New York Law Review

Tag: 2008

  • People v. MacShane, 11 N.Y.3d 841 (2008): Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination in Jury Selection

    People v. MacShane, 11 N.Y.3d 841 (2008)

    A defendant alleging discriminatory jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky must present specific facts and circumstances that raise an inference that the prosecutor excused potential jurors for a discriminatory reason; a general motive to discriminate, untethered to the particular jurors at issue, is insufficient.

    Summary

    Defendant MacShane appealed his conviction, arguing that the prosecutor discriminated against male prospective jurors and that the trial judge should have recused himself. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order, holding that MacShane failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection because he did not articulate specific facts suggesting the prosecutor’s challenges were based on gender. The Court also found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the recusal motion.

    Facts

    During jury selection, defense counsel claimed the prosecutor eliminated two male prospective jurors “for no good reason” because “she wants a female jury.” Defense counsel provided no further explanation or comparison to unchallenged jurors. The trial judge denied the motion. The defendant was ultimately convicted.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction, but the Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Term incorrectly proceeded to steps two and three of the Batson inquiry for the first time on appeal. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the initial Batson challenge was insufficient to establish a prima facie case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky by asserting the prosecutor eliminated male jurors “for no good reason” and wanted a female jury.

    2. Whether the trial judge abused his discretion by denying the defendant’s recusal motion.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant’s assertions were “sketchy” and failed to articulate facts and circumstances that raised an inference that the prosecutor excused these jurors for a discriminatory reason.

    2. No, because there was no legal disqualification and the decision was within the trial judge’s discretion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Batson v. Kentucky, which outlines a three-step process for evaluating claims of discrimination in jury selection. The first step requires the defendant to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court cited People v. Childress, stating that “‘sketchy assertions’ and the fact that the prospective jurors ‘indicated no reason why they could not serve fairly’ are, standing alone, generally insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.”

    Here, the Court found that defense counsel’s assertion of a general motive to discriminate was “untethered to the particular jurors at issue.” The defense failed to compare the challenged jurors to unchallenged jurors, identify factors suggesting pro-prosecution bias in the challenged jurors, or present any factor suggesting the prosecutor exercised the challenges due to the prospective jurors’ gender. Because the defendant failed to meet his burden under step one, the prosecutor was not required to provide gender-neutral reasons for the challenges.

    Regarding the recusal motion, the Court noted that the Appellate Term erred by considering a confidential opinion of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics that was not part of the record. However, the Court ultimately agreed that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion because there was no legal disqualification and the decision was within the personal conscience of the court, citing People v. Moreno.

  • People v. Naradzay, 11 N.Y.3d 460 (2008): Defining ‘Dangerously Near’ in Attempted Crimes

    People v. Naradzay, 11 N.Y.3d 460 (2008)

    To be guilty of an attempted crime, a defendant’s conduct must pass beyond mere intent or preparation and come ‘dangerously near’ the commission of the completed crime, though the defendant need not take the final step necessary.

    Summary

    Jason Naradzay was convicted of attempted murder and burglary after being found near D.G.’s home with a loaded shotgun and a plan to harm her and her family. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Naradzay’s actions, including purchasing the gun, driving to the victim’s neighborhood, and possessing the loaded weapon near her property, constituted conduct that came “dangerously near” the commission of the intended crimes, even though he was apprehended before entering the home. The court emphasized that the jury was entitled to infer intent from Naradzay’s conduct and surrounding circumstances, rejecting his claim that he had abandoned his plan.

    Facts

    D.G. met Jason Naradzay through a mutual friend. After D.G. attempted to end their contact, Naradzay’s behavior became troubling. He appeared at events she attended, and on February 3, 2004, she told him not to contact her again. On February 4, Naradzay created a “to-do” list outlining a plan to break into D.G.’s home and shoot her and her husband. He purchased a shotgun and ammunition, telling the seller he needed a gun with less “kick” for his elderly father. He borrowed a friend’s car under false pretenses, drove to D.G.’s neighborhood, and loaded the shotgun. A motorist saw him concealing the shotgun near D.G.’s property and called 911.

