New York Law Review

Tag: 2008

  • Van Kipnis v. Van Kipnis, 11 N.Y.3d 573 (2008): Enforceability of Foreign Prenuptial Agreements on Equitable Distribution

    11 N.Y.3d 573 (2008)

    A prenuptial agreement designating assets as separate property, including those acquired during the marriage, will be enforced to preclude equitable distribution upon divorce, absent an express waiver of equitable distribution in the agreement.

    Summary

    This case concerns the enforceability of a French prenuptial agreement in a New York divorce proceeding. The Court of Appeals held that the agreement, which established a separation of estates regime, validly precluded equitable distribution of separately held assets. The court clarified that a prenuptial agreement need not contain an explicit waiver of equitable distribution to be enforceable, as long as it clearly designates assets as separate property. The Court also addressed maintenance and attorney fees, remitting the case for reconsideration of legal fees incurred while contesting the applicability of the prenuptial agreement.

    Facts

    Claire and Gregory Van Kipnis married in France in 1965. Before the wedding, they executed a “Contrat de Mariage” under the French Civil Code, opting for a separation of estates regime. This agreement stipulated that each spouse would retain ownership of their assets, acquired before or during the marriage. After marrying, the couple moved to New York, maintained separate accounts, and acquired two jointly-owned homes. In 2002, Claire filed for divorce, seeking equitable distribution of all assets.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court allowed Gregory to amend his answer to assert the prenuptial agreement as a defense against equitable distribution. The Appellate Division affirmed. A Special Referee determined the French contract provided for separate ownership of assets. The Supreme Court confirmed the Referee’s report. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the 1965 French prenuptial agreement, establishing a separation of estates, precludes equitable distribution of property acquired during the marriage under New York Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B).

    2. Whether the lower courts properly weighed the factors in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6)(a) when awarding maintenance.

    3. Whether the lower courts erred by precluding the wife’s recovery of legal fees under Domestic Relations Law § 237 for services provided in opposing the husband’s affirmative defense based on the prenuptial agreement.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the agreement clearly designated assets acquired during the marriage as separate property, and Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (1) (d) (4) and (5) (b) provide that such assets remain separate upon dissolution of the marriage.

    2. No, because the record supports the findings of the lower courts, and there was no abuse of discretion in their calculation.

    3. Yes, because the wife’s request is similar to the fee application in Ventimiglia v Ventimiglia, where attorneys’ fees were awarded to a party who contested her spouse’s affirmative defense based on an antenuptial agreement; therefore, this portion of wife’s fee application should not have been excluded as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that prenuptial agreements are generally valid and enforceable under New York law, reflecting a policy of allowing individuals to control their own interests through contracts. The court cited Bloomfield v Bloomfield, 97 NY2d 188, 193 (2001). The Court emphasized that such agreements must be interpreted based on the parties’ intent, as expressed in the writing. The Court stated, “a written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms” (Greenfield v Philles Records, 98 NY2d 562, 569 [2002]). The agreement clearly stipulated a “separation of estates” where each party retained ownership of their assets acquired during the marriage. According to the Court, Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) does not mandate an express waiver of equitable distribution in a prenuptial agreement. The key is whether the agreement sufficiently designates assets as separate property, thus removing them from the scope of equitable distribution. On maintenance, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the lower courts’ calculation. As for attorney’s fees, the Court distinguished the case from situations where a party seeks to set aside a prenuptial agreement. Because the wife was contesting the applicability of the agreement, the Court remitted the case for reconsideration of the legal fees related to that challenge, relying on Ventimiglia v Ventimiglia, 36 AD3d 899 (2d Dept 2007).

  • People v. Mills, 11 N.Y.3d 527 (2008): Eligibility for Resentencing Under the Drug Law Reform Act

    11 N.Y.3d 527 (2008)

    To be eligible for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2005, a class A-II felony drug offender must not be eligible for parole within three years of applying for resentencing.

