New York Law Review

Tag: 2003

  • James v. Jamie Towers Housing Co., Inc., 99 N.Y.2d 639 (2003): Landlord’s Duty of Care for Foreseeable Criminal Acts

    James v. Jamie Towers Housing Co., Inc., 99 N.Y.2d 639 (2003)

    A landlord satisfies its duty of care to tenants and residents by providing minimal security precautions against reasonably foreseeable criminal acts by third parties.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a cooperative housing complex discharged its duty of care to a resident assaulted in a vestibule by providing locking doors, an intercom system, and 24-hour security. The plaintiff argued the housing company and its security contractor negligently failed to provide adequate security. The Court found that providing the listed security measures met the common-law duty of minimal security precautions. Even assuming a contractual duty extended to the plaintiff, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a breach of that duty or that the housing company failed to ensure the security company performed its contractual duties. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

    Facts

    Jahi James, a resident of the Jamie Towers Housing complex, was attacked by a gang while walking between buildings in the complex. James and his companions fled into the vestibule of a building. The vestibule had unlocked glass doors leading from the outside but locked glass doors separating it from the lobby. James, unable to access the lobby, was trapped in the vestibule and assaulted. No security guards were stationed in the lobby at the time of the assault. The housing complex had locking doors, an intercom system, and contracted for 24-hour security.

    Procedural History

    James’s father sued Jamie Towers and Lance Investigation Service, alleging negligence and breach of contract. The Supreme Court denied motions for summary judgment by both defendants. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Jamie Towers Housing Company fulfilled its duty of care to protect residents from foreseeable criminal acts.
    2. Whether Lance Investigation Service breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiffs, arising from its contract with Jamie Towers.
    3. Whether Jamie Towers failed to ensure that Lance Investigation Service performed its contractual duty.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because by providing locking doors, an intercom service, and 24-hour security, Jamie Towers discharged its common-law duty to take minimal security precautions against reasonably foreseeable criminal acts by third parties.
    2. No, because even assuming Lance owed plaintiffs a duty of care (which Lance did not contest for the purposes of this case), plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact concerning the scope and breach of that duty.
    3. No, because the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding Jamie Towers’ failure to ensure that Lance performed its contractual duty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the precedent set in Nallan v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 NY2d 507 (1980) and Jacqueline S. v City of New York, 81 NY2d 288 (1993), stating that Jamie Towers satisfied its common-law duty by providing “locking doors, an intercom service and 24-hour security.” This level of security was deemed adequate to protect against reasonably foreseeable criminal acts. The Court emphasized the necessity of minimal security precautions but did not mandate an exhaustive security apparatus. The Court found no evidence that Jamie Towers failed to ensure Lance performed its contractual duty or that Lance breached any duty to the plaintiffs, assuming such a duty existed. The Court did not elaborate on policy considerations beyond the existing common-law framework established in prior cases. The decision was unanimous; there were no dissenting or concurring opinions. The court stated, “As to Jamie Towers, both the majority and the dissent below correctly ruled that by providing locking doors, an intercom service and 24-hour security, Jamie Towers discharged its common-law duty to take minimal security precautions against reasonably foreseeable criminal acts by third parties”. The Court’s analysis focused on whether the existing security measures were reasonable under the circumstances, not on whether additional measures could have been implemented to prevent the assault.

  • People v. Shabazz, 99 N.Y.2d 634 (2003): Admissibility of Evidence Based on Police Radio Transmissions

    People v. Shabazz, 99 N.Y.2d 634 (2003)

    When a defendant fails to challenge the reliability of police radio transmissions at a suppression hearing, the prosecution is entitled to a presumption of reliability, and the defendant’s argument that the proof was deficient is unpreserved for appellate review.

    Summary

    Bobby Shabazz was convicted of weapon possession charges. Police stopped his vehicle based on radio transmissions indicating he was involved in recent shootings. During the stop, Shabazz made an incriminating statement, and a subsequent vehicle search revealed a gun. Shabazz moved to suppress the gun and his statements, but the motion was denied. On appeal, he argued that the radio transmissions were unreliable, but the Appellate Division upheld the conviction, citing his failure to raise the reliability issue during the suppression hearing. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant’s failure to challenge the reliability of the radio transmissions at the suppression hearing meant that the prosecution was entitled to rely on a presumption of reliability, and his appellate argument was unpreserved.

