New York Law Review

Tag: 2010

  • For the People Theatres of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 27 Misc 3d 1079 (2010): Zoning Restrictions on Adult Businesses and the Burden of Proof

    For the People Theatres of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 27 Misc 3d 1079 (2010)

    When a municipality defends a zoning ordinance regulating adult businesses against a First Amendment challenge, it must show that the affected businesses retain a predominant focus on sexually explicit materials or activities.

    Summary

    The City of New York amended its zoning regulations to curb negative secondary effects associated with adult businesses, which were found to be circumventing the 1995 zoning ordinance. The City’s zoning amendments were challenged by adult businesses, who claimed their First Amendment rights were violated. The New York Court of Appeals, applying the burden-shifting framework from Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., found that the City met its burden of demonstrating that the affected establishments retained a predominant focus on sexually explicit materials or activities, and that the 2001 amendments were facially constitutional. The Court emphasized that the City bore a modest evidentiary burden, akin to substantial evidence, in demonstrating the continued focus on sexually explicit content. The case underscores the importance of balancing free speech rights with a municipality’s legitimate interest in controlling the secondary effects of adult businesses.

    Facts

    In 1994, the New York City Department of City Planning (DCP) conducted a study on the negative impacts of adult businesses. In response, the City Council enacted a zoning ordinance in 1995, which was challenged. The City then amended its zoning regulations in 2001 to clarify the definition of adult establishments and to address what it saw as sham compliance with the 1995 ordinance. The new regulations affected adult bookstores and adult eating or drinking establishments, which both claimed they had a First Amendment right to show adult materials. The businesses reconfigured their establishments to comply with the 1995 regulations but continued to emphasize sexually explicit content. The City presented evidence from inspections of the businesses, photographs, and video recordings to demonstrate the ongoing focus on sexually explicit content.

    Procedural History

    The original zoning ordinance of 1995 was challenged and upheld by the New York Court of Appeals. The businesses then challenged the 2001 amendments in the Supreme Court, where the court initially declared the amendments unconstitutional, and the Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court. Upon remand, the trial court upheld the 2001 zoning regulations. The Appellate Division, however, reversed the trial court’s decision, prompting an appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the 2001 zoning amendments, which redefined “adult establishments” to address “sham compliance” with the 1995 zoning ordinance, violated the businesses’ First Amendment rights.
    2. Whether the City met its evidentiary burden to show that the 2001 amendments were constitutional by proving that the regulated businesses had a continued focus on sexually explicit materials.

    Holding

    1. Yes, the 2001 zoning amendments did not violate the businesses’ First Amendment rights.
    2. Yes, the City met its burden of demonstrating the continued focus on sexually explicit content in the regulated businesses, thereby justifying the amended regulations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the burden-shifting framework established in Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. to determine whether the zoning regulations were constitutional under the First Amendment. First, the Court confirmed the City’s right to regulate businesses. The Court clarified that the City only needed to provide “reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence” for its regulation, and it had done so. The Court then considered whether the businesses offered any facts that would dispute the city’s conclusion, which the Court found they had. The Court reviewed the city’s evidence showing that, despite technical compliance, the businesses’ essential character remained unchanged. In applying the Alameda Books framework, the court reiterated that the City’s burden was light and it only needed to show a rational basis for the law. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Appellate Division erred in applying a mechanical checklist. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that the City provided sufficient evidence to support its position and that the 2001 amendments were constitutional. The court emphasized that the City’s zoning regulations did not need to meet a high burden of proof and should be upheld if there was relevant evidence that supported it.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides clear guidance on how municipalities can regulate adult businesses while respecting First Amendment rights. Attorneys advising municipalities should understand:

    – That a local government’s evidentiary burden in defending such regulations is relatively light, requiring only “substantial evidence” to justify the ordinance’s rationale.
    – That the focus of the analysis should be on whether the business retains a predominant focus on sexually explicit materials.
    – That courts should be deferential to the local government’s factual judgments.
    – That a mechanical, factor-based approach to determining the “focus” of a business is inappropriate; instead, the court should assess the totality of the evidence.
    – Later cases should analyze the facts of each case based on how similar zoning regulations are aimed at controlling the secondary effects of adult businesses while respecting free speech.

