New York Law Review

Tag: 2007

  • Fung v. Japan Airlines Co., Ltd., 8 N.Y.3d 351 (2007): Clarifying the Scope of Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity

    Fung v. Japan Airlines Co., Ltd., 8 N.Y.3d 351 (2007)

    The exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law do not automatically extend to a managing agent of an employer unless there is a sufficient working relationship between the agent and the employee to establish a special employment relationship.

    Summary

    Brent Fung, an electrician for the Port Authority, sued Japan Airlines Management Corp. (JAMC), the managing agent of the building where he worked, and Aero Snow Removal Corp. after slipping on ice in the parking lot. The Court of Appeals addressed whether JAMC, as a managing agent, could invoke the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law, barring Fung’s negligence claim. The Court held that JAMC could not claim this protection because there was no demonstrated working relationship between JAMC and Fung that would establish JAMC as Fung’s special employer. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the claim against Aero, finding that Aero did not owe Fung a duty of care.

    Facts

    Brent Fung, an electrician employed by the Port Authority, sustained injuries after slipping on ice in the parking lot of Building 14 at John F. Kennedy International Airport. The Port Authority owned the building and leased it to JAMC, who then subleased a portion of it back to the Port Authority. JAMC contracted with Aero for snow removal services, including plowing and ice/snow control services upon request. The lease agreement stipulated that JAMC was not an agent or representative of the Port Authority. Fung later testified he had complained about inadequate lighting in the parking lot. JAMC’s contract with Aero stated JAMC acted “As Agents [sic] for the Port Authority.”

    Procedural History

    Fung sued JAMC and Aero, alleging negligence. JAMC then brought a third-party action against Aero and a fourth-party action against the Port Authority for indemnification. Aero also moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against them. The Supreme Court denied JAMC and Aero’s motions, but the Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the claims against both, finding JAMC was acting as the Port Authority’s managing agent and therefore protected by workers’ compensation exclusivity, and that Aero owed no duty to Fung. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether JAMC, as a managing agent of the Port Authority, could invoke the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law to bar a negligence claim by a Port Authority employee.

    2. Whether Aero Snow Removal Corp. owed a duty of care to Fung, a non-contracting third party.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was no evidence of a working relationship between JAMC and Fung sufficient to deem JAMC Fung’s special employer.

    2. No, because Aero’s snow removal contract did not create a duty of care to Fung, and Aero’s actions did not create or exacerbate a dangerous condition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 11 and 29 (6) generally bar an employee from suing their employer or co-employee for work-related injuries. However, this exclusivity does not automatically extend to third parties such as managing agents. Citing Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 553 (1991), the court emphasized that a special employment relationship must exist, demonstrated by factors such as “who controls and directs the manner, details and ultimate result of the employee’s work.” The Court found no evidence of such a relationship between JAMC and Fung. The Court stated, “Thus, it is not the title of the purported ’employer’—in this case, a putative managing agent—that controls, but rather the actual working relationship between that party and the purported ’employee.’”

    Regarding Aero, the Court cited Espinal v. Melville Snow Contrs., 98 N.Y.2d 136 (2002), reaffirming that a contractual obligation alone does not create tort liability to non-contracting third parties. The Court recognized three exceptions but found none applicable. The Court stated that “by merely plowing the snow, as required by the contract, defendant’s actions could not be said ‘to have created or exacerbated a dangerous condition’”. The Court noted that Aero had no contractual obligation to salt or sand the parking lot absent a request from JAMC, and there was no evidence of such a request.

  • ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 9 N.Y.3d 467 (2007): Unfair Competition and Protection of Foreign Marks

    ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 9 N.Y.3d 467 (2007)

    Under New York common law, unfair competition, specifically misappropriation, can protect a foreign business’s goodwill from being exploited in New York if the business has a demonstrable reputation and commercial advantage within the state.

