New York Law Review

Tag: 2001

  • Waters v. City of New York, 96 N.Y.2d 843 (2001): Timeliness of Jail Time Credit Recalculation

    Waters v. City of New York, 96 N.Y.2d 843 (2001)

    The calculation of jail time credit is a continuing, non-discretionary, ministerial obligation, and a proceeding to compel its performance is timely if commenced within four months of the respondent’s refusal to perform its duty upon demand.

    Summary

    Waters sought a recalculation of his jail time credit, arguing that he was not credited for time spent in custody awaiting trial between 1972 and 1975. The Court of Appeals held that the four-month statute of limitations for bringing a CPLR article 78 proceeding did not begin to run when Waters was initially given jail time credit in 1977. Instead, the obligation to calculate jail time credit is a continuing ministerial duty, and the proceeding was timely because it was commenced within four months of the City Commissioner’s failure to respond to Waters’s 1998 request for recalculation. This case clarifies the ongoing nature of the duty to calculate jail time credit accurately.

    Facts

    Waters was sentenced in California in 1972 to one year to life. He was extradited to New York in December 1972, convicted of murder, and sentenced to 25 years to life. Waters remained in New York custody until May 19, 1975, when he was returned to California. He was paroled from his California sentence on September 19, 1977, and transferred back to New York custody. The City Department of Correction initially calculated 58 days of jail time credit for Waters.

    Procedural History

    In 1998, Waters requested a recalculation of his jail time credit from the City Commissioner of Correction to account for the two and one-half years he spent in New York awaiting trial. When the Commissioner did not respond, Waters filed a CPLR article 78 petition in February 1999 against the City and State Commissioners, seeking a recalculation. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition as untimely, reasoning that the four-month statute of limitations began to run in 1977. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the four-month statute of limitations for commencing a CPLR article 78 proceeding to compel the recalculation of jail time credit began to run when the prisoner was initially given jail time credit, or whether the calculation of jail time credit is a continuing ministerial duty such that the statute of limitations begins to run from the refusal to recalculate upon demand.

    Holding

    No, because the calculation of jail time credit is a continuing, non-discretionary, ministerial obligation, and the proceeding was timely commenced within four months after the City Commissioner’s refusal to recalculate the jail time credit upon Waters’s demand.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Correction Law § 600-a and Penal Law § 70.30(3) impose a continuing, non-discretionary, ministerial duty on the City Commissioner to accurately calculate jail time credit. Penal Law § 70.30(3) states that “the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence imposed on a person shall be credited with and diminished by the amount of time the person spent in custody prior to the commencement of such sentence as a result of the charge that culminated in the sentence.” Citing Matter of Harper v Angiolillo, 89 NY2d 761, 765, the court noted that when a person seeks to compel the performance of a purely ministerial act, relief may be sought through mandamus. The court emphasized that CPLR 217(1) requires such a proceeding to be commenced within four months “after the respondent’s refusal, upon the demand of the petitioner * * * to perform its duty.” Because Waters’s proceeding was commenced within four months of the City Commissioner’s failure to respond to his request for recalculation, it was deemed timely. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving discretionary actions, where the statute of limitations would run from the initial determination. The key point is that the duty to calculate jail time credit is ongoing and can be re-triggered by a demand for recalculation.

  • Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 96 N.Y.2d 201 (2001): Statute of Limitations for Deceptive Business Practices

    Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 96 N.Y.2d 201 (2001)

    A claim under General Business Law § 349, concerning deceptive business practices, is governed by a three-year statute of limitations which accrues when the plaintiff suffers actual injury due to the deceptive practice, not necessarily at the time of purchase.

    Summary

    This case addresses the statute of limitations applicable to claims under New York General Business Law § 349 concerning deceptive business practices, specifically in the context of “vanishing premium” life insurance policies. The Court of Appeals held that the three-year statute of limitations for statutory claims applies, rather than the six-year period for fraud, because § 349 encompasses a broader range of conduct than common-law fraud. The Court further determined that the cause of action accrues when the policyholder is required to pay premiums beyond the date they were led to believe the premiums would vanish, not necessarily when the policy was purchased.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs purchased “vanishing premium” life insurance policies from Guardian Life and Massachusetts Mutual, respectively. They were allegedly induced by marketing materials and sales agent representations that premiums would vanish after a specified period, covered by policy dividends. Later, the insurers demanded additional premium payments beyond the projected vanishing dates.