  • Stega v. New York Assn. for the Blind, 16 N.Y.3d 149 (2010): Limits on ‘Brandt’ Privilege and Blackmail Schemes

    Stega v. New York Assn. for the Blind, 16 N.Y.3d 149 (2010)

    The privilege for truthful communications exposing offenses against the public, as established in Brandt v. Winchell, does not extend to communications regarding private matters lacking public concern, even if motivated by malicious intent such as blackmail.

    Summary

    In a dispute arising from an alleged blackmail scheme, the New York Court of Appeals considered the scope of the privilege for truthful communications. The plaintiff claimed the defendants disclosed his adulterous affair and resume omissions after he refused to surrender rights to his child. The court affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss, holding that the Brandt privilege does not protect communications about private matters (like adultery and resume omissions) lacking public concern, even when motivated by an alleged blackmail scheme. The court emphasized that the communications at issue did not relate to matters warranting public exposition or legitimate news interest.

    Facts

    The plaintiff alleged that defendants engaged in a blackmail scheme. After the plaintiff refused to surrender rights to his child, the defendants disclosed plaintiff’s adulterous affair with a fellow teacher and omissions from his resume to the Department of Education and the school district.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing their communications were privileged. The lower courts denied the motion. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Brandt privilege didn’t apply because the communications did not concern a matter of public interest.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the privilege for truthful communications extends to the disclosure of private matters, such as an adulterous affair and resume omissions, when motivated by an alleged blackmail scheme.

    Holding

    No, because the Brandt privilege protects the exposure of offenses against the public, but does not extend to private matters lacking public concern, regardless of the communicator’s motivation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while Brandt v. Winchell provides “immunity from civil suit” for truthful communications resulting in “the exposure of those guilty of offenses against the public,” this privilege is not without limits. The court distinguished the facts from cases like Brandt and ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, noting that those cases involved matters of public concern (e.g., cancer fundraising improprieties, threats to the ozone layer). The court emphasized that the communications in Stega concerned the plaintiff’s private life and did not relate to a matter of legitimate public interest or warrant public exposition. The court stated, “As we put it in Chapadeau, a matter ‘within the sphere of legitimate public concern’ is one ‘which is reasonably related to matters warranting public exposition.’” Adultery and resume omissions, the court found, did not meet this standard. Judge Smith’s concurrence clarified that the New York Times line of cases (regarding defamation) offers no protection where statements don’t involve matters of public concern. The concurrence further noted that extending the Brandt privilege to minor offenses like adultery would be unacceptable, as it should be reserved for matters of public concern or significant criminal activity.

  • Dahar v. Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co., 15 N.Y.3d 521 (2010): Scope of Labor Law § 240(1) for Cleaning Activities

    Dahar v. Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co. ,15 N.Y.3d 521 (2010)

    Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes strict liability on owners and contractors for elevation-related hazards, does not extend to injuries sustained by a factory employee while cleaning a manufactured product as part of the manufacturing process.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, an employee of West Metal Works, was injured when he fell from a ladder while cleaning a steel “wall module” manufactured by West for defendant Bechtel. He sued under Labor Law § 240(1), arguing that cleaning the module constituted “cleaning” a “structure.” The Court of Appeals held that Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply to a factory employee cleaning a manufactured product, emphasizing that the statute’s central concern is construction-related hazards and that extending it to cover manufacturing processes would broaden its scope beyond the legislature’s intent. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.

    Facts

    West Metal Works, Inc. manufactured a steel “wall module” for Bechtel National, Inc., intended for installation in a nuclear waste treatment plant. Before shipping, the module required cleaning. Plaintiff, a West employee, was cleaning the module while standing on a ladder when the ladder allegedly broke, causing him to fall and sustain injuries.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued multiple defendants, including Bechtel and West’s landlords (the Martins), under Labor Law § 240(1). Supreme Court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim. The Appellate Division affirmed, with two justices dissenting. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to an injury sustained by a factory employee while cleaning a product (a steel wall module) during the manufacturing process.

