New York Law Review

Tag: 2009

  • People v. Davis, 14 N.Y.3d 20 (2009): When Criminal Possession is Not a Lesser Included Offense of Criminal Sale

    14 N.Y.3d 20 (2009)

    Criminal possession of a controlled substance is not a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance under New York law, even when an agency defense is presented, because it is theoretically possible to commit the sale crime without necessarily committing the possession crime.

    Summary

    George Davis was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At trial, he requested a jury instruction on the agency defense (arguing he acted as the buyer’s agent) and also requested that the court charge criminal possession as a lesser included offense. The trial court granted the agency defense instruction but denied the lesser included offense charge. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that criminal possession is not a lesser included offense of criminal sale, even when the agency defense is raised, because the theoretical possibility exists to sell without possessing. This decision emphasizes a strict application of the ‘impossibility’ test for lesser included offenses.

    Facts

    An undercover officer approached Davis outside a building known for drug sales, requesting two bags of crack cocaine and providing $60. Davis entered the building, returned, and handed the officer the drugs. At trial, Davis testified that the officer solicited his help in purchasing crack, promising to “look out for” him. Davis claimed he led the officer to the building, took $40, purchased the crack inside, and gave it to the officer, receiving no payment for his services. He argued he was merely acting as an agent for the buyer.

    Procedural History

    Davis was indicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. At trial, he requested and received an agency defense instruction. He also requested a charge for criminal possession of a controlled substance as a lesser included offense, which was denied. He was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree as a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, when an agency defense was properly submitted to the jury.

    Holding

    No, because it is theoretically possible to commit the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance without, by the same conduct, committing the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The agency defense does not alter this analysis.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the two-pronged test established in People v. Glover to determine whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense charge. The first prong requires that it be theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without committing the lesser. The Court emphasized that this determination is made by a “comparative examination of the statutes defining the two crimes, in the abstract” (Glover). Here, the court reasoned that one can “offer or agree to” sell drugs without having physical possession or control over them. The court dismissed the argument that the agency defense changes this analysis. The agency defense is an interpretation of the definition of “sell.” The Court stated, “Although ‘[r]eading the statute literally, any passing of drugs from one person to another would constitute a sale,’ we have held that ‘[o]ne who acts solely as the agent of the buyer cannot be convicted of the crime of selling narcotics’.” Because the agency defense is still a defense to sale, the Court reasoned that the Glover test remains applicable and an exception to the test is not warranted. As such, the Court affirmed the lower court’s conclusion. The dissenting opinion argued for an exception to the Glover test when the agency defense is invoked. The dissent contended that because a defendant asserting the agency defense essentially admits to possessing the drugs on behalf of the buyer, a charge of simple possession should be included to avoid coercing the jury into either acquitting a defendant who admits to criminal conduct or convicting them of a greater crime.

  • People v. Samandarov, 13 N.Y.3d 433 (2009): Hearing Requirements for Juror Misconduct and Rosario Violations

    13 N.Y.3d 433 (2009)

    A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a hearing on post-trial motions alleging juror misconduct or a Rosario violation when the defendant’s claims are based on hearsay or contradicted by substantial evidence.

    Summary

    Simon Samandarov was convicted of attempted murder and related charges. After the verdict, he moved to set it aside, alleging juror misconduct based on a newspaper article and hearsay information suggesting the jury improperly considered his alleged ties to the Russian Mob. He later moved to vacate his conviction based on a Rosario violation, claiming the prosecution failed to disclose police notes from interviews with a key witness, Jose Ramirez. The trial court denied both motions without a hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the hearings because Samandarov’s claims were not sufficiently supported and were contradicted by substantial evidence.

    Facts

    Alik Pinhasov was shot, and Jose Ramirez witnessed the aftermath, identifying Samandarov as potentially the shooter. Samandarov was arrested with the gun used in the shooting. Following the conviction, a newspaper article suggested jurors were aware of possible links between the shooting and a related murder, implying Russian Mob involvement. Samandarov’s counsel also claimed a neighbor, coworker to the jury foreperson, said the jury discussed Samandarov’s alleged mob ties. Later, Ramirez provided an affidavit claiming police detectives took notes during multiple interviews, which were not disclosed to the defense. He later recanted this affidavit.