    Summary

    ITC, an Indian corporation, sought to prevent Punchgini, Inc. from using the name “Bukhara Grill” for its New York restaurants, arguing unfair competition based on ITC’s famous Bukhara restaurant in India. ITC had previously operated a Bukhara restaurant in New York but had abandoned the mark in the U.S. The Second Circuit certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding whether New York common law protects famous foreign marks. The Court of Appeals held that New York law recognizes unfair competition claims but does not specifically adhere to a “famous marks” doctrine. Protection hinges on whether the foreign mark possesses demonstrable goodwill within New York, and consumers associate the mark with the foreign entity.

    Facts

    ITC owns and operates the Maurya Sheraton in New Delhi, which includes the Bukhara restaurant. ITC had limited success franchising Bukhara restaurants globally, including a closed Manhattan location. Punchgini’s principals, some former employees of ITC’s Bukhara, opened Bukhara Grill in New York, featuring similar dishes and design elements. ITC accused Punchgini of capitalizing on Bukhara’s reputation, demanding they cease using the name. Punchgini claimed ITC abandoned the mark in the U.S.

    Procedural History

    ITC sued Punchgini in the Southern District of New York, alleging trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act and New York common law. The District Court granted summary judgment to Punchgini, finding ITC abandoned the trademark. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of federal claims but certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding New York common law claims, specifically concerning the “famous marks” doctrine.

    Issue(s)

    1. Does New York common law permit the owner of a famous mark or trade dress to assert property rights therein by virtue of the owner’s prior use of the mark or dress in a foreign country?

    2. How famous must a foreign mark or trade dress be to permit its owner to sue for unfair competition?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because New York recognizes unfair competition claims, particularly misappropriation, when a business has demonstrable goodwill within the state.

    2. The mark must have a level of fame that the relevant consumer market primarily associates the mark with the foreign plaintiff and their goods or services.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court clarified that New York common law recognizes two types of unfair competition: palming off and misappropriation. While the “famous marks doctrine” is debated, New York cases like Maison Prunier v Prunier’s Rest. & Cafe, Inc. and Vaudable v Montmartre, Inc., often cited as examples of this doctrine, are actually grounded in misappropriation theory. The Court emphasized that a foreign business with a reputation extending into New York possesses goodwill protectable from misappropriation. The court stated, “Under New York law, ‘[a]n unfair competition claim involving misappropriation usually concerns the taking and use of the plaintiffs property to compete against the plaintiffs own use of the same property’”. To succeed, ITC needed to show Punchgini deliberately copied ITC’s mark, and that New York consumers primarily associate the “Bukhara” mark with ITC’s restaurants. The Court refused to provide an exhaustive list, but some factors that would be relevant include evidence that the defendant intentionally associated its goods with those of the foreign plaintiff in the minds of the public, direct evidence, such as consumer surveys, indicating that consumers of defendant’s goods or services believe them to be associated with the plaintiff; and evidence of actual overlap between customers of the New York defendant and the foreign plaintiff. This case clarifies that while New York protects against unfair competition, such protection for foreign marks depends on establishing a real presence and consumer association within New York, not merely international fame.

  • People v. Zimmerman, 9 N.Y.3d 421 (2007): Establishing County Jurisdiction Based on ‘Particular Effect’

    9 N.Y.3d 421 (2007)

    For a county to assert criminal jurisdiction over an offense based on its ‘particular effect’ under CPL 20.40(2)(c), the defendant must have intended or known that their actions would have a materially harmful impact on the governmental processes or community welfare of that specific county.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that New York County lacked jurisdiction to prosecute James Zimmerman for perjury. Zimmerman, while testifying in Ohio as part of a New York Attorney General’s antitrust investigation, allegedly made false statements. The court reasoned that the evidence presented to the grand jury did not establish that Zimmerman intended or knew his statements would have a concrete and identifiable injury to either New York County’s governmental processes or its community welfare. This case highlights the difficulty in establishing county jurisdiction when the impact of an out-of-state action is primarily felt at the state level.

    Facts

    The New York Attorney General investigated Federated Department Stores and others for antitrust violations. James Zimmerman, Federated’s CEO, testified in Ohio during the investigation. The Attorney General’s office had agreed to examine Zimmerman in Cincinnati as an accommodation. Subsequently, Zimmerman was indicted in New York County for perjury based on his testimony. The indictment alleged that his perjury was intended to prevent a particular effect in New York County and State.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the indictment, finding that Zimmerman’s acts had no ‘particular effect’ on New York County. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the evidence did not show that Zimmerman was aware his statements would have a deleterious effect on the governmental or judicial processes of New York County. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented to the grand jury established that Zimmerman’s alleged perjury in Ohio had, or was likely to have, a particular effect upon New York County, such that New York County has jurisdiction to prosecute him for perjury under CPL 20.40(2)(c).