    Holding

    No, because Labor Law § 240(1) is primarily intended to protect workers from construction-related hazards, and extending it to cover the cleaning of manufactured products within a factory setting would unduly broaden the statute’s scope beyond what the legislature intended.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that Labor Law § 240(1) is primarily concerned with dangers in the construction industry, tracing its origins to addressing deaths and injuries in the construction trades. While the Court had previously rejected limiting the law solely to construction sites, it had not extended it to a factory employee cleaning a manufactured product. The Court noted that the majority of “cleaning” cases under Labor Law § 240(1) involved window cleaning, and even those cases had limitations, such as excluding routine household window washing. The court reasoned that applying the statute to the cleaning of manufactured products would expand its coverage far beyond its intended purpose, potentially including activities like dusting bookshelves or cleaning light fixtures, thus creating a flood of new potential plaintiffs. The Court stated, “It is apparent from the text of Labor Law § 240 (1), and its history confirms, that its central concern is the dangers that beset workers in the construction industry.” The Court found no precedent for allowing recovery under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries suffered while cleaning a product in a manufacturing process and concluded that the statute does not apply to such situations. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that “cleaning” any “structure” should automatically trigger the statute’s protections, highlighting the need for a more nuanced interpretation consistent with the law’s original intent.

  • People v. Thomas, 15 N.Y.3d 924 (2010): Admissibility of Codefendant Identification to Bolster Eyewitness Testimony

    People v. Thomas, 15 N.Y.3d 924 (2010)

    Evidence of an eyewitness’s identification of a codefendant, who is not on trial, is admissible to bolster the witness’s in-court identification of the defendant if it is probative of the witness’s ability to accurately observe and identify the perpetrators of the crime.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that testimony regarding a witness’s showup identification of a codefendant was admissible to support the accuracy of the witness’s in-court identification of the defendant. The court distinguished this case from prior rulings that restricted third-party testimony about pretrial identifications. Here, the eyewitness himself testified about identifying both the defendant and the codefendant, whose possession of the stolen cell phone made the identification highly relevant. The court reasoned that the witness’s accurate identification of the codefendant was probative of the witness’s overall ability to observe and recall the events of the robbery, thus bolstering the reliability of his identification of the defendant.

    Facts

    Oscar Magallanes was robbed by two men outside his apartment. The well-lit landing allowed Magallanes to clearly see the faces of his attackers. Police officers nearby noticed Daniel Thomas and Victor Cruz running from the scene. Cruz was found with Magallanes’s cell phone and cash. Magallanes identified both Thomas and Cruz in a showup. Prior to trial, the showup identification of Thomas was suppressed as fruit of an illegal arrest. However, Magallanes was permitted to identify Thomas in court based on an independent source.

    Procedural History

    Thomas was convicted of robbery in the second degree. He appealed, arguing that the evidence of Magallanes’s showup identification of Cruz was inadmissible. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding any error harmless. A dissenting justice granted Thomas leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether testimony concerning an eyewitness’s pretrial identification of a codefendant, who is not on trial, is admissible to bolster the witness’s in-court identification of the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the eyewitness’s accuracy in identifying the person who possessed the stolen property (the codefendant) was relevant to the eyewitness’s ability to observe and accurately identify the other attacker (the defendant) at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Monroe, which involved improper bolstering of identification by a third party. Here, the eyewitness himself testified about the identification. The court also distinguished this case from the Trowbridge rule, which prohibits third-party testimony about a witness’s prior identification of a defendant. The Court emphasized that the concerns underlying Trowbridge—namely, the improper bolstering of an identification by a third party—were not present. The court stated that “[t]he repetition of an identification by a third party may ‘improperly influence the jury’s belief in the reliability of the identification…The testimony of the third party is not probative of whether the defendant was the person who committed the crime, but it could at best establish that the eyewitness, prior to trial, identified the defendant in the presence of others’ (People v Bolden, 58 NY2d 741, 743 [1982, Gabrielli, J., concurring]).”

    Instead, Magallanes’s testimony concerning his identification of Cruz was probative of whether Thomas had attacked Magallanes. This is because Magallanes’s accuracy in identifying the person who, it turned out, had his cell phone was relevant to whether the conditions on the landing at 124 East 103rd Street were conducive to observing the other attacker and accurately identifying him at trial. The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony, because “Magallanes’s accuracy in identifying the person who, it turned out, had his cell phone was relevant to whether the conditions on the landing at 124 East 103rd Street were conducive to observing the other attacker and accurately identifying him at trial.” Thus, the testimony was deemed relevant and admissible.

  • People v. Medina, 16 N.Y.3d 95 (2010): Reversible Error for Failing to Define ‘Deprive’ and ‘Appropriate’ in Larceny Cases

    People v. Medina, 16 N.Y.3d 95 (2010)

    In larceny-related crimes, a trial court’s failure to provide the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” to the jury, when those terms are essential to understanding larcenous intent, constitutes reversible error if it creates a likelihood of confusion and prejudices the defendant.

