New York Law Review

Tag: 2001

  • People v. Marte, 97 N.Y.2d 82 (2001): Implied Consent to Mistrial Based on Silence at O’Rama Conference

    People v. Marte, 97 N.Y.2d 82 (2001)

    A defendant’s consent to a mistrial can be implied from the circumstances, particularly their silence and lack of objection at an O’Rama conference when the trial judge indicates the intention to declare a mistrial.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant impliedly consented to a mistrial. During jury deliberations, the jury sent a note indicating they reached a verdict on some counts but were deadlocked on others. At an O’Rama conference, the trial judge stated his intent to take a partial verdict and declare a mistrial on the remaining counts. Defense counsel did not object when asked for their input. After the jury was discharged, the defendant objected. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant impliedly consented to the mistrial by remaining silent during the O’Rama conference when the judge announced his intentions, precluding a later objection. The court emphasized the importance of active participation in O’Rama conferences to avoid misleading the court.

    Facts

    The jury deliberated and sent a note stating it reached a verdict on two counts but was deadlocked on others.

    At an O’Rama conference, the trial judge indicated his intent to take a partial verdict and declare a mistrial on the undecided charges.

    The judge asked defense counsel if they wanted to be heard; counsel for one defendant responded “no,” and counsel for the co-defendant remained silent.

    After the partial verdict but before discharging the jury, the judge again inquired if there was anything defense counsel wanted to put on the record; neither attorney responded.

    After the jury was discharged, the defendant objected to the mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court declared a mistrial on the undecided charges.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, finding implied consent to the mistrial.

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant impliedly consented to a mistrial by remaining silent during the O’Rama conference when the trial judge indicated his intention to declare a mistrial.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was record support for the lower court’s finding of implied consent based on the defendant’s silence and lack of objection at the O’Rama conference when the trial judge indicated his intention to declare a mistrial. The purpose of the O’Rama conference is for attorneys to advise the court, and the defense cannot remain silent, giving the false impression of acquiescence, and then object later.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on People v. Ferguson, which states that consent to a mistrial can be implied from the circumstances. The court found that the defense counsels’ silence during the O’Rama conference, when the judge announced his intention to declare a mistrial on the undecided charges, constituted implied consent. The court emphasized the purpose of an O’Rama conference, which is for attorneys to assist the court in averting error by advising the court concerning the appropriate response to a jury note. Allowing attorneys to remain silent during the conference and then object later would undermine the purpose of the O’Rama procedure. The court reasoned that if the defense believed the court should have taken a different course of action, such as giving an Allen charge, they should have suggested it at the O’Rama conference. By remaining silent, they allowed the court to proceed under the impression that the defense agreed with the proposed course of action. The Court stated, “If this were permissible, attorneys could—by their silence—lull the court into taking actions that could not later be undone.” The court concluded that focusing on the circumstances leading up to the dismissal of the jury, rather than post-discharge statements, is appropriate when determining implied consent. The court noted the defense’s silence prevented the creation of a record that would facilitate appellate review of whether manifest necessity existed for the mistrial.

  • Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001): Scope of “Falling Object” Liability Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001)

    Under Labor Law § 240(1), “falling object” liability extends beyond objects being hoisted or secured, applying to inadequately secured objects used as makeshift supports, but the plaintiff’s own culpable conduct can preclude summary judgment.

    Summary

    Narducci sued Manhasset Bay Associates under Labor Law § 240(1) after being injured by falling planks used as a makeshift shelf. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division correctly denied summary judgment for the defendants. The court clarified that “falling object” liability isn’t limited to objects being hoisted or secured and can apply to inadequately secured objects. However, summary judgment was inappropriate here because there were triable issues of fact concerning whether the planks were adequately secured for their purpose and whether the plaintiff’s actions contributed to the accident.

    Facts

    Narducci, a construction worker, was injured when planks placed over open doorways, acting as a makeshift shelf, fell and struck him. The planks were intended to facilitate the installation of an air conditioner above the doorway. Narducci claimed the planks were inadequately secured. The defendants contended that Narducci was warned not to enter the doorway area and that his own actions in jostling the doors caused the planks to fall.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order, denying partial summary judgment to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) liability for falling objects is limited to situations where the object is being hoisted or secured, or whether it extends to inadequately secured objects serving as makeshift supports.

