that a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence arises after release from prison. State law permitted defendants’ release after having served substantial portions of their determinate prison terms. The administrative imposition by DOCS of any additional penalty other than that issued by the sentencing court is a nullity and cannot negate a defendant’s reasonable expectation that, once completed, the imposed sentence will not be increased.

    Since Rodriguez’s double jeopardy claim implicates a fundamental mode of proceedings, it is reviewable absent preservation. In Echevarria’s case, there was no need to seek prohibition relief before the court determined “the lawfulness of the sentence that was imposed” or whether it would accept the served sentence without a term of PRS.

  • Matter of Stewart v. Chautauqua County Bd. of Elections, 14 N.Y.3d 143 (2010): Validating Ballots with Technical Defects and Establishing Residency Requirements

    Matter of Stewart v. Chautauqua County Bd. of Elections, 14 N.Y.3d 143 (2010)

    Election boards must substantially comply with election law, and ballots should be counted if voter intent is clear, but residency for voting requires physical presence and intent to remain.

    Summary

    This case involves a dispute over several ballots cast in a Chautauqua County election. The New York Court of Appeals addressed the validity of an affidavit ballot, two optical scan ballots, and two absentee ballots. The Court held that one affidavit ballot was invalid due to the voter’s lack of residency in the district, but validated the two optical scan ballots that were initially rejected by the machine because the voters’ intent was clear. The Court also validated two absentee ballots despite a procedural error by the Board of Elections, finding substantial compliance with election law. The decision emphasizes voter intent when technical errors occur and clarifies residency requirements for voting purposes.

    Facts

    Robert Stewart and Leon Beightol were candidates for Chautauqua County Legislator. Disputes arose over the validity of certain ballots: (1) an affidavit ballot of J.K., challenged for residency; (2) two absentee ballots where the applications were allegedly incomplete when sent; (3) two optical scan ballots rejected by the scanning machine but manually counted. The absentee ballots were sent to voters R.Y. and W.Y. with instructions to return completed applications. Both voters complied.

    Procedural History

    Stewart initiated a proceeding challenging the affidavit ballot and absentee ballots. Beightol counterclaimed, seeking to validate the affidavit and absentee ballots. Subsequently, Beightol commenced another proceeding to invalidate the absentee ballots, arguing that absentee voter applications should not have been included in the return envelopes. The Supreme Court ordered the affidavit and absentee ballots counted, but not the optical scan ballots, resulting in a tie. The Appellate Division modified, invalidating the affidavit ballot but validating the optical scan ballots. Beightol appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether J.K.’s affidavit ballot should be invalidated due to lack of residency in the voting district.
    2. Whether the two optical scan ballots, initially rejected by the machine, should be counted.
    3. Whether the two absentee ballots should be invalidated because the Board of Elections sent the ballots before receiving fully completed applications and included extrinsic materials (applications) in the return envelope.

    Holding

    1. No, because J.K. did not maintain a fixed, permanent, and principal home in the district, and lacked significant attachments to the Chautauqua County address.
    2. Yes, because the voters’ intent was clear, and the ballots were “non-machine processable as submitted by the voter[s],” requiring a manual count under applicable regulations.
    3. No, because the Board of Elections substantially complied with election law, and the inclusion of absentee ballot applications did not invalidate the ballots as no marks on the ballots themselves identified the voters.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Residency requires physical presence with the intent to remain. The Court relied on People v. O’Hara, 96 N.Y.2d 378 (2001), stating that an individual must have “legitimate, significant and continuing attachments as [his or] her residence for purposes of the Election Law.” Because J.K. had a more permanent residence elsewhere and lacked significant ties to the Chautauqua County location, her affidavit ballot was invalid.

    For the optical scan ballots, the Court looked to 9 NYCRR 6210.13 (A) (8), stating “If a ballot is ‘non-machine processable as submitted by the voter, [it] shall be manually counted by a bipartisan team of election inspectors and such vote totals shall be added to the canvass’”. Since the ballots were rejected by the machine, the Court validated them to ensure voter intent was honored.