    Procedural History

    In Gaidon, the trial court dismissed the complaint; the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reinstated the § 349 claim in Gaidon I and remitted it. On remittal, the Appellate Division held the § 349 claim was timely. In Russo, the trial court dismissed the § 349 claim as time-barred; the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in both cases to resolve the statute of limitations issue.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214(2) or the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213(8) applies to a cause of action brought under General Business Law § 349.

    2. Whether the plaintiffs’ actions accrued when they purchased their policies or when the defendant insurers demanded additional premium payments.

    Holding

    1. Yes, the three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214(2) applies because General Business Law § 349 creates a statutory liability distinct from common-law fraud.

    2. The actions accrued when the insurers demanded additional premium payments because that is when the plaintiffs suffered actual, measurable injury due to the deceptive practices.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPLR 214(2) applies to liabilities created by statute. While General Business Law § 349 may address conduct similar to common-law fraud, it encompasses a broader range of deceptive practices not previously recognized at common law. The Court distinguished the case from situations where a statute merely codifies existing common-law liability. Here, § 349 creates a new cause of action focused on consumer protection, even if the conduct does not rise to the level of common-law fraud.

    The Court emphasized that the injury occurred when the plaintiffs’ expectations of vanishing premiums were not met and they were required to pay additional premiums. The deceptive act was not a false guarantee in the policy itself, but the misleading marketing scheme that created unrealistic expectations about future dividend rates. Quoting Gaidon I, the Court noted the insurers “failed to reveal that the illustrated vanishing dates were wholly unrealistic” (94 N.Y.2d at 350). Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run when the policyholders were actually damaged – when they had to pay more premiums or risk losing coverage.

    The Court explicitly rejected the argument that injury occurred at the time of purchase, as the policies contained disclaimers and the cause of action wasn’t based on the policy terms themselves. Rather it was the deceptive marketing practices which induced unrealistic expectations. The Court concluded that the demand for additional premiums triggered the statute of limitations, making the actions timely.

  • Oberly v. Bangs Ambulance, Inc., 96 N.Y.2d 295 (2001): Defining “Permanent Loss of Use” Under New York’s No-Fault Law

    Oberly v. Bangs Ambulance, Inc., 96 N.Y.2d 295 (2001)

    Under New York’s No-Fault Law, a plaintiff claiming a “permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function, or system” must demonstrate a total, not partial, loss of use to establish a serious injury.

    Summary

    Richard Oberly, a dentist, was injured when an IV pump fell on his arm while being transported in an ambulance owned by Bangs Ambulance. Oberly sued, claiming a “serious injury” under New York’s No-Fault Law, specifically a “permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system.” The New York Court of Appeals held that to qualify as a serious injury under this category, the loss of use must be total, not partial. Because Oberly did not demonstrate a total loss of use of his arm, his claim failed. The court reasoned that the legislative intent, the plain wording of the statute and related categories within the statute all point toward requiring complete loss in order to meet the standard for “permanent loss of use.”

    Facts

    Richard Oberly, a dentist, was a patient in a Bangs Ambulance. While being transported, an IV pump fell from a shelf and struck his right forearm. Oberly sustained bruising and claimed ongoing pain and cramping in his arm. This pain allegedly limited his ability to practice dentistry.

    Procedural History

    Oberly and his wife sued Bangs Ambulance in Supreme Court, alleging negligence and claiming a serious injury under New York’s No-Fault Law. The Supreme Court dismissed the action due to lack of evidence of a serious injury. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that a partial loss of use requires a showing that the limitation is “consequential or significant.” The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a party bringing a claim under the no-fault serious injury category of “permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system” is required to prove that the loss of use is significant or consequential, or whether a total loss of use is required.