    Holding

    No, because Labor Law § 240(1) liability for falling objects is not limited to objects being hoisted or secured; it can extend to other inadequately secured objects, although the plaintiff’s own culpable conduct can preclude summary judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals, referencing its holding in Outar v. City of New York, reiterated that falling object liability under Labor Law § 240(1) isn’t confined to instances where the object is actively being hoisted or secured. The court emphasized the remedial nature of the statute, designed to protect workers from elevation-related risks. The court found that the planks, used as a makeshift shelf, fell within the statute’s purview if they were inadequately secured. However, the court also highlighted the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s own actions in disregarding a warning and jostling the doors contributed to the accident. Because of the factual dispute regarding the adequacy of the securing and the plaintiff’s potential culpable conduct, summary judgment was deemed inappropriate. The court stated, “triable questions of fact preclude summary judgment on plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240 (1) claim, including whether the planks were adequately secured in light of the purposes of the plank assembly and whether plaintiff caused the accident by jostling the doors after disregarding a warning not to enter the doorway area.” This case underscores that while the statute is broadly construed to protect workers, the plaintiff’s own negligence can be a factor in determining liability. The concurrence is implicit as all judges concurred in the memorandum opinion.

  • Venigalla v. Alagappan, 96 N.Y.2d 53 (2001): Abandonment of Corporate Bylaws

    Venigalla v. Alagappan, 96 N.Y.2d 53 (2001)

    A corporation’s bylaws can be deemed abandoned and abrogated if they are not used for a considerable time and this non-use is acquiesced to by the corporation’s members.

    Summary

    The Hindu Temple Society of North America adopted bylaws in 1970 calling for the election of trustees by its members, but these bylaws were never implemented and were later forgotten. For three decades, the Society was governed by a self-perpetuating board of trustees under bylaws adopted in 1978. In 2001, some members rediscovered the 1970 bylaws and demanded elections. The New York Court of Appeals held that the 1970 bylaws were invalid because they contradicted the Religious Corporations Law, which governs the Society, and because they had been abandoned due to long-term non-use and acquiescence.

    Facts

    The Hindu Temple Society of North America incorporated in 1970 under Article 9 of the Religious Corporations Law. In 1970, the Society adopted bylaws requiring the election of trustees by its members. These bylaws were never implemented or referenced. The Society operated from its inception with a self-perpetuating board of trustees, as outlined in bylaws adopted in 1978. The 1978 bylaws gave the Board of Trustees the function of final selection and appointment of its own members. Members of the Society did not challenge the validity of the 1978 bylaws until 2001.

    Procedural History

    In 2001, Society members petitioned for the removal of the board of trustees. Petitioners later discovered the 1970 bylaws and presented them to the Supreme Court as an alternative basis for relief. The Supreme Court initially treated the 1978 bylaws as valid amendments to the 1970 bylaws. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the 1970 bylaws were never properly amended, voided the post-1970 bylaws, and directed an election. After a new election which yielded a similar board, the trustees appealed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Society’s 1970 bylaws, which called for the election of trustees by the general membership, were valid given the Society’s incorporation under Article 9 of the Religious Corporations Law. 2. Whether the Society’s 1970 bylaws could be considered abandoned due to non-use and acquiescence by the Society’s members.

    Holding

    1. No, because Article 9 of the Religious Corporations Law provides for self-perpetuating boards of trustees, not boards elected by the general membership. 2. Yes, because the bylaws were not used for a considerable length of time, and this non-use was acquiesced to by the members of the Society.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the 1970 bylaws conflicted with Article 9 of the Religious Corporations Law, which governs the Society. Article 9 provides for self-perpetuating boards, where vacancies are filled by the remaining trustees, and does not require elections by the general membership. The Court also determined that the 1970 bylaws had been abandoned. Citing Pomeroy v. Westaway, the Court stated that “nonusage of a by-law, continuing for a considerable length of time, and acquiesced therein, will work its abrogation.” The Court found that the 1970 bylaws fell into “complete desuetude” for three decades, with the Society being run according to the 1978 bylaws. The Court emphasized that to allow petitioners to revive the 1970 bylaws after such a long period of non-use would be “unwise and unfair.” The Court also pointed out a founder of the society stating, “it will be self-defeating” if a temple “is organised as a cultural society with annual elections, [and] continuous change in officials …. High level people will not join if they have to stand for elections. Decision-making with clear-cut responsibility are [sic] difficult if subjected to general body meetings.”