    Procedural History

    Naradzay was indicted for attempted murder, attempted burglary, and criminal possession of a weapon. The Supreme Court denied his motion to suppress evidence. A jury convicted him on all charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Justice granted Naradzay leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Naradzay’s actions constituted conduct that came “dangerously near” the commission of burglary and murder, thereby establishing the elements of attempt under New York law.

    Holding

    Yes, because Naradzay’s actions went beyond mere preparation and placed him in a position to commit the intended crimes but for the intervention of law enforcement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied Penal Law § 110.00, which defines an attempt as engaging in conduct that “tends to effect the commission” of a crime with the intent to commit that crime. The court emphasized that the defendant’s conduct must go beyond “mere intent or mere preparation” and come “dangerously near” the completed crime. The court found that Naradzay’s actions—creating a detailed plan, purchasing a shotgun and ammunition, driving to D.G.’s neighborhood, loading the gun, and approaching her property with the weapon—demonstrated a clear intent and constituted conduct that was “potentially and immediately dangerous.” The court rejected Naradzay’s argument that his intent wavered, stating that the jury was entitled to discredit his self-serving testimony about considering suicide. The court noted that the intervention of an observant motorist and the prompt response of law enforcement prevented Naradzay from carrying out his plan. The court cited People v. Mahboubian, stating, “there comes a point where it is ‘too late in the stage of preparation for the law to conclude that no attempt occurred.’” The court also held that the police questioning was threshold questioning and did not violate Naradzay’s Miranda rights.

  • White House Manor, Ltd. v. Benjamin, 11 N.Y.3d 392 (2008): Scope of Stipulations and Enforcement in Pending Actions

    White House Manor, Ltd. v. Benjamin, 11 N.Y.3d 392 (2008)

    A court’s power to enforce a stipulation in a pending action extends only to the terms of that stipulation; it cannot be used to resolve separate contract claims between the parties without a plenary action.

    Summary

    White House Manor sued the Levys for unjust enrichment related to property taxes. The Korean Presbyterian Church, a contract vendee of the Levys’ property, entered into a stipulation to settle the tax dispute. When a dispute arose between the Levys and the Church regarding the underlying purchase contract, the Levys sought to enforce the purchase contract within the existing unjust enrichment action. The Court of Appeals held that the lower court improperly used the stipulation to resolve the contract dispute, as the stipulation only pertained to the property tax issue, and the Levys needed to bring a separate action to litigate the contract claim. The court emphasized that stipulations cannot be used to circumvent standard procedural rules.

    Facts

    White House Manor owned land and sold a portion to Travis Levy, who mortgaged it. The mortgage was assigned to the Levys (Benjamin, Levy, and Levy). White House later defaulted, deeding the land back to the Levys. White House then sued the Levys for unjust enrichment, seeking a pro rata share of property taxes. The Levys contracted to sell their land to the Korean Presbyterian Church. The Church’s purchase contract contained contingencies regarding obtaining necessary government approvals for subdivision and site plans. The Church, the Levys, and White House entered into a stipulation to settle the unjust enrichment action, with the Church agreeing to pay the Levys’ share of the property taxes. Disputes arose between the Levys and the Church regarding the purchase contract.

    Procedural History

    White House moved to enforce the stipulation against the Levys and the Church. The Levys cross-moved for a declaration that the Church was in default of the purchase contract, the amendment, and the stipulation. Supreme Court granted the motion and cross-motion, declaring the Church in default and ordering various forms of relief. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court can use a stipulation in a pending action to resolve a separate contract dispute between the parties, or whether a plenary action is required to litigate the contract claim.

    Holding

    No, because the court’s power to enforce a stipulation is limited to the terms of that stipulation. A separate plenary action, including service of process and an opportunity to answer, is required to resolve the underlying contract dispute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Teitelbaum Holdings v. Gold, which states that a trial court has supervisory control over pending actions, including the power to relieve parties from stipulations made during litigation. However, this power extends only to the enforcement of the stipulation itself. The Church expressly agreed to be a party to the stipulation regarding the property tax dispute. Therefore, the court could enforce the stipulation against the Church. However, the Supreme Court exceeded its authority by ordering remedies against the Church for breach of the purchase contract and its amendment, as those issues were not within the scope of the stipulation.