    Holding

    No, because to qualify as a serious injury within the meaning of the statute, “permanent loss of use” must be total.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court based its reasoning on the statutory text and the legislative intent behind the No-Fault Law. The court stated that “the statute speaks in terms of the loss of a body member, without qualification,” indicating the Legislature intended a complete loss. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the 1977 amendments to the No-Fault Law, which added the categories of “permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member” and “significant limitation of use of a body function or system,” would be redundant if partial losses were already covered under “permanent loss of use.” The court stated that had the Legislature considered partial losses already covered under “permanent loss of use,” there would have been no need to enact the two new provisions. The court emphasized a consistent framework within the statute. The court rejected the Appellate Division’s addition of “partial” to the “loss of use” standard, stating there is no qualitative difference between a partial “loss of use” and a “limitation of use” when both require a permanent injury, thus creating a redundancy. The court reasoned “requiring a total loss is consistent with the statutory addition, in 1977, of the categories ‘permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member’ and ‘significant limitation of use of a body function or system.’”

  • Dutchess County Dept. of Social Services v. Day, 96 N.Y.2d 149 (2001): Applying CSSA Guidelines in Foster Care Cases

    Dutchess County Dept. of Social Services v. Day, 96 N.Y.2d 149 (2001)

    Child support obligations for children in residential or foster care are determined using the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) guidelines, allowing for deviations based on specific, enumerated factors.

    Summary

    This case clarifies that the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) governs parental support obligations even when a child is in residential or foster care. Dutchess County Department of Social Services sought reimbursement from parents for the costs of their child’s residential care. The Court of Appeals held that while Family Court Act § 415 establishes a general duty of support, the CSSA provides the specific framework for calculating child support, including in foster care cases. The court emphasized the need for uniform child support standards and affirmed the Hearing Examiner’s application of the CSSA, including permissible deviations based on relevant factors.

    Facts

    The Dutchess County Department of Social Services (DSS) commenced proceedings against two parents to recover funds spent on their child’s residential care. A Hearing Examiner calculated each parent’s basic child support obligation using the CSSA formula. The Hearing Examiner then deviated from the CSSA amount, considering factors such as the parents’ need to maintain a home for the child, the child’s home visits, and the mother’s temporary inability to work due to surgery. Support orders were issued against both parents.

    Procedural History

    The DSS objected to the support orders, arguing that the Hearing Examiner improperly deviated from the CSSA standards. The Family Court denied the objections, reasoning that Family Court Act § 415 applied, granting broader discretion. Alternatively, the Family Court found the orders reasonable even under the CSSA. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that § 415 applied. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether child support obligations for a child placed in residential or foster care should be determined under Family Court Act § 415, which allows for broader discretion, or under the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA), Family Court Act § 413.

    Holding

    No, because the CSSA provides the specific and uniform standard for determining child support obligations, including in cases involving children in residential or foster care. Deviations are permitted only based on the specific factors enumerated in the CSSA.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that statutes relating to the same subject matter should be construed together. While Family Court Act § 415 establishes a general duty to support relatives receiving public assistance, the CSSA, enacted later, provides a specific mathematical formula for calculating child support. The CSSA mandates that courts “shall” make child support awards according to its provisions (Family Ct Act § 413[1][a]). The court emphasized the need for uniform standards in child support awards, aligning with federal mandates for state child support programs. The court noted the legislative history of CSSA indicating that it “ends the use of different support criteria for awards made to recipients of public assistance from those made to non-public assistance recipients.” The Court held that Section 415 continues to establish support liability when a spouse or stepchild is a recipient of public assistance. The court distinguished Bast v. Rossoff, noting the policy considerations against encouraging parents to track visitation time to reduce support obligations were not relevant in the context of temporary residential or foster care. The Hearing Examiner appropriately considered parent-child visitation in the temporary residential/foster care context. Failing to consider expenses incurred during visitation would abrogate the strong public policy and underlying goal of returning the child home and reuniting the family. The court explicitly rejected contrary holdings in other state courts that had applied Family Court Act § 415 instead of CSSA.

  • Clara C. v. William L., 96 N.Y.2d 244 (2001): Enforceability of Child Support Agreements and Judicial Review

    96 N.Y.2d 244 (2001)

    A support agreement between a mother and a putative father of a nonmarital child is only binding if the court determines that adequate provision has been made for the child’s support, ensuring the child’s needs are met and not contracted away.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a father can use Family Court Act § 516 to prevent a mother from seeking more child support when their agreement was court-approved without considering the child’s needs. Clara C. sought additional support from William L. for their child, Thomas, years after a settlement agreement was approved. The Court of Appeals held that William could not bar Clara’s claim because the initial agreement lacked judicial review regarding the adequacy of support for Thomas. The court emphasized the statutory requirement for judicial determination of adequate provision for the child, protecting nonmarital children’s welfare. This decision underscores the importance of judicial oversight in child support agreements to ensure children’s needs are prioritized. The ruling reverses the lower court’s decision, remanding the case for further proceedings.