    Holding

    No, because the evidence presented to the grand jury did not establish that Zimmerman intended or knew that his alleged perjurious statements would have a concrete and identifiable injury to either New York County’s governmental processes or the welfare of the County’s community.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that for prosecutorial jurisdiction to lie in New York County, that county must suffer a particular effect as a result of the defendant’s alleged conduct. This requires a concrete and identifiable injury to either the county’s governmental processes or the welfare of the county’s community. The impact must be more than minor or incidental, harming the well-being of the community as a whole. The court found no evidence that Zimmerman intended or knew his actions would materially and harmfully affect New York County’s judicial processes. While Zimmerman’s perjury may have been designed to mislead the New York State Attorney General and frustrate his investigation, there was no evidence that Zimmerman’s conduct was intended to have, or was likely to have, any materially harmful impact on the governmental processes or community welfare of New York County specifically. The Court acknowledged a gap in the ‘particular effect’ venue statutory scheme, highlighting that while the State had jurisdiction, no county did. The Court noted, “[a]bsent [a] statutory exception, … the territorial unit for criminal prosecutions is [a] county”.

  • Schreiber v. K-Sea Transportation Corp., 9 N.Y.3d 331 (2007): Enforceability of Post-Injury Seaman Arbitration Agreements

    9 N.Y.3d 331 (2007)

    Post-injury arbitration agreements between seamen and their employers are not automatically prohibited, but their enforceability depends on the absence of fraud, deception, or coercion, with the burden of proof on the seaman to demonstrate the agreement’s invalidity. Any arbitration order must ensure the seaman can pursue the claim without prohibitive costs.

    Summary

    Nicholas Schreiber, a seaman, was injured while working for K-Sea Transportation. After the injury, K-Sea offered Schreiber increased maintenance payments in exchange for agreeing to arbitrate any claims related to the injury. Schreiber signed the agreement. Later, Schreiber sued K-Sea under the Jones Act. K-Sea sought to compel arbitration. The New York Court of Appeals held that post-injury arbitration agreements are not prohibited but ordered a hearing to determine the enforceability of the agreement, placing the burden on Schreiber to prove its invalidity due to factors like fraud or unconscionability. The court also specified that Schreiber shouldn’t be burdened with costs that would prevent him from pursuing his claim.

    Facts

    Nicholas Schreiber, a seaman employed by K-Sea Transportation Corp., sustained injuries while working on K-Sea’s tugboat. K-Sea initially provided maintenance payments of $15 per day. Several weeks post-injury, K-Sea’s claims manager proposed increasing payments to two-thirds of Schreiber’s regular wage as an advance against settlement, contingent on Schreiber agreeing to arbitration. Schreiber signed the agreement, which stipulated arbitration under AAA rules and K-Sea’s advancement of filing fees up to $750. Later, Schreiber sued K-Sea under the Jones Act after his injury worsened. K-Sea then demanded arbitration, but the AAA required a $10,000 filing fee, significantly exceeding the $750 mentioned in the agreement.

    Procedural History

    Schreiber petitioned the Supreme Court to stay arbitration; K-Sea cross-moved to compel it. The Supreme Court granted Schreiber’s petition, finding K-Sea failed to prove the absence of deception or coercion. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a hearing on the agreement’s enforceability, but maintained that K-Sea had the burden to show the agreement was equitable. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order for a hearing, but modified it by placing the burden of proof on Schreiber to demonstrate the agreement’s unenforceability.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) prohibits the enforcement of a post-injury arbitration agreement between a seaman and his employer?

    2. Whether Section 5 of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) renders the arbitration agreement void?

    3. Whether the “ward of the admiralty” doctrine invalidates the arbitration agreement unless proven fair to the seaman?

    Holding

    1. No, because the agreement at issue is not a “contract of employment” excluded from the FAA; it is a separate agreement made after the employment relationship was established and after the injury occurred.