    Procedural History

    Samandarov was convicted in Supreme Court. He moved to set aside the verdict (CPL 330.30) based on juror misconduct, which was denied without a hearing. He then moved to vacate the conviction (CPL 440.10) alleging a Rosario violation, also denied without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a hearing on the motion to set aside the verdict based on alleged juror misconduct.
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a hearing on the motion to vacate the conviction based on an alleged Rosario violation.

    Holding

    1. No, because Samandarov failed to provide sufficient proof that the jurors were subject to any outside influence, and the claims were based on hearsay and speculation.
    2. No, because the People presented substantial evidence contradicting Ramirez’s initial affidavit claiming undisclosed police notes existed, and the trial court reasonably found this evidence strong enough to make a hearing unnecessary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that to impeach a jury verdict, there must be proof of an “outside influence” on the jurors. Here, the evidence suggested the jurors may have speculated about the case’s connection to the Russian Mob, but there was no evidence they received information from outside the courtroom. The defense itself raised the issue of possible stereotypes related to Russian-Americans during voir dire. Regarding the Rosario violation, the Court noted that while conflicting affidavits usually necessitate a hearing, the People submitted detailed proof that Ramirez’s initial affidavit was mistaken. This proof included affidavits from the ADA and other District Attorney’s office employees who were present at the interviews, stating that no police officers were present and no notes were taken. The Court emphasized a contemporaneous record showed the police closed the case the day of the crime, making later police interviews unlikely. The Court concluded it was theoretically possible a hearing could show otherwise, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding this possibility too slim to justify the burden and expense of a hearing. The dissent argued an evidentiary hearing was required because Ramirez’s initial affidavit raised a triable issue of fact regarding the existence of undisclosed Rosario material and its potential impact on the trial’s outcome.

  • Riverside South Planning Corp. v. CRP/Extell Riverside, L.P., 13 N.Y.3d 398 (2009): Interpreting Sunset Clauses in Real Estate Development Agreements

    13 N.Y.3d 398 (2009)

    When interpreting contracts, particularly in real estate transactions, courts must enforce the agreement according to its clear terms, giving paramount concern to commercial certainty and avoiding the addition or excision of terms.

    Summary

    Riverside South Planning Corp. (RSPC) sued CRP/Extell Riverside (Extell) for breach of contract, alleging Extell violated a 1993 Letter Agreement concerning the development of Riverside South. The agreement contained a sunset clause limiting its duration to 10 years. Extell argued the agreement expired before it purchased the property. The court held that the sunset clause unambiguously terminated the agreement 10 years after its execution, precluding Extell’s liability because Extell purchased the property two years after the contract’s expiration. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the clear terms of agreements in real estate, especially when negotiated by sophisticated parties.

    Facts

    In 1993, Donald Trump, then controlling Penn Yards Associates, entered into a Letter Agreement with RSPC regarding the Riverside South development. The agreement addressed design guidelines, park development, and required Trump to assign the agreement’s obligations to any purchaser of the property. A sunset clause stipulated that “the agreements contained herein” would last 10 years. In 2005, Hudson Waterfront Associates, which had acquired the property from Penn Yards, sold it to Extell. Extell initially complied with the Letter Agreement but later asserted it was not bound by it, claiming the agreement had expired in 2003 based on the sunset clause.

    Procedural History

    RSPC sued Extell for breach of contract. The Supreme Court denied Extell’s motion to dismiss, finding the sunset clause ambiguous. The Appellate Division reversed, granting Extell’s motion, holding the sunset clause unambiguously terminated the agreement. RSPC appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the sunset clause in the 1993 Letter Agreement unambiguously terminated the agreement 10 years after its execution, thereby precluding Extell’s liability for breach of contract.