    Facts

    Police officers received radio transmissions reporting recent shootings involving a black male named Bobby Shabazz, driving a gray 1987 Chevy Astro van with a specific license plate number. The officers located a matching vehicle, confirmed the license plate, and stopped the van. The defendant, Shabazz, was driving. As police removed him from the van, he asked, “Who did I kill?” A subsequent search of the van revealed a gun in the back seat.

    Procedural History

    Shabazz was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and other charges. He moved to suppress the gun and his statements, but the suppression court ruled the evidence admissible. A jury convicted him of the weapon possession offenses. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Shabazz then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the radio transmissions were sufficient to justify the motor vehicle stop and subsequent arrest, considering the defendant’s argument on appeal that the People did not establish the reliability of the information conveyed in those transmissions.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to challenge the reliability of the radio transmissions at the suppression hearing; therefore, the burden never shifted to the People to establish the reliability of that information, and the issue is unpreserved for review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the legality of a motor vehicle stop and search is a mixed question of law and fact that will not be disturbed on appeal if the Appellate Division’s finding has a record basis. Here, the officers’ testimony about the radio information supported the conclusion that the stop was lawful under People v. Dodt, 61 NY2d 408 (1984). The critical point was that Shabazz *never* challenged the reliability of the radio information at the suppression hearing. Because he failed to do so, the burden never shifted to the People to prove the reliability of the information as per People v. Jenkins, 47 NY2d 722 (1979). The Court cited People v. Martin, 50 NY2d 1029, 1031 (1980), stating that the argument was unpreserved for review. Furthermore, the court dismissed his argument that the search was illegal for failure to verify his identity before arrest, also because it was unpreserved. The Court concluded that there was a sufficient basis to support the Appellate Division’s determination that probable cause existed for the arrest.

  • Tri-State Employment Services, Inc. v. Mountbatten Surety Co., 99 N.Y.2d 478 (2003): Determining if a PEO Can Claim Under a Surety Bond

    Tri-State Employment Services, Inc. v. Mountbatten Surety Co., 99 N.Y.2d 478 (2003)

    A professional employer organization’s (PEO) claim under a labor and materials surety bond is presumptively invalid if its primary role is providing administrative, human resources services, and payroll financing, unless the PEO exercises sufficient direction and control over the workers.

    Summary

    Tri-State Employment Services, Inc., a PEO, sought payment under a labor and materials surety bond after Team Star Contractors, Inc. failed to pay for employee leasing services. Tri-State argued it was owed money for wages, taxes, and insurance premiums it paid on behalf of Team Star’s employees. The New York Court of Appeals held that Tri-State was not a proper claimant under the bond because its primary role was administrative and financial, and it did not exercise sufficient control over the workers to be considered a provider of labor. The court established a factual test for determining whether a PEO qualifies as a labor provider under a surety bond.

    Facts

    Team Star contracted with O’Ahlborg & Sons for construction work, secured by a surety bond from Mountbatten Surety Co. Tri-State provided employee leasing services to Team Star, handling payroll, taxes, and insurance. Team Star failed to pay Tri-State, leading to a debt of $1.2 million. Tri-State filed a claim under the surety bond.

    Procedural History

    The District Court dismissed Tri-State’s claim, holding it wasn’t a proper claimant under the bond. The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals: “In the circumstances presented, is a PEO, under New York law, a proper claimant under a labor and materials surety bond?” The New York Court of Appeals accepted the certification.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under New York law, a professional employer organization (PEO) is a proper claimant under a labor and materials surety bond when its primary role involves administrative services and payroll financing.

    Holding

    No, because Tri-State’s primary role was providing administrative and financial services, and it did not exercise sufficient direction and control over the workers to qualify as a provider of labor under the terms of the bond.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that surety bonds protect workers and material suppliers, but should not be extended to entities that merely advance money. While PEOs provide administrative services, including paying wages and taxes, their claimant status depends on their level of control over the workers. The court declined to base its decision solely on whether the PEO was the “legal employer.” Instead, the court established a factual test, considering factors such as the PEO’s involvement in hiring, training, supervising, and disciplining the workers. The court stated, “a PEO’s sole or primary role as a provider of administrative and human resources services, and as a payroll financier, gives rise to a presumption that the PEO does not provide labor to a contractor for purposes of a payment bond claim.”

