New York Law Review

Tag: 2000

  • Britt v. Legal Aid Society, 95 N.Y.2d 443 (2000): Accrual of Criminal Legal Malpractice Claims

    Britt v. Legal Aid Society, 95 N.Y.2d 443 (2000)

    A cause of action for criminal legal malpractice accrues for Statute of Limitations purposes when the criminal proceeding is terminated, i.e., on the date when the indictment against the plaintiff is dismissed.

    Summary

    Danny Britt sued the Legal Aid Society and attorney Norman Bock for legal malpractice arising from Bock’s representation in a rape case. Britt alleged Bock coerced him into pleading guilty, which he later withdrew. The New York Court of Appeals addressed when the statute of limitations begins to run for criminal legal malpractice claims. The Court held the cause of action accrues when the criminal proceeding terminates with a dismissal of the indictment, not when the conviction is vacated. This allows the plaintiff to assert innocence, a required element of such claims. Britt’s action, commenced after the indictment was dismissed, was therefore timely.

    Facts

    Danny Britt was indicted for rape in 1990. Attorney Norman Bock of the Legal Aid Society was assigned to represent him. Britt claimed he wanted to go to trial because he was innocent and that Bock was unprepared. On the trial date in March 1991, Britt asked the court to replace Bock, but the request was denied. Britt then pleaded guilty to attempted rape. He subsequently moved to withdraw his plea, alleging coercion by Bock. New counsel was appointed for this motion. After the motion was denied and Britt was sentenced, the Appellate Division remanded for a hearing on the plea’s voluntariness.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially denied Britt’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Appellate Division remanded for a hearing, after which the trial court found Bock’s ineffective assistance rendered Britt unable to consider the plea properly, vacating the guilty plea on September 30, 1994. Britt was released from prison in December 1994. On March 7, 1996, the indictment against him was dismissed. Britt sued for malpractice in September 1997. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, holding the claim accrued upon vacatur or reversal of the conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed but clarified that accrual occurs upon dismissal of the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a cause of action for criminal legal malpractice accrues for Statute of Limitations purposes when the criminal proceeding is terminated by dismissal of the indictment, or at an earlier point such as when the underlying conviction is vacated?

    Holding

    Yes, because the cause of action accrues for Statute of Limitations purposes when the criminal proceeding is terminated, specifically on the date the indictment against the plaintiff is dismissed. Only then can a plaintiff assert their innocence or a colorable claim of innocence, a necessary element of a criminal legal malpractice claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the unique nature of criminal legal malpractice claims, particularly the requirement that a plaintiff must allege innocence or a colorable claim of innocence, as established in Carmel v. Lunney. The Court reasoned that until the criminal proceeding is terminated without a conviction, a plaintiff cannot truly assert innocence, as the possibility of a renewed conviction remains. The court stated, “Accrual occurs ‘when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements of the tort can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.’” Vacating the conviction alone isn’t enough, since retrial and conviction remain possible. Dismissal of the indictment is required for the cause of action to fully accrue.

    The Court also addressed the policy considerations, including the need to avoid conflicting determinations on the issue of guilt, citing Smith-Hunter v. Harvey and Heck v. Humphrey. Allowing a malpractice suit before the criminal charges are resolved could lead to a civil court indirectly challenging the validity of a potential or existing criminal judgment. The Court acknowledged the purpose of statutes of limitations—preventing stale claims—but balanced that against the injured party’s right to a reasonable opportunity to assert a claim. The court stated, “[C]ivil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.”

  • Colella v. Board of Assessors, 95 N.Y.2d 401 (2000): Taxpayer Standing to Challenge Property Tax Exemptions

    Colella v. Board of Assessors, 95 N.Y.2d 401 (2000)

    A taxpayer lacks standing to challenge a property tax exemption granted to another property owner based solely on the claim that the exemption increases the taxpayer’s own tax burden; an exception exists only when there is a systemic perversion of the exemption process.

    Summary

    Residents of a village brought an Article 78 proceeding challenging the local Board of Assessors’ grant of a real property tax exemption to a religious organization. The residents claimed that the exemption increased their own property tax burden and that the Temple failed to comply with zoning ordinances and state corporation laws. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of standing. The Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the residents lacked standing because they only alleged a legally erroneous determination regarding a single parcel of real estate, not a systemic abuse of the exemption process. To have standing, they needed to show special damages different from the community and that the issue was within the zone of interest of the statute under which the agency acted.