    Holding

    Yes, because the phrase “the agreements contained herein” in the sunset clause unambiguously encompasses all obligations in the contract, and no other language limits its applicability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that contracts should be enforced according to their clear terms, especially in real estate where commercial certainty is crucial. The court found no ambiguity in the sunset clause, stating that “[w]hether an agreement is ambiguous is a question of law for the courts… Ambiguity is determined by looking within the four corners of the document, not to outside sources” (Kass v Kass, 91 NY2d 554, 566 [1998]). The court rejected RSPC’s argument that the assignment clause created ambiguity, explaining the assignment clause was triggered only if Trump sold a portion, but not all, of the property while retaining an interest in other parcels. The court stated: “[t]he agreements contained herein shall continue for ten (10) years…” The court held that the plain meaning of the sunset clause limited all obligations, including the assignment obligation, to a maximum of 10 years. Since Extell purchased the property after the agreement’s expiration, it had no contractual obligations to RSPC. The court also noted that RSPC negotiated a Development Plan recorded in the chain of title, binding all successors, including Extell, ensuring the long-term sustainability and design criteria of the development.

  • Snyder v. Bronfman, 13 N.Y.3d 507 (2009): Oral Agreements for Business Acquisition Services and the Statute of Frauds

    13 N.Y.3d 507 (2009)

    An oral agreement to compensate someone for services rendered in negotiating the purchase of a business opportunity falls within the Statute of Frauds and is unenforceable.

    Summary

    Snyder sued Bronfman for compensation related to Snyder’s role in Bronfman’s acquisition of Warner Music. Snyder claimed an oral agreement existed where he would act as Bronfman’s advisor and be compensated fairly for his services. After Snyder helped Bronfman acquire Warner Music, Bronfman refused to pay him. Snyder sued for breach of a joint venture agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, accounting, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and quantum meruit. The lower courts dismissed all claims except unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that the Statute of Frauds barred Snyder’s claims because they sought compensation for services in negotiating the purchase of a business, and the agreement was not in writing.

    Facts

    Snyder and Bronfman had an oral agreement to acquire and operate media companies. Snyder would be Bronfman’s advisor. Bronfman assured Snyder he would share in the proceeds of any deal without putting up his own funds and that he would receive a fair and equitable share of the value created. Snyder worked on several potential acquisitions. Eventually, Bronfman acquired Warner Music for $2.6 billion, with Snyder’s help. Bronfman then refused to compensate Snyder for his contribution.

    Procedural History

    Snyder sued Bronfman in Supreme Court, asserting several causes of action, including unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. The Supreme Court dismissed most claims but allowed the unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims to proceed, finding the Statute of Frauds inapplicable. Bronfman appealed. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the remaining claims, holding that the Statute of Frauds applied. Snyder appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Statute of Frauds, specifically General Obligations Law § 5-701(a)(10), bars Snyder’s claims for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, which are based on an oral agreement to compensate him for services rendered in negotiating the purchase of a business opportunity.

    Holding

    Yes, because Snyder’s claims seek compensation for services rendered in negotiating the purchase of a business opportunity, namely Warner Music, and the agreement was not in writing as required by the Statute of Frauds.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims, in this context, are essentially identical claims under a “contract implied … in law to pay reasonable compensation.” General Obligations Law § 5-701(a)(10) requires agreements to compensate services rendered in negotiating the purchase of a business opportunity to be in writing. Negotiating includes procuring an introduction to a party to the transaction or assisting in the negotiation or consummation of the transaction. The court stated, “The essence of plaintiffs claim is that he devoted years of work to finding a business to acquire and causing an acquisition to take place—efforts that ultimately led to defendant’s acquisition of his interest in Warner Music. In seeking reasonable compensation for his services, plaintiff obviously seeks to be compensated for finding and negotiating the Warner Music transaction. His claim is of precisely the kind the statute of frauds describes.” The court distinguished Dura v Walker, Hart & Co., stating that the Statute of Frauds applies to dealings with principals, not between finders. The court also referenced Freedman v. Chemical Constr. Corp., clarifying that providing “know-how” or “know-who” to facilitate a complex enterprise or acquisition falls within the Statute of Frauds.