    Summary

    This case interprets the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) of 2005, specifically who is eligible for resentencing. The Court of Appeals held that to qualify for resentencing under the 2005 DLRA, class A-II felony drug offenders must not be eligible for parole within three years of their resentencing application. The Court reasoned that the plain meaning of the statute and its legislative history support this interpretation. The Court rejected arguments that prior parole or subsequent offenses should alter this eligibility requirement, emphasizing the legislature’s intent to target offenders facing the longest prison terms. The orders of the lower courts were affirmed, denying resentencing to both defendants.

    Facts

    Donald Mills pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in 1995 and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of three years to life. He was denied parole multiple times. Jose Then pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance in 1999 and was sentenced to five years to life, then paroled in 2002. He was arrested again on drug charges, convicted in 2003, and sentenced to six years to life. His parole on the 1999 conviction was revoked.

    Procedural History

    Mills moved for resentencing under the 2005 DLRA, which was initially granted but later vacated by the County Court. The Appellate Division affirmed the vacatur. Then moved for resentencing on both his 1999 and 2003 convictions; the Supreme Court granted it for both. The Appellate Division reversed the resentencing for the 1999 conviction. Both Mills and Then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Drug Law Reform Act of 2005 applies to A-II felony drug offenders who are eligible for parole within three years of applying for resentencing.

    2. Whether a defendant who has been released on parole for a class A-II drug felony conviction is eligible for resentencing under the 2005 DLRA for that conviction after parole revocation and re-incarceration.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute explicitly requires applicants to be more than twelve months from being an “eligible inmate,” as defined by Correction Law § 851(2), which includes those eligible for parole within two years. Therefore, to qualify for resentencing, offenders must not be eligible for parole within three years of their resentencing application.

    2. No, because once a defendant has been released to parole supervision for a class A-II drug felony conviction, they no longer qualify for 2005 DLRA relief for that particular conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the plain language of the 2005 DLRA, specifically referencing Correction Law § 851(2), unambiguously requires that A-II felony drug offenders must not be eligible for parole within three years of their resentencing application. The Court rejected alternative interpretations, finding no support in legislative history or policy considerations. The Court cited letters from the Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services and the Executive Director of the New York State Defenders Association, both of which explicitly mentioned the three-year limitation.
    Regarding Then, the Court reasoned that allowing a resentencing opportunity based on a subsequent offense would create an illogical outcome. The Court emphasized that the Legislature did not intend for fresh crimes to trigger resentencing opportunities. “A valid and more sensible reading of the statutory text is that in order to be eligible for resentencing, an inmate must be more than three years from parole eligibility for the same class A-II drug felony for which resentencing is sought.” In short, the 2005 DLRA was designed to “ameliorate[] the conditions of those A-II offenders facing the longest prison time“.

  • People v. Ford, 11 N.Y.3d 875 (2008): Evaluating Sufficiency of Evidence Based on Jury Charge Absent Objection

    People v. Ford, 11 N.Y.3d 875 (2008)

    When a jury instruction is not objected to, the legal sufficiency of a conviction must be viewed in light of the charge as given, even if the charge incorrectly states the law; the appellate court must evaluate whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction under the erroneous jury charge.

    Summary

    Defendant Ford was convicted of first-degree robbery. On appeal, he argued insufficient evidence of “actual possession” of a dangerous instrument (knife) and erroneous denial of his severance motion. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the first-degree robbery conviction to third-degree robbery, concluding that the evidence of actual possession was legally insufficient, even though the charge, as given, alerted the jury to the “actual possession” element. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the jury charge was not objected to, the legal sufficiency of the conviction must be viewed in light of that charge, and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction under the given charge. The Court also rejected the severance claim.