    Summary

    Medina, a DEA informant, was convicted of first-degree robbery. During jury deliberations, the jury expressed confusion about the meaning of intent. The trial court had not provided the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate,” which are components of larcenous intent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the failure to define these terms was reversible error because the jury’s notes showed they struggled with the concept of intent, and the omission created a likelihood of confusion regarding whether Medina intended to permanently deprive the victim of property.

    Facts

    Medina, a paid DEA informant, participated in an unauthorized break-in at Jose Oleaga’s home. During the incident, Medina took Pena’s cell phone. Pena and Oleaga later claimed several thousand dollars were missing. Medina was arrested and told police conflicting stories, initially claiming he was trying to stop a robbery, then admitting he was offered money to participate. He implicated others, including Nelson Guerrero, whom he had previously informed on.

    Procedural History

    Medina was indicted on multiple counts, including first-degree robbery. He was convicted of first-degree robbery. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial, holding that the failure to instruct the jury on the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” was reversible error.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s failure to charge the jury with the statutory definition of “appropriate” and/or “deprive,” which forms part of the definition of larcenous intent, is reversible error.

    Holding

    Yes, because the omission of the definition of “appropriate” and/or “deprive” did not adequately convey the meaning of intent to the jury and instead created a great likelihood of confusion such that the degree of precision required for a jury charge was not met.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the failure to define “deprive” and “appropriate” was reversible error. The Court emphasized that, based on prior precedent (People v. Blacknall), omission of these definitions “could have misled the jury into thinking that any withholding, permanent or temporary, constituted larceny.” The court highlighted that the concepts of “deprive” and “appropriate” are essential to defining larcenous intent because they “ ‘connote a purpose … to exert permanent or virtually permanent control over the property taken, or to cause permanent or virtually permanent loss to the owner of the possession and use thereof’ ” (quoting People v. Jennings). The court found that the jury’s notes during deliberations indicated confusion about intent, demonstrating that the omission was not harmless. The court explicitly stated: “in this case, no such speculation is necessary as the jury’s confusion concerning the concept of intent is evident from its own messages to the court during deliberations. Taken together with the facts underlying the conviction in this case, we find that the jury notes provide a clear basis for our conclusion that the court’s failure to define ‘appropriate’ and/or ‘deprive’ was not harmless.” The court noted that it is critical that the jury understands whether the defendant intended to permanently deprive the victims of their property. Because of this failure, the court reversed the conviction.

  • Schenectady County SPCA v. Mills, 16 N.Y.3d 44 (2010): Redaction Required for FOIL Requests

    Schenectady County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc. v. Mills, 16 N.Y.3d 44 (2010)

    An agency responding to a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request must redact a record to remove exempt information if it can do so without unreasonable difficulty, rather than withhold the entire record.

    Summary

    Schenectady County SPCA requested a list of names and addresses of licensed veterinarians and veterinary technicians from the New York State Education Department under FOIL. The Department offered names and city/state portions of addresses but refused to provide street addresses, claiming they could not distinguish between business and residential addresses. The SPCA sought only business addresses. The Court of Appeals held that the Department could not refuse to produce the entire record simply because some of it might be exempt. The court emphasized the duty to redact exempt information when reasonably possible, to fulfill FOIL obligations efficiently.

    Facts

    The Schenectady County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) requested, via email and then formally under FOIL, a list of names and addresses of licensed veterinarians and veterinary technicians in Schenectady County from the Education Department.

    The Department offered a list of names, cities, and states but refused to provide street addresses, stating that it did not provide home addresses for licensed professionals and could not distinguish between business and residential addresses in its computerized files.

    The SPCA clarified it was seeking only business addresses.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the SPCA’s petition to compel production of the list.

    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision and granted the petition, compelling the Department to produce the list.

    The Department appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an agency responding to a FOIL request may withhold a record entirely because some of the information in that record may be exempt from disclosure, even if the exempt information could be redacted.

    Holding

    No, because an agency responding to a FOIL request must redact the record to remove exempt information if it can do so without unreasonable difficulty, rather than withhold the entire record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Education Department could not refuse to produce the entire list of names and addresses simply because it contained some information (home addresses) that might be exempt from disclosure under FOIL’s privacy provisions.

    The Court reasoned that the SPCA was only seeking business addresses, which the Department did not claim were private. The Court found it “obvious” that the Department should simply delete the home addresses from the list, especially because the SPCA was only seeking business addresses.