    Because Tri-State did not select, screen, train, supervise, or discipline the workers, and did not hold itself out as the workers’ employer beyond issuing checks, it failed to overcome the presumption. The court emphasized that Tri-State withheld its services, not the workers, when Team Star failed to pay. Consequently, the court concluded that Tri-State was not a provider of labor and therefore not a proper claimant under the bond. The court emphasized that “the contracts of sureties are to be construed like other contracts so as to give effect to the intention of the parties. In ascertaining that intention we are to read the language used by the parties in the light of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument…But when the meaning of the language used has been thus ascertained, the responsibility of the surety is not to be extended or enlarged by implication or construction, and is strictissimi juris.“

  • Panek v. County of Albany, 99 N.Y.2d 452 (2003): Defining “Altering” Under New York’s Labor Law § 240(1)

    Panek v. County of Albany, 99 N.Y.2d 452 (2003)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), an activity constitutes “altering” a building or structure if it involves making a significant physical change to its configuration or composition, regardless of whether the building is slated for future demolition.

    Summary

    Andrew Panek, an FAA employee, was injured while removing air handlers from an old air traffic control tower slated for demolition. The New York Court of Appeals held that his work constituted “altering” the building under Labor Law § 240(1) because it involved a significant physical change, despite the building’s impending demolition. The Court emphasized that the focus should be on the nature of the work at the time of the injury, not the building’s future.

    Facts

    The FAA leased an air traffic control tower from the County of Albany Airport Authority. After a new tower was built, Panek was instructed to remove two 200-pound air handlers from the old tower’s cooling system. This involved dismantling the cooling system over two days. On the third day, while removing the second air handler, Panek fell from a ladder and sustained injuries. The ladder allegedly failed, causing him to fall.

    Procedural History

    Panek sued the County and the Authority, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). Supreme Court granted Panek’s motion for partial summary judgment on the § 240(1) claim, finding he was engaged in an alteration. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint, reasoning that the tower’s scheduled demolition precluded a finding of alteration. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Panek’s work constituted “demolition” within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1)?

    2. Whether Panek’s removal of the air handlers constituted “altering” the building under Labor Law § 240(1), given the building’s scheduled demolition?

    Holding

    1. No, because Panek’s work was to be completed before the commencement of any work by the demolition contractor.

    2. Yes, because the removal of the air handlers involved making a significant physical change to the building, satisfying the standard for an alteration under Labor Law § 240(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while Panek was not engaged in demolition work, his activities did constitute an alteration. The Court relied on its prior holdings in Joblon v. Solow and Weininger v. Hagedorn & Co., emphasizing that “altering” requires making a “significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure.” The removal of the 200-pound air handlers, requiring preparatory labor and the use of a mechanical lift, clearly met this standard. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the impending demolition of the tower should preclude a finding of alteration, stating that the focus should be on the nature of the work project at the time of the accident. Furthermore, because the defendants did not contest that the ladder failed, the court found no issue of fact regarding proximate causation. The Court emphasized the purpose of Labor Law § 240(1) is to protect workers by placing ultimate responsibility for safety practices on owners and contractors. The court stated that the strict liability provision “is to be construed as liberally as may be for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was thus framed.” (Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 NY2d 555, 559 [1993]).

  • Moran Towing Corp. v. Urbach, 99 N.Y.2d 438 (2003): Constitutionality of State Fuel Tax on Vessels in Interstate Commerce

    Moran Towing Corp. v. Urbach, 99 N.Y.2d 438 (2003)

    A state tax on fuel consumption by vessels engaged in interstate commerce is facially constitutional if a substantial nexus exists between the taxing state and the entity being taxed, meaning there are circumstances under which the statute could be validly applied.

    Summary

    Moran Towing Corp. challenged the constitutionality of New York Tax Law §§ 301 and 301-a, arguing that the state’s petroleum business tax (PBT) on fuel consumed by vessels in interstate commerce violated the Commerce Clause. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s ruling that the tax was facially unconstitutional, holding that the intervenors failed to prove the statute was unconstitutional in every conceivable application. The court reasoned that the tax could be constitutionally applied to businesses with a substantial nexus to New York, such as those incorporated and operating within the state.