    Facts

    Ford was indicted on robbery charges related to two successive robberies in elevators. Before trial, he unsuccessfully sought to sever the trials. At one of the robberies, Ford stated, “I got a knife,” while moving his hand toward his pants pocket.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Ford of two counts of first-degree robbery. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the conviction for first-degree robbery to third-degree robbery. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted both the People and defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree robbery, given the jury charge as given, even though that charge did not explicitly require a finding of “actual possession” of a dangerous instrument.
    2. Whether the trial court erroneously denied the defendant’s severance motion.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was no objection to the jury charge, the legal sufficiency of the conviction must be viewed in light of that charge, and the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant “used or threatened the immediate use” of a knife under the charge as given.
    2. No, because the defendant failed to establish good cause for severance, and the evidence as to the two crimes was presented separately and was readily capable of being segregated in the minds of the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the jury charge did not adequately convey the “actual possession” requirement because it did not use the term “actual possession” or otherwise communicate that requirement. The court distinguished its recent decision in People v. Jean-Baptiste, where the defendant’s motion to dismiss apprised the trial judge of the error in the charge, rendering an objection superfluous. Here, by contrast, the legal sufficiency objection was based on the perceived inadequacy of proof, not an interpretation of an element of the offense. Because the defense failed to object to the jury charge, the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction had to be evaluated in light of the charge as given. The Court found that the evidence, specifically Ford’s statement “I got a knife,” while simultaneously moving his hand toward his pants pocket, was sufficient to establish that Ford “used or threatened the immediate use” of a knife as the trial court charged. The Court emphasized that under CPL 200.20 (3)(a), severance was not warranted because there was no material variance in the quantity of proof for the separate incidents and the evidence of each was easily segregated by the jury.

  • People v. Diggins, 11 N.Y.3d 520 (2008): Adjournment Discretion in Persistent Felony Offender Hearings

    People v. Diggins, 11 N.Y.3d 520 (2008)

    A trial court has discretion to deny an adjournment request for gathering evidence to challenge a prior conviction in a persistent felony offender hearing, especially when the defendant had ample time to prepare and offers only conclusory allegations.

    Summary

    Isaac Diggins appealed his conviction and sentencing as a persistent violent felony offender, arguing that he was improperly denied an adjournment to gather evidence challenging the constitutionality of a prior conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the adjournment. Diggins had ample time to challenge the prior conviction and failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant further delay. The court emphasized that while defendants can challenge prior convictions used for enhancement, they must do so with adequate preparation and specific allegations, not vague requests for more time. Additionally, the court upheld the admission of evidence of prior gun convictions to demonstrate intent.

    Facts

    Isaac Diggins was convicted of attempted second-degree murder, first-degree assault, and weapons possession. The People filed a statement indicating Diggins had two prior violent felony convictions: a 2004 conviction for criminal possession of a weapon and a 1991 conviction for robbery. Diggins confessed to the shooting but claimed it was accidental. Before sentencing, Diggins challenged the 2004 conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney purportedly did not participate meaningfully in the trial. He requested an adjournment to file motions and obtain trial minutes.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Diggins’ request for an adjournment and sentenced him as a persistent violent felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding that Diggins advanced only conclusory allegations and had sufficient opportunity to obtain the trial minutes. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Diggins an adjournment to gather evidence supporting his claim that a prior felony conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.

    Holding

    No, because Diggins had sufficient time to prepare a challenge to the prior conviction and failed to present specific, non-conclusory allegations warranting further delay.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Criminal Procedure Law § 400.15, which governs persistent felony offender hearings. While the statute allows defendants to challenge the constitutionality of prior convictions, it also contemplates that hearings will proceed promptly if the defendant receives adequate notice of the predicate felony statement. The Court emphasized that granting an adjournment is within the trial court’s discretion. Here, Diggins received the predicate felony statement four months before sentencing. He failed to provide an affidavit from the attorney in the 2004 case or offer specific reasons why that attorney’s conduct constituted ineffective assistance. The court noted the inference that the attorney’s non-participation might have been a deliberate protest strategy, which does not automatically equate to ineffective assistance. As the court observed, Diggins simply stated he wanted more time without demonstrating any effort to gather evidence or providing a persuasive basis for believing further investigation would yield favorable results. The Court also upheld the admission of evidence of Diggins’ prior gun-related convictions to demonstrate intent, given his claim that the shooting was accidental. The trial court mitigated potential prejudice by providing limiting instructions to the jury, directing them to consider the evidence only in relation to the issue of accident and not propensity. The Court found the prior convictions highly probative because Diggins “at least suggested in a videotaped statement admitted at trial that he was unaccustomed to handling firearms.”