    Facts

    The Yun Lin Temple, a religious corporation dedicated to Black Sect Tibetan Tantric Buddhism, owned and occupied a property in the Village of Old Westbury. The Nassau County Board of Assessors granted the Temple a real property tax exemption under RPTL 420-a, which exempts property used exclusively for religious purposes. Residents of the Village, whose properties were adjacent to or near the Temple’s property, commenced an Article 78 proceeding. They argued that the exemption was wrongfully granted, resulting in higher property taxes for them. They did not contest the Temple’s religious use of the property. Instead, they argued the Temple failed to obtain a special permit under the Village’s zoning ordinance and lacked authorization to do business in New York State as a foreign religious corporation.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the resident’s petition, finding that they lacked standing and that compliance with local zoning laws or state corporation laws was not a prerequisite for the RPTL 420-a exemption. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether real property owners have standing to challenge the grant of a real property tax exemption to another property owner, based on the argument that the exemption increases their own real property taxes.

    Holding

    No, because the residents only alleged a legally erroneous determination regarding a single parcel of real estate, not a systemic abuse of the exemption process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the precedent set in Van Deventer v. Long Is. City, 139 N.Y. 133 (1893), which held that a taxpayer cannot challenge an individual real property tax exemption solely because it adversely affects their own tax liability. The Court reasoned that allowing such challenges would lead to uncertainty and interminable litigation in the collection of revenues. The Court distinguished this case from Matter of Dudley v. Kerwick, 52 N.Y.2d 542 (1981), where standing was granted because the assessor had engaged in a “broad perversion of the entire process of granting exemptions.” Here, the residents only alleged an error in granting an exemption for a single parcel, which has an insignificant impact on the county’s tax base. The Court also noted that the residents failed to meet the two-part test for standing to challenge governmental action: (1) injury in fact that is different in kind and degree from the community generally, and (2) the injury falls within the “zone of interests” protected by the relevant statute. The Court found that the residents’ injury was indistinguishable from that of all other Nassau County property owners. Furthermore, the Court stated, “Compliance with such totally unrelated local and State legislation is not within the zone of interest of RPTL 420-a, and petitioners do not contest that the Temple otherwise fully qualifies for an exemption under the provision.” Finally, the Court found that “Common-Law Taxpayer Standing” did not apply because the determination of local governmental officials lacked appreciable public significance beyond the immediately affected parties.

  • Bliss v. State, 95 N.Y.2d 911 (2000): Defining Recklessness Standard for Highway Workers

    Bliss v. State, 95 N.Y.2d 911 (2000)

    When a vehicle is ‘actually engaged in work on a highway,’ as per Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), the driver is exempt from the rules of the road but must not act recklessly, defined as consciously disregarding a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.

    Summary

    George Bliss sued the State for injuries sustained when his car was struck by a New York State Thruway Authority (NYSTA) truck driven by John Lawler. The Court of Claims granted summary judgment to the State, applying a recklessness standard and finding insufficient evidence of recklessness. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the order, holding that while the recklessness standard applied, there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether Lawler acted recklessly, and remitted the case to the Court of Claims for further proceedings.

    Facts

    On October 20, 1995, George Bliss was injured when his vehicle was struck by a NYSTA truck driven by John Lawler. The accident occurred on a bridge located on a heavily-traveled interstate highway. Lawler was backing the truck down a narrow decline. The truck only had side view mirrors and no rear view mirror. Lawler strayed 100 to 250 feet from the cone truck instead of staying within the required 30 feet according to NYSTA safety directives. There was no spotter provided for the backing operation. The work crew was allegedly hurrying to dismantle the lane closure because they started late. Lawler pleaded guilty to unsafe backing in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1211(a) as a result of the incident.

    Procedural History

    The Court of Claims granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the recklessness standard applied and that the claimant failed to present sufficient evidence of recklessness. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the order, denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remitting the case to the Court of Claims for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), Lawler’s truck was exempt from the rules of the road because it was “actually engaged in work on a highway,” and if so, whether the claimant presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Lawler acted recklessly.