  • Matter of Kelly v. Safir, 96 N.Y.2d 32 (2001): Standard for Reviewing Administrative Penalties

    Matter of Kelly v. Safir, 96 N.Y.2d 32 (2001)

    A court reviewing an administrative penalty in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding should only overturn the penalty if it is so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the standard of review that appellate courts must apply when evaluating penalties imposed by administrative bodies in New York. Kelly, a police officer, was terminated for misconduct. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division overstepped its bounds by modifying the penalty. The Court emphasized that appellate courts lack the discretion to substitute their judgment for that of the administrative agency unless the penalty is so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the judicial conscience. The Court found that the officer’s conduct was serious enough to warrant dismissal, and the penalty did not shock the conscience.

    Facts

    Kelly, a New York City police officer, was found guilty of departmental charges related to misconduct. As a result of this misconduct, the Police Commissioner terminated Kelly’s employment.

    Procedural History

    Kelly challenged his termination by initiating a proceeding under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR). The Supreme Court upheld the Police Commissioner’s decision. The Appellate Division modified the penalty, finding it too severe. The Police Commissioner appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division improperly substituted its judgment for that of the Police Commissioner in modifying the disciplinary penalty imposed on the petitioner?

    Holding

    Yes, because the Appellate Division does not have discretionary authority or interest of justice jurisdiction in a CPLR article 78 proceeding to review the penalty imposed by the respondent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the Appellate Division exceeded its authority by modifying the penalty. The court reiterated the standard for reviewing administrative penalties: a penalty must be upheld unless it is “so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness.” The Court emphasized that the administrative agency, not the court, is best suited to determine appropriate discipline. The Court determined that Kelly’s misconduct was serious and that the penalty of termination was not shocking to one’s sense of fairness. The court referenced Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 233 (1974), reinforcing the limited scope of judicial review in such cases. The Court noted, “The determination of whether to impose a penalty of dismissal . . . rests with the Commissioner, not the courts.”

  • People v. McIntosh, 96 N.Y.2d 521 (2001): Search Consent Requires Founded Suspicion

    People v. McIntosh, 96 N.Y.2d 521 (2001)

    A request to search, and any subsequent consent, is invalid unless supported by a founded suspicion of criminality.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s suppression order, holding that the police lacked a founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify their extended questioning of the defendant. The Court reiterated that consent to search is invalid unless the police have a founded suspicion of criminality prior to requesting the search. Because the lower courts found that the defendant only granted permission to search after being questioned in a manner that suggested he was suspected of a crime without any founded suspicion, the evidence obtained from the search was suppressed.

    Facts

    The police questioned the defendant in circumstances that led him to believe he was suspected of criminal activity. After this questioning, the defendant granted the police permission to search his person and his car. The suppression court found that the police lacked a founded suspicion of criminal activity at the time of the questioning and the request for consent.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court ruled that the evidence obtained from the search should be suppressed. The Appellate Division affirmed this ruling. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a consent to search is valid when the request to search is not supported by a founded suspicion of criminality.

    Holding

    No, because a consent to search will not be upheld unless the request to search is supported by a founded suspicion of criminality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Hollman, stating that a consent to search will not be upheld unless the request to search is supported by a founded suspicion of criminality. The Court emphasized that the lower courts had determined that the defendant only gave permission to search after questioning that reasonably led him to believe he was suspected of criminality, and that this questioning was not based on any founded suspicion. The Court stated, “When, as here, there is support in the record for the lower courts’ undisturbed finding as to the lack of a founded suspicion of criminality, our review is at an end.” The Court effectively deferred to the factual findings of the lower courts regarding the absence of founded suspicion.

  • People v. D’Amico, 96 N.Y.2d 687 (2001): Validity of SCI After Dismissal of Defective Indictment

    People v. D’Amico, 96 N.Y.2d 687 (2001)

    A defendant may waive indictment and plead guilty to a superior court information (SCI) after the dismissal of a defective indictment covering the same charges, even without a formal order granting the People leave to re-present the case to a grand jury, provided the court’s intent to allow re-presentation is clear.