  • Rivera v. Firetog, 11 N.Y.3d 501 (2008): Double Jeopardy and Mistrials Based on Jury Deadlock

    Rivera v. Firetog, 11 N.Y.3d 501 (2008)

    A trial court’s decision to declare a mistrial based on jury deadlock is entitled to great deference and will not bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds unless the court abused its discretion by failing to explore appropriate alternatives or if the jury clearly indicated it had reached a partial verdict.

    Summary

    Rivera was tried for second-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon, with lesser included manslaughter offenses submitted to the jury. After nearly six days of deliberation and multiple deadlock notes, the trial court declared a mistrial without inquiring whether the jury had reached a partial verdict, despite a request from defense counsel. Rivera sought to bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial because the jury never declared it had reached a partial verdict and the trial court reasonably determined further deliberation would be futile.

    Facts

    Rivera was indicted for second-degree murder and weapon possession for a fatal stabbing. The trial court instructed the jury to consider first-degree manslaughter only if it acquitted Rivera of murder, and second-degree manslaughter only if it acquitted him of first-degree manslaughter. The jury sent multiple notes indicating deadlock. After the jury requested clarification of the manslaughter charges, it repeatedly asked for copies of all three charges. Defense counsel requested the court ask about a partial verdict before adjourning for the weekend. Ultimately, the jury sent another deadlock note stating they could not reach a unanimous decision after extensive deliberations.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court declared a mistrial after the jury indicated they were deadlocked. Rivera moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, which the Supreme Court denied. Rivera then commenced an Article 78 proceeding to prevent retrial. The Appellate Division granted the petition, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, dismissing the petition and allowing retrial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial based on jury deadlock without first inquiring whether the jury had reached a partial verdict, thereby barring retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court reasonably determined that there was a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial and the jury never clearly declared that it had reached a partial verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that double jeopardy protects a defendant’s right to have their trial completed by a particular tribunal. However, this right is subordinate to the public interest in seeing a criminal prosecution proceed to verdict. A mistrial may be declared when there is a manifest necessity, such as a genuinely deadlocked jury. The determination of jury deadlock is within the trial court’s discretion, which is entitled to great deference. The court must consider factors such as the length of trial and deliberations, communications between court and jury, and potential effects of further deliberation. Here, the jury deliberated longer than the trial lasted, sent three deadlock notes, and requested reinstruction on all three charges multiple times, suggesting it had not reached a verdict on any count. The court distinguished Matter of Robles v. Bamberger, where there was “overwhelming evidence” the jury had reached agreement on at least one count. The Court also rejected the argument that Matter of Oliver v. Justices of N.Y. Supreme Ct. of N.Y. County compelled a different result because, unlike in Oliver, the jury here never explicitly declared it had reached a partial verdict. The Court declined to create a per se rule requiring inquiry into a partial verdict whenever requested, stating, “no per se rules or mechanical formulas apply to mistrial determinations.” The Court concluded that the trial court reasonably determined there was a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial, and retrial does not violate double jeopardy principles.

  • People v. Giles, 11 N.Y.3d 495 (2008): Admissibility of Uncharged Crimes & Limiting Instructions

    People v. Giles, 11 N.Y.3d 495 (2008)

    Evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible to show a defendant’s propensity to commit crime unless it directly establishes an element of the charged crime or is relevant to show intent, motive, knowledge, common scheme, or identity; if admitted, a proper limiting instruction is required to prevent undue prejudice.