    The Court emphasized that the Levys needed to commence a plenary action to pursue their contract claims against the Church, following the standard procedural rules: “If the Levys desire to pursue a claim against the Church for breach of contract, they will have to commence a plenary action by filing a summons and complaint… after which the Church would have at least 20 days to answer… Then, after issue is joined, the Levys may move for summary judgment if they believe there are no material disputed issues of fact to be resolved.” The stipulation in the unjust enrichment action could not be used to bypass these procedural steps.

    The Court found that the Supreme Court’s judgment improperly declared the Church in default of the purchase contract without specifying when or how any default may have occurred. To the extent that the judgment directed the Church to pay the Levys’ pro rata share of property taxes after termination of the contract, it was erroneous. The Court remitted the case to Supreme Court to resolve any remaining differences between the Levys and the Church over the Church’s obligation to pay real estate taxes under the stipulation.

  • Morgenthau v. Avion Resources Ltd., 11 N.Y.3d 384 (2008): Sufficiency of CPLR 313 for Service on Foreign Defendants

    11 N.Y.3d 384 (2008)

    Compliance with CPLR 313 alone constitutes proper service upon foreign defendants in New York actions when no treaties or international agreements supplant New York’s service requirements; principles of international comity do not mandate compliance with the foreign nation’s service laws.

    Summary

    New York County District Attorney Morgenthau initiated a civil forfeiture action against Brazilian depositors allegedly involved in an illegal international money transfer scheme. The defendants argued that service was improper because it did not comply with Brazilian law, which requires service via letters rogatory. The New York Court of Appeals held that service under CPLR 313 was sufficient because no treaty mandated a specific form of service, and principles of comity did not require importing foreign service laws. The court emphasized that CPLR 313 allows service outside the state in the same manner as within the state, aiming to enhance the possibility of acquiring personal jurisdiction over non-residents.

    Facts

    Federal agents uncovered an alleged international money transfer scheme operating from Brazil to Manhattan. Defendants allegedly violated Brazilian currency laws and New York banking laws by transferring money through a money transfer station. Federal authorities seized over $21 million but were later ordered to relinquish control of the funds. Subsequently, District Attorney Morgenthau commenced a civil forfeiture action pursuant to CPLR article 13-A, seeking $636,924,865. Plaintiff served 14 individual defendants and representatives of five corporate defendants in Brazil, utilizing methods prescribed under the CPLR. Some defendants were served through their attorneys under alternative service methods.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court vacated an attachment order and dismissed the complaint, concluding that service failed to comply with the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory and Brazilian service requirements, violating principles of comity. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion in declining to confirm the attachment orders and holding that service procedures were improper for failing to comply with Brazilian law and comity principles. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether service of process pursuant to CPLR 313 on defendants in a foreign country is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction, or whether one must additionally satisfy the service requirements of that foreign locale.

    Holding

    No, because compliance with CPLR 313 alone constitutes proper service upon foreign defendants where no treaties or international agreements supplant New York’s service requirements, and principles of international comity do not mandate a different result.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plain language of CPLR 313 does not require fulfilling a foreign locale’s service of process requirements. The statute allows service outside the state “in the same manner as service is made within the state.” The court emphasized the statute’s purpose of removing state lines and enhancing the possibility of acquiring personal jurisdiction over non-residents. The court stated, “[T]he permissive methods of service without the state have been increased in order to enhance the possibility of acquiring in personam jurisdiction over non-residents subject to our courts’ jurisdiction.” The court found that principles of comity did not compel a different result, as comity need not be applied to service of process issues where the CPLR’s requirements of service upon foreign defendants are fulfilled. “[C]omity is not an additional hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome in serving a party in a foreign country.” The court distinguished situations involving treaties, like the Hague Service Convention, which mandate specific forms of service, but noted that Brazil is not a signatory to that convention. While both the US and Brazil are signatories to the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, Article 2 of that treaty does not mandate letters rogatory as the exclusive means of service. Since CPLR 313 was satisfied for the individual and corporate defendants, the service was proper.