  • Walton v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional Services, 13 N.Y.3d 475 (2009): Whether a Commission on Inmate Calls is an Illegal Tax

    13 N.Y.3d 475 (2009)

    A state agency’s commission on inmate phone calls, where recipients voluntarily accept the calls, is not an illegal tax, taking without compensation, or a violation of equal protection or free speech rights under the New York Constitution.

    Summary

    Family members and legal service providers of inmates sued the NYS Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), challenging the commissions DOCS collected from inmate phone calls as unconstitutional. They argued the commissions were an illegal tax, a taking without just compensation, and violated equal protection and free speech rights. The Court of Appeals held that because call recipients voluntarily accepted the calls, the commission was not a tax or taking. Further, because all recipients of inmate calls were treated the same, and because alternative means of communication existed, no equal protection or free speech violations occurred. The court affirmed the dismissal of the suit, emphasizing that while the policy was questionable, it did not violate the NY Constitution.

    Facts

    DOCS contracted with MCI to provide telephone services in state prisons. The agreement stipulated that MCI would pay DOCS a commission on each collect call made by inmates. DOCS used these commissions to fund programs within its Family Benefit Fund, including healthcare for inmates and bus services for family visitation. The Public Service Commission (PSC) approved MCI’s rate filings, including the commission, but later stated it lacked jurisdiction over the DOCS commission itself. Call recipients were informed that the call was from an inmate and had the option to refuse the call. Petitioners, who accepted collect calls and paid the rate, challenged the DOCS commission.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners sued DOCS and MCI, alleging various state constitutional violations. The Supreme Court initially dismissed the constitutional claims as time-barred, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals in Walton I reinstated the constitutional claims. On remand, the Supreme Court dismissed the claims on the merits. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the substantive constitutional arguments.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether DOCS’s collection of commissions on inmate phone calls constituted an illegal tax or fee in violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine and Article III, § 1 and Article XVI, § 1 of the New York Constitution?

    2. Whether the DOCS commission amounted to a governmental taking of property without just compensation in violation of Article I, § 7(a) of the New York Constitution?

    3. Whether the inclusion of the DOCS commission in the rates charged for telephone services violated the petitioners’ right to equal protection of the law under Article I, § 11 of the New York Constitution?

    4. Whether the commission impeded the petitioners’ freedom to associate with and speak to their loved ones and clients, violating Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution?

    Holding

    1. No, because MCI, not the call recipients, was obligated to pay the commission, and the commission was a contractual obligation, not a tax imposed on the recipients.

    2. No, because the acceptance of collect calls was a voluntary action, and in exchange for their payments, petitioners received telephone services.

    3. No, because the petitioners were not similarly situated to other New York residents who did not accept collect calls from inmates, and all recipients of inmate calls were treated the same.

    4. No, because alternative means of communication remained available, such as mail and visitation, and the additional expense did not imperil the right of inmates to communicate with others.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a tax is a charge exacted by the government for general costs, while a fee is related to a specific benefit received. Here, the commission was neither. MCI’s obligation to pay DOCS arose from a voluntary contract, similar to how property owners receive compensation for allowing payphones on their premises. The court distinguished this situation from a tax because the call recipients voluntarily accepted the calls and were not compelled to pay DOCS directly.

    The court dismissed the takings claim because the petitioners voluntarily accepted the calls and received telephone services in exchange for their payment. There was no confiscation of property without consent. The court stated that the State Constitution does not mandate the lowest possible phone rates for inmates’ families.

    Regarding free speech and association, the court applied the Turner v. Safley standard, which asks whether a policy impinging on prisoners’ constitutional rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The court found that because alternative means of communication existed, the commission did not substantially impair inmates’ right to communicate.

    The court dismissed the equal protection claim, holding that the petitioners were not similarly situated to other New York residents. The court stated that all recipients of inmate calls were treated the same, and the security concerns attending incarceration justified the limited options available to inmates.

    The court explicitly stated that its holding should not be seen as an endorsement of the DOCS policy, recognizing that the executive and legislative branches had already determined the commission was not a proper cost to pass on to families and legal representatives of inmates.

