New York Law Review

Tag: 2008

  • Lawrence v. Graubard Miller, 11 N.Y.3d 588 (2008): Enforceability of Revised Attorney Retainer Agreements

    Lawrence v. Graubard Miller, 11 N.Y.3d 588 (2008)

    A revised attorney retainer agreement entered into after representation has begun is enforceable if it is not procedurally or substantively unconscionable, considering the client’s understanding, the risks assumed by the attorney, and the proportionality of the fee to the services rendered.

    Summary

    Alice Lawrence, after paying Graubard Miller approximately $18 million in legal fees related to a protracted estate litigation, entered into a revised retainer agreement for a 40% contingency fee. After a favorable settlement, Lawrence disputed the fee and sought to reclaim gifts she had given to the firm’s partners years earlier. The court found the revised retainer agreement enforceable because Lawrence understood its terms, the firm bore significant risk, and the fee, while substantial, was proportional to the result achieved. The claims regarding the gifts were deemed time-barred due to the lack of continuous representation tolling.

    Facts

    Alice Lawrence retained Graubard Miller in 1983 to litigate her late husband’s estate against his brother, Seymour Cohn. Over two decades, Lawrence paid the firm $18 million in hourly fees. In 2004, facing uncertain outcomes and high costs, Lawrence sought a new fee arrangement. Following an unfavorable ruling and settlement negotiations, she agreed to a 40% contingency fee. In 1998, after a large distribution from the estate, Lawrence gifted substantial sums to three Graubard partners. After the case settled in 2005 for over $100 million, Lawrence disputed the contingency fee and sought return of the gifts.

    Procedural History

    Graubard Miller sued in Surrogate’s Court to compel payment of its fees. Lawrence sued Graubard and the attorneys in Supreme Court, seeking rescission of the revised retainer agreement and return of fees and gifts; the Supreme Court action was removed to Surrogate’s Court. A Referee found the revised retainer agreement not unconscionable when made, but unconscionable in hindsight. The Surrogate affirmed the fee ruling but set aside the gifts. The Appellate Division modified, finding the revised retainer agreement unconscionable, reinstating the original hourly agreement, and upholding the return of the gifts. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the revised retainer agreement was procedurally unconscionable because Lawrence did not fully understand it?

    2. Whether the revised retainer agreement was substantively unconscionable because the fee was disproportionate to Graubard’s risk and effort?

    3. Whether the statute of limitations on the Lawrence estate’s claim for return of the gifts was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine?

    Holding

    1. No, because Lawrence was a sophisticated client who understood the agreement and sought it herself, and her accountant reviewed it.

    2. No, because Graubard undertook significant risk, and the $44 million fee was proportional to the $111 million recovery.

    3. No, because the gifts were a separate financial transaction, not the subject of ongoing legal representation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the revised retainer agreement was not procedurally unconscionable, as Lawrence was fully informed and understood the agreement. The court emphasized that Lawrence was a sophisticated businesswoman, actively involved in the litigation, and had the agreement reviewed by her accountant. The court rejected the argument that Graubard exerted undue influence over Lawrence, noting her history of firing professionals at will.

    The court also determined that the agreement was not substantively unconscionable. It acknowledged that while $44 million was a large fee, Graubard undertook significant risk in entering the contingency fee arrangement, including the risk of Lawrence terminating the agreement or the litigation continuing for years without additional compensation. The court stated that “the contingency system cannot work if lawyers do not sometimes get very lucrative fees, for that is what makes them willing to take the risk.” Further, the court considered the value of Graubard’s services to be the $111 million recovery obtained for Lawrence.

    Finally, the court held that the statute of limitations on the claim for return of the gifts was not tolled by the continuous representation doctrine. The court reasoned that the gifts were a separate financial transaction, not the subject of ongoing legal representation. The court emphasized that the continuous representation doctrine applies only where there is a claim of misconduct in the provision of professional services and ongoing representation regarding the same matter. The court stated, “when an attorney engages in a financial transaction with a client…the attorney is not representing the client in that transaction at all.” Therefore, the claims seeking to recoup the gifts were time-barred.