  • Briggs Avenue LLC v. Insurance Corporation of Hannover, 11 N.Y.3d 377 (2008): Insured’s Failure to Update Address Justifies Disclaimer

    Briggs Avenue LLC v. Insurance Corporation of Hannover, 11 N.Y.3d 377 (2008)

    A liability insurer can disclaim coverage if the insured fails to comply with a policy condition requiring timely notice of a lawsuit due to the insured’s error in not updating its address with the Secretary of State.

    Summary

    Briggs Avenue LLC failed to update its address with the Secretary of State, resulting in the company not receiving notice of a lawsuit filed against it. When Briggs eventually learned of the suit and notified its insurer, Insurance Corporation of Hannover (ICH), ICH disclaimed coverage due to late notice. The New York Court of Appeals held that ICH’s disclaimer was valid because Briggs did not comply with the policy condition requiring notice of a lawsuit “as soon as practicable.” The court emphasized that the ability to update the address was within Briggs’s control, and failure to do so was a simple oversight, justifying the insurer’s disclaimer.

    Facts

    Briggs Avenue LLC, managed by Shaban Mehaj, owned a building in the Bronx. As required, Briggs designated the Secretary of State as its agent for service of process, including the company’s address in its articles of organization. Briggs later moved, but Mehaj did not update the address with the Secretary of State. In July 2003, a tenant, Nelson Bonilla, sued Briggs, serving the summons and complaint on the Secretary of State. Because the address was outdated, Mehaj did not receive the lawsuit notice. Mehaj learned of the lawsuit in April 2004 when Bonilla served a motion for default judgment directly on Briggs. Briggs then notified its insurer, ICH, which disclaimed coverage based on a policy provision requiring notice of a suit “as soon as practicable.”

    Procedural History

    Briggs filed a declaratory judgment action against ICH in Supreme Court, seeking to compel ICH to defend the Bonilla case. ICH removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which dismissed Briggs’s complaint, upholding ICH’s disclaimer. Briggs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which then certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the validity of ICH’s disclaimer given the circumstances.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, given the terms of the insurance policy and the reason for the insured’s failure to give more prompt notice of the lawsuit to the insurer, the insurer’s disclaimer of coverage should be sustained?

    Holding

    Yes, the insurer’s disclaimer of coverage should be sustained because Briggs failed to comply with the policy condition requiring timely notice, and this failure resulted from Briggs’s own error in not updating its address with the Secretary of State.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on whether Briggs complied with the policy condition to provide notice of a lawsuit to ICH “as soon as practicable.” The court found that it was unquestionably practicable for Briggs to keep its address current with the Secretary of State, which would have ensured timely notice of the lawsuit. The court distinguished Agoado Realty Corp. v United Intl. Ins. Co., where the insureds’ lawyer had died, making it arguably impracticable for them to learn of the lawsuit. In Briggs’s case, the court reasoned that the insured could have easily prevented the mishap. The court reaffirmed the rule that an insurer may disclaim coverage if it does not receive timely notice, regardless of whether the delay prejudices the insurer, citing Argo Corp. v Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 4 NY3d 332, 339 (2005) and Security Mut. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 31 NY2d 436, 440 (1972). The court acknowledged that while this rule may seem harsh, it encourages prompt notice, enabling insurers to promptly investigate claims and deter fraud. The court noted that recent legislation would alter this balance in favor of the insured for policies issued after January 17, 2009, but that legislation did not apply to this case. As the court stated, “[a]n insurer that does not receive timely notice in accordance with a policy provision may disclaim coverage, whether it is prejudiced by the delay or not.”

  • In re Estate of Abraham XX., 11 N.Y.3d 429 (2008): State Reimbursement from Supplemental Needs Trust

    11 N.Y.3d 429 (2008)

    When a supplemental needs trust (SNT) is established under 42 USC § 1396p(d)(4)(A), the state is entitled to reimbursement from the trust for the total amount of Medicaid assistance paid on behalf of the beneficiary, not limited to the amount paid after the trust’s creation.