    Facts

    In 1983, Clara C. gave birth to Thomas L.C. In 1986, Clara initiated a paternity suit against William L., Thomas’s biological father. Blood tests showed a 99.9% probability of William’s paternity. The parties entered into a settlement agreement under Family Court Act § 516. William agreed to pay $275 monthly until Thomas turned 21 and maintain a life insurance policy. Clara agreed to drop the paternity suit and refrain from future support proceedings if William complied. The Family Court approved the agreement without determining if the support was adequate for Thomas’s needs.

    Procedural History

    Ten years later, Clara sought a paternity declaration and increased support for Thomas’s education. A Hearing Examiner dismissed the proceeding, citing the § 516 agreement. Family Court appointed a law guardian for Thomas and upheld the dismissal, finding any noncompliance immaterial and the agreement final. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s decision. Clara appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a putative father can invoke Family Court Act § 516 to bar a mother from seeking additional child support when the initial support agreement was approved by the court without a determination of whether adequate provision had been made for the child’s needs.

    Holding

    Yes, because Family Court Act § 516 requires a court to determine that adequate provision has been made for the child’s support before a support agreement is binding, and in this case, the Family Court failed to make such a determination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that Family Court Act § 516 requires judicial review and a determination of adequacy for child support agreements to be binding. The statute’s language explicitly states that an agreement is binding “only when the court determines that adequate provision has been made.” The purpose of this requirement is to protect the welfare of nonmarital children, ensuring their needs are adequately met. The court stated that absent judicial review and approval, the agreement will not be enforced to preclude a later modification of support. In this case, the Family Court’s approval was perfunctory, with no consideration of the parties’ financial situation or Thomas’s needs. The court emphasized that Clara’s failure to object earlier does not validate an agreement that lacked the required judicial determination of adequacy. Because the agreement failed to comply with § 516, William could not bar Clara’s petition for increased support. The Court did not rule on the constitutionality of § 516. A concurring opinion argued that § 516, as applied, violates equal protection because it treats nonmarital children differently from marital children regarding support rights, but the majority found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question given the statutory grounds for the decision.

  • People v. Gonzalez, 96 N.Y.2d 195 (2001): Retrial on Lesser Included Offense After Mistrial

    People v. Gonzalez, 96 N.Y.2d 195 (2001)

    When a jury acquits a defendant of a greater offense but fails to reach a verdict on a lesser-included offense, the defendant can be retried on the lesser-included offense using the original accusatory instrument, provided the retrial is limited to the lesser charge and the jury (if any) is not informed of the original, greater charge.

    Summary

    Gonzalez was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI). At trial, the jury acquitted him of DWI but couldn’t agree on the lesser charge of driving while impaired (DWAI), resulting in a mistrial on that charge. The prosecution sought to retry him for DWAI using the original accusatory instrument. Gonzalez argued double jeopardy and that the original instrument was invalid. The court rejected these arguments, convicted him of DWAI, and the Appellate Term reversed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that retrial on the original accusatory instrument was permissible because the Vehicle and Traffic Law and Criminal Procedure Law authorized it, and there was no double jeopardy concern since the retrial was limited to the DWAI charge.

    Facts

    Gonzalez was arrested and charged with DWI. At his first trial, the jury was also charged on the lesser-included offense of DWAI. The jury acquitted Gonzalez of DWI but could not reach a verdict on the DWAI charge, leading to a mistrial on that count.

    Procedural History

    The People sought to retry Gonzalez on the DWAI charge using the original information. The trial court denied Gonzalez’s double jeopardy claim and ruled the retrial would proceed on the original accusatory instrument. After a bench trial on the DWAI charge only, Gonzalez was convicted. The Appellate Term reversed, holding that a new accusatory instrument was required. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a new accusatory instrument is necessary to commence a retrial on a lesser-included charge (DWAI) after the jury in the first trial acquitted the defendant of the greater offense (DWI) but failed to reach a verdict on the lesser-included offense.