  • Hargett v. Town of Ticonderoga, 13 N.Y.3d 326 (2009): Reimbursement of Fees After Successful Challenge to Condemnor’s Authority

    Hargett v. Town of Ticonderoga, 13 N.Y.3d 326 (2009)

    Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) § 702(B) allows a condemnee to be reimbursed for attorney’s fees and costs when they successfully challenge a condemnor’s authority to acquire property in proceedings under EDPL 207(A).

    Summary

    This case addresses whether EDPL § 702(B) provides for the reimbursement of attorney’s fees and costs when a property owner successfully challenges a condemnor’s authority to acquire their property in an EDPL 207(A) proceeding. The Court of Appeals held that it does. In a prior action, a property owner successfully challenged the Town of Ticonderoga’s attempt to condemn her property. She then sought reimbursement for her legal fees under EDPL 702(B). The Supreme Court initially dismissed her claim, relying on a Second Department case. The Appellate Division reversed, disagreeing with the Second Department, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that EDPL 702(B) allows for reimbursement in such cases, clarifying that condemnees can seek reimbursement for fees incurred during the initial challenge to the condemnation.

    Facts

    The Superintendent of Highways of the Town of Ticonderoga sought to condemn certain real property for purposes not related to his position.
    The property owner challenged the condemnation, arguing that the Superintendent exceeded his authority.
    The Appellate Division agreed with the property owner, determining that the Superintendent’s actions were unauthorized.
    The property owner then commenced a new action in Supreme Court, Essex County, seeking reimbursement of attorney’s fees and costs under EDPL 702(B) for the prior proceeding.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially dismissed the property owner’s complaint, relying on a Second Department case that interpreted EDPL 702(B) as not providing for reimbursement in such circumstances.
    The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order, granting the property owner’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and remitting the case to Supreme Court to determine the amount of reimbursable costs. The Appellate Division expressly disagreed with the Second Department case.
    The Appellate Division then granted the Town’s motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, certifying a question regarding the correctness of the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether EDPL § 702(B) provides for reimbursement of attorney’s fees and costs when a condemnee successfully challenges a condemnor’s authority to acquire real property in proceedings pursuant to EDPL 207(A).

    Holding

    Yes, because EDPL 702(B) provides for reimbursement to a condemnee who successfully challenges a “proposed acquisition” at the first step of the eminent domain process (EDPL 207) and obtains a judicial determination that the condemnor lacks the authority to pursue the proposed acquisition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that although the EDPL defines “acquisition” as the vesting of title, the definition of “condemnee” includes those subject to a “proposed acquisition.”
    Since EDPL 207(A) requires a condemnee to challenge the condemnor’s authority within 30 days of the determination, they cannot wait until the vesting proceeding (step two). Thus, EDPL 702(B) must provide reimbursement for those who successfully challenge the proposed acquisition at the first step.
    The court stated, “Given section 207 (A)’s 30-day statute of limitations to seek such judicial review, a condemnee may not sit on its claims until the second step when the condemnor commences a vesting proceeding…Rather, a condemnee must seek judicial review in the Appellate Division practically forthwith—before step two of the process.”
    The Court found no reason why the legislature would allow reimbursement to condemnees successful in Article 4 proceedings, but not to those successful in Article 2 proceedings.
    The Court clarified that the fees and costs that may be reimbursed are limited to those “actually incurred by such condemnee because of the acquisition procedure” (EDPL 702[B]). The Court did not decide whether fees incurred *before* an adverse determination are reimbursable.

  • Godfrey v. Spano, 13 N.Y.3d 358 (2009): Recognition of Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriages

    13 N.Y.3d 358 (2009)

    New York’s recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages for purposes of public employee benefits is permissible under existing law, specifically the broad discretion granted to the Civil Service Commission president in defining “spouse” for benefits eligibility.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether New York State and Westchester County can recognize same-sex marriages performed legally out-of-state for the purpose of extending employee benefits. Taxpayers challenged directives by the County Executive of Westchester and the NYS Department of Civil Service to recognize these marriages. The Court of Appeals held that the directives were permissible. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any specific illegal expenditure of funds resulting from the recognition of same-sex marriages. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the broad discretion granted to the President of the Civil Service Commission to define “spouse” for the purpose of employee benefits.