    Regarding the absentee ballots, while the Board of Elections deviated from the ideal procedure, they substantially complied with the law. Citing Matter of Gross v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 3 N.Y.3d 251 (2004), the Court distinguished this case, noting that the Board had a basis to determine the voters were entitled to absentee ballots. The Court also found that including the applications in the return envelope did not violate Election Law § 9-112(1) as it states extrinsic marks must appear on the ballot itself.

    The Court emphasized that “[a] vote for any candidate or ballot measure shall not be rejected solely because the voter failed to follow instructions for marking the ballot.” This underscored the importance of counting ballots where voter intent is clear, even with technical imperfections.

  • People v. Brown, 14 N.Y.3d 113 (2010): Voluntariness of Guilty Pleas and Furloughs for Family Visitation

    People v. Brown, 14 N.Y.3d 113 (2010)

    A guilty plea conditioned on a furlough to visit a seriously ill family member requires special scrutiny to ensure it is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; a hearing is required where the record raises a legitimate question about voluntariness.

    Summary

    Defendant Brown pleaded guilty to robbery and grand larceny in exchange for a 2-to-4-year sentence and a three-week furlough to visit his comatose son. He later moved to withdraw the plea, arguing duress due to his son’s condition. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the circumstances raised a genuine question about the plea’s voluntariness, necessitating an evidentiary hearing. The Court emphasized the need for careful scrutiny of pleas conditioned on furloughs for family visitation.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested and indicted for robbery and grand larceny and held on $10,000 bail. While in custody, his son was hospitalized in a coma due to gunshot wounds. At the initial court appearance, the court presented a plea deal: a guilty plea to both counts in exchange for a 2-to-4-year sentence and a three-week furlough to see his son. The court was aware that Brown was especially interested in the furlough. Prior to the plea, Brown’s request to visit his son in the hospital while in custody was denied. After a brief colloquy about rights, Brown pleaded guilty and was released on his own recognizance for the furlough.

    Procedural History

    After surrendering following the furlough, Brown moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming duress. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea without holding an evidentiary hearing, given his claim that the plea was involuntary due to duress related to his son’s medical condition and the grant of a furlough to visit him.

    Holding

    Yes, because the circumstances surrounding the plea, including the furlough and the defendant’s detailed allegations of duress, raised a legitimate question about the plea’s voluntariness that required an evidentiary hearing to resolve.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a guilty plea must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, representing an informed choice among valid alternatives. While the decision to grant a hearing on a motion to withdraw a plea rests largely in the trial court’s discretion, a hearing is required when the record raises a legitimate question about the plea’s voluntariness. The court distinguished this case from People v. Fiumefreddo, 82 N.Y.2d 536 (1993), noting that unlike Fiumefreddo, here, there was no indication of extended negotiations or sufficient time for Brown to consider alternatives. The trial court failed to inquire about the impact of the furlough on Brown’s decision or whether the plea was truly voluntary. Brown provided detailed allegations of duress, which the trial court disregarded, relying solely on Brown’s admission of guilt. The court noted, “[t]he court’s statement that defendant was ‘interested in taking the plea if I were to give [him] a furlough’ suggests that the court itself was aware of the central influence the furlough had on defendant’s decision to plead guilty.” The denial of Brown’s prior request to visit his son further supported his claim of duress. The Court clarified that pleas conditioned on furloughs are not per se invalid but require “special scrutiny.” The Court held that “so long as the totality of the circumstances reveals that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made, it will be upheld.” In this instance, an evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine voluntariness.

  • Glacial Aggregates LLC v. Town of Yorkshire, 14 N.Y.3d 127 (2010): Establishing Vested Rights and Nonconforming Uses in Zoning Law

    Glacial Aggregates LLC v. Town of Yorkshire, 14 N.Y.3d 127 (2010)

    A property owner acquires a vested right to continue a prior nonconforming use when, in reliance on local permission, they make substantial changes or incur significant expenses, even if a zoning law is subsequently enacted.

    Summary

    Glacial Aggregates sought to mine sand and gravel in a town with no zoning laws. After obtaining a DEC mining permit and investing substantially in preparations, the town enacted a zoning law requiring a special use permit for mining. The town initially acknowledged Glacial’s right to mine but later reversed its position. Glacial sued, claiming a vested right and prior nonconforming use. The Court of Appeals held that the jury could reasonably find Glacial had a vested right and a prior nonconforming use, considering Glacial’s significant investment and preparatory actions taken before the zoning law’s enactment. The case highlights how municipalities cannot retroactively impair vested rights without due process.