    Summary

    This case addresses the extent to which New York State can seek reimbursement from a supplemental needs trust (SNT) for Medicaid payments made on behalf of a disabled individual. Abraham XX. received a settlement from a malpractice suit, which was placed into an SNT. The State sought reimbursement for all Medicaid payments made on Abraham’s behalf, including those made before the SNT’s creation. The Court of Appeals held that the state could recover the total amount of Medicaid paid from the trust assets, as per the terms of the SNT agreement and relevant state and federal laws, emphasizing that the statutory language contained no temporal limitation on the State’s right to recovery.

    Facts

    Abraham XX. suffered from severe disabilities from birth and received Medicaid benefits. His mother, Kathleen XX., secured a malpractice settlement on his behalf. A portion of this settlement was used to establish a supplemental needs trust (SNT) to maintain Abraham’s Medicaid eligibility. The SNT agreement stipulated that upon Abraham’s death, the State would be reimbursed for medical assistance provided through Medicaid. The State sought reimbursement for all Medicaid payments, including those made before the trust was funded.

    Procedural History

    The State filed a claim against the trust for Medicaid payments. Kathleen petitioned for a refund of payments made before the SNT’s funding, arguing res judicata. Supreme Court ordered a partial refund. The Appellate Division modified the order, reversed the partial refund, and granted summary judgment to the State, holding that the State was entitled to reimbursement for all Medicaid expended. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State’s right to reimbursement from a supplemental needs trust (SNT) for Medicaid payments is limited to the amount of assistance provided after the trust’s creation, or whether it extends to the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual.

    Holding

    No, because 42 USC § 1396p(d)(4)(A) and Social Services Law § 366(2)(b)(2)(iii)(A) authorize the State to recover the "total medical assistance paid" on behalf of the beneficiary from the trust’s remaining assets, without temporal limitation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the plain language of 42 USC § 1396p(d)(4)(A) and Social Services Law § 366(2)(b)(2)(iii)(A) allows the state to recover the "total medical assistance paid" on behalf of the trust’s beneficiary. The Court emphasized that there is no temporal limitation on this recovery, only a limit based on the assets remaining in the trust. The SNT represents a bargain where the state continues Medicaid payments in exchange for the possibility of reimbursement upon the recipient’s death. The court stated, "When a trust is established pursuant to 42 USC § 1396p (d) (4) (A) or Social Services Law § 366 (2) (b) (2) (iii) (A), the beneficiary explicitly provides the State with a right to recover the total Medicaid paid on behalf of that individual." The Court distinguished the anti-recovery provisions of Medicaid law, stating that the SNT statute specifically addresses the unique needs of severely disabled individuals. The Court found that Arkansas Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v Ahlborn was inapplicable as it did not involve the interpretation of an SNT or the relevant Medicaid SNT statute. Judge Smith dissented, arguing that the statute should be interpreted to allow recovery only of payments made as a result of the SNT’s existence, to avoid discouraging the creation of such trusts.

  • Matter of Jung v. State Commn. on Jud. Conduct, 11 N.Y.3d 365 (2008): Judge’s Removal for Due Process Violations

    Matter of Jung v. State Commn. on Jud. Conduct, 11 N.Y.3d 365 (2008)

    A judge’s persistent denial of due process rights, including the right to be heard and the right to counsel, to litigants in Family Court, coupled with a failure to recognize the impropriety of such actions, warrants removal from judicial office.

    Summary

    Judge Jung was removed from his position as a Family Court Judge due to a pattern of violating litigants’ due process rights. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct sustained five charges against him, finding that he denied litigants their right to be heard and right to counsel in multiple cases. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s decision, emphasizing that the judge’s systematic errors and unwillingness to acknowledge their impropriety posed a threat to the proper administration of justice, particularly in the sensitive context of Family Court proceedings. The court found Jung’s policies resulted in repeated deprivations of fundamental rights.