  • Matter of Policemen’s Benevolent Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc. v. New York State, 892 N.E.2d 994 (2008): Statute of Limitations for Challenging Administrative Orders

    Matter of Policemen’s Benevolent Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc. v. New York State, 892 N.E.2d 994 (2008)

    The statute of limitations for challenging an administrative order begins to run when the order impacts the petitioner, and a subsequent order addressing a different aspect of the same subject matter does not necessarily extend the limitations period.

    Summary

    This case addresses the timeliness of a challenge to two administrative orders regarding the reclassification of New York State Court Officers. The Court of Appeals held that the challenge to the first order was time-barred because the petitioners waited more than four months after their paychecks reflected the changes made by that order to bring their claim. The court further held that the second order, which adjusted the salary grade, did not revive the expired statute of limitations because it addressed a separate issue and did not involve a fresh examination of the merits of the initial reclassification decision. However, the Court agreed that because the record lacked an explanation for the retroactive application of the second order, the petitioners were entitled to relief as to that order.

    Facts

    The Chief Administrative Judge (CAJ) issued two administrative orders affecting New York State Court Officers. The first order (January 2004) abolished the position of Court Officer (JG-16) and replaced it with NYS Court Officer (JG-17). The CAJ treated this as a reclassification under Judiciary Law § 37 (5), denying the officers continuous service credit. The second order (December 2004) increased the salary grade of NYS Court Officer from JG-17 to JG-18, retroactive to January 8, 2004. Court Officers received paychecks on April 7, 2004 reflecting JG-17 without continuous service credit. The officers commenced a proceeding in July 2005, challenging both orders.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners commenced an Article 78 proceeding challenging the CAJ’s orders. The lower courts ruled on the timeliness of the challenge and the validity of the retroactive application of the second order. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order and affirmed it.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the challenge to the January 2004 order was time-barred under CPLR 217.

    2. Whether the December 2004 order extended the statute of limitations for challenging the January 2004 order.

    3. Whether the petitioners were entitled to relief regarding the retroactive application of the December 2004 order.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the petitioners commenced the proceeding more than one year after receiving paychecks reflecting the impact of the January 2004 order.

    2. No, because the December 2004 order simply assigned a salary grade and did not involve a fresh examination of the merits of the initial reclassification.

    3. Yes, because the record contained no explanation or rationale for the retroactive application of the December 2004 order.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the four-month statute of limitations under CPLR 217 began to run when the petitioners received their first paychecks on April 7, 2004, reflecting the changes implemented by the January 2004 order. The Court cited Matter of Edmead v McGuire, 67 NY2d 714, 716 (1986), for the principle that the limitations period begins when the petitioner is aggrieved by the order. Because the proceeding was not commenced until July 2005, the challenge to the January 2004 order was untimely.

    The Court distinguished the December 2004 order, noting that it merely assigned a salary grade to the new position and did not revisit the initial decision to reclassify the positions. The Court quoted Matter of Chisholm v Martinez, 277 AD2d 166, 167 (1st Dept 2000), stating that the December 2004 order “did not involve the sort of fresh, complete and unlimited examination into the merits as is necessary to extend the four-month limitations period.”

    Regarding the retroactive application of the December 2004 order, the Court found that the absence of any explanation or rationale in the record entitled the petitioners to relief. This suggests that administrative actions, particularly those with retroactive effects, should be supported by a clear justification.

  • Chien v. Tonnino, 11 N.Y.3d 203 (2008): Defining ‘Owner’ Liability Under New York Labor Law in Condominium Context

    Chien v. Tonnino, 11 N.Y.3d 203 (2008)

    Under New York Labor Law, a condominium association is not considered an ‘owner’ subject to liability for construction-related injuries within a unit, even with certain reserved controls, unless it acts as an owner by engaging in the work or has a significant property interest beyond typical condominium governance.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a condominium association can be held liable as an ‘owner’ under New York Labor Law for injuries sustained by a worker during renovations within a privately owned unit. The plaintiff, Chien, was injured while working on renovations in a condominium unit owned by the Tomchinskys. He sued the unit owners and the condominium association. The Court of Appeals held that the condominium association was not an ‘owner’ within the meaning of the Labor Law, despite having certain approval rights over unit alterations. The court reasoned that the association’s limited control did not equate to the kind of ownership interest that triggers liability under the statute.