    2. No, because an arbitration agreement is not a forbidden exemption from Jones Act liability.

    3. No, because the “ward of the admiralty” doctrine does not outweigh the policy favoring arbitration; Schreiber must show fraud, unconscionability, or some other defect to invalidate the agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the FAA favors arbitration, even for claims under protective statutes like the Jones Act, citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. The court distinguished the arbitration agreement from an employment contract, finding it a separate agreement made after the injury. Therefore, the FAA applies. The court rejected the argument that FELA § 5 voids the agreement under the precedent of Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., emphasizing the federal policy favoring arbitration. “To hold, as Schreiber urges, that any agreement to arbitrate a Jones Act claim is void would contradict that policy.”

    Regarding the “ward of the admiralty” doctrine, the court acknowledged its historical basis from Harden v. Gordon and Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., but asserted that it doesn’t automatically invalidate arbitration agreements. The court stated, “Schreiber is bound by his agreement with K-Sea unless he can show that fraud, unconscionability or some other defect justifies invalidating it.”

    The court ordered a hearing due to a “troubling aspect” of the agreement: the statement that K-Sea would advance filing fees “up to $750.00,” which could mislead Schreiber about the actual $10,000 fee. The court emphasized that “If Supreme Court finds that K-Sea intentionally misled Schreiber, and that if correctly informed he would not have agreed to arbitration, the arbitration agreement should be set aside.” The court also stipulated that if arbitration is compelled, K-Sea must bear any costs that would prevent Schreiber from pursuing his claim, citing Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph.

  • Arons v. Jutkowitz, 9 N.Y.3d 393 (2007): Permissibility of Ex Parte Interviews with Treating Physicians After HIPAA

    Arons v. Jutkowitz, 9 N.Y.3d 393 (2007)

    An attorney may conduct ex parte interviews with an adverse party’s treating physician when the party has placed their medical condition in controversy, subject to HIPAA’s procedural prerequisites.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an attorney can privately interview an opposing party’s treating physician in a medical malpractice case. The New York Court of Appeals held that such interviews are permissible, provided the attorney adheres to the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). By placing their medical condition at issue in a lawsuit, a plaintiff waives the physician-patient privilege. HIPAA does not prohibit these interviews but requires either a valid authorization from the patient or a court order to ensure compliance with privacy regulations. This decision clarifies the interaction between informal discovery practices and federal patient privacy laws.

    Facts

    In three separate medical malpractice cases consolidated for appeal, plaintiffs refused to provide HIPAA-compliant authorizations allowing defense counsel to interview their treating physicians. The plaintiffs argued that defense counsel were limited to formal discovery methods under the CPLR. The defendant physicians sought these interviews to gather information relevant to the medical conditions placed at issue by the lawsuits.

    Procedural History

    In Arons v. Jutkowitz, the Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion to compel the plaintiff to provide authorizations. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that ex parte interviews were not authorized by the CPLR. In Webb v. New York Methodist Hospital, the Supreme Court granted a similar motion, but the Appellate Division reversed based on its decision in Arons. In Kish v. Graham, the Supreme Court granted the motion to compel authorizations, but the Appellate Division reversed, again relying on Arons. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in all three cases to resolve the issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney may interview an adverse party’s treating physician privately when the adverse party has affirmatively placed his or her medical condition in controversy, subject to HIPAA’s procedural prerequisites.