    Holding

    No, because both the Vehicle and Traffic Law and the Criminal Procedure Law provide statutory authority for the retrial on the original accusatory instrument, and there was no double jeopardy concern since the retrial was limited to the DWAI charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(9) permits a conviction for DWAI even if the accusatory instrument charges only DWI. Also, Criminal Procedure Law § 310.70(2) authorizes a retrial on any count submitted to the jury at the first trial for which the jury failed to reach a verdict. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Mayo, 48 N.Y.2d 245, where the defendant was retried on the original indictment that included the greater offense of which he was effectively acquitted. In this case, Gonzalez was only retried on the lesser charge. The court emphasized that “the People here did not seek to retry defendant on the count (driving while intoxicated) of which he was acquitted at the first trial. Rather, the only count at issue in the retrial was the lesser driving while impaired charge for which the jury had failed to reach a verdict. At no point during the retrial was defendant in jeopardy of conviction of the greater offense.” The court also noted the distinction between felony and misdemeanor charges, highlighting that felony charges require a Grand Jury indictment, a concern not present in misdemeanor cases. Finally, the court cautioned that in retrials on lesser-included offenses using the original instrument, the jury should not be informed of the original, greater charge to avoid prejudice.

  • Bell v. New York Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 811 (2001): Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals

    Bell v. New York Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 811 (2001)

    Courts may impose sanctions on litigants who engage in frivolous conduct, including pursuing appeals that are completely without merit in law and are intended to delay resolution of a case.

    Summary

    This case concerns the imposition of sanctions on appellant John B. Bell for pursuing a frivolous appeal related to a nearly 30-year-old unpaid law school loan. The New York Court of Appeals determined that Bell’s appeal was completely without merit and part of a pattern of delaying litigation and avoiding payment of his student loan. Despite prior sanctions and an injunction against further litigating the claim, Bell continued to file frivolous motions. The Court, therefore, imposed a $5,000 sanction to prevent further abuse of the judicial process.

    Facts

    John B. Bell had an unpaid law school loan that was almost 30 years old.

    Bell had previously been sanctioned by the Court of Appeals and enjoined by the Supreme Court from further litigating his claim regarding the loan.

    Despite the prior sanctions and injunction, Bell continued to file appeals and motions related to the loan.

    Procedural History

    The New York Court of Appeals previously sanctioned Bell in a related matter (Bell v New York Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 76 NY2d 930, rearg denied 76 NY2d 1015).

    The Supreme Court issued an order enjoining Bell from further litigating his claim.

    Bell appealed a subsequent order related to the loan, leading the Court of Appeals to consider sanctions again.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the appellant’s appeal is “frivolous” within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a) and (c), thus warranting the imposition of sanctions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the appeal is “completely without merit in law” and “cannot be supported by a[ny] reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law” and is part of a continued strategy to delay the resolution of the litigation and payment of his student loan.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that Bell’s appeal met the definition of “frivolous” conduct under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a) and (c), which includes appeals that are “completely without merit in law” and are intended to delay the resolution of the case. The court noted that no constitutional question was directly involved in the order being appealed, and the appeal was merely the latest in a series of frivolous attempts to avoid paying the student loan. The court emphasized Bell’s continued strategy to delay the resolution of the litigation and the payment of his student loan, which constituted an abuse of the judicial process. Referring to prior instances where sanctions were imposed on Bell in connection with the same matter, the court found him undeterred. The court cited *Maroulis v 64th St. Third Ave. Assocs., 77 NY2d 831* and *Matter of Minister, Elders & Deacons of Refm. Prot. Dutch Church v 198 Broadway, 76 NY2d 411* to further support the imposition of sanctions. Considering the need to prevent appellant from engaging in further frivolous motion practice, the Court fixed the sanction at $5,000.

  • People v. Besser, 96 N.Y.2d 141 (2001): Accomplice Corroboration in Enterprise Corruption Cases

    People v. Besser, 96 N.Y.2d 141 (2001)

    In an enterprise corruption prosecution, the accomplice corroboration rule (CPL 60.22[1]) requires only independent evidence tending to connect the defendant to the offense of enterprise corruption, not separate corroboration for each predicate criminal act.

    Summary

    Defendants Besser and Ciauri were convicted of enterprise corruption based on multiple predicate criminal acts. On appeal, they argued that the accomplice testimony used to prove each predicate act required independent corroboration. The New York Court of Appeals held that CPL 60.22(1) requires only that there be independent corroborative evidence tending to connect the defendant to the overall offense of enterprise corruption, not to each individual predicate act. The Court reasoned that the ‘offense’ is enterprise corruption, not the underlying acts, and thus the corroboration requirement is satisfied by a link to the enterprise.