    Summary

    D’Amico was arrested for selling heroin. After indictment, plea negotiations began, but the court realized D’Amico’s name was missing from the indictment’s body. The court dismissed the indictment, and D’Amico then waived indictment and pleaded guilty to a superior court information (SCI) on the same terms. He failed to complete drug treatment, received the agreed-upon sentence, and appealed, arguing his SCI waiver was invalid. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the SCI was permissible because the original indictment was entirely defective and the court’s intent to allow re-presentation to a grand jury was evident, even without a formal order.

    Facts

    Defendant D’Amico and Evelyn Ramirez were arrested for selling heroin to an undercover officer.
    They were charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.
    After indictment, D’Amico and the prosecution negotiated a plea deal.
    The court realized that D’Amico’s name was in the caption but not in the body of the indictment itself, naming only Ramirez who acted “in concert with another.”

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the indictment due to the defect.
    The defendant then pleaded guilty to a superior court information (SCI).
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s waiver of indictment and guilty plea to a superior court information (SCI) is invalid when entered after the court dismissed a defective indictment covering the same charges, but without explicitly granting the People leave to re-present the case to the grand jury?

    Holding

    No, because the indictment was defective and dismissed entirely, and the court’s intent to allow re-presentation was evident, making prosecution by SCI permissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from People v. Boston and People v. Casdia, where a valid indictment (or part of one) was still pending when the defendant waived indictment and pleaded to an SCI. Here, the indictment was entirely defective and was dismissed. The Court noted that “Criminal Procedure Law § 195.10 (2) (b) provides that with the consent of the prosecutor, a defendant may waive indictment and be prosecuted by SCI in ‘the appropriate superior court, at any time prior to the filing of an indictment by the grand jury’” but found that this rule didn’t apply as the prior indictment was void.

    The court emphasized that it was clear to everyone that the omission of D’Amico’s name was a clerical error and that the case would have to be re-presented to a grand jury. The Court found that the trial court implicitly authorized re-presentation, noting that “[a]s the Appellate Division correctly noted, the court obviously authorized representation even though it did not formally order it, considering that both sides agreed to dispose of the case by SCI on the agreed terms. No magic words were required.” The Court found that requiring a formal order in this scenario would be an unnecessary formality.

  • People v. DePallo, 96 N.Y.2d 357 (2001): Attorney’s Duty When Client Intends to Perjure Themselves

    People v. DePallo, 96 N.Y.2d 357 (2001)

    When a criminal defendant intends to commit perjury, defense counsel’s disclosure of an ethical dilemma to the court, without revealing client confidences, does not deprive the defendant of a fair hearing or effective assistance of counsel; the attorney must first try to dissuade the client and can disclose the intent to commit a crime to the court.

    Summary

    DePallo was convicted of second-degree murder. Prior to a Huntley hearing, his attorney sought to withdraw due to an ethical conflict, suggesting the client intended to perjure himself. The court denied the motion. The attorney then informed the court, outside the defendant’s presence, that the defendant would testify in narrative form. The defendant testified and his motion to suppress was denied because his testimony was not credible. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that counsel’s actions appropriately balanced their duty to the client and the court, and the defendant’s right to be present was not violated. This case clarifies the attorney’s responsibilities when facing potential client perjury in a bench trial setting.

    Facts

    The defendant became enraged when he heard rumors that a woman with whom he had a sexual relationship was infected with HIV. The defendant, with the aid of a 14-year-old, confronted the woman, and a fight ensued. Subsequently, the defendant and the 14-year-old lured the woman to an isolated area where the defendant choked her with a bandana, and he and the 14-year-old stabbed her, killing her. The defendant was arrested and gave written and videotaped statements admitting to acting in concert with the 14-year-old in killing the woman.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress his confessions, leading to a Huntley hearing. Before the hearing, the attorney asked to be relieved, citing an ethical conflict. The court denied the request. The defendant testified at the hearing, and the court denied the motion to suppress. The jury convicted the defendant of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to 25 years to life. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether defense counsel’s disclosure to the court of an ethical dilemma, stemming from the defendant’s intent to testify, and decision to allow the defendant to testify in narrative form, deprived the defendant of a fair hearing and the effective assistance of counsel.