    Holding

    Yes, because by bringing a lawsuit that places their medical condition at issue, a plaintiff waives the physician-patient privilege, and HIPAA does not prohibit ex parte interviews but imposes procedural requirements for obtaining protected health information.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principles established in Niesig v. Team I and Muriel Siebert & Co., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., which emphasized the importance of informal discovery practices in litigation. The court reasoned that a litigant waives the physician-patient privilege when bringing a personal injury action by affirmatively placing their mental or physical condition in issue. “[A] party should not be permitted to affirmatively assert a medical condition in seeking damages or in defending against liability while simultaneously relying on the confidential physician-patient relationship as a sword to thwart the opposition in its efforts to uncover facts critical to disputing the party’s claim” (Dillenbeck v Hess, 73 NY2d 278, 287 [1989]). The court rejected the argument that the absence of express authorization for ex parte interviews in CPLR Article 31 prohibited the practice. The court emphasized that attorneys have always sought to interview potential witnesses as part of trial preparation. HIPAA does not preempt state law on ex parte interviews; instead, it imposes procedural prerequisites. To conduct an interview, an attorney must obtain a valid HIPAA authorization, a court order, or a subpoena with satisfactory assurances regarding notification or a qualified protective order. The court noted the long-standing practice of New York trial attorneys engaging in ex parte interviews with treating physicians, particularly in malpractice actions after the note of issue was filed. Finally, the court reversed the lower courts’ orders requiring defense counsel to disclose all materials obtained during the interviews, finding those stipulations inconsistent with Niesig and Siebert.

  • Haywood v. Drown, 9 N.Y.3d 481 (2007): State Law Barring Suit Against Correction Officers Does Not Violate Supremacy Clause

    Haywood v. Drown, 9 N.Y.3d 481 (2007)

    A state law that bars civil actions for money damages against correction officers in state court, transferring such claims to the Court of Claims against the state, does not violate the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it does not discriminate against federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

    Summary

    Haywood, a prisoner, filed two § 1983 actions in state Supreme Court against Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) employees, alleging civil rights violations. The defendants moved to dismiss based on Correction Law § 24, which bars civil actions against DOCS employees in their personal capacity in state court, requiring such claims to be brought against the state in the Court of Claims. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaints, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Correction Law § 24 does not violate the Supremacy Clause because it creates a neutral jurisdictional barrier applicable to both state and federal claims.

    Facts

    Keith Haywood, an inmate, was subject to misbehavior reports while incarcerated at Attica Correctional Facility. He subsequently filed two pro se civil actions in state Supreme Court against DOCS employees, premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. One action involved allegations of a biased hearing. The second lawsuit stemmed from an alleged assault by a correction officer and tampering with a urinalysis test. In both cases, Haywood sought monetary damages.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed both complaints based on Correction Law § 24. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that § 24 did not violate the Supremacy Clause. Haywood appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Correction Law § 24, which prohibits civil actions against correction officers in their personal capacity in state court, violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution by preventing state courts from adjudicating federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

    Holding

    No, because Correction Law § 24 creates a neutral jurisdictional rule that applies equally to state and federal claims for money damages against DOCS employees, and therefore does not discriminate against federal law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Supremacy Clause generally prevents states from immunizing conduct wrongful under § 1983, it allows states to deny enforcement of a federal right if they have a valid excuse, such as a neutral state rule regarding court administration. The Court stated that states have broad authority to structure their court systems. A state rule is considered neutral if it does not discriminate against federal claims in favor of analogous state claims. “Ultimately, what the Supremacy Clause prohibits is refusal by a state court to entertain a suit for the sole reason that the cause of action arises under federal law.” Here, Correction Law § 24 creates a neutral jurisdictional barrier, preventing all claims for monetary damages against correction officers in their personal capacity in state court, regardless of whether the claim arises under state or federal law. The court emphasized that the statute applies with equal force to all state and federal claims based on the identity of the defendant and the alleged conduct. The court noted that because Congress exempted states from being sued directly under § 1983, New York’s decision to allow suits against the state in the Court of Claims does not alter the analysis. Litigants retain the ability to pursue § 1983 claims against individual defendants in federal court. The Court distinguished cases like Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) and Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), where state laws imposed discriminatory burdens on § 1983 claims that were not applied to analogous state law claims. The court concluded that Correction Law § 24 does not violate the Supremacy Clause because it does not treat § 1983 claims differently than related state law causes of action.

  • White v. Continental Cas. Co., 9 N.Y.3d 264 (2007): Defining ‘Total Disability’ in Insurance Policies

    White v. Continental Cas. Co. , 9 N.Y.3d 264 (2007)

    An insurance policy’s definition of “total disability” is unambiguous if its language has a definite and precise meaning, and an insured is not considered totally disabled if they are capable of performing any gainful occupation for which they are reasonably fitted by education, training, or experience.