    Facts

    Glacial Aggregates acquired land in the Town of Yorkshire, which had no zoning laws, to operate a sand and gravel mine. Glacial spent approximately $500,000 on engineering and environmental studies to obtain a mining permit from the DEC. Glacial excavated material for testing, cleared trees, surveyed the land, and drilled test holes. The Town Board initially declared support for Glacial’s operation but later reversed course by enacting a zoning law requiring a special use permit, effectively preventing Glacial from mining without one. This reversal undermined Glacial’s financing and operations.

    Procedural History

    Glacial sued the Town, seeking a declaration that it could mine without a special use permit, alleging a vested right and a prior nonconforming use. The trial court denied the Town’s motion for a directed verdict, and the jury found in favor of Glacial, awarding damages. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the Town’s motion for a directed verdict and declaring that Glacial had neither a lawful nonconforming use nor a vested right. Glacial appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Glacial Aggregates established a vested right to mine its property based on substantial expenditures and actions taken in reliance on the absence of zoning regulations and initial town approval.

    Holding

    Yes, because Glacial made substantial expenditures and took significant actions to prepare the property for mining in reliance on the Town’s initial permission and the absence of zoning laws, a jury could reasonably find that Glacial had acquired a vested right and a prior nonconforming use.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that existing nonconforming uses are generally constitutionally protected. A vested right is established when a landowner, relying on a legally issued permit (or, in this case, the absence of zoning restrictions and initial approval), makes substantial changes and incurs substantial expenses, such that the municipal action causes serious loss. The court distinguished this case from others by emphasizing that the Town had no zoning laws when Glacial began its operations, and the key was not the DEC permit, but the unqualified permission initially enjoyed from the Town. The court noted Glacial’s $500,000 expenditure on DEC permitting costs was a significant investment. The court further noted that Glacial’s actions, such as clearing trees, surveying, and test drilling, were sufficient to demonstrate an overt manifestation of intent to mine the property before the zoning ordinance took effect. Quoting Buffalo Crushed Stone, Inc. v Town of Cheektowaga, 13 NY3d 88 (2009), the Court stated that mining permits are “strong evidence of a manifestation of intent to mine a given area.” The Court found that the jury could reasonably conclude that Glacial’s improvements were essentially valueless due to the Town’s actions.

  • Mullen v. City of New York, 14 N.Y.3d 190 (2010): Applying the Firefighter Rule to On-Duty and Off-Duty Police Officers

    Mullen v. City of New York, 14 N.Y.3d 190 (2010)

    The “firefighter rule” bars common-law negligence recovery by firefighters and police officers for injuries resulting from risks associated with their employment, even when not technically on duty, if the injury arises from a risk inherent in police work.

    Summary

    A police officer, while entering the parking lot of the New York City Police Headquarters, was injured when a security gate, designed to prevent car bombs, malfunctioned and lifted his car. The officer sued the City and Police Department for negligence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the “firefighter rule” barred the officer’s recovery because the injury resulted from a risk associated with the inherent dangers of police work, regardless of whether the officer was technically on duty at the time. The court emphasized the heightened risk faced by police officers encountering such security devices.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a commanding officer, was driving into the parking lot of the New York City Police Headquarters. The parking lot was protected by a retractable concrete barrier designed to stop car bombs. Plaintiff showed his credentials, and the barrier was lowered, but then it unexpectedly rose again while his car was passing over it. The front of the car was lifted approximately four feet, and the plaintiff sustained injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City and the Police Department for negligence. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the firefighter rule. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “firefighter rule” bars a police officer’s recovery for injuries sustained due to the negligent operation of a security device at police headquarters, when the officer was not technically on duty but entering the facility using his police credentials.