    Holding

    Yes, because under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), Lawler’s truck was exempt from the rules of the road since it was “actually engaged in work on a highway.” No, because while factual and credibility issues remained, the claimant presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue for the jury to consider regarding whether Lawler acted recklessly.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), which exempts vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” from the standard rules of the road. Because Lawler was exempt, the claimant needed to demonstrate recklessness to recover damages. The court defined recklessness by quoting Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494, 501 (1994), as acting in conscious disregard of “a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.” The court found the claimant presented enough evidence to demonstrate recklessness to warrant a trial. This evidence included Lawler backing his truck down a narrow decline on a bridge located on a heavily-traveled interstate highway, at an excessive speed, using only side view mirrors. There was no indication Lawler slowed down or sounded his horn. Furthermore, Lawler violated NYSTA safety directives. The court noted that Lawler’s guilty plea to a traffic offense further supported a finding of recklessness. The court explicitly declined to determine whether Lawler acted recklessly as a matter of law, and remitted the case to the lower court for trial. The court also did not rule on the viability of the defendant’s affirmative defenses, stating that the Court of Claims should address the claimant’s motion to dismiss those defenses in the first instance.

  • Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 407 (2000): Duty of Care for Vehicles Engaged in Road Work

    Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 407 (2000)

    Vehicles engaged in work on a highway are exempt from the rules of the road, and their operators are liable only for conduct that demonstrates a reckless disregard for the safety of others.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard of care applicable to vehicles engaged in highway work under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). Two separate cases were consolidated. In the first, a street sweeper caused a dust cloud leading to a collision. In the second, a snowplow turned unexpectedly, colliding with a car. The New York Court of Appeals held that § 1103(b) exempts vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” from the rules of the road, limiting liability to reckless disregard for the safety of others. The Court reasoned that the legislative history supported this interpretation and that the standard of care should be consistent with that applied to emergency vehicles.

    Facts

    In Riley v. County of Broome, Betty Riley collided with a street sweeper operated by Garwood Young, a Broome County employee. The sweeper was moving slowly, creating a cloud of dust. In Wilson v. State of New York, John Wilson’s car collided with a snowplow operated by William Hunt. The snowplow made a sudden turn across Wilson’s lane during a snowstorm with poor visibility.

    Procedural History

    In Riley, the trial court instructed the jury that the recklessness standard applied under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), and the jury found for the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed. In Wilson, the Court of Claims dismissed the claim after trial, holding that the recklessness standard applied and the evidence was insufficient to meet that standard. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) exempts “hazard vehicles” engaged in highway work from all rules of the road, or only from the stopping, standing, and parking regulations of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1202(a)?

    Whether the applicable standard of care for vehicles engaged in highway work is ordinary negligence or reckless disregard for the safety of others?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statute’s plain language exempts all vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” from the rules of the road.

    2. Reckless disregard, because the 1974 amendment to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) explicitly references reckless disregard, and the legislative history indicates an intent to align the standard of care with that of emergency vehicles.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the language of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) is clear: all vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” are exempt from the rules of the road. The Court rejected the argument that designated “hazard vehicles” are only exempt from stopping, standing, and parking regulations. The Court stated, “the statute nowhere states that ‘hazard vehicles’ are a distinct class from ‘work vehicles,’ nor does it deny ‘hazard vehicles’ the special protection given to all vehicles actually engaged in road work.”

    Regarding the standard of care, the Court relied on its prior holding in Saarinen v. Kerr, which interpreted identical language in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) (regarding emergency vehicles) as imposing a recklessness standard. The Court reasoned that the Legislature’s specific reference to “reckless disregard” would be unnecessary if the intended standard was ordinary negligence. The Court stated, “the only way to apply the statute is to read its general admonition to exercise ‘due care’ in light of its more specific reference to ‘recklessness’.” The Court also referenced the Attorney General’s memorandum, which explicitly stated that the amendment “extends the standard of care presently applicable to drivers of authorized emergency vehicles under § 1104 * * * to persons engaged in maintenance and hazardous operations”. Despite acknowledging concerns that extending this lesser standard of care was unjustified, the court deferred to the Legislature and made it clear that “Any change in that standard, therefore, must come from the Legislature, not the courts.”

  • People v. Carroll, 95 N.Y.2d 375 (2000): Sufficiency of Evidence for Rape Conviction and Admissibility of Exculpatory Statements

    95 N.Y.2d 375 (2000)

    A rape conviction requires sufficient evidence of penetration, and a defendant has a right to introduce exculpatory statements to rebut the prosecution’s claim that they never denied the allegations.

    Summary

    John Carroll was convicted of rape and sexual abuse of his stepdaughter. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the rape convictions, finding insufficient evidence of penetration. The court also held that the trial court erred in excluding an audiotape of a conversation where Carroll denied the allegations, as the prosecution emphasized Carroll’s alleged failure to deny the accusations. This exclusion prejudiced Carroll’s right to present a defense.