    Summary

    Dwight Giles was caught attempting to break into a medical office. He possessed a stolen Visa card and a MetroCard purchased with a stolen ATM card, from burglaries he wasn’t charged with. At trial for attempted burglary and possession of stolen property, the prosecution introduced detailed testimony about the uncharged burglaries to prove Giles knew the cards were stolen and intended to commit theft in the medical office. The court provided a limiting instruction but failed to specify the purpose for which the evidence was admitted. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the evidence was admissible for the stolen property charges, the failure to provide a proper limiting instruction prejudiced the attempted burglary charges, warranting a new trial on those counts.

    Facts

    Police officers observed Dwight Giles attempting to pick the lock of a medical office door. Upon confrontation, Giles fled and was apprehended. A search revealed a knife, a Visa card belonging to Frank Ballabio, and a MetroCard. Ballabio’s Visa card had been stolen from his home a week prior, and the MetroCard was purchased with an ATM card stolen from Uri Kaufman six days prior. Giles was not charged with either burglary.

    Procedural History

    Before trial, Giles moved to preclude detailed testimony about the uncharged burglaries. The trial court allowed the testimony but provided a limiting instruction without explaining its purpose. Giles was convicted of attempted burglary, criminal possession of stolen property, and possession of burglar’s tools. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the order, reversing the attempted burglary and possession of burglar’s tools convictions and remitting for a new trial on those counts, while allowing the stolen property convictions to stand pending possible resentencing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence of uncharged burglaries is admissible to prove the defendant’s intent to commit a burglary and knowledge that property in his possession was stolen.

    2. Whether the trial court’s limiting instruction regarding the uncharged burglaries was sufficient to cure potential prejudice to the defendant.

    Holding

    1. Yes, in part, because the evidence of the uncharged burglaries was relevant to establish the defendant’s knowledge that the Visa card and MetroCard were stolen for the criminal possession charges, but not to prove intent to commit burglary.

    2. No, because the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which it could consider the evidence of the uncharged burglaries, creating a prejudicial effect on the attempted burglary charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that relevant evidence is generally admissible unless an exclusionary rule applies. Evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible to show a defendant’s propensity to commit crime. However, the Molineux exception allows such evidence if it helps establish an element of the charged crime, such as intent, motive, knowledge, common scheme, or identity. The Court found that the evidence of the uncharged burglaries was offered to prove Giles’s knowledge that the cards were stolen, which was relevant to the criminal possession charges. However, there was no direct link between the uncharged burglaries and Giles’s intent to commit a burglary at the medical office; the evidence merely suggested a criminal propensity. The Court stated that if the evidence “has no bearing other than to show that defendant is of a criminal bent or character and thus likely to have committed the crime charged, it is excluded” (People v. Dales, 309 NY 97, 101 [1955]). Since the jury was not properly instructed on the limited purpose of the evidence, it could have improperly inferred that Giles was likely to commit burglary because he possessed stolen items, thus prejudicing the attempted burglary charges. The Court emphasized the importance of a limiting instruction to guide the jury on the permissible use of such evidence.

  • Kopsachilis v. 130 E. 18 Owners Corp., 10 N.Y.3d 514 (2008): Landlord Liability for Extinguished Lights in Windowless Stairwells

    Kopsachilis v. 130 E. 18 Owners Corp., 10 N.Y.3d 514 (2008)

    A landlord can assert a “knowledge or consent” defense under Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(2) to avoid liability for extinguished lights in a windowless stairwell, even though § 37(3) requires such lights to be kept burning continuously.