    Facts

    The Tomchinskys owned a condominium unit and hired contractors to perform renovations. Chien, a worker, was injured during the renovation. The condominium association had an Alteration Agreement with unit owners, requiring board approval for renovations, including the right to approve plans and contractors and ensure compliance with regulations. The agreement allowed the condominium association to inspect the work and stop it if necessary.

    Procedural History

    Chien sued the unit owners and the condominium association, alleging violations of the New York Labor Law. The trial court denied the condominium association’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the condominium association, holding it was not an ‘owner’ under the Labor Law. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a condominium association, which retains certain approval and oversight powers over renovations within individual units, qualifies as an ‘owner’ subject to liability under New York Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) when a worker is injured during such renovations.

    Holding

    No, because the condominium association’s reserved rights and responsibilities, as outlined in the Alteration Agreement, did not constitute the level of ownership or control necessary to impose liability under the Labor Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the condominium association did not qualify as an ‘owner’ under the Labor Law. The court emphasized that mere contractual or statutory authority to control work does not equate to the proprietary interest or control indicative of an ‘owner.’ The court distinguished between a condominium’s governance role and the type of ownership contemplated by the Labor Law. The court stated that to be deemed an owner, the entity must act as an owner by engaging in the work itself or have a significant property interest in the premises. Here, the condominium association’s role was primarily administrative, ensuring compliance with building standards rather than directing or controlling the renovation work. The court noted that Labor Law liability generally rests on title ownership but can extend to non-owners who act as owners by hiring contractors and controlling the work. However, the court found that the Alteration Agreement did not grant the condominium association sufficient control to be considered an ‘owner’ for Labor Law purposes. The dissenting opinion argued that the condominium association retained significant proprietary powers over unit alterations, akin to a cooperative corporation, and should be held responsible under the Labor Law for ensuring worker safety. The dissent emphasized the non-delegable nature of owner responsibilities under the Labor Law. The dissent also pointed out the practical implications of the decision, potentially leaving injured workers without recourse under the Labor Law in many condominium renovation scenarios.

  • Rondack Construction Services, Inc. v. Kaatsbaan International Dance Center, Inc., 11 N.Y.3d 580 (2008): Tender Before Judicial Sale Discharges Execution Lien

    11 N.Y.3d 580 (2008)

    A judgment debtor’s tender to the sheriff, before its property is auctioned at a judicial sale, automatically discharges the execution lien, terminating the sheriff’s authority to sell the property.

    Summary

    Rondack Construction obtained a judgment against Kaatsbaan, and sought to execute on Kaatsbaan’s property. Before the auction began, Kaatsbaan offered a cashier’s check to the sheriff’s department for the full amount of the judgment, interest, and fees. The sheriff refused the tender and proceeded with the sale. Kaatsbaan moved to vacate the sale. The New York Court of Appeals held that Kaatsbaan’s pre-sale tender discharged the execution lien, reaffirming the principle established in Tiffany v. St. John. The sheriff, therefore, lacked the authority to sell the property, and the sale was invalid. The Court found that the relevant CPLR provisions did not abrogate the common-law rule allowing for discharge of the lien via pre-sale tender.

    Facts

    Rondack Construction Services, Inc. obtained a default judgment against Kaatsbaan International Dance Center, Inc. for $105,631.05. When Kaatsbaan did not satisfy the judgment, Rondack directed the Dutchess County Sheriff to sell a 53-acre parcel owned by Kaatsbaan. The Sheriff scheduled a judicial auction and sale of the property for September 6, 2006. Before bidding began, Kaatsbaan’s executive director inquired whether the sale could be prevented by satisfying the judgment with a check. Kaatsbaan’s agent offered a cashier’s check for $116,754.15, sufficient to cover the judgment, interest, and fees. The Sheriff, after receiving instructions from the County Attorney’s office, refused the tender and proceeded with the sale. TBays, LLC made the highest bid of $118,000.