    Facts

    Several states and Canada legalized same-sex marriage. The Westchester County Executive issued an executive order directing all county departments to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully entered into outside of New York for the purpose of extending rights and benefits. The NYS Department of Civil Service issued a policy memorandum that it would recognize as spouses partners in same-sex marriages legally performed in other jurisdictions for purposes of benefits eligibility under NYSHIP and other benefit plans it administered. Taxpayers brought suit challenging the legality of these directives.

    Procedural History

    In Godfrey, Supreme Court granted motions to dismiss the taxpayers’ complaint, declaring the Executive Order valid. The Appellate Division affirmed. In Lewis, Supreme Court denied the taxpayers’ cross-motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to defendants, declaring the policy memorandum lawful. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals consolidated and granted leave to appeal both cases.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Westchester County Executive’s order illegally legislated in the areas of marriage and domestic relations in violation of General Municipal Law § 51.

    2. Whether the NYS Department of Civil Service’s policy memorandum violated State Finance Law § 123-b or the separation of powers doctrine.

    Holding

    1. No, because the taxpayers failed to allege an unlawful expenditure of taxpayer funds as a result of the Executive Order.

    2. No, because the taxpayers failed to show specific expenditures, and because Civil Service Law grants the Civil Service Commission president broad authority to define “spouse” for benefits purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the General Municipal Law § 51 claim, the Court stated that such a claim “lies only when the acts complained of are fraudulent, or a waste of public property in the sense that they represent a use of public property or funds for entirely illegal purposes”. The Court found the plaintiffs’ allegations too conclusory. They failed to identify any specific impact the Executive Order had on any public employee or private individual. The Court emphasized that Westchester County already provided benefits to same-sex domestic partners before the Executive Order was issued.

    Regarding the State Finance Law § 123-b claim, the Court stated that “there must be some specific threat of an imminent expenditure.” The Court reiterated that the Department of Civil Service had offered benefits to domestic partners since the mid-1990s, thus the claim failed. Regarding the separation of powers claim, the Court cited Civil Service Law § 164 (1), which provides that every state employee “shall be entitled to have his spouse and dependent children, as defined by the regulations of the president, included in the coverage.” The Court found that the statute expressly gives the President of the Civil Service Commission the authority to define “spouse”. The Court further referenced legislative history that supported the intent to give the Department of Civil Service “complete discretion to determine the limits of dependent coverage, provided that, at a minimum, spouses and dependent children were covered.”

  • People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251 (2009): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251 (2009)

    When a case hinges on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications with minimal corroborating evidence, excluding expert testimony on eyewitness reliability is an abuse of discretion if the testimony is relevant, scientifically accepted, offered by a qualified expert, and addresses topics beyond the average juror’s understanding.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification reliability in two cases, Abney and Allen. In Abney, where a robbery conviction rested solely on a 13-year-old victim’s identification, the court held it was an abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness accuracy, particularly regarding witness confidence. In Allen, where corroborating evidence existed, the court upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude such testimony. The court emphasized that expert testimony should be admitted when it can aid the jury in understanding factors affecting eyewitness reliability that are beyond common knowledge, but its exclusion may be appropriate when other evidence supports the conviction.

    Facts

    In Abney, Farhana U. was robbed at knifepoint in a subway station. She identified Quentin Abney from a photo array and later in a lineup. At trial, Abney presented an alibi defense. In Allen, Gregory Allen was convicted of robbing a barbershop. Two witnesses, Bierd and Almonte, identified Allen. Bierd recognized Allen from the neighborhood. Allen refused to participate in a lineup without masks for all participants.

    Procedural History

    In Abney, the trial court denied Abney’s motion to present expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing corroborating evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed. In Allen, the trial court denied Allen’s motion to admit expert testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision as well.

    Issue(s)

    1. In Abney, whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification when the case turned on the accuracy of a single eyewitness and there was little to no corroborating evidence.
    2. In Allen, whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to adduce expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification when there were multiple eyewitnesses and some corroborating evidence.