    Summary

    Plaintiff was injured when she fell in a dark, windowless stairwell of defendant’s apartment building during the 2003 blackout. She sued, claiming the defendant violated Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(3), which requires lights in windowless fire-stairs to be kept burning continuously, constituting negligence per se. The defendant argued that § 37(2) provides a defense if a light is extinguished without the owner’s knowledge or consent. The Court of Appeals held that the “knowledge or consent” defense applies to violations of § 37(3), reversing the Appellate Division and granting summary judgment to the defendant. The court reasoned that the statute’s language and legislative intent support applying the defense, even when lights are required to be on continuously.

    Facts

    During the August 14, 2003 blackout, the plaintiff stayed overnight in a coworker’s apartment in a building owned by the defendant. The building’s backup battery-operated lights lasted only 40 minutes and were out when the plaintiff arrived. Building staff provided flashlights and candles, escorting occupants up the fire-stairs. The next morning, without a flashlight or assistance, the plaintiff opened the door to the fire-stairs, saw nothing, and fell, sustaining injuries. The building was not required to have emergency lighting connected to a backup power source.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that § 37(3) imposes a categorical duty regardless of the owner’s knowledge or consent. Two justices dissented, arguing that the statute does not impose absolute liability and the defendant should be able to assert a “knowledge or consent” defense. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “knowledge or consent” defense in Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(2) applies to a violation of § 37(3), which requires lights in windowless fire-stairs to be kept burning continuously.

    Holding

    No, because the “knowledge or consent” defense in Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(2) applies to the extinguishment of any lights required by subdivision (1), whether they are required to be on only at night or continuously.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute’s language supports the application of the “knowledge or consent” defense to § 37(3). The court stated, “The words ‘[e]xcept as provided in subdivision three’ do not modify the knowledge or consent defense—the exception and the defense appear in separate sentences.” The court further reasoned that it is unlikely the Legislature intended to impose strict liability for a light failure in a windowless area but not in a windowed hallway, absent a clear statement to that effect. The court noted that the defendant did not “consent” to the blackout. Therefore, the defendant had no liability under Multiple Dwelling Law § 37. The Court emphasized the interconnectedness of subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) of the statute. Subdivision (1) establishes the lighting requirement, subdivision (2) sets the duration, and subdivision (3) creates an exception to the durational requirement. The court stated, “We therefore read subdivision (3)’s statement that lights in windowless areas ‘shall be kept burning continuously’ as stating an exception to the rule that lights need be on only at night, not as creating a new liability to which there is no defense.”

  • People v. Jean-Baptiste, 11 N.Y.3d 539 (2008): Retroactivity of Feingold’s Depraved Indifference Standard on Direct Appeal

    People v. Jean-Baptiste, 11 N.Y.3d 539 (2008)

    When a defendant’s conviction for depraved indifference murder is pending on direct appeal and the defendant has adequately challenged the sufficiency of the proof, the appellate court must apply the subjective mental state standard for depraved indifference established in People v. Feingold.

    Summary

    Jean-Baptiste was convicted of depraved indifference murder under the then-prevailing objective standard. While his appeal was pending, People v. Feingold redefined depraved indifference murder to require a culpable, subjective mental state. Jean-Baptiste argued that his conviction should be overturned because the evidence did not establish the mental state required under Feingold. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Feingold standard applies to cases on direct appeal where the defendant has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, distinguishing direct appeals from collateral attacks on final convictions. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to reduce the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree.

    Facts

    Michael Weekes attended a party and had a confrontation with a man nicknamed “Back-shot,” striking him with a bottle. Jean-Baptiste, Back-shot’s cousin, then pulled a handgun and shot Weekes in the chest at close range, killing him.