    Procedural History

    Kaatsbaan moved to vacate the sale and compel the Sheriff to accept its check. TBays cross-moved to direct the Sheriff to execute and deliver the deed. Supreme Court denied Kaatsbaan’s motion and granted TBays’ cross motion. The Appellate Division reversed, granting Kaatsbaan’s motion, relying on Tiffany v. St. John. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and certified the question of whether its decision was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a judgment debtor’s tender to the sheriff, before its property is auctioned at a judicial sale, of an amount sufficient to satisfy the judgment, interest, poundage, and related fees, automatically discharges the execution lien, thereby terminating the sheriff’s authority to sell the property.

    Holding

    Yes, because a judgment debtor’s tender to the sheriff before the judicial sale automatically discharges the execution lien, terminating the sheriff’s authority to sell the property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reaffirmed Tiffany v. St. John, which held that a pre-sale tender of the full amount due is equivalent to payment and has the “instantaneous effect” of discharging the lien created by the execution. TBays argued that CPLR article 52, specifically CPLR 5236 and 5240, abrogated the common-law rule in Tiffany. The Court disagreed, stating that CPLR 5236, while abolishing the statutory right to redeem property *after* a judicial sale, did not alter the right to recover property *before* a sale. The Court noted that CPLR 5236(a) even preserves “a kind of ‘redemption’ period” by requiring an eight-week timeframe between notice and sale. The Court stated that Tiffany, permitting redemption by tendering full payment before the auction, is fully compatible with CPLR 5236.

    Regarding CPLR 5240, which allows courts to issue protective orders, the Court stated that nothing in this provision explicitly or implicitly supplants Tiffany. The Court emphasized that property owners possess a common-law right under Tiffany to redeem their property before sale without judicial intervention. The Court quoted Guardian Loan Co. v. Early, noting CPLR 5240 “grants the courts broad discretionary power to control and regulate the enforcement of a money judgment under article 52 to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the courts.”

    The Court found that Kaatsbaan, like the debtor in Tiffany, timely tendered an amount sufficient to satisfy the judgment and all fees and expenses, extinguishing the lien and precluding the sale. Therefore, the Appellate Division properly granted Kaatsbaan’s motion.

  • People v. D’Alessandro, 11 N.Y.3d 216 (2008): Distinguishing Coram Nobis Relief from Motions for Reargument

    People v. D’Alessandro, 11 N.Y.3d 216 (2008)

    A motion seeking coram nobis relief based on a new argument, not previously raised, should not be characterized as a motion for reargument, even if it pertains to the same general issue as a prior coram nobis application.

    Summary

    D’Alessandro appealed the Appellate Division’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise a speedy trial claim. The Appellate Division treated the petition as a motion to reargue a prior, pro se coram nobis application. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the second petition raised a novel argument, distinct from the first, and thus should not have been characterized as a motion to reargue. The court emphasized its authority to examine the true nature of the petition, irrespective of the Appellate Division’s label, and remitted the case for consideration of the merits of D’Alessandro’s claim.

    Facts

    D’Alessandro’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in 1996. Nearly twelve years later, represented by counsel, he petitioned the Appellate Division for a writ of error coram nobis, asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. This claim was based on his appellate counsel’s failure to argue a speedy trial violation. D’Alessandro previously filed a pro se coram nobis application nine years earlier, which was denied.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division denied D’Alessandro’s second petition, deeming it a motion to reargue its prior denial of his first coram nobis application. D’Alessandro appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division properly characterized D’Alessandro’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis as a motion to reargue a prior coram nobis application.