    Facts

    Moran Towing Corp., Eklof Marine Corporation, and Reinauer Transportation Companies operated tugboats and barges transporting cargo in New York waters. These companies imported fuel into New York to power their vessels and were subject to New York’s Petroleum Business Tax (PBT) on fuel consumed within the state. The companies sought refunds of PBT taxes paid, arguing the tax was unconstitutional as applied to fuel consumed during interstate commerce. The challenge focused on the 1997 amendments to the PBT intended to clarify the tax’s application to fuel consumed by vessels in the state.

    Procedural History

    Moran initially filed an Article 78 proceeding challenging the denial of its tax refund request. Eklof and Reinauer were granted permission to intervene. Supreme Court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but the Appellate Division reversed, declaring Tax Law § 301 (a) (1) (ii), § 301-a (b) (2) and § 301-a (c) (1) (B) facially unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. The Commissioner appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right on constitutional grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Tax Law §§ 301 and 301-a, imposing a tax on fuel consumed by vessels engaged in interstate commerce while operating in New York waters, are facially unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution?

    Holding

    No, because there are circumstances under which the statutes at issue could be constitutionally applied, thus the facial challenge fails.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the four-prong test from Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, which asks whether the tax (1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the State. The court focused on the substantial nexus prong. The court stated that intervenors making a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the PBT must prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that “ ‘in any degree and in every conceivable application,’ the law suffers wholesale constitutional impairment”.

    The Court distinguished pre-Complete Auto cases, which held that states could not directly tax interstate commerce, finding those cases irrelevant to the modern Commerce Clause analysis. The court emphasized that physical presence of a business in the state is sufficient to constitute a “substantial nexus”. The Court cited Orvis Co. v Tax Appeals Trib., holding that the required nexus with the taxing State need not necessarily be directly related to the activity being taxed, but could simply be whether the facts demonstrate some definite link between the taxing State and the person it seeks to tax.

    The Court reasoned that a sufficient nexus would exist where the entity being taxed was a New York corporation, with offices in the state, employing New York citizens and conducting business in the state. This set of facts would constitute a physical presence that is more than a “slightest presence” in New York. Therefore, the statute could survive a facial constitutional challenge. The court remitted the issue of the retroactive application of the 1997 amendments, and any other issues raised but not determined by the Appellate Division, to that Court for its consideration.

  • People v. Rodriguez, 100 N.Y.2d 30 (2003): Juror Misconduct and Prejudice to Defendant

    People v. Rodriguez, 100 N.Y.2d 30 (2003)

    A defendant is not entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct unless the misconduct prejudiced a substantial right of the defendant.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of selling cocaine to an undercover officer. After the verdict, a juror contacted an Assistant District Attorney (ADA) and revealed that he intentionally concealed their friendship during voir dire. The defendant moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the concealment deprived him of a fair jury selection. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing, finding no prejudice to the defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right, juror misconduct does not automatically entitle a defendant to a new trial. The Court also addressed a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during summation, finding any error harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt.

    Facts

    An undercover officer asked the defendant for cocaine. The defendant sold the officer cocaine for $20 of prerecorded money. Another undercover officer followed them, transmitting their location to a field team. The field team arrested the defendant and found the prerecorded money in his pocket. After the verdict, a juror, Steven Cohen, contacted Andrew Carey, an ADA, and admitted that he intentionally concealed their friendship during voir dire.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. The defendant moved to set aside the verdict based on juror misconduct. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a juror’s concealment of information during voir dire automatically warrants a new trial.
    2. Whether the prosecutor’s comments during summation regarding the defense witnesses’ lack of outrage constituted prosecutorial misconduct.

    Holding

    1. No, because absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right of the defendant, proof of juror misconduct does not automatically entitle a defendant to a new trial.
    2. No, because although the prosecutor’s comment was uncalled for, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 330.30(2) authorizes a court to set aside a verdict if “improper conduct by a juror…may have affected a substantial right of the defendant.” The Court cited People v. Irizarry, 83 N.Y.2d 557, 561 (1994), stating that “absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right, proof of juror misconduct does not entitle a defendant to a new trial.” The court emphasized that each case must be examined on its unique facts to determine the nature of the misconduct and the likelihood that prejudice was engendered. The Court found that the trial court’s findings, made after a hearing, were supported by the record. The Court stated, “not every misstep by a juror rises to the inherently prejudicial level at which reversal is required automatically” People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 394 (1979). The Court further stated “due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).