    Procedural History

    Jean-Baptiste was initially charged with intentional murder and depraved indifference murder. The first trial resulted in an acquittal on the intentional murder charge but a hung jury on the depraved indifference charge. A superseding indictment added manslaughter in the first degree. At the second trial, the jury convicted Jean-Baptiste of depraved indifference murder under the objective standard established in People v. Register. The Appellate Division reversed the depraved indifference murder conviction, finding insufficient evidence of the mental state required under the new standard established in People v. Feingold, and reduced the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the subjective mental state standard for depraved indifference murder articulated in People v. Feingold applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal where the defendant has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a depraved indifference murder conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because cases on direct appeal are generally decided in accordance with the law as it exists at the time the appellate decision is made, and a failure to apply the new standard would result in a conviction even though one of the elements of the crime had not been established.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on common-law principles that cases on direct appeal should be decided based on the current state of the law. The Court cited People v. Hill, which held that a new definition of “knowingly” applied to cases pending on direct appeal. The Court reasoned that failing to apply the new, more demanding standard for depraved indifference murder would result in a person being found guilty even if an essential element of the crime (depraved indifference mental state) was not proven.

    The Court distinguished Policano v. Herbert, which held that the new depraved indifference standard did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court emphasized the critical difference between cases on direct appeal and those where the appellate process had concluded. Applying the new standard to cases on direct appeal is consistent with ensuring convictions are based on legally sufficient evidence, while retroactive application to final convictions would create a flood of collateral attacks, disrupting the finality of judgments.

    The Court also addressed the People’s argument that the legal sufficiency should be measured by the jury charge given at trial. The Court noted that defense counsel made a specific motion for a trial order of dismissal based on legal insufficiency, anticipating the change in law brought by Feingold, therefore preserving the issue for appeal.

    Ultimately, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division, stating that, in applying the Feingold standard, “the evidence failed to establish that defendant acted with the requisite mental state of depraved indifference to human life.” The Court further concurred that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for manslaughter in the second degree.

  • Continental Casualty Co. v. Stradford, 11 N.Y.3d 443 (2008): Timeliness of Disclaimer Based on Insured’s Non-Cooperation

    Continental Casualty Co. v. Stradford, 11 N.Y.3d 443 (2008)

    An insurer’s disclaimer of coverage based on an insured’s non-cooperation must be made within a reasonable time, and the reasonableness of the delay is a factual question considering the insurer’s need to investigate and the insured’s pattern of conduct.

    Summary

    Continental Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify its insured, Terrance Stradford, in two dental malpractice actions due to his non-cooperation. Over six years, Stradford sporadically cooperated with Continental. The court addressed whether Continental timely disclaimed coverage. The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact remained regarding the timeliness of Continental’s disclaimer, considering Stradford’s pattern of conduct and Continental’s need to investigate. The Court modified the Appellate Division’s order by denying summary judgment to the defendants.

    Facts

    Hector and Rose Gunaratne, and Sumanadasa Perera, commenced dental malpractice actions against Stradford in 1998. Continental had issued a professional liability policy to Stradford, requiring him to notify Continental of actions, cooperate fully in litigation and settlement efforts, attend hearings and trials, and assist in securing evidence and obtaining witnesses. Stradford notified Continental, but subsequently largely ignored Continental’s requests for treatment records, views on expert witnesses, scheduling depositions, and discussions on settlements, despite repeated warnings that non-cooperation could jeopardize his coverage. Stradford made occasional promises to cooperate and eventually appeared for a deposition in the Gunaratne case. After four years, Stradford requested new counsel in both actions, but never executed the necessary substitution form.

    Procedural History

    Continental sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Stradford. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Continental. The Appellate Division reversed, finding Continental had established non-cooperation, but the two-month delay in disclaiming was unreasonable. Continental appealed. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, denying summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the timeliness issue was a question of fact.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Continental’s approximately two-month delay in disclaiming coverage based on Stradford’s non-cooperation was unreasonable as a matter of law.