    Holding

    No, because D’Alessandro’s second petition raised a novel argument, not previously presented, regarding the alleged speedy trial violation; thus, the Appellate Division erred in treating it as a motion for reargument.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals asserted its authority to look beyond the Appellate Division’s characterization of the petition, citing People v. Giles, 73 NY2d 666 (1989). The court emphasized that a motion to reargue, under CPLR 2221(d)(2), must be based on matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion. A motion to reargue “is not an appropriate vehicle for raising new questions . . . which were not previously advanced” (People v. Bachert, 69 NY2d 593, 597 (1987). D’Alessandro’s second petition raised a new argument: that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds, citing People v. McKenna, 76 NY2d 59 (1990) and People v. Correa, 77 NY2d 930 (1991). The People conceded that D’Alessandro “never raised the speedy trial claims advanced in his current petition.” The Court distinguished the case from People v. Mazzella, 13 NY2d 997 (1963), noting that Mazzella involved a coram nobis writ brought at the trial level and predated the codification of CPL Article 440. The court emphasized that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should first be heard in the court where the alleged deficiency occurred (citing Bachert). Remitting the case allows for two potential reviews of the claims—one by the Appellate Division and, if unsuccessful, another by the Court of Appeals on a motion for leave to appeal.

  • Duffy v. Vogel, 91 N.Y.2d 167 (2008): Jury Polls are Required Upon Request

    Duffy v. Vogel, 91 N.Y.2d 167 (2008)

    In New York, a litigant has an absolute right to have the jury polled upon request, and the failure to honor this request can never be deemed harmless error.

    Summary

    After a complex medical malpractice trial, the jury returned a verdict seemingly in favor of the defendant physicians but also awarded damages to the plaintiff. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request to poll the jury. The trial court later acknowledged its error and granted a mistrial. The Appellate Division reversed, deeming the error harmless because the jury unanimously signed the verdict sheet. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the denial of a request for a jury poll is never harmless error in New York, as it is a necessary condition for a perfected verdict.

    Facts

    The plaintiff sued defendant physicians for medical malpractice, alleging failure to diagnose and treat a tumor. The jury returned a verdict appearing to favor the defendants, yet it also awarded damages to the plaintiff. Each juror had signed the verdict sheet in response to each interrogatory, with unanimous responses recorded. The foreperson announced the verdict in open court, with no juror objecting.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially denied the plaintiff’s request to poll the jury but subsequently granted the plaintiff’s post-trial motion to set aside the verdict and declare a mistrial. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, finding the failure to poll the jury a harmless error. The New York Court of Appeals granted plaintiff’s appeal as of right and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the denial of a party’s request to poll the jury constitutes harmless error, where the jury unanimously signed the verdict sheet and no juror voiced dissent during the verdict’s announcement.

    Holding

    No, because in New York, honoring a request for a jury poll is a necessary condition for a perfected verdict, and the failure to poll the jury can never be deemed harmless.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the long-standing common-law right to poll a jury to ensure each juror individually assents to the verdict. The Court stated that polling is “indispensable to a properly published, and thereby perfected, verdict.” The court reasoned that a verdict isn’t “finished or perfected” until recorded, and it cannot be validly recorded without a jury poll when one is requested. It refuted the argument that signing a verdict sheet is equivalent to a poll, quoting Root v. Sherwood, 6 Johns 68, 68 (1810): “There is no verdict of any force but a public verdict, given openly in court; until it was received and recorded it was no verdict.” The court reasoned it could not know each juror’s conscience retrospectively to assure that the verdict initially expressed their actual intent, and only timely inquiry of jurors will disclose whether their announced verdict truly expresses their will. The dissent argued that the error was harmless given the detailed and unanimous verdict, suggesting the majority’s decision could lead to trial judges improperly denying jury poll requests. The majority rejected this, arguing that jury polling entails little burden, is demonstrably efficacious, and protects the right to trial by jury. It emphasized that harmless error analysis impermissibly substitutes judicial judgment for the judgments of the jurors.

  • Criscolo v. Vagianelis, 11 N.Y.3d 93 (2008): Permissible Reclassification of Civil Service Titles

    Criscolo v. Vagianelis, 11 N.Y.3d 93 (2008)

    Administrative determinations concerning position classifications are subject to limited judicial review and will not be disturbed unless wholly arbitrary or without rational basis.