    Facts

    Carroll was accused of raping and sexually abusing his stepdaughter from 1993 to 1997. The stepdaughter initially reported the abuse in March 1997. She claimed the rapes occurred in 1993 and 1994, involving “pressure” between her legs, but provided vague details. Police recorded a phone call where the stepdaughter accused Carroll, and he denied the allegations. During a police interrogation, Carroll, confronted with a false polygraph, said his stepdaughter was not lying, but did not explicitly admit guilt. At trial, he denied all accusations. The trial court excluded the audiotape of the phone call.

    Procedural History

    Carroll was convicted on all counts. The Appellate Division modified the sentence but affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the rape convictions and ordered a new trial on the sexual abuse charges.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the rape convictions, specifically regarding the element of penetration.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in precluding the audiotape of Carroll’s conversation with his stepdaughter, where he denied the allegations.

    Holding

    1. No, because the victim’s testimony was vague and lacked details of penetration, and there was no corroborating physical or testimonial evidence.
    2. Yes, because the prosecution emphasized Carroll’s alleged failure to deny the allegations, and the exclusion of the tape prejudiced Carroll’s right to present a defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the rape convictions, the Court of Appeals found the stepdaughter’s testimony insufficient to prove penetration beyond a reasonable doubt. Her descriptions were vague, and there was no corroborating evidence like medical testimony of injuries consistent with forceful penetration. The court distinguished the case from others where a child victim’s testimony, along with other evidence, established penetration. The court stated, “Sexual intercourse ‘has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any penetration, however slight’ (Penal Law § 130.00 [1]).” However, here, that slight penetration was not demonstrated.

    Regarding the audiotape, the Court of Appeals held that excluding the tape was an abuse of discretion, violating Carroll’s right to present a defense. The prosecution made a “major theme” of Carroll’s alleged failure to deny the accusations. The officers testified that he never denied the accusations, giving the jury a distorted impression. The court stated that “The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.” The proposed evidence rebutted a key element of the prosecution’s case, making it material, not merely collateral. By preventing Carroll from introducing evidence of his denial, the trial was “decidedly skewed in the People’s favor.”

  • People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354 (2000): Preserving Objections to Hearsay in Criminal Informations

    People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354 (2000)

    Hearsay pleading defects in the factual portion of a local criminal court information must be preserved by timely objection to be reviewable on appeal.

    Summary

    Casey was convicted of criminal contempt for violating a Temporary Order of Protection. He appealed, arguing the information charging him was jurisdictionally defective because it lacked non-hearsay allegations of his knowledge of the order and failed to attach the order itself. The Court of Appeals held that while the information had a potential hearsay defect, Casey’s failure to raise a timely pretrial objection waived his right to challenge it on appeal. The Court clarified that not all pleading defects are jurisdictional, distinguishing between failing to plead an element of the crime (non-waivable) and using hearsay to plead an element (waivable if not objected to). The Court emphasized the importance of preserving objections and the curability of hearsay defects through amendment.

    Facts

    A Temporary Order of Protection was issued against Casey in connection with a harassment charge. The complainant reported a violation of the order to the police. A detective verified the order and interviewed the complainant, who showed him a certified copy. The detective contacted Casey, who confirmed he was served with the order. Casey surrendered, was given Miranda rights, and made statements implying he violated the order.

    Procedural History

    Casey moved to suppress his statements, which was denied. He was convicted of criminal contempt. The Appellate Term affirmed, rejecting Casey’s arguments that the information was defective and his statements inadmissible. Casey appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a hearsay pleading defect in a local criminal court information, specifically the failure to include a non-hearsay allegation of the defendant’s knowledge of the order violated, must be preserved by timely objection to be reviewable on appeal.

    Holding

    No, because hearsay pleading defects in the factual portion of a local criminal court information must be preserved to be reviewable on appeal. Casey’s failure to raise a timely objection waived the defect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed whether the hearsay allegation regarding Casey’s knowledge of the order was a jurisdictional defect that could be raised for the first time on appeal. The Court distinguished People v. Alejandro, clarifying that while failure to plead an element of a crime is a non-waivable jurisdictional defect, using hearsay to plead an element is waivable if not objected to. The Court reasoned that pre-CPL case law required non-hearsay criminal pleadings, but any hearsay defect was waived if not raised in a pretrial motion. The court found no legislative intent in the Criminal Procedure Law to change this. It stated that the non-hearsay requirement is met if the allegation falls under a hearsay exception. Here, the detective’s allegation of service was admissible under the public documents exception (certified copy of the order) and Casey’s admission to the detective. The Court stated, “So long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading.” The Court emphasized that pleading deficiencies cannot be jurisdictional because a court must have and exercise subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the sufficiency of a pleading. Moreover, the defect was curable by amendment. The Court concluded that because Casey failed to object to the hearsay defect before trial, he was precluded from raising it on appeal.