    Summary

    Dr. White, an orthopedic surgeon, sought disability benefits under a policy with Continental Casualty after a hip condition prevented him from performing surgery. The policy defined “total disability” as the inability to perform the substantial duties of his occupation and the inability to perform any gainful occupation for which he was reasonably suited. The court held that the definition was unambiguous. Despite his inability to perform surgery, Dr. White was still capable of rendering medical opinions, performing independent medical examinations, and serving as an expert witness; therefore, he did not meet the policy’s definition of total disability. The court affirmed the lower court’s summary judgment dismissal of Dr. White’s claim.

    Facts

    In 1992, Dr. White obtained a disability income policy. This policy was transferred twice, eventually to Life Insurance Company of Boston & New York (LICOBNY). The policy initially defined total disability as being “unable to perform the substantial and material duties of [his] occupation.” After the transfer to LICOBNY, a second provision was added, requiring that Dr. White also be unable to “[perform] the duties of any gainful occupation for which [he is] reasonably fitted by education, training, or experience.” In December 2001, Dr. White informed LICOBNY that he could no longer perform orthopedic surgeries due to a hip condition and filed a claim for disability benefits.

    Procedural History

    LICOBNY denied Dr. White’s claim, leading him to sue for breach of contract in Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted LICOBNY’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, with two justices dissenting. Dr. White appealed to the New York Court of Appeals based on the two-justice dissent on a question of law.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the definition of “total disability” in the disability income policy is ambiguous, and if not, whether Dr. White satisfied the requirements of that definition as a matter of law.

    Holding

    No, the definition of “total disability” is not ambiguous because the policy language has a “definite and precise meaning.” No, Dr. White did not satisfy the requirements of the policy’s definition of total disability because he was capable of performing other gainful occupations for which he was reasonably fitted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that unambiguous provisions of an insurance contract must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. A contract is unambiguous if its language has “ ‘a definite and precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in the purport of the [agreement] itself, and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion’ ” (quoting Greenfield v Philles Records, 98 N.Y.2d 562, 569 (2002)). The court found that the definition of total disability in the policy was clear and unambiguous. Although Dr. White could no longer perform surgery, the evidence showed that he was still rendering second medical opinions, performing independent medical examinations, and serving as an expert medical witness. Therefore, he was “performing the duties of [a] gainful occupation for which [he is] reasonably fitted by [his] education, training, or experience.” The court emphasized that while the question of whether a policyholder’s condition falls within the policy’s definition of total disability is typically one for a jury, Dr. White failed to present any evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact. The court rejected the argument that the second provision of the definition rendered the coverage illusory, highlighting that the policy required both conditions to be met for total disability benefits to be payable.

  • Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar of Kiryas Joel, Inc. v. Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc., 9 N.Y.3d 300 (2007): Religious Corporation Property Transfer Requires Court Approval

    Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar of Kiryas Joel, Inc. v. Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc., 9 N.Y.3d 300 (2007)

    A religious corporation must obtain court approval before transferring real property, and retroactive approval will only be granted if the transfer demonstrably furthers religious or charitable objects generally, not merely the interests of one faction within the corporation.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between two factions of the Satmar community over a cemetery. The Monroe Congregation sought a declaration that a transfer of a one-half interest in the cemetery property from the Brooklyn Congregation was lawful, or alternatively, for nunc pro tunc (retroactive) approval. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the transfer, made amidst a factional dispute and not clearly furthering religious or charitable objects generally, was invalid without prior court approval as required by Religious Corporations Law § 12.

    Facts

    The Monroe Congregation acquired a cemetery in 1981 which contained the grave of the Satmar movement’s founder, Grand Rabbi Joel Teitelbaum. The Monroe Congregation conveyed the cemetery to the Brooklyn Congregation in 1988, and they jointly operated it. A schism within the Brooklyn Congregation led to two rival factions with separate elections. One faction, led by Berl Friedman, transferred a one-half interest in the cemetery to the Monroe Congregation in 2001. The other faction, led by Jacob Kahan, attempted to restrict use of the cemetery by filing a declaration limiting who could encumber the property.