    Facts

    Judge Jung, a Family Court Judge in Fulton County, presided over several cases in 2005 that led to misconduct charges. In DeMagistris, he sentenced a defendant to jail in absentia while the defendant was in a holding cell at the courthouse. In Constantino and DaCorsi, he sentenced incarcerated individuals to jail in absentia, based on a policy requiring incarcerated litigants to request to be produced in court. In Smith, he denied a litigant’s request for assigned counsel as untimely. In Foote, he denied a litigant, who he knew had reading difficulties, the right to counsel and sentenced her to jail.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct filed a formal complaint against Judge Jung. A Referee sustained all five charges after a hearing. The Commission unanimously sustained the charges and recommended removal. Judge Jung then sought review of the Commission’s determination in the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Judge Jung’s actions violated litigants’ due process rights, specifically the right to be heard and the right to counsel, thereby constituting judicial misconduct.
    2. Whether the sanction of removal from judicial office was appropriate given the sustained charges of judicial misconduct.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Judge Jung’s persistent denial of fundamental due process rights, stemming from established policies, constituted judicial misconduct.
    2. Yes, because Judge Jung’s pattern of injudicious behavior and unwillingness to acknowledge the impropriety of his actions demonstrated a threat to the proper administration of justice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to be heard and the right to counsel, especially in family offense proceedings. It stated that parents have a fundamental interest in the liberty, care, and control of their children. The court found that Judge Jung’s policies, such as requiring incarcerated litigants to request to be produced and imposing a strict two-week deadline for requesting counsel, created unfair burdens and resulted in gross deprivations of these rights. The court noted that these policies demonstrated a “pattern of injudicious behavior” that could not be sustained. Furthermore, the court found significant Judge Jung’s response to Appellate Division decisions reversing his rulings on habeas corpus petitions, noting that he modified his policies but continued to place the burden on incarcerated litigants and considered discontinuing confirmation hearings where litigants could invoke their right to counsel. The court quoted Matter of Reeves, stating that the errors were fundamental, the pattern of repeating them, coupled with an unwillingness to recognize their impropriety, indicate that the judge poses a threat to the proper administration of justice. The Court concluded that Judge Jung’s adherence to policies that seriously compromised due process rights justified removal, even acknowledging that removal is an “extreme sanction” reserved for truly egregious circumstances.

  • Episcopal Diocese of Rochester v. Harnish, 11 N.Y.3d 341 (2008): Church Property Disputes and the Neutral Principles Approach

    11 N.Y.3d 341 (2008)

    Under the neutral principles of law approach, a court must examine deeds, church charters, state statutes, and the constitution of the general church to determine if a trust or restriction exists in favor of the general church regarding local church property.

    Summary

    This case addresses a dispute over church property following a parish’s separation from its diocese. The New York Court of Appeals applied the “neutral principles of law” approach to determine whether the local parish held its property in trust for the benefit of the Episcopal Diocese and the National Church. The Court found that while deeds and incorporation documents did not establish an express trust, the Dennis Canons (constitution of the general church) did, and the parish’s agreement to abide by the church’s enactments created a legally cognizable trust. Thus, the property was held in trust for the Diocese and the National Church.

    Facts

    All Saints was organized as a mission in 1927 under the Episcopal Diocese of Western New York. It incorporated under Article 3 of the Religious Corporations Law. In 1947, All Saints became a parish in spiritual union with the Rochester Diocese, agreeing to abide by the Diocese’s constitution and canons. In 2005, theological disputes led the Rochester Diocese to declare All Saints ecclesiastically “extinct” and sought transfer of its assets. All Saints argued it held legal title to its property free and clear of any trust.

    Procedural History

    The Rochester Diocese sued All Saints for a declaratory judgment that All Saints’ property was held in trust. All Saints counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title and challenging the Religious Corporations Law. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the Diocese. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether All Saints held its real and personal property in trust for the benefit of the Rochester Diocese and the National Church, such that upon the parish’s separation, its property reverted to the Diocese or the National Church.