    Facts

    James Besser and Jerry Ciauri, along with others, were indicted on enterprise corruption charges. The indictment alleged 62 pattern criminal acts in furtherance of an organized crime family’s activities between 1983 and 1993. Besser and Ciauri were charged with multiple pattern acts, including robbery, conspiracy to commit murder, grand larceny, and coercion. The evidence showed the crime family engaged in various illegal schemes like bookmaking, loansharking, and credit card fraud.

    Procedural History

    Besser and Ciauri were jointly tried and convicted of enterprise corruption. The Appellate Division affirmed their convictions. A judge of the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, and the Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in an enterprise corruption prosecution, the accomplice corroboration rule (CPL 60.22[1]) requires independent evidence tending to connect the defendant to each specific pattern criminal act, or whether it is sufficient for there to be independent evidence tending to connect the defendant to the overall offense of enterprise corruption.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 60.22(1) requires only independent evidence tending to connect the defendant to the offense charged, which in this case is enterprise corruption, not the individual pattern acts that make up the offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Penal Law § 10.00(1) defines an “offense” as conduct for which a sentence of imprisonment or a fine is provided. While enterprise corruption requires proof of at least three pattern acts, those acts themselves are not offenses that carry separate sentences. The “offense” is the overarching crime of enterprise corruption, which involves participation in a criminal enterprise through a pattern of criminal activity. The Court emphasized that the purpose of the enterprise corruption statute is to target the unique harm caused by complex criminal organizations, not merely to punish individual criminal acts already covered by other Penal Law provisions. The court noted the jury must find the defendant committed the acts to participate in an ascertainable criminal enterprise. Quoting CPL 60.22(1), the court stated that a “defendant may not be convicted of any offense upon the testimony of an accomplice unsupported by corroborative evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of such offense”. Here, the offense is enterprise corruption. The court also found sufficient independent proof linking the defendants to the crime family, including testimony from non-accomplice witnesses, documentary evidence placing defendants at a “safe house,” and telephone records corroborating accomplice accounts of communications.

  • In re Elion, 96 N.Y.2d 818 (2001): Constitutionality of False Personation Statute

    In re Elion, 96 N.Y.2d 818 (2001)

    A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited and is written in a manner that permits or encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of New York Penal Law § 190.23, the false personation statute. The Court of Appeals held that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it prohibits specific conduct (giving a false name, age, or address to a police officer) and the term “consequences” in the statute clearly means that the officer must inform the defendant that giving false pedigree information subjects a person to criminal liability. The warning requirement ensures people are aware that providing false information is a crime, encouraging compliance and preventing wasted police resources. The court emphasized that a statute is presumed valid and the challenger bears the burden of proving unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Facts

    In November 1998, the appellant was charged with unauthorized use of a vehicle and false personation. The unauthorized use charge was later dismissed. At the time of his arrest, the appellant, then 14 years old, provided a false name, age, and address to a police officer. He continued to provide false information even after the officer warned him that he would face additional charges for doing so.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a juvenile delinquency petition. The specific court history prior to the Court of Appeals is not detailed in the opinion. The Court of Appeals reviewed the challenge to the constitutionality of Penal Law § 190.23.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Penal Law § 190.23 is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to define the “consequences” of lying to the police as required by the statute.

    Holding

    No, because the statute prohibits specific conduct and the term “consequences” clearly means that the officer must inform the defendant that giving false pedigree information subjects a person to criminal liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a statute is presumed valid and the party challenging its constitutionality bears the burden of proving it beyond a reasonable doubt. The court applied the established standard for vagueness, stating that a statute is “unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, and it is written in a manner that permits or encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.”

    The Court found that Penal Law § 190.23 clearly prohibits specific conduct: providing a false name, age, or address to a police officer. It further reasoned that the term “consequences” is not subject to arbitrary enforcement because it clearly means the officer must inform the defendant that giving false pedigree information subjects them to criminal liability.

    The court noted the statute’s objective: to prevent wasted police resources searching for the identities of individuals providing false information. The warning requirement ensures that individuals are aware that providing false information is a crime, which encourages compliance.