    Summary

    New York Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) employees challenged the Division of Classification and Compensation’s (Division) decision to revise civil service titles to include conducting inmate disciplinary hearings (tier III hearings). The Division determined that these hearings were routine and that DOCS employees in certain positions were qualified to conduct them. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the Division’s determination was rational because it was based on a comprehensive analysis of the job duties and the requirements of tier III hearings, and did not constitute an impermissible out-of-title assignment designed to circumvent competitive examination requirements.

    Facts

    DOCS employees in civil service titles such as education supervisor and plant superintendent began conducting tier III hearings. The Public Employees Federation (PEF) grieved this assignment, arguing it was outside their job descriptions. The Division analyzed the civil service titles, the tier III hearing process, and the duties of an Inmate Disciplinary Hearing Officer (IDHO). The Division determined that tier III hearings assigned to non-attorney personnel were routine, less complex, and employees received appropriate training. As a result, the Division amended the classification specifications for these titles to include tier III hearing duties.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, which dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Division’s revision of civil service titles to include tier III hearing work was arbitrary and capricious, and whether it violated constitutional and statutory limits on reclassification of civil service positions.

    Holding

    No, because the Division demonstrated a rational basis for adding tier III hearing duties, and the revision did not result in an improper out-of-grade assignment circumventing competitive examination requirements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the limited scope of judicial review for administrative determinations concerning position classifications, stating they “will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing that they are wholly arbitrary or without any rational basis” (Cove v. Sise, 71 NY2d 910, 912 [1988]). The Court found the Division’s determination was rational based on its comprehensive analysis of the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for the civil service titles and the tier III hearings. The court distinguished prior decisions finding tier III hearing duties comprised out-of-title work, explaining that those decisions were based on prior classification specifications. The Division is permitted to “rework classification specifications to reflect management’s needs and available resources.” The court also distinguished cases like Gavigan v. McCoy, explaining those cases prevented manipulating a reclassification to avoid the competitive examination requirements for promotions, which was not the case here. The court noted, “reclassification may not be employed as a device to sanction the performance of out-of-title duties and thereby avoid the requirement of a competitive examination for promotion” (Niebling, 12 NY2d at 319). The court emphasized that petitioners’ titles were not reclassified to a higher grade or salary, so the revised classification standards did not violate constitutional or statutory limits on reclassification.

  • County of Erie v. Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 11 N.Y.3d 76 (2008): Bargaining Duty Regarding Inmate Classification Systems

    11 N.Y.3d 76 (2008)

    A public employer’s decision regarding its primary mission, such as implementing an inmate classification system mandated by statute, is not subject to mandatory collective bargaining, although the impact of such a decision on employees’ terms and conditions of employment may be.

    Summary

    Erie County and its Sheriff were accused of improperly transferring exclusive bargaining unit work by assigning correction officers and deputy sheriffs to guard both sentenced and unsentenced inmates after implementing a unified classification system. The New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) found the County committed an improper employment practice. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Sheriff’s implementation of a classification system, as required by Correction Law § 500-b, was a policy decision related to the primary mission of ensuring inmate safety and security, and thus not subject to mandatory bargaining, although the impact of that decision may be.

    Facts

    The Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) represented correction officers who guarded sentenced inmates at the Erie County Correctional Facility. The Teamsters Local 264 represented deputy sheriffs who guarded unsentenced inmates at the Erie County Holding Center and an adjacent “Annex.” In 2000, control of the Correctional Facility was transferred to the Erie County Sheriff. Due to overcrowding at the Holding Center and vacancies at the Correctional Facility, the State Commission of Correction directed the Sheriff to utilize a unified classification system per Correction Law § 500-b. The Sheriff implemented a single classification system, resulting in the commingling of sentenced and unsentenced inmates, and the assignment of both correction officers and deputy sheriffs to guard both types of inmates.