    Holding

    Yes, because under the neutral principles of law approach, the Dennis Canons of the National Church established an express trust, and All Saints agreed to abide by these canons, creating a legally enforceable trust in favor of the Diocese and the National Church.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court adopted the “neutral principles of law” approach from Jones v. Wolf, requiring examination of deeds, church charters, state statutes, and the general church’s constitution to determine if a trust exists. While the deeds, certificate of incorporation, and Religious Corporations Law didn’t conclusively establish a trust, the Dennis Canons did. The Court noted that the enactment of the Dennis Canons was an attempt by the Episcopal Church to “ensure . . . that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church [would] retain the church property.” By agreeing to abide by the “canonical and legal enactments” of the Diocese, All Saints agreed to be bound by future changes to the canons. The Court found it significant that All Saints never objected to the Dennis Canons in the more than 20 years since their adoption. The court explicitly referenced Trustees of Diocese of Albany v Trinity Episcopal Church of Gloversville as precedent. The Court concluded that the Dennis Canons created an express trust, and All Saints’ agreement to abide by them created a binding legal obligation. The Court also affirmed the lower court’s determination that the resolution deeming the parish “extinct” was a nonreviewable ecclesiastical determination.

  • Katz Park Avenue Corp. v. Jagger, 11 N.Y.3d 314 (2008): Rent Stabilization and Primary Residence of a Tourist Visa Holder

    Katz Park Avenue Corp. v. Jagger, 11 N.Y.3d 314 (2008)

    A foreign national in the United States on a tourist visa cannot, absent unusual circumstances, satisfy the “primary residence” requirement for rent stabilization purposes in New York City.

    Summary

    The landlord brought an ejectment action against Jagger, a British citizen residing in a rent-stabilized apartment in Manhattan. The landlord argued that Jagger did not use the apartment as her primary residence, presenting passport evidence showing she was in the U.S. on a tourist visa (B-2), which requires the visa holder to maintain a principal residence outside the United States. Jagger did not offer evidence to the contrary. The Court of Appeals held that holding a B-2 visa is generally incompatible with maintaining a primary residence in New York City for rent stabilization purposes. The Court thus affirmed the Appellate Division’s order granting summary judgment to the landlord.

    Facts

    Katz Park Avenue Corp., the landlord, sought to evict Jagger from her rent-stabilized apartment in Manhattan.

    The landlord supported the claim by providing copies of Jagger’s passport, which showed she was a British citizen admitted to the U.S. on a B-2 tourist visa.

    Jagger presented no evidence demonstrating that the apartment was her primary residence or challenging the validity of her visa; she argued that the landlord failed to meet its burden of proof.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied the landlord’s motion for summary judgment.

    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, granting summary judgment to the landlord.

    The Appellate Division granted Jagger leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a foreign national, present in the United States on a tourist visa requiring them to maintain a principal residence outside the U.S., can simultaneously satisfy the “primary residence” requirement for rent-stabilized apartments in New York City.

    Holding

    Yes, generally no, because holding a B-2 visa is logically incompatible with maintaining a primary residence in New York City, absent unusual circumstances not present in this case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) requires a tenant to maintain a “primary residence” in the city to qualify for rent stabilization benefits. While RSC § 2520.6(u) does not provide a single definition, it speaks of “evidence which may be considered”. Moreover, New York courts have defined “primary residence” as an “ongoing, substantial, physical nexus with the . . . premises for actual living purposes” (Emay Props. Corp. v Norton, 136 Misc 2d 127, 129 [App Term, 1st Dept 1987]).

    Federal regulations dictate that a B-2 visa is available only to aliens “having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning” (8 USC § 1101 [a] [15] [B]). The term “residence” is defined as the alien’s “principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent” (8 USC § 1101 [a] [33]).

    The Court found these requirements contradictory. It stated, “Thus, if her B-2 visa is valid, defendant has a ‘principal, actual dwelling place in fact’ outside the United States. How she could at the same time have a ‘primary residence’ in New York City is something she has not explained.”

    The court distinguished between “primary residence” and “domicile,” noting that neither the rent regulations nor immigration status depends on domicile.

    The court acknowledged the possibility of “unusual circumstances” where a tenant might demonstrate that their principal dwelling place for immigration purposes differs from their primary residence for rent regulation, but Jagger made no such attempt.