    The court emphasized that there is no constitutional requirement for such a warning, but that by informing the appellant that an additional charge would be brought against him for providing false information, the officer fulfilled the statutory requirement.

  • In re Penepent Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 186 (2001): Enforceability of Shareholder Agreements vs. Statutory Election

    In re Penepent Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 186 (2001)

    When a shareholder in a close corporation makes an irrevocable election to purchase another shareholder’s shares at fair value under Business Corporation Law § 1118 in response to a dissolution petition, that election takes precedence over a mandatory buy-out provision in a shareholder agreement that would otherwise be triggered by the petitioning shareholder’s death.

    Summary

    Francis Penepent, a shareholder in Penepent Corp., petitioned for dissolution under Business Corporation Law § 1104-a. Richard Penepent, another shareholder, elected to purchase Francis’ shares at fair value under § 1118. Before the fair value was determined, Francis died. A shareholder agreement stipulated that upon a shareholder’s death, the estate must surrender the shares to the corporation for a set price, lower than the anticipated fair value. The court addressed whether Richard’s election remained binding despite Francis’ death and the shareholder agreement. The Court of Appeals held that Richard’s § 1118 election was irrevocable and took precedence over the shareholder agreement’s buy-out provision. Once the election is made, it creates a vested right to receive fair value, which survives the shareholder’s death.

    Facts

    Anthony Penepent started Penepent Corp. with his four sons, each holding a 20% share. They entered into a shareholder agreement stating that upon a shareholder’s death, the corporation would purchase the deceased’s shares at a predetermined price. Later, the four sons bought out their father, each holding a 25% share. Disputes arose, and Francis petitioned for dissolution under Business Corporation Law § 1104-a. Richard elected to purchase Francis’ shares at fair value under § 1118. Before fair value was determined, Francis died. Richard then asserted the shareholder agreement required Francis’ estate to sell the shares to the corporation at the lower, predetermined price.

    Procedural History

    Francis filed for dissolution; Richard elected to purchase his shares. Supreme Court denied Richard’s motion to dismiss the dissolution proceeding and to revoke his § 1118 election, holding that Francis’ right to fair value vested upon Richard’s election. The Appellate Division affirmed. Richard argued for a discount in the share value due to a separate pending dissolution proceeding. The referee rejected this argument, which the Supreme Court adopted. The Appellate Division affirmed, and Richard appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a mandatory buy-out provision in a shareholder agreement controls when a valid Business Corporation Law § 1118 election has already been made to purchase shares at fair value before the event triggering the buy-out provision (death) occurs.

    2. Whether the value of shares should be discounted because of a separate, pending dissolution proceeding when the election to purchase shares in the present dissolution proceeding has already been made.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because once a shareholder makes an irrevocable election to purchase shares under Business Corporation Law § 1118, that election creates a vested right to receive fair value, which takes precedence over a mandatory buy-out provision triggered by death.

    2. No, because a pending dissolution proceeding involving different shareholders does not impact the fair value of the shares in a separate proceeding where an election to purchase has already been made.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Richard’s § 1118 election was irrevocable and binding. The purpose of making the election irrevocable was to prevent majority shareholders from delaying dissolution proceedings and exhausting the petitioning shareholder’s resources. The Court emphasized that once the election is made, the purchasing party is obligated to purchase the shares at fair value. The divestiture event (Francis’ death) occurred after Richard made the election, solidifying Francis’ right to fair value. The Court distinguished cases where shareholder agreements divested shareholders of their shares *before* a dissolution proceeding was commenced. Regarding the valuation discount, the Court stated that any litigation pending against the corporation could be considered. However, in this instance, the pending dissolution proceeding had no bearing on fair value because Richard had already irrevocably elected to purchase the shares. The court stated the objective in calculating “fair value” is to determine “what a willing purchaser in an arm’s length transaction would offer for petitioners’ interest in the company as an operating business”. Furthermore, imposing a discount due to a minority shareholder’s lack of control would violate equitable principles of corporate governance, depriving minority shareholders of their proportionate interest and treating shares of the same class unequally. The court quotes, “the stock so purchased shall be delivered and surrendered by the representative of the [deceased] to the Corporation, which shall thereupon retire such stock.”, illustrating the original agreement terms but ultimately prioritizing statutory rights.