    Regarding the prosecutor’s comment, the Court acknowledged it was uncalled for because it made an oblique reference to the defendant’s character, which was not in evidence. However, the Court deemed the error harmless, citing People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241-242 (1975), due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The Court emphasized that this was “part and parcel of his argument that nothing in the testimony of the defense witnesses showed that defendant ‘couldn’t’ have committed the crime.”

  • Horn v. New York Times, 100 N.Y.2d 85 (2003): Limits to the Wieder Exception for At-Will Employees

    100 N.Y.2d 85 (2003)

    The narrow exception to the at-will employment doctrine established in Wieder v. Skala, which protects employees from termination for upholding professional ethical obligations, does not extend to a physician employed by a non-medical employer.

    Summary

    Dr. Horn, a physician employed by The New York Times, claimed she was terminated for refusing to disclose confidential employee medical records and misinform employees about work-related injuries, as allegedly directed by the Times. She argued her termination breached an implied contract term requiring her to practice medicine ethically. The Court of Appeals held that the Wieder exception to the at-will employment doctrine, which applies when an employee’s professional duties are integral to the employer’s business and involve a mutual commitment to ethical standards, did not apply to Horn’s situation. The court emphasized the absence of a “common professional enterprise” and the importance of legislative action to alter employment relationships.

    Facts

    Dr. Sheila Horn worked as the Associate Medical Director for The New York Times, providing medical care to employees. Horn alleged that the Times’ Labor Relations, Legal, and Human Resources Departments frequently directed her to provide confidential employee medical records without consent. She also claimed the Human Resources Department instructed her to misinform employees about whether their injuries were work-related to reduce workers’ compensation claims. Horn refused to comply, citing ethical and legal concerns. Subsequently, the Times restructured its Medical Department, eliminating Horn’s position. Horn claimed this was a pretext for terminating her due to her refusal to comply with unethical requests.

    Procedural History

    Horn sued the New York Times for breach of contract. The Supreme Court denied the Times’ motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim, finding the Wieder exception applicable. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division’s order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Wieder exception to the at-will employment doctrine extends to a physician employed by a non-medical employer, thereby creating an implied contractual obligation to allow the physician to practice medicine ethically.

    Holding

    No, because the unique circumstances that justified the Wieder exception—a “common professional enterprise” and a mutual commitment to ethical self-regulation—are not present when a physician is employed by a non-medical entity. The physician’s role is not integral to the employer’s primary business.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the strong presumption of at-will employment in New York, allowing either party to terminate the relationship without cause. While acknowledging the Wieder exception, the Court clarified its narrow scope. The Court distinguished Wieder, where the attorney’s ethical obligations were central to the law firm’s practice and involved self-regulation within the legal profession. Here, Horn’s medical services were directed to fellow employees as directed by her employer. Further, the court noted that Horn’s provision of medical services did not occupy the “very core” or “only purpose” of her employment with the Times. The Court also noted the lack of a “common professional enterprise” between Horn and the Times. The Court rejected the dissent’s argument that the Times’ knowledge of Horn’s ethical obligations was sufficient to create an implied contract, warning that such a broad interpretation would create a new exception applicable to numerous professional employees. The Court reaffirmed its reluctance to create common-law exceptions to the at-will rule, deferring to the Legislature to address such significant changes in employment law. The Court quoted Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., reiterating that significant changes in employment relationships are best left to the Legislature. The Court stated that there was no compelling reason to expand the Wieder exception to Horn’s case.

  • Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N.Y.2d 1 (2003): Due Diligence Required for Tax Foreclosure Notice

    100 N.Y.2d 1 (2003)

    When a notice of tax foreclosure is returned as undeliverable, due process requires the enforcing officer to conduct a reasonable search of public records to ascertain the owner’s correct address, but the extent of that search is defined by reasonableness and the owner’s own actions.

    Summary

    Kennedy sued Mossafa to quiet title after purchasing Mossafa’s property at a tax foreclosure sale due to unpaid 1996 taxes. The County sent a foreclosure notice to the address on the tax roll, but it was returned as undeliverable. The County did not conduct further investigation. Mossafa claimed she had notified the Town of a change of address. The Court of Appeals held that while sending notice to the tax roll address is insufficient when it’s returned undeliverable, the County’s search was reasonable under the circumstances because Mossafa provided no evidence that a further search would have revealed her correct address, and her actions contributed to the confusion.