    The court explicitly declined to consider whether someone in the U.S. illegally could establish a primary residence for rent regulation purposes, as Jagger did not claim her visa was invalid.

    In conclusion, the court found Jagger’s status as a B-2 visa holder inconsistent with a claim of primary residence in New York City. The implication is that New York courts will not allow manipulation of immigration status to gain rent stabilization benefits.

  • Graev v. Graev, 11 N.Y.3d 262 (2008): Defining “Cohabitation” in Separation Agreements Requires Extrinsic Evidence of Intent

    Graev v. Graev, 11 N.Y.3d 262 (2008)

    The term “cohabitation” in a separation agreement is ambiguous absent a clear definition within the agreement itself, and courts must consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intended meaning, rather than relying solely on a presumption of shared economic circumstances.

    Summary

    Linda and Lawrence Graev divorced, incorporating a settlement agreement that obligated Mr. Graev to pay spousal support, terminating if Mrs. Graev cohabitated with an unrelated adult for 60 days. Mr. Graev stopped payments, alleging cohabitation between Mrs. Graev and MP, based on overnight stays at her vacation home and their social activities as a couple. Mrs. Graev argued that “cohabitation” required sexual relations, and later, an economic unit, which did not exist. The Court of Appeals held that “cohabitation” is ambiguous without a specific definition in the agreement and reversed the lower court’s decision, remanding the case for consideration of extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.

    Facts

    Linda and Lawrence Graev divorced in 1997, with a settlement agreement incorporated but not merged into the divorce judgment. The agreement stipulated Mr. Graev would pay $10,000 monthly spousal support until August 2009 or the occurrence of certain termination events, including Mrs. Graev’s cohabitation with an unrelated adult for 60 substantially consecutive days. The agreement did not define “cohabitation.” In 2004, Mr. Graev ceased payments, asserting that Mrs. Graev was cohabitating with MP, based on surveillance showing MP stayed overnight at Mrs. Graev’s vacation home in Connecticut for more than 60 days. Mr. Graev argued the pair had an “obvious serious relationship,” acting as a couple at family events.

    Procedural History

    Mrs. Graev moved to enforce the maintenance provisions of the settlement agreement. Mr. Graev cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing cohabitation had occurred. Supreme Court ordered a hearing to determine if the relationship constituted cohabitation, holding sexual intercourse was not conclusive. After a hearing, the trial court found no cohabitation, emphasizing the lack of a shared residence and economic unit. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding “cohabitation has a plain meaning which contemplates changed economic circumstances, and is not ambiguous.” The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the term “cohabitation” ambiguous and remanded the case for a hearing considering extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the term “cohabitation,” as used in the settlement agreement, is ambiguous, thus requiring the consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent, or whether it has a plain meaning under New York law that requires a shared economic unit.

    Holding

    No, the term “cohabitation” is ambiguous as used in the settlement agreement because neither the dictionary nor New York case law supplies an authoritative or “plain” meaning. Extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent must be considered.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the word “cohabitation” is ambiguous because neither dictionary definitions nor New York case law provides a singular, authoritative meaning. The Court highlighted the various definitions of “cohabit,” noting the common element of “living together” in a manner resembling marriage. The Court rejected the Appellate Division’s assertion that New York case law established a distinct meaning of “cohabitation” as requiring “changed economic circumstances,” stemming from the decision in Scharnweber v. Scharnweber. While some Appellate Division decisions implied that there could be no “cohabitation” without changed economic circumstances, the Court of Appeals had never adopted that position. The Court observed the parties’ shifting interpretations of “cohabitation” throughout the litigation, further demonstrating the term’s ambiguity. Because the term is ambiguous, the Court reasoned that extrinsic evidence is necessary to determine the parties’ intent, stating, “Without extrinsic evidence as to the parties’ intent, there is no way to assess the particular factors inherent in the dictionary meanings or case law discussions of ‘cohabitation’ the parties may have meant to embrace or emphasize.” Therefore, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to Supreme Court for further proceedings to consider such evidence.