    Procedural History

    The unions filed improper practice charges, and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in their favor. PERB affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The County commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging PERB’s determination. Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Appellate Division, which confirmed PERB’s determination. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, granting the petition and annulling PERB’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Sheriff was required to collectively bargain with the unions before implementing a classification policy that was satisfactory to the State Commission of Correction and that resulted in the assignment of unit work to non-unit employees.

    Holding

    No, because the Sheriff’s implementation of a formal and objective inmate classification system, as mandated by Correction Law § 500-b and related regulations, constitutes a non-bargainable policy decision relating to the primary mission of ensuring inmate safety and security. The impact of that decision, if any, on the contracts between the parties, however, is subject to bargaining.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a public employer’s decisions are not bargainable if they are inherently and fundamentally policy decisions relating to the primary mission of the employer, citing Matter of Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 75 NY2d 660, 669 (1990). While policy decisions themselves are exempt from bargaining, their impact is not, citing West Irondequoit Teachers Assn. v Helsby, 35 NY2d 46 (1974). The Court emphasized that Correction Law § 500-b directs the Sheriff to exercise good judgment and discretion to ensure the safety, security, and good order of the jail. The Sheriff is charged with implementing and maintaining a formal and objective system for the consistent classification of all inmates, considering factors like criminal history, prior escapes, and mental/medical illness, without regard to adjudication status or collective bargaining units.

    The court found PERB’s determination that petitioners committed an improper practice was not entitled to deference, citing Matter of Newark Val. Cent. School Dist. v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 83 NY2d 315, 320 (1994). Once the Sheriff implemented such a system, the impact of that decision, if any, upon the contracts between the parties is subject to bargaining. The Court stated, “Given the statutory requirement that the Sheriff implement and maintain a formal and objective classification system, we conclude that PERB’s determination that petitioners committed an improper practice by unilaterally transferring unit work to nonunit employees is not entitled to deference.”

  • People v. Elysee, 11 N.Y.3d 100 (2008): Overcoming Physician-Patient Privilege for Blood Samples in DWI Cases

    People v. Elysee, 11 N.Y.3d 100 (2008)

    In cases involving driving while intoxicated (DWI) resulting in death or serious injury, a court order issued under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(3) compelling a blood test overcomes the physician-patient privilege that might otherwise protect previously drawn blood samples taken for medical purposes.

    Summary

    Elysee was involved in a fatal car accident and taken to the hospital, where blood samples were drawn for treatment (5:30 a.m. samples). Later, pursuant to a court order, a second set of samples was drawn for a blood alcohol test (2:50 p.m. samples). A search warrant was then issued to seize the 5:30 a.m. samples from the hospital. Elysee argued that seizing the 5:30 a.m. samples violated the physician-patient privilege. The New York Court of Appeals held that even if the samples were privileged, the privilege was overcome by the court order issued under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(3), which authorizes chemical tests in DWI cases involving death or serious injury.

    Facts

    On December 25, 2003, Elysee was involved in a four-vehicle car accident resulting in a fatality and injuries. At 5:30 a.m., he was taken to the hospital, where blood samples were drawn for treatment purposes. At 1:50 p.m., a court order compelled him to submit to a blood alcohol test, resulting in a second blood draw at 2:50 p.m. A search warrant was issued and executed on December 29, 2003, to seize the 5:30 a.m. samples from the hospital.

    Procedural History

    Elysee moved to controvert the search warrant and suppress the results of the blood alcohol test performed on the 5:30 a.m. samples, arguing a violation of the physician-patient privilege. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, both sets of blood samples were tested. The jury convicted Elysee of manslaughter, assault, and driving while intoxicated. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the seizure of blood samples drawn for medical purposes, pursuant to a search warrant issued after a court order compelling a blood alcohol test under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(3), violates the physician-patient privilege defined by CPLR 4504.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included offense of second-degree manslaughter.

    Holding

    1. No, because even if the blood samples were privileged, the privilege was overcome by the court order issued pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(3).