    Holding

    Yes, because the injury arose from a risk “associated with the particular dangers inherent” in police work, specifically the heightened risk of encountering security devices protecting police facilities from terrorist attacks.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the firefighter rule as articulated in Zanghi v Niagara Frontier Transp. Commn., which states that police officers may not recover in common-law negligence for line-of-duty injuries resulting from risks associated with the particular dangers inherent in that type of employment. The court distinguished between situations where an officer’s duties increased the risk of injury and those where the duties merely furnished the occasion for the injury. The court stated, “[W]here some act taken in furtherance of a specific police or firefighting function exposed the officer to a heightened risk of sustaining the particular injury, he or she may not recover damages for common-law negligence.”

    The court found that the high-security device protecting the police headquarters parking lot was plainly a risk “associated with the particular dangers inherent” in police work. While ordinary civilians might encounter such devices, police officers are far more likely to do so, especially when working in secure areas at risk of terrorist attacks. The court emphasized that the officer’s entry into the protected parking lot, permitted only by his police credentials, exposed him to this risk.

    The court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument that he was not technically “on duty” at the time of the injury, stating that the nature of the risk, rather than the officer’s duty status, is dispositive. Police officers often face significant risks even when not technically at work. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the firefighter rule because the injury stemmed from a risk inherent to police work.

  • Chasm Hydro, Inc. v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 14 N.Y.3d 24 (2010): Availability of Prohibition Against Agency Action

    Chasm Hydro, Inc. v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 14 N.Y.3d 24 (2010)

    Prohibition does not lie to prevent an administrative agency from bringing an enforcement proceeding when the petitioner has an adequate remedy at law and has not demonstrated that the agency has exceeded its jurisdiction.

    Summary

    Chasm Hydro, Inc. sought to prevent the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) from pursuing an administrative enforcement action against it for allegedly violating state water quality laws. Chasm argued that federal law preempted DEC’s authority over its federally regulated dam. The New York Court of Appeals held that prohibition was not warranted because Chasm had an adequate legal remedy through the administrative proceeding and subsequent judicial review, and had not clearly demonstrated that DEC was acting outside its jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that the administrative process should be allowed to determine the extent of DEC’s authority in the first instance.

    Facts

    Chasm Hydro, Inc. operates a hydroelectric dam on the Chateaugay River. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has licensing authority over the dam, but states retain some control over water quality impacts. Chasm received a water quality certificate from DEC in 1980. In 2006, after informing FERC and DEC of its intent to repair the dam, Chasm received a stream disturbance permit and a revised water quality certificate from DEC authorizing the draining of the pond behind the dam, with specific conditions related to sediment removal. After draining the pond, DEC alleged that Chasm discharged approximately 4,000 cubic yards of sediment into the river, exceeding the permitted amount and violating other conditions. DEC then commenced an administrative enforcement proceeding against Chasm.

    Procedural History

    DEC commenced an administrative enforcement proceeding against Chasm. Chasm then initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding, seeking to enjoin DEC’s action. Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a CPLR article 78 petition in the nature of prohibition lies to prevent the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) from bringing an administrative enforcement proceeding against Chasm Hydro, Inc. for alleged violations of state water quality laws.

    Holding

    No, because Chasm Hydro, Inc. has an adequate remedy at law through the administrative proceeding and subsequent judicial review, and it has not clearly demonstrated that the DEC is acting outside its jurisdiction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and is only appropriate when a party demonstrates a clear legal right to relief and that prohibition would provide a more complete and efficacious remedy than other available avenues. The Court found that Chasm failed to meet this burden. Chasm argued that DEC’s authority was preempted by federal law, but the Court determined that this preemption argument should be addressed in the first instance through the administrative process. The Court emphasized that DEC’s authority to enforce violations of New York’s water quality standards pursuant to CWA § 401(d) was a crucial factor. The Court cited PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 US 700, 714 (1994), stating that whether the enforcement actions fall within the State’s power to “determine[] that construction and operation of the project as planned would be inconsistent with one of the designated uses” of the water should be determined, in the first instance, through the administrative process. The Court further noted that the administrative proceeding should address whether the dam, as an exempt project, should be treated the same as a licensed project for preemption analysis. Ultimately, the Court concluded that Chasm had not clearly established that DEC’s enforcement action was in excess of its jurisdiction and that the administrative process, followed by judicial review, was the appropriate forum for resolving the dispute. The court stated that “prohibition does not lie against an administrative agency if another avenue of judicial review is available, absent a demonstration of irreparable injury to the applicant”.

  • Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303 (2010): Attachment of Intangible Property When Personal Jurisdiction Exists

    Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303 (2010)

    When a court has personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary present in New York, it also has jurisdiction over that individual’s tangible or intangible property, even if the situs of the property is outside New York.

    Summary

    Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC sued guarantors of a defaulted mezzanine loan in New York. The plaintiff obtained a pre-judgment order of attachment against the defendants’ ownership interests in out-of-state LLCs, serving the order on defendant Mitchell while he was in New York. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the defendants had submitted to personal jurisdiction in New York, the attachment of their intangible property (LLC membership interests), served on a proper garnishee (Mitchell) present in New York, was valid, even though the LLCs were located outside of New York. The Court also upheld the appointment of a receiver to manage those interests.

    Facts

    Plaintiff made a mezzanine loan to Chicago H & S Senior Investors, LLC for hotel renovations. The loan agreement was executed in New York, and funds were disbursed from New York. The defendants, including Mitchell, guaranteed the loan, agreeing to be jointly and severally liable and submitting to New York jurisdiction. The borrower defaulted and filed for bankruptcy. Plaintiff sued the guarantors in New York to enforce the guaranty. Plaintiff sought a pre-judgment order of attachment to secure any potential judgment against the defendants’ property interests in various out-of-state entities. The property at issue consisted of the defendants’ interests in 22 limited liability companies formed in Delaware, Georgia and Florida and a Florida corporation solely owned by defendant Mitchell. Unlike stock certificates, which are tangible property, defendants’ ownership/membership interests are intangible and uncertificated.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court (trial court) granted the order of attachment and later confirmed it, holding that the defendants’ intangible interests were attachable. The court also appointed a receiver for the out-of-state entities. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over the out-of-state interests. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a New York court can attach a non-domiciliary defendant’s intangible personal property (ownership/membership interests in out-of-state business entities) when the defendant has voluntarily submitted to personal jurisdiction in New York.

    2. Whether the Supreme Court abused its discretion in appointing a receiver pursuant to CPLR 5228.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because when a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of one who owns or controls property, it can compel observance of its decrees by proceedings in personam against the owner within the jurisdiction.

    2. No, because the appointment of a receiver pursuant to section 5228 (a) is a matter within the court’s discretion, and a special reason appeared to justify one.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that attachment serves to provide security for a potential judgment against a debtor. Where a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant, it also has jurisdiction over their property, even if the property is located outside the state. This case was not about using attachment to gain quasi in rem jurisdiction; the defendants had already submitted to personal jurisdiction. The Court found that the defendants’ LLC membership interests were assignable and transferable, making them “property” subject to attachment under CPLR 6202. Because the interests were uncertificated, the Court applied the principles of Harris v. Balk, holding that the situs of the debt (or, in this case, intangible property) is wherever the debtor (or the garnishee) is present. The Court stated, “The obligation of the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies him wherever he goes. He is as much bound to pay his debt in a foreign state when therein sued upon his obligation by his creditor, as he was in the state where the debt was contracted” (quoting Harris v. Balk). Therefore, serving the order of attachment on Mitchell while he was in New York was sufficient to establish the situs of the property in New York. The Court distinguished National Broadway Bank v Sampson, which held that the situs of intangible property is the domicile of the debtor, noting that Harris v Balk overruled that earlier holding. As for the receivership, the court considered (1) alternative remedies available to the creditor; (2) the degree to which receivership will increase the likelihood of satisfaction; and (3) the risk of fraud or insolvency if a receiver is not appointed.

  • Matter of Kachalsky v. Cacace, 14 N.Y.3d 743 (2010): Defining ‘Substantial Constitutional Question’ for Appellate Review

    14 N.Y.3d 743 (2010)

    The case addresses the interpretation of what constitutes a ‘substantial constitutional question’ sufficient to warrant an appeal as of right to the New York Court of Appeals under Article 6, § 3 (b) (1) of the New York Constitution and CPLR 5601 (b).