    Procedural History

    The Monroe Congregation sued the Brooklyn Congregation seeking a declaration that the 2001 transfer was valid, or for retroactive approval under Religious Corporations Law § 12. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the Monroe Congregation. The Appellate Division reversed, finding factual questions regarding the conveyance related to internal religious matters beyond court competence, and voided the conveyance because the Monroe Congregation did not establish that the transfer promoted the Brooklyn Congregation’s religious or charitable objects. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division properly determined that the transfer of the cemetery property required court approval and that the Monroe Congregation was not entitled to retroactive approval of the transfer under Religious Corporations Law § 12.

    Holding

    Yes, because the transfer was not demonstrably in the best interests of the Brooklyn Congregation or furthering religious or charitable objects generally; rather, it appeared to advance one side of a factional dispute, making retroactive approval inappropriate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its reasoning on Religious Corporations Law § 12(1), which states that a religious corporation may not sell its real property without court approval. Furthermore, Section 12(8) dictates that when transferring property to another religious corporation for nominal consideration, the transferring corporation must show that “religious or charitable objects generally” would be conserved by the conveyance. The court emphasized that the transfer was “at least in part plainly designed to advance one side of the factional dispute.” Therefore, the Appellate Division was justified in finding that the transfer did not meet the statutory requirements for retroactive judicial approval. The court reasoned that allowing such a transfer would set a bad precedent, as it could be used as a tool in factional disputes rather than for genuinely furthering religious or charitable goals.

  • Haymon v. Pettit, 9 N.Y.3d 324 (2007): No Duty to Protect Non-Patrons Chasing Foul Balls Outside Stadium

    Haymon v. Pettit, 9 N.Y.3d 324 (2007)

    A baseball park operator generally owes no duty to warn or protect non-patron spectators who are injured while chasing foul balls outside the stadium, even if the operator offers an incentive for retrieving such balls.

    Summary

    A 14-year-old, L.H., was injured when struck by a drunk driver after chasing a foul ball into a public street near Falcon Park. The baseball association operating the park offered free tickets for returned foul balls. L.H.’s mother sued the association, arguing its promotion created a duty to protect or warn participants. The New York Court of Appeals held that the association owed no such duty. The inherent dangers of crossing a street, coupled with the association’s lack of control over the street and third parties, negated any duty of care.

    Facts

    L.H., a 14-year-old, regularly retrieved foul balls outside Falcon Park, a baseball stadium operated by the Auburn Community Non-Profit Baseball Association, Inc. (Ball Club). The Ball Club offered free tickets for returning foul balls. L.H. was struck by a vehicle driven by Donald Pettit, who was intoxicated, after L.H. chased a foul ball into a public street adjacent to the stadium while wearing headphones and failing to look for traffic. The parking lot across the street was owned by the City of Auburn and used by baseball fans.

    Procedural History

    L.H.’s mother sued the Ball Club, Pettit, and the City of Auburn. The Supreme Court denied the Ball Club’s motion for summary judgment, finding it had a duty. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint against the Ball Club, holding that no legal duty existed. Two justices dissented. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a baseball park operator owes a duty to warn or protect non-patron spectators who are injured while chasing foul balls that are hit out of the stadium when the operator offers an incentive for retrieving those balls.

    Holding

    No, because an owner or occupier of land generally owes no duty to warn or protect others from a dangerous condition on adjacent property unless the owner created or contributed to such a condition and, here, the dangers of crossing the street exist independent of the Ball Club’s promotion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that landowners generally don’t owe a duty to protect others from dangers on adjacent property unless they created or contributed to the condition. Citing Galindo v Town of Clarkstown, 2 NY3d 633, 636 (2004), the court stated, “The reason for such a rule is obvious—a person who lacks ownership or control of property cannot fairly be held accountable for injuries resulting from a hazard on neighboring property.” Foreseeability alone doesn’t create a duty. The Court distinguished the case from situations where a landowner created a dangerous condition on adjacent property. It drew an analogy to Darby v Compagnie Natl. Air France, 96 NY2d 343 (2001), where a hotel wasn’t liable for a guest’s drowning at a public beach despite encouraging its use. Here, the Ball Club’s promotion, like the hotel’s services, didn’t create a duty to ensure safety in an area they didn’t control. The court observed: “The dangers of crossing the street—and individuals electing to cross it in pursuit of foul balls—exist independent of the Ball Club’s promotion.” Even if the promotion contributed to the risk, the court considered the “practical realities” that “foul balls can land on virtually any square foot of property surrounding a stadium, and imposition of a duty to warn or protect under such circumstances is neither fair nor practical”. Imposing a duty would lead to limitless liability, requiring the stadium to control the conduct of third persons outside its premises, which is unrealistic. The court stated: “[I]t is difficult to imagine what steps the stadium operator could have taken that would have sufficed to meet a duty.”