    Facts

    Mossafa purchased property in 1983, listing her address as Blaisdell Road. She paid property taxes at this address until 1996. In 1991, she moved to Lester Drive and allegedly notified the Town of her new address. She paid the 1997 and 1998 tax bills using checks with her Lester Drive address. The 1996 taxes went unpaid, and in October 1997, the County filed a foreclosure petition and mailed a notice to the Blaisdell Road address. The notice was returned as undeliverable. The tax bill for 1998 included a notice on the back stating previous taxes were due and failure to pay could result in loss of property; she paid it but made no inquiry. The County sold the property to Kennedy in June 1998 after obtaining a default judgment.

    Procedural History

    Kennedy sued Mossafa to quiet title. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Kennedy, dismissing Mossafa’s third-party complaint against the County. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the procedures used by a county to foreclose on a property following a tax delinquency satisfied constitutional due process when the owner never actually received notice of the proceeding, even though the county mailed the notice to the address on the tax roll and the notice was returned as undeliverable.

    Holding

    No, because the County satisfied its due process obligations by attempting to send notice to the address on the tax roll, and, after that notice was returned as undeliverable, a reasonable search of public records would not have revealed a different address. The attempted personal notice, coupled with posting and publication, satisfied due process under the circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that due process requires “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise” interested parties of a foreclosure action (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.). When a notice is returned as undeliverable, the enforcing officer should conduct a reasonable search of public records for an alternative address. However, the public record does not consist solely of the tax roll. RPTL 1125 specifically refers to the records of the surrogate’s office and contemplates that the enforcing officer may charge for any reasonable search of the public record. A reasonable search, however, does not necessarily require searching the Internet, voting records, etc. Here, Mossafa presented no evidence that a search of public records would have revealed her correct address. While towns are required to keep a record that payment was made, they are not required to retain copies of checks or the envelopes they came in. Also relevant was that, as required by RPTL 1125 (2) (a), at least for 1998, a tax bill put appellant on notice that taxes were due, and that the failure to pay them would result in the loss of the property. The Court balanced Mossafa’s interests against the State’s interest in collecting delinquent taxes and considered Mossafa’s conduct in not updating her address. “Ownership carries responsibilities.” The court concluded that, under these circumstances, Mossafa’s current address was not reasonably ascertainable, and the attempted notice, coupled with posting and publication, satisfied due process.

  • People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418 (2003): Proper Procedure for Batson Challenges

    People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418 (2003)

    The Batson procedure for challenging peremptory strikes requires a three-step process: the moving party must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the non-moving party must provide a race-neutral reason for each strike, and the court must determine whether the reason is pretextual.

    Summary

    This case concerns the proper application of the three-step Batson test for determining whether peremptory challenges were used to exclude potential jurors based on race. During jury selection, the defense raised a Batson objection after the prosecutor struck three minority women. While the prosecutor offered reasons for the strikes, the defense argued a pattern of discrimination. The trial court found sufficient reasons for two strikes but was less clear on the third. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that although the trial court’s analysis was flawed, the defendant failed to adequately preserve the issue for appeal by not pressing the issue of pretext regarding one of the jurors.

    Facts

    During the first round of jury selection for Smocum’s trial for criminal possession of a stolen vehicle, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove three prospective jurors: one Hispanic woman and two African-American women.

    Defense counsel raised a Batson challenge, suggesting a pattern of racial discrimination.

    The prosecutor explained that two jurors were struck due to family involvement with police officers, and the third because of the recent death of her son.

    Defense counsel contested the reasons given, particularly regarding the level of concern expressed by one juror regarding a negative experience her son had with police.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the Batson challenge, finding sufficient reasons for the strikes and stating the challenge of one additional juror did not establish a pattern.

    Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred by revisiting the prima facie case determination after the prosecutor offered race-neutral explanations for the peremptory strikes.