    Holding

    1. In Abney, yes, because the case hinged on a single eyewitness identification with no corroborating evidence, and the expert testimony concerned topics beyond the ken of the average juror.
    2. In Allen, no, because the case did not depend exclusively on one eyewitness’s testimony and corroborating evidence existed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on its prior decisions in People v. Lee, People v. Young, and especially People v. LeGrand, which established a framework for assessing the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. In Abney, the court emphasized that when a case rests solely on eyewitness testimony, excluding expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness accuracy is an abuse of discretion if the testimony is relevant, scientifically accepted, offered by a qualified expert, and addresses topics beyond the average juror’s understanding. The court found the trial court erred in not allowing testimony on witness confidence and should have held a Frye hearing on other factors. In Allen, the court found the presence of multiple eyewitnesses and corroborating evidence (Allen’s use of nicknames given to police by a witness, Allen’s knowledge that robbers wore masks) distinguished it from LeGrand and supported the trial court’s decision to exclude expert testimony. The court stated that because the case did not turn entirely on one uncorroborated eyewitness, it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the expert testimony. The court also noted that factors such as stress and disguise were within the jury’s common sense understanding, and did not require expert explanation.

  • IDT Corp. v. Tyco Group, S.A.R.L., 13 N.Y.3d 209 (2009): Enforceability of Settlement Agreements Pending Further Negotiation

    IDT Corp. v. Tyco Group, S.A.R.L., 13 N.Y.3d 209 (2009)

    When a settlement agreement expressly requires further definitive agreements to be negotiated and executed as a precondition to performance, the initial settlement agreement is not fully enforceable until those subsequent agreements are finalized.

    Summary

    IDT Corp. sued Tyco Group for breach of a settlement agreement related to a joint venture dispute. The settlement required Tyco to provide IDT with an “indefeasible right of use” (IRU) of fiber optic capacity, documented in further agreements. When Tyco proposed an IRU that IDT claimed was inconsistent with the settlement, IDT sued for breach. The New York Court of Appeals held that the initial settlement was not fully enforceable because the negotiation and execution of the further IRU agreement was a condition precedent to Tyco’s obligation to provide the capacity. The court emphasized that the intent of the parties, as discerned from the agreement, was that the IRU had to be executed before any handover of capacity.

    Facts

    IDT and Tyco entered into a written settlement agreement on October 10, 2000, to resolve pending lawsuits arising from a dispute over a joint venture. The agreement stipulated that Tyco would provide IDT with an “indefeasible right of use” (IRU) of fiber optic capacity on Tyco’s TyCom Global Network (TGN) for 15 years, free of charge. The TGN was under construction at the time of the settlement. The settlement agreement stated that the IRU “shall be documented pursuant to definitive agreements to be mutually agreed upon and, in any event, containing terms and conditions consistent with those described herein.” Tyco submitted a proposed IRU document to IDT in June 2001. IDT claimed the IRU contained terms inconsistent with the settlement agreement, including a decommissioning provision. Negotiations continued until March 2004 without a finalized agreement.

    Procedural History

    IDT sued Tyco in May 2004, alleging breach of the settlement agreement. Supreme Court granted IDT’s motion for summary judgment, finding Tyco liable. The Appellate Division reversed, denying IDT’s motion and granting Tyco’s cross-motion to dismiss the complaint, holding that the settlement agreement was contingent on the negotiation of additional terms. The Appellate Division granted IDT leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a settlement agreement is fully enforceable when it contemplates the negotiation and execution of further definitive agreements as a precondition to a party’s obligation to perform.