  • Haberman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 8 N.Y.3d 269 (2007): Authority of Counsel to Extend Variance Time Limits

    Haberman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 8 N.Y.3d 269 (2007)

    When a zoning board of appeals has voted to grant a variance, the board’s attorney, acting with actual or apparent authority, may agree to extend the time to build the improvements permitted by the variance without requiring a second board meeting and vote.

    Summary

    Sinclair Haberman obtained a variance from the Long Beach Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) to construct a residential complex. A subsequent dispute was resolved by a stipulation that required Haberman to obtain new variances with time limits for applying for building permits. Haberman paid the city $200,000 for public improvements, which the city failed to complete on time. Haberman agreed to extend the city’s deadline in exchange for tolling the time limits on his building permits. Years later, the ZBA revoked Haberman’s building permit, arguing the extension required a new ZBA vote. The Court of Appeals held that the ZBA’s attorney’s agreement to extend the time was binding, as the attorney had at least apparent authority and a new ZBA vote was not required.

    Facts

    Sinclair Haberman sought a variance to build a four-tower residential condominium complex. The ZBA granted the variance, but a dispute arose after one tower was built. A 1989 stipulation settled Haberman’s lawsuit against the City and ZBA, requiring him to apply for new variances subject to time limits for building permit applications. Haberman also agreed to pay $200,000 to the City for public improvements, including underground utility lines, to be completed by the City within two years. The City failed to meet the deadline, and Haberman agreed to extend the deadline, contingent upon tolling the time limits on his building permits.

    Procedural History

    Haberman applied for and received new variances in 1989. The City failed to meet the deadline for the utility lines. In 1992, Haberman agreed to extend the City’s deadline in exchange for tolling his time to apply for building permits, memorialized in a letter agreement signed by the City’s Corporation Counsel, representing the ZBA. In 2002, Haberman applied for a building permit, which the Building Department issued in 2003. The ZBA then revoked the permit, arguing Haberman missed the 1989 stipulation deadline and the extension was invalid. Haberman sued to annul the revocation. The Supreme Court annulled the ZBA’s action, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the extension unenforceable. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the ZBA is bound by its attorney’s agreement to extend the time to apply for building permits, or whether such an extension requires a new vote by the ZBA.

    Holding

    No, the ZBA is bound by its attorney’s agreement, because the attorney had at least apparent authority to act on the ZBA’s behalf and a new ZBA vote was not required for the extension.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the Corporation Counsel’s agreement to extend Haberman’s time to apply for building permits was binding on the ZBA. The Court reasoned that parties are generally bound by their attorneys’ agreements. While granting a variance requires ZBA action, extending the duration of a variance does not require the same formality. Citing Matter of New York Life Ins. Co. v Galvin, 35 NY2d 52, 59 (1974), the Court noted that an extension does not require a new application, public notice, or a hearing. The court found no basis to require a ZBA vote for an extension. The agreement was in writing, negotiated by counsel, and approved by the court. The City received a benefit (extension of time for utility work) in exchange for the extension granted to Haberman. The Corporation Counsel, as the ZBA’s attorney, had at least apparent authority. The Court emphasized the unfairness of invalidating the agreement years later due to a procedural requirement not mandated by statute or precedent. The court stated, “It would be unfair to hold, many years after the event, that the lawyer’s agreement was a nullity because the parties did not follow a procedure that no statute and no precedent required.”