    2. No, because given the overwhelming evidence of Elysee’s intoxication, there was no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding of criminally negligent homicide.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(a) establishes implied consent to chemical tests for drivers in the state. Further, § 1194(3) allows for court-ordered chemical tests when a person is involved in an accident causing death or serious injury, operates the vehicle while intoxicated, is lawfully arrested, and refuses or is unable to consent to a chemical test. The Court stated, “Here, it is illogical to conclude that a blood sample taken at 5:30 a.m. cannot be seized pursuant to a properly issued court order, merely because the order issued after the blood was actually drawn by an authorized person.” The seizure of the earlier blood sample was in accord with the statute, as the Vehicle and Traffic Law authorized a chemical test under the circumstances. Regarding the lesser-included offense, the court held that a person who fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk by reason of his intoxication acts recklessly, not with criminal negligence. The court cited People v. Donohue, 123 AD2d 77, 81 (3d Dept 1987) and People v. Van Dusen, 89 AD2d 649 (3d Dept 1982).

  • People v. Romeo, 12 N.Y.3d 54 (2008): Prosecutorial Delay & Speedy Trial Rights

    12 N.Y.3d 54 (2008)

    A lengthy post-indictment delay, caused by the prosecution’s decision to defer to a foreign prosecution and failure to seek extradition, can violate a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.

    Summary

    Romeo was indicted in New York for murder in 1987. He fled to Canada and killed a police officer there. Instead of seeking Romeo’s extradition on the New York murder charge, the prosecution deferred to Canadian authorities. Romeo was convicted in Canada and imprisoned. Twelve years after the indictment, Romeo moved to dismiss the New York indictment on speedy trial grounds. He was eventually brought back to New York, convicted of manslaughter, and appealed, arguing a violation of his speedy trial rights. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate court’s decision to dismiss the indictment, holding that the prosecution’s delay in pursuing the case violated Romeo’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, based on the five factor test from People v. Taranovich.

    Facts

    In November 1985, a fatal shooting occurred in Suffolk County, New York. A gun belonging to Romeo was identified as the murder weapon. In February 1987, Romeo was ordered to provide a DNA sample. Before providing the sample, Romeo fled to Canada. In Canada, he killed a police officer. He was apprehended and held on a Canadian warrant. Suffolk County authorities obtained hair and blood samples from Romeo, which matched evidence from the New York crime scene.

    Procedural History

    Romeo was indicted in Suffolk County, NY in March 1987. He demanded a speedy trial. The Suffolk County Court denied Romeo’s application to be produced for arraignment before extradition to Canada, suggesting any delay could be addressed later. Romeo was extradited to Canada, convicted, and sentenced. In 1999, Romeo moved to dismiss the NY indictment based on speedy trial grounds; this was denied. In 2005, he was brought back to Suffolk County. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter and appealed, arguing a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s lengthy postindictment delay occasioned by delaying their prosecution in favor of a Canadian prosecution violated defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People’s decision to defer to the Canadian prosecution, coupled with their failure to make a good-faith effort to extradite Romeo, resulted in an excessive delay that prejudiced Romeo’s ability to defend himself.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the five-factor balancing test from People v. Taranovich to determine if Romeo’s speedy trial rights were violated: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charges; (4) any extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) any impairment of defendant’s defense. The Court found the 12-year delay between indictment and the speedy trial motion to be extraordinary. The primary reason for the delay was the People’s decision to defer to the Canadian prosecution and their failure to seek extradition. The Court noted that while the underlying charge of murder was serious, it didn’t excuse the delay. While Romeo was incarcerated, it was due to the Canadian charges. However, the Court found it highly likely that the delay impaired Romeo’s ability to defend himself, especially given his incarceration in a foreign prison. The Court emphasized that the People had been warned that deferring prosecution could cause a speedy trial violation. The Court distinguished this case from others where extradition would clearly be futile, stating, “The fact that a defendant is incarcerated outside of the state makes it incumbent upon the People to make diligent, good faith efforts to secure his presence in the state for arraignment and trial.” Because the People failed to make such efforts, Romeo’s speedy trial rights were violated.