    Holding

    No, because the defense counsel properly balanced his duties to his client with his duties to the court and the criminal justice system, and the defendant was not deprived of a fair hearing or the effective assistance of counsel. Also, the defendant’s right to be present was not violated because the colloquy involved procedural matters at which the defendant could offer no meaningful input.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defense attorney’s duty to zealously represent a client is limited by their duty as an officer of the court to ensure the truth-seeking function of the justice system. An attorney cannot assist a client in presenting false evidence. The court noted the requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility, preventing attorneys from knowingly using perjured testimony or false evidence. When faced with a client who intends to commit perjury, the attorney must first attempt to dissuade the client. If that fails, the attorney may seek to withdraw or, if withdrawal is denied, allow the client to testify in narrative form without the attorney eliciting the testimony in a traditional question-and-answer format, and counsel may not use the perjured testimony in making argument to the court. The court found that here, the defense counsel properly advised the defendant against lying on the witness stand, and when the defendant insisted on testifying, the attorney properly sought to withdraw. The court held that informing the court about the ethical dilemma did not violate the defendant’s rights, as the attorney never disclosed client confidences. The court stated, “Counsel could have properly made such a disclosure since a client’s intent to commit a crime is not a protected confidence or secret.” The court rejected the suggestion that counsel should have remained silent while the client committed perjury, stating that such an approach is incompatible with counsel’s role as an officer of the court. The court noted it was proper to exclude the defendant from the discussion on how to handle the testimony because “a colloquy of this nature involves procedural matters at which a defendant can offer no meaningful input.”

  • Matter of Newsday, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 651 (2001): Limits on Appellate Review of Orders in Criminal Proceedings

    Matter of Newsday, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 651 (2001)

    Orders issued by the Supreme Court in criminal proceedings, such as those concerning access to search warrant records, are generally not appealable to the Appellate Division or the Court of Appeals unless specifically authorized by statute.

    Summary

    Newsday sought to intervene in a criminal proceeding to gain access to records supporting the issuance of a search warrant. The New York Court of Appeals held that there was no statutory authority for the Court of Appeals to review the Supreme Court’s order regarding access to those records. The Court reasoned that Newsday’s application was part of a criminal investigation, rendering the Supreme Court’s order unappealable under the relevant criminal procedure law. The Court suggested alternative remedies, such as a Freedom of Information Law request or a civil proceeding, which could potentially lead to an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Facts

    Newsday, Inc., sought access to records supporting the issuance of a search warrant in a criminal investigation. The Supreme Court issued an order concerning this access. Newsday attempted to appeal this order.

    Procedural History

    Newsday appealed the Supreme Court’s order to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division’s decision was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, sua sponte, dismissed the appeal, finding no statutory basis for its review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Court of Appeals has statutory authority to review a Supreme Court order concerning access to records supporting a search warrant issued in a criminal proceeding.

    Holding

    No, because no statutory authority exists for the Court of Appeals to review the Supreme Court’s order in this criminal proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the principle that appellate review in criminal proceedings is limited to instances where it is explicitly authorized by statute. The Court determined that Newsday’s application to access search warrant records was part of a criminal investigation. Consequently, the Supreme Court’s order was deemed to have been issued in a criminal proceeding. Under CPL Article 450, such orders are not directly appealable to the Appellate Division, and under CPL 460.20 and 450.90, the Appellate Division’s order is not appealable to the Court of Appeals without specific statutory permission, which was lacking here.

    The Court distinguished this situation from cases involving motions to quash subpoenas, which have historically been treated as final orders in special proceedings on the civil side of the court due to stare decisis, originating with People v. Doe, 272 N.Y. 473 (1936). However, the Court acknowledged the asymmetry in the support for that rule.

    The Court highlighted that Newsday had alternative remedies available, such as filing a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request under Public Officers Law § 87 or initiating a civil proceeding under CPLR Article 78 at the trial court level. Appeals from such civil proceedings could potentially reach the Court of Appeals. Citing Matter of Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370 (1977) and Matter of Associated Press v. Bell, 70 N.Y.2d 32 (1987), the Court emphasized that these avenues could provide a path for appellate review that was unavailable through a direct appeal in the criminal proceeding.

    In essence, the Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory frameworks governing appellate jurisdiction and highlighted alternative legal pathways for seeking access to information in criminal investigations.

  • Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001): Defines ‘Elevation-Related Risk’ Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for failing to provide safety devices to protect workers from elevation-related risks, and this protection extends to situations where a worker falls a significant distance, even if they do not ultimately hit the ground.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a roofer, slipped on frost while working on a sloped roof and slid 15-20 feet to the eaves, where his pants were snagged, preventing a fall to the ground. He sued the property owner under Labor Law § 240(1) for failing to provide safety devices. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s injury was covered under the statute because he was exposed to an elevation-related risk and the lack of safety devices was the proximate cause of his injuries. The Court clarified that coverage under § 240(1) does not require the worker to actually hit the ground; it is sufficient that the injury stems from a fall from a height.

    Facts

    The plaintiff was employed by Sahlem’s Roofing & Siding, Inc. and was instructed to lay felt and shingles on a newly constructed house roof. While walking along the roof’s ridge with a roll of felt, the plaintiff’s foot slipped on frost, causing him to twist and slide 15-20 feet down the roof to the eaves. Protruding nails snagged his pants, preventing him from falling to the ground. The plaintiff was not provided with any safety devices, such as toe boards or scaffolding, which were available at other work sites.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued Hillcrest Heights Development Corporation, the property owner. The Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff, finding liability under Labor Law § 240(1). The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff’s accident, involving a slide down a roof that was stopped before hitting the ground, constituted an elevation-related risk covered under Labor Law § 240(1).

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff was subject to an elevation-related risk due to the lack of safety devices, and the failure to provide these devices was the proximate cause of his injuries. Coverage under Labor Law § 240(1) does not require a worker to actually hit the ground after a fall.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for failing to provide safety devices that protect workers from elevation-related hazards. The statute is interpreted liberally to achieve its purpose. The Court distinguished this case from Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co. and Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., noting that in those cases, the injuries were not directly related to the risk of falling from a height. In this case, the plaintiff fell a significant distance (15-20 feet) due to the lack of safety devices. The Court emphasized that the critical factor is the elevation-related risk and that the statute’s protection should not hinge on whether the worker ultimately hits the ground. The Court stated that “[i]n short, plaintiff was subject to an elevation-related risk while working on this particular roof, and he was not provided with any safety devices. In addition, the failure to provide any safety devices was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. He was within the protective ambit of Labor Law § 240 (1).”

  • People v. Dupont, 96 N.Y.2d 569 (2001): Speech Critical of Government Action is Protected

    People v. Dupont, 96 N.Y.2d 569 (2001)

    Speech, even if crude or offensive, is protected when it occurs in the context of complaining about government actions, especially when directed to a forum established for such complaints.

    Summary

    Dupont left five messages on the Village of Ossining’s Parking Violations Bureau answering machine, complaining about tickets and village employees, using offensive language. She was convicted of aggravated harassment under Penal Law § 240.30(1). The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that while the messages were crude, they were made in the context of complaining about government actions, and therefore constituted protected speech. The court distinguished this case from prior cases involving harassing conduct, emphasizing that Dupont’s messages were related to government actions and directed to a complaint receiving system.

    Facts

    The Village of Ossining restricted overnight street parking to permit holders. Residents could leave messages on the Parking Violations Bureau’s answering machine to register guest vehicles. Dupont left five messages after hours, including complaints about parking tickets, criticisms of village employees, and offensive language. The messages mentioned license plate numbers and vehicles, along with invective and ill wishes towards the employees.

    Procedural History

    The People filed five informations charging Dupont with aggravated harassment in the second degree under Penal Law § 240.30(1). A jury convicted Dupont on four of the five counts. The Appellate Term affirmed the convictions. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Dupont leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s messages, left on a government answering machine and containing complaints about government actions along with offensive language, constitute protected speech under the First Amendment, thus precluding a conviction for aggravated harassment under Penal Law § 240.30(1).

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s messages, though crude and offensive, were made in the context of complaining about government actions on a telephone answering machine set up to receive public complaints, and therefore constitute protected speech.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Shack, where the conviction for telephone harassment was upheld because the defendant’s multiple calls constituted harassing conduct. Here, the court emphasized that Dupont’s messages, while offensive, were made in the context of complaining about government actions. The court noted that the answering machine was set up, among other purposes, to receive complaints from the public. The court held that Dupont’s messages did not fall within any of the classes of speech or conduct that could be permissibly proscribed. The court emphasized the importance of allowing citizens to voice concerns about government actions, even if the expression is crude or unpleasant. The court reasoned that punishing such speech would chill legitimate complaints and undermine the purpose of the complaint system. The court did not find any dissenting or concurring opinions.