    The Court distinguished between creating a new record (which FOIL generally does not require) and redacting an existing one. Citing Matter of Data Tree, LLC v Romaine, 9 NY3d 454, 464 (2007), the court noted that “even when a document subject to FOIL contains . . . private, protected information, agencies may be required to prepare a redacted version with the exempt material removed.”

    The Court criticized the extensive litigation of the case, stating, “It seems that an agency sensitive to its FOIL obligations could have furnished petitioner a redacted list with a few hours’ effort, and at negligible cost.” The Court expressed its hope that the Department and other government agencies would comply with their FOIL obligations more efficiently in the future.

  • People v. Steward, 16 N.Y.3d 104 (2010): Limits on Voir Dire Questioning

    16 N.Y.3d 104 (2010)

    A trial court abuses its discretion when it imposes an unreasonably short time restriction on attorney questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire, especially in a complex felony case where potential jurors have expressed biases or have connections to the victim.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a five-minute time limit on defense counsel’s questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire. The court found that this limitation, given the serious felony charges, the victim’s prominence, and the jurors’ potential biases, deprived the defendant of a fair opportunity to assess juror qualifications. The Court emphasized the need for trial courts to tailor voir dire procedures to the specific circumstances of each case, and to reconsider time limitations when they prove unduly restrictive and prejudicial.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with robbery after allegedly stealing a necklace from Raashaun Casey, a radio personality known as “DJ Envy.” Casey and a friend pursued the defendant, leading to his apprehension. Before jury selection, the trial court imposed a five-minute time limit for each round of voir dire. During voir dire, several prospective jurors revealed they or their close relations were victims of robbery or theft. Some jurors also indicated familiarity with the victim, DJ Envy. Defense counsel objected to the time limit but the court continued to enforce it.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of robbery. He appealed, arguing that the time restriction during voir dire denied him a fair trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a five-minute limitation on counsel’s questioning of jurors during voir dire in a multiple felony case, thus denying the defendant a fair trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court’s time restriction prevented defense counsel from adequately exploring potential juror biases and relevant matters affecting their qualifications, especially given the serious nature of the charges and the identity of the victim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized the broad discretion afforded to trial courts in supervising voir dire under CPL 270.15(1)(c), but emphasized that any time restrictions must still afford counsel a “fair opportunity to question prospective jurors about relevant matters.” The Court acknowledged the absence of rigid guidelines for determining appropriate time limits but highlighted several factors, including the number and seriousness of charges, media attention, and unique concerns arising from the identity of the defendant, victim, or witnesses. The court noted that the five-minute restriction was significantly shorter than those previously upheld.

    The Court also found it significant that the victim was a local radio celebrity known to many prospective jurors and that a number of venire members stated that they or someone close to them had been a crime victim. The Court reasoned that these circumstances called for a more extended period for counsel questioning. Although the trial judge was conscientious in her examination of the venire, “the attorneys were significantly limited in their efforts to follow-up on provocative answers given by prospective jurors in response to the court’s inquiries.”

    The Court stated, “Given the lack of clarity in the record concerning whether certain prospective jurors were discharged or retained, we cannot say that defendant’s claim of prejudice is refuted by the record.” The Court emphasized that “trial judges are not always able to cover all avenues of questioning that interest the parties during voir dire—that is why the Legislature has directed that counsel must be provided a ‘fair opportunity’ to examine prospective jurors after the court has concluded its questioning.”

    The Court concluded that “the unusually short time restriction imposed by the court prevented counsel from having a sufficient opportunity to examine the various prospective jurors whose statements could reasonably be expected to elicit further questioning, and defendant’s claim of prejudice cannot be discounted…” and reversed the conviction.

  • Hickey v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 16 N.Y.3d 731 (2010): Enforceability of Union Waivers of Teacher Disciplinary Procedures

    Hickey v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 16 N.Y.3d 731 (2010)

    A union can waive certain procedural rights granted to tenured teachers under Education Law § 3020-a through a collective bargaining agreement, provided the waiver is knowing and intentional.

    Summary

    Two tenured teachers, Hickey and Cohn, challenged the placement of letters of reprimand in their personnel files, arguing that the Board of Education failed to follow the procedures outlined in Education Law § 3020-a. The Board argued that the teachers’ union had waived these procedures in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), replacing them with a different process. The Court of Appeals held that the union’s agreement to Article 21A of the CBA constituted a limited waiver of the teachers’ procedural rights under § 3020-a, as the CBA provisions were incompatible with the statutory procedure. Therefore, the teachers were not entitled to have the letters expunged.