    2. Whether the trial court’s ruling on pretext regarding prospective juror Mapp was supported by the record.

    3. Whether inadequacies in the record were attributable to the trial court’s impatience during the Batson inquiry.

    Holding

    1. The issue became moot when the prosecutor stated their reasons and the court ruled on the ultimate issue.

    2. No, because the defendant failed to adequately preserve the issue for appeal by not pressing the issue of pretext regarding one of the jurors.

    3. While the court improperly rushed and compressed the Batson inquiry, defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing an equal protection violation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the three-step Batson framework. First, the party challenging the strike must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, the striking party must offer a race-neutral explanation. Third, the trial court must determine whether the explanation is pretextual. The court stated that “It makes no sense, for example, to revisit the issue of whether a prima facie case has been made once the prosecutor has come forward with race-neutral reasons.”

    The Court found that the trial court erred by seemingly merging steps two and three, not explicitly allowing defense counsel to argue pretext. However, the Court also noted that the defense failed to adequately preserve the issue regarding juror Mapp, stating, “While defense counsel persisted in her challenge regarding Torres and Gordon despite the court’s impatience, she said nothing further about Mapp at a time when any ambiguity — if indeed she actually perceived any ambiguity — could have been clarified.”

    The court underscored the importance of both trial court attention to each of Batson’s well-articulated, sequential steps, and of trial counsel attention to placing their objections on the record so they may be addressed by the court.

  • People v. Brisco, 99 N.Y.2d 596 (2003): Legality of Showup Identifications

    99 N.Y.2d 596 (2003)

    A showup identification is permissible if conducted in close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime and if the procedure is not unduly suggestive.

    Summary

    Frank Brisco was convicted of attempted burglary. The key evidence was a showup identification made by the victim at the crime scene approximately one hour after the burglary. Brisco, who matched the victim’s initial description, was asked to hold maroon shorts (matching the victim’s description of the perpetrator’s clothing) during the showup. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the showup was reasonable under the circumstances because it was conducted promptly at the crime scene as part of a continuous investigation and the procedure was not unduly suggestive. The court emphasized that the victim independently identified Brisco based on his height, hair color, and build.

    Facts

    On July 6, 1999, at 11:30 AM, police responded to a reported burglary at 51 Mills Pond Road. The victim described the suspect as a shirtless white male, 18-20 years old with brown hair, muscular build, and wearing maroon shorts. Officers found Brisco, who matched the description, at a nearby house at 11:55 AM. Brisco was shirtless, wearing a towel. Later, he wore tan shorts. Inside the house, officers found wet maroon shorts that Brisco claimed were his. At 12:25 PM, police transported Brisco to the victim’s house, where, while holding the maroon shorts, the victim identified him as the person she saw leaving her house, based on height, hair color, and build.

    Procedural History

    Brisco was charged with burglary in the second degree and petit larceny. He pleaded guilty to attempted burglary in the second degree, conditional upon his right to appeal the suppression ruling related to the showup identification. The trial court upheld the showup identification. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the crime scene showup identification of the defendant was unduly suggestive because the defendant, wearing tan shorts and no shirt, was asked to hold a pair of maroon shorts that matched the victim’s description of the perpetrator’s clothing.

    Holding

    No, because the showup was reasonable under the circumstances, taking place at the crime scene within an hour of the crime as part of a continuous investigation, and the procedure was not unduly suggestive, as the victim initially and independently identified the defendant based on his height, hair color, and build.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent allowing showup identifications when conducted in close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime and when the procedure used was not unduly suggestive (citing People v Ortiz, 90 NY2d 533, 537 [1997] and People v Johnson, 81 NY2d 828, 831 [1993]). The court found that the showup took place at the scene of the crime within an hour of the crime’s commission as part of a continuous investigation. Crucially, the court emphasized that the victim had independently identified the defendant based on his height, hair color, and build *before* identifying the maroon shorts. The court stated, “the presence of defendant’s maroon shorts, admittedly his own, did not, as a matter of law, negate the reasonableness of the police action.” The dissenting judge argued that the showup was unduly suggestive because Brisco was required to hold the shorts, effectively singling him out as the perpetrator. The dissent also noted that a lineup would have been a more appropriate identification procedure given the circumstances. The majority distinguished this case from others where showups were deemed improper because those cases often involved a greater lapse of time between the crime and the identification. The court emphasizes that determining the timeliness of a showup should not be a “bright-line rule” and should be assessed case-by-case.