    Holding

    No, because the clear intent of the parties, as expressed in the settlement agreement, was that the negotiation and execution of the further definitive agreements, specifically the IRU in this case, was a condition precedent to Tyco’s obligation to provide fiber optic capacity. As such, Tyco did not breach the agreement by proposing an IRU with allegedly inconsistent terms.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that contracts should be construed according to the parties’ intent, discerned from the four corners of the document. The court quoted MHR Capital Partners LP v Presstek, Inc., stating that “a written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms.” The court defined a condition precedent as “an act or event… which, unless the condition is excused, must occur before a duty to perform a promise in the agreement arises” (quoting Oppenheimer & Co. v Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co.). Here, the settlement agreement required the negotiation and execution of further agreements, including the IRU, before Tyco was obligated to provide capacity. The court noted that despite negotiations, the IRU was never executed, and the record did not support a finding that Tyco breached its obligation to negotiate in good faith. The Court reasoned, “Here, the settlement agreement contemplated the occurrence of numerous conditions, i.e., the negotiation and execution of four additional agreements, most importantly, the IRU. Regarding the IRU, the clear intent of the parties was that it had to be executed before any handover of capacity. As such, it cannot be said that defendants breached the settlement agreement by merely proposing an IRU which allegedly contained terms inconsistent with settlement.”

  • Matter of Feldman v. Board of Assessment Review, 12 N.Y.3d 176 (2009): Technical Defects in Tax Certiorari Proceedings

    Matter of Feldman v. Board of Assessment Review, 12 N.Y.3d 176 (2009)

    In Real Property Tax Law Article 7 proceedings, the omission of a return date from a notice of petition does not automatically deprive the court of personal jurisdiction, especially where the assessing authority suffers no prejudice from the omission.

    Summary

    Feldman, a property owner, initiated a tax certiorari proceeding but left the return date blank on the notice of petition, following instructions from the County Clerk due to a judicial vacancy. The Board of Assessment Review moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal, holding that the omission of the return date was a technical defect that did not deprive the court of personal jurisdiction because the Board demonstrated no prejudice. The court emphasized the remedial nature of tax assessment review and the absence of prejudice to the Board, aligning with the principle that substance should prevail over form.

    Facts

    Petitioner Feldman challenged his property tax assessment by filing a petition and notice of petition with the Board of Assessment Review. The notice of petition lacked a return date. Feldman stated he was instructed by the Ontario County Clerk to leave the date blank due to a judicial vacancy. The Clerk informed him the court would set the return date and notify all parties once the vacancy was filled. The Town acknowledged being informed of the scheduled return date by the Clerk.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court denied the Board’s motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the Board’s motion and dismissing the petition. The Court of Appeals granted Feldman’s motion for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the failure to include a return date in a notice of petition in an RPTL Article 7 proceeding deprives the court of personal jurisdiction over the respondent taxing authority.

    Holding

    No, because the omission of the return date in the notice of petition, under the specific circumstances of this case and without demonstrable prejudice to the respondent, constitutes a technical defect that does not deprive the court of personal jurisdiction in an RPTL Article 7 proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while CPLR 403(a) requires a notice of petition to specify the hearing’s time and place, strict compliance is not always necessary, especially in RPTL Article 7 proceedings. The court highlighted the practical difficulty of setting a return date when a judge has not yet been assigned, coupled with the short statute of limitations in RPTL Article 7. Drawing upon Matter of Great E. Mall v Condon, 36 NY2d 544 (1975), the court reiterated that tax assessment proceedings are remedial and should be liberally construed to ensure taxpayers can have their assessments reviewed. The court emphasized that technical defects should not defeat meritorious claims, especially when the respondent suffers no prejudice. The Board failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the missing return date. The purpose of the return date—to notify the respondent—is less critical in RPTL Article 7 proceedings, where the allegations in the petition are deemed denied if no answer is served (RPTL 712[1]). The court distinguished the case from situations where a fictitious return date was used, finding it incongruous to approve a fictitious date but condemn an absent one, referencing Matter of National Gypsum Co., Inc. v Assessor of Town of Tonawanda, 4 NY3d 680 (2005). The Court concluded that requiring strict compliance with CPLR 403(a) would unfairly prevent petitioners from challenging tax assessments through no fault of their own. The court explicitly limited its holding to RPTL Article 7 proceedings where the petitioner cannot designate a return date. The court noted, “Critical to the analysis in Great E. Mall was our long-standing view that the law regarding real property assessment proceedings is ‘remedial in character and should be liberally construed to the end that the taxpayer’s right to have his assessment reviewed should not be defeated by a technicality’ (36 NY2d at 548 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People ex rel. New York City Omnibus Corp. v Miller, 282 NY 5, 9 [1939]).”