    Holding

    No, because the reasonableness of the delay is a question of fact considering the insurer’s need to evaluate the insured’s pattern of conduct and the insurer’s duty to attempt to elicit cooperation from the insured.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that even with a valid basis for disclaimer, an insurer must issue it within a reasonable time. Timeliness is almost always a factual question, requiring an assessment of all relevant circumstances, including the time needed for a prompt investigation. The Court noted the difficulty of fixing the time when an insurer’s obligation to disclaim begins, stating that “That period begins when an insurer first becomes aware of the ground for its disclaimer.” However, an insured’s non-cooperation is often not readily apparent, and can be obscured by promises and sporadic cooperation. The court reiterated the “heavy burden that an insurer seeking to establish a noncooperation defense must carry.” Insurers must be encouraged to disclaim for non-cooperation only after it is clear that further reasonable attempts to elicit their insured’s cooperation will be futile. The Court found that the reasonableness of the two-month delay to analyze the six-year pattern of obstructive conduct presented a question of fact precluding summary judgment for either party. The court quoted prior precedent that “investigation into issues affecting an insurer’s decision whether to disclaim coverage obviously may excuse delay in notifying the policyholder of a disclaimer.”

  • People v. Naradzay, 11 N.Y.3d 460 (2008): Defining ‘Dangerously Near’ in Attempted Crimes

    People v. Naradzay, 11 N.Y.3d 460 (2008)

    To be guilty of an attempted crime, a defendant’s conduct must pass beyond mere intent or preparation and come ‘dangerously near’ the commission of the completed crime, though the defendant need not take the final step necessary.

    Summary

    Jason Naradzay was convicted of attempted murder and burglary after being found near D.G.’s home with a loaded shotgun and a plan to harm her and her family. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Naradzay’s actions, including purchasing the gun, driving to the victim’s neighborhood, and possessing the loaded weapon near her property, constituted conduct that came “dangerously near” the commission of the intended crimes, even though he was apprehended before entering the home. The court emphasized that the jury was entitled to infer intent from Naradzay’s conduct and surrounding circumstances, rejecting his claim that he had abandoned his plan.

    Facts

    D.G. met Jason Naradzay through a mutual friend. After D.G. attempted to end their contact, Naradzay’s behavior became troubling. He appeared at events she attended, and on February 3, 2004, she told him not to contact her again. On February 4, Naradzay created a “to-do” list outlining a plan to break into D.G.’s home and shoot her and her husband. He purchased a shotgun and ammunition, telling the seller he needed a gun with less “kick” for his elderly father. He borrowed a friend’s car under false pretenses, drove to D.G.’s neighborhood, and loaded the shotgun. A motorist saw him concealing the shotgun near D.G.’s property and called 911.

    Procedural History

    Naradzay was indicted for attempted murder, attempted burglary, and criminal possession of a weapon. The Supreme Court denied his motion to suppress evidence. A jury convicted him on all charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Justice granted Naradzay leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Naradzay’s actions constituted conduct that came “dangerously near” the commission of burglary and murder, thereby establishing the elements of attempt under New York law.

    Holding

    Yes, because Naradzay’s actions went beyond mere preparation and placed him in a position to commit the intended crimes but for the intervention of law enforcement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied Penal Law § 110.00, which defines an attempt as engaging in conduct that “tends to effect the commission” of a crime with the intent to commit that crime. The court emphasized that the defendant’s conduct must go beyond “mere intent or mere preparation” and come “dangerously near” the completed crime. The court found that Naradzay’s actions—creating a detailed plan, purchasing a shotgun and ammunition, driving to D.G.’s neighborhood, loading the gun, and approaching her property with the weapon—demonstrated a clear intent and constituted conduct that was “potentially and immediately dangerous.” The court rejected Naradzay’s argument that his intent wavered, stating that the jury was entitled to discredit his self-serving testimony about considering suicide. The court noted that the intervention of an observant motorist and the prompt response of law enforcement prevented Naradzay from carrying out his plan. The court cited People v. Mahboubian, stating, “there comes a point where it is ‘too late in the stage of preparation for the law to conclude that no attempt occurred.’” The court also held that the police questioning was threshold questioning and did not violate Naradzay’s Miranda rights.