    Facts

    Hickey received a letter of reprimand for incompetence in preparing students for a field day. Cohn received a letter detailing a substantiated complaint regarding an incident where she allegedly told her principal to watch her “Latin temper.” Both letters stated that they “may lead to further disciplinary action” and were placed in the teachers’ files in 2008. The 2007-2009 CBA between the Board of Education and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), the teachers’ union, contained Article 21A, which outlined a procedure for placing written reprimands in teachers’ files, allegedly waiving the procedures outlined in Education Law § 3020-a.

    Procedural History

    Hickey and Cohn filed Article 78 proceedings seeking to compel the Board of Education to expunge the letters of reprimand from their personnel files. Supreme Court granted the petitions, ordering the expungement. The Appellate Division reversed, denying the petitions, finding that the CBA constituted a valid waiver of the statutory procedures.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a collective bargaining agreement between a teachers’ union and the Board of Education can waive the procedural rights granted to tenured teachers under Education Law § 3020-a regarding the placement of letters of reprimand in their personnel files.

    Holding

    Yes, because pursuant to Education Law § 3020, a CBA can modify or waive the § 3020-a procedures, and in this case, Article 21A of the 2007-2009 CBA effectuated a limited waiver of those rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Education Law § 3020 allows for alternative disciplinary procedures to be established through collective bargaining agreements. The court found that Article 21A of the 2007-2009 CBA detailed specific due process and review procedures for teachers’ files, including the right to read and respond to derogatory material. Specifically, the court highlighted subdivision (5) of Article 21A which prohibited members from grieving material in the file, except in cases of unsubstantiated accusations of corporal punishment or verbal abuse, and also stipulated a three year removal period from the file if disciplinary charges do not follow. The court determined this provision was significantly different from and incompatible with the procedure in Education Law § 3020-a, indicating an intent to substitute the CBA procedure for the statutory one. The Court stated that “comparison of the statute and the CBA provision reveals that the procedure in Article 21A is significantly different than, and incompatible with, the procedure in Education Law § 3020-a, meaning that the parties to the contract could not have intended both procedures to simultaneously apply.” The Court emphasized the history of collective bargaining between the parties, concluding that the union was aware that by adopting Article 21A, it was agreeing to substitute that procedure for other due process procedures. Therefore, the union knowingly waived the procedural rights granted in Education Law § 3020-a in this limited context, making the letters not subject to § 3020-a procedures and thus not requiring expungement. This case is significant because it clarifies the extent to which unions can negotiate disciplinary procedures for teachers that differ from the statutory requirements, provided that the union’s waiver of statutory rights is clear and intentional.

  • People v. White, 16 N.Y.3d 726 (2010): Preserving Fourth Amendment Standing Arguments for Appeal

    People v. White, 16 N.Y.3d 726 (2010)

    To preserve for appellate review a challenge to a defendant’s standing to contest a search, the People must raise a timely objection in the suppression court.

    Summary

    Defendant White was convicted of drug charges, and sought to suppress evidence found during a warrantless search of an apartment. The People argued the search was justified by exigent circumstances, hot pursuit, and consent. The suppression court denied the motion. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, finding White lacked standing to challenge the search, an argument not raised at the suppression hearing. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the People must timely object to a defendant’s failure to prove standing in order to preserve that issue for appellate review. This requirement ensures the defendant has notice and an opportunity to develop the record on standing.