    Summary

    Alan Kachalsky appealed the denial of his application for a concealed carry pistol license, arguing that the ‘proper cause’ requirement of New York Penal Law § 400.00 (2) (f) violated the Second Amendment. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal sua sponte, finding that no substantial constitutional question was directly involved. Judge Smith dissented, arguing that the Second Amendment issues raised were indeed substantial, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s recent holdings and pending cases on the Second Amendment’s applicability to the states. The dissent contended that the court was improperly using its discretion to avoid hearing a case it was obligated to hear under the New York Constitution.

    Facts

    Alan Kachalsky applied for a license to carry a concealed pistol or revolver in New York. His application was denied because he failed to demonstrate ‘proper cause’ as required by New York Penal Law § 400.00 (2) (f). Kachalsky argued that this ‘proper cause’ requirement infringed upon his Second Amendment rights.

    Procedural History

    Kachalsky’s challenge to the denial of his pistol license application was rejected by the lower courts. He then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as of right, asserting that his appeal directly involved the construction of the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal sua sponte, determining that no substantial constitutional question was directly involved.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the denial of a pistol license based on the ‘proper cause’ requirement of New York Penal Law § 400.00 (2) (f) raises a ‘substantial constitutional question’ regarding the Second Amendment, thereby entitling the applicant to an appeal as of right to the New York Court of Appeals under Article 6, § 3 (b) (1) of the New York Constitution and CPLR 5601 (b).

    Holding

    No, because the Court of Appeals determined, without further explanation, that the constitutional questions presented were not ‘substantial’ enough to warrant an appeal as of right.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority opinion provides no reasoning, simply stating that the appeal is dismissed because no substantial constitutional question is directly involved. Judge Smith’s dissent argues that the court is incorrectly interpreting the meaning of “substantial constitutional question.” Smith asserts that the Second Amendment issues are indeed substantial, especially considering the Supreme Court granted certiorari in McDonald v. City of Chicago to determine whether the Second Amendment applies to the states. Smith also points to District of Columbia v. Heller, arguing that it provides fair ground for litigation regarding whether ‘proper cause’ requirements for carrying concealed weapons are consistent with the Second Amendment. Smith contends that the court is improperly using its discretion to decide whether to hear the appeal, when the Constitution grants the appellant the right to have the appeal heard. Judge Smith stated, “I think, however, that petitioner has a constitutional right to have us hear this appeal, and that’s all there is to it.”

  • People v. Price, 14 N.Y.3d 61 (2010): Exceptional Circumstances and Speedy Trial Rights

    14 N.Y.3d 61 (2010)

    The “exceptional circumstances” exclusion to the speedy trial rule requires the prosecution to demonstrate that, for practical reasons beyond their control, they could not proceed with a legally viable prosecution, and it does not apply where the delay is a result of prosecutorial inaction.

    Summary

    Price was charged with attempted disseminating indecent material to minors. After an intermediate appellate court decision made such a prosecution legally untenable, the prosecution paused the case, but did not dismiss it or notify the defendant. After the New York Court of Appeals reversed that intermediate decision, the prosecution moved forward, more than six months after the initial charge. The Court of Appeals held that the time between the intermediate court’s decision and its reversal did not constitute “exceptional circumstances” excusing the delay under CPL 30.30(4)(g), emphasizing the need to discourage prosecutorial inaction and ensure defendants are informed about the status of their cases.

    Facts

    Defendant Price was arraigned on February 2, 2006, on a felony complaint for attempted disseminating indecent material to minors. The charge stemmed from explicit internet conversations with an undercover officer posing as a 14-year-old, but no sexual images were transmitted.

    Procedural History

    The Second Department held in People v. Kozlow that a conviction for disseminating indecent material requires the transmission of sexual images. The District Attorney, bound by this precedent, determined that Price could not be indicted, but left the criminal complaint pending. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Kozlow, holding that no images were required for a conviction. The People then indicted Price, more than six months after his initial arraignment. The Supreme Court granted Price’s motion to dismiss based on speedy trial grounds. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the interval between an intermediate appellate court decision holding a prosecution legally untenable and a Court of Appeals decision reversing that holding constitutes “exceptional circumstances” under CPL 30.30(4)(g), excusing the prosecution’s delay in bringing the case to trial.