    Facts

    Police officers conducted a warrantless entry into an apartment and arrested White. The arrest stemmed from a “buy and bust” operation where White sold drugs to an undercover officer. Incident to the arrest, officers recovered “buy money” from White. White moved to suppress the buy money, arguing the warrantless entry and search were unlawful. The People argued the entry was justified under the exigent circumstances and hot pursuit exceptions to the warrant requirement, and also that the tenant (White’s mother) had consented to the search.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied White’s suppression motion, holding that the warrantless entry was justified under the exigent circumstances and hot pursuit exceptions. The issue of White’s standing was not raised at the suppression hearing. White pleaded guilty and appealed his conviction, arguing the suppression ruling was erroneous. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding White failed to establish standing to challenge the search, and thus did not reach the other arguments. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People must timely object to a defendant’s failure to prove standing to challenge a search in order to preserve that issue for appellate review.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People are required to alert the suppression court if they believe that the defendant has failed to meet his burden to establish standing. The preservation requirement also serves the purpose of alerting the adverse party of the need to develop a record for appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reiterated its holding in People v. Stith, that the People cannot raise a defendant’s lack of standing for the first time on appeal. The Court acknowledged conflicting rulings from the Appellate Division, and clarified that those decisions should no longer be followed to the extent they suggest the People need not timely object to preserve the standing issue. The Court emphasized that the primary reason for requiring a timely objection is to bring the claim to the trial court’s attention, allowing it to make a ruling on the issue. Quoting People v. Gray, the court stated that “demanding notice through objection or motion in a trial court, as with any specific objection, is to bring the claim to the trial court’s attention.” The court also noted that the preservation requirement alerts the defendant to the need to develop a record on appeal. The court emphasized that a defendant “must allege standing to challenge the search and, if the allegation is disputed, must establish standing.” Because the People did not challenge White’s claim of a legitimate expectation of privacy in his mother’s apartment at the suppression hearing, they failed to preserve the issue for appeal, and the Appellate Division erred in considering it.

  • People v. Scott, 15 N.Y.3d 590 (2010): Applying the Rape Shield Law & Jury Selection

    People v. Scott, 15 N.Y.3d 590 (2010)

    New York’s Rape Shield Law (CPL 60.42) generally prohibits evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct, but a trial court has discretion to admit such evidence if it is relevant and admissible in the interests of justice; furthermore, a trial court has discretion in ruling on challenges for cause regarding jurors.

    Summary

    This case concerns the admissibility of evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct under New York’s Rape Shield Law and challenges for cause during jury selection. The defendant was convicted of rape in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in precluding certain evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct and in its rulings regarding jury selection, finding no abuse of discretion. The court emphasized the importance of protecting victims from harassment and confusion of jurors, while also recognizing the court’s role in ensuring an impartial jury.

    Facts

    K.D., a minor, attended a party where she consumed alcohol and marijuana. She later claimed to have had intercourse with both Steven A. and the defendant, Scott. Initially, she only accused Steven A., but later accused the defendant of rape. At trial, K.D. testified that the defendant raped her. Another attendee, A.B., testified that K.D. was crying and wearing only a sheet after being alone with the defendant. The defense sought to introduce evidence of K.D.’s sexual activity with Steven A. to explain her emotional state, but the trial court largely prohibited this evidence.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with rape in the first degree (forcible), rape in the second degree (statutory), and endangering the welfare of a child. The County Court initially granted the defendant’s motion to introduce evidence of K.D.’s sexual conduct but later reversed its decision. The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree rape but convicted him of second-degree rape and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in precluding evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct with another person around the time of the alleged rape, pursuant to CPL 60.42 (5)?

    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its rulings regarding the disqualification and retention of jurors?

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court appropriately applied CPL 60.42 (5) and the evidence’s relevance was contingent on the People introducing evidence of bruising, which they did not do.

    2. No, because the trial court’s actions were within its discretion under CPL 270.15 (4) and CPL 270.20, and leaning towards disqualification of a potentially biased juror is permissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Rape Shield Law, CPL 60.42, generally prohibits the introduction of evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct in sex offense prosecutions to protect victims from harassment and prevent juror confusion. The court acknowledged that CPL 60.42 (5) allows for an exception “in the interests of justice,” but emphasized that this discretion should be exercised cautiously. The court found that the trial court’s decision to preclude evidence of K.D.’s sexual activity with Steven A. was appropriate because the People did not introduce evidence of bruising caused by sexual contact and attributed to the defendant, which was the basis upon which the defense argued for admissibility.

    Regarding jury selection, the court cited CPL 270.15 (4) and CPL 270.20, which govern challenges for cause. The court acknowledged the trial court’s failure to make a probing inquiry of the sworn juror who expressed reservations about the lack of DNA evidence. However, the court stated that discharging this juror was authorized and proper under CPL 270.15(4). The Court also noted that a trial court should err on the side of disqualifying a prospective juror of dubious impartiality, quoting People v. Branch, 46 NY2d 645, 651 (1979): “trial court should lean toward disqualifying a prospective juror of dubious impartiality, rather than testing the bounds of discretion by permitting such a juror to serve”. The court found no error in refusing to disqualify the other prospective juror, citing People v. Provenzano, 50 NY2d 420 (1980), because the relationship between the prosecutor and that juror was distant in time and limited in nature.