    Holding

    No, because the delay was the result of prosecutorial inaction, as the People failed to either withdraw the complaint or seek a continuance, and this inaction does not constitute exceptional circumstances under CPL 30.30(4)(g).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPL 30.30 aims to prevent prosecutorial inaction. While there is no precise definition of “exceptional circumstances,” the term is limited by the legislative intent to discourage inaction. The exclusion applies only when the People, for practical reasons beyond their control, cannot proceed with a legally viable prosecution. The Court highlighted that the prosecutor could have sought a continuance from the court, ensuring judicial oversight and keeping the defendant informed. Here, the People concede there was no legal basis to proceed after the intermediate appellate court’s decision. The Court stated, “[l]egal rulings are routine events in criminal trials. The fact that a particular ruling may be erroneous does not by itself transform that ruling into an ‘exceptional circumstance.’” While the People were not in control of the appellate court’s erroneous decision, they did have control over the criminal complaint and allowed it to stand, despite the apparent legal impediment. The Court concluded that applying the exclusion here would allow criminal complaints to pend indefinitely based on the mere possibility of a change in the law. The Court acknowledged the potential for unfortunate results where a defendant may benefit from an erroneous appellate decision, but reiterated that speedy trial cases often transcend the specifics of a particular defendant’s guilt, and exist to protect the public interest.

  • Ayers v. O’Brien, 14 N.Y.3d 452 (2010): Emergency Vehicle Standard of Care When the Operator is the Plaintiff

    14 N.Y.3d 452 (2010)

    Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104, which provides a reckless disregard standard of care for drivers of emergency vehicles, cannot be used offensively by the emergency vehicle operator to prevent a comparative fault defense when the operator is the plaintiff.

    Summary

    A Deputy Sheriff, Ayers, was injured when his patrol car was struck by O’Brien while making a U-turn to pursue a speeding vehicle. Ayers sued O’Brien for negligence. O’Brien asserted a comparative fault defense. Ayers moved to dismiss the defense, arguing that as an emergency vehicle operator, he was only liable for reckless disregard under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e), and he had not acted recklessly. The New York Court of Appeals held that the reckless disregard standard only applies when the emergency vehicle operator is a defendant, not when they are the plaintiff. The comparative fault defense was reinstated.

    Facts

    On July 31, 2005, Deputy Sheriff Ayers was on patrol. Ayers made a U-turn to pursue a speeding vehicle. While executing the U-turn, Ayers’ patrol car was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by O’Brien.

    Procedural History

    Ayers sued O’Brien for common-law negligence in New York State Supreme Court. O’Brien asserted a comparative fault defense. The Supreme Court granted Ayers’ motion to dismiss the comparative fault defense. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the defense. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division erred in reinstating the defense.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the reckless disregard standard of liability under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) applies in determining the culpable conduct of the operator of an emergency vehicle when the operator is the plaintiff.

    Holding

    No, because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) is intended to protect emergency vehicle operators from liability, not to provide them with an advantage when they are the ones bringing the lawsuit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) was designed to give emergency vehicle operators the freedom to perform their duties without being unduly hampered by the normal rules of the road. Citing Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494 (1994), the court reiterated that the purpose of the statute is to prevent emergency personnel from being deterred from taking calculated risks to save lives or property due to the fear of civil liability for “a mere failure of judgment.” The court emphasized that the statute “precludes the imposition of liability for otherwise privileged conduct except where the conduct rises to the level of recklessness.”

    However, the court found that allowing Ayers to use the statute to shield himself from a comparative fault defense would be an inappropriate extension of the statute’s purpose. The court stated that Ayers’ interpretation of the statute would “shift the responsibility for any contributory negligence on the part of an emergency vehicle operator to the driver of another vehicle whom the emergency vehicle operator sues.” This would lead to unfair results, such as an emergency vehicle operator recovering full damages from a minimally negligent defendant even if the operator’s own negligence contributed to the injuries. The court concluded that there was no evidence that the legislature intended such a “financial windfall” when it enacted the statute. The Court stated that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) “cannot be used as a sword to ward off a comparative fault defense” and should only apply when the emergency vehicle operator is sued or countersued.