  • California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Shearman & Sterling, 95 N.Y.2d 427 (2000): Limits on Assigning Legal Malpractice Claims

    California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Shearman & Sterling, 95 N.Y.2d 427 (2000)

    A legal malpractice claim is not assignable where the assignor has not suffered any injury as a result of the alleged malpractice, even if the assignor attempts to transfer “all” rights related to a transaction.

    Summary

    California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) sued Shearman & Sterling for legal malpractice after purchasing a loan from Equitable Real Estate Investment Management, Inc. Shearman & Sterling, as Equitable’s counsel, allegedly drafted a defective promissory note that reduced the acceleration fee. CalPERS, as Equitable’s assignee, argued it could sue Shearman & Sterling directly or through Equitable’s assigned claims. The court held that CalPERS lacked privity with Shearman & Sterling and was not a third-party beneficiary of their contract with Equitable. Critically, because Equitable suffered no injury (having been paid in full for the loan), it had no malpractice claim to assign to CalPERS. The decision underscores the necessity of injury to maintain a legal malpractice claim and limits the scope of assignment, even with broad language.

    Facts

    CalPERS and Equitable had an agreement where Equitable originated commercial property loans for CalPERS. Equitable retained Shearman & Sterling to handle the legal work for a loan to Sersons Corp. CalPERS approved the loan, and Shearman & Sterling drafted the loan documents, including a promissory note. The note, deviating from CalPERS’ standard form, contained a significantly lower acceleration fee. Equitable assigned the loan to CalPERS via an “Omnibus Assignment.” Sersons defaulted, and CalPERS discovered the lower fee. CalPERS and Equitable later entered a Settlement Agreement further assigning any potential claims against Shearman & Sterling to CalPERS.

    Procedural History

    CalPERS sued Shearman & Sterling for professional negligence and breach of contract. The Supreme Court dismissed CalPERS’ direct claims but upheld the assigned claims from Equitable. The Appellate Division dismissed the entire complaint, finding Equitable had no viable claim to assign because it suffered no injury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CalPERS had a relationship with Shearman & Sterling so close to privity as to allow direct claims for negligence.
    2. Whether CalPERS was an intended third-party beneficiary of Shearman & Sterling’s contract with Equitable.
    3. Whether the Omnibus Assignment or the Settlement Agreement effectively assigned a viable legal malpractice claim from Equitable to CalPERS.

    Holding

    1. No, because CalPERS failed to demonstrate the necessary elements for a relationship approaching privity, specifically reliance on Shearman & Sterling’s actions.
    2. No, because Equitable did not retain Shearman & Sterling for CalPERS’ benefit, and CalPERS’ benefit was merely incidental.
    3. No, because Equitable suffered no injury from the alleged malpractice, thus it had no claim to assign; “the elimination of any injury to Equitable upon the assignment of the loan extinguished any malpractice claims Equitable may have had against defendant related to the loan, and Equitable could not thereafter assign such defunct claims”.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding privity, the court applied the three-part test from Prudential Ins. Co. v Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, requiring awareness of the statement being used for a particular purpose, reliance by a known party, and conduct linking the maker to the relying party. The court found that CalPERS reserved final approval of the loan documents for itself and its counsel and failed to object to the changes, demonstrating a lack of reliance on Shearman & Sterling. As to third-party beneficiary status, the court found that Equitable retained Shearman & Sterling for its own benefit, not CalPERS’.

    Crucially, the court addressed the assignment issue. The court reasoned that the Omnibus Assignment only transferred rights under the loan documents, not claims arising outside those documents. Even though the assignment used the word “all”, this did not extend to claims against Shearman & Sterling arising from a failure to adhere to the Correspondent Agreement. More importantly, Equitable suffered no injury. “Upon executing the Omnibus Assignment, CalPERS paid Equitable in full for the part it played in the negotiation and sale of the Sersons loan…The reduced acceleration fee caused no injury to Equitable and thus Equitable had no malpractice claim against Shearman & Sterling to assign.” Since a legal malpractice claim requires injury, Equitable had nothing to assign. The court effectively prevented the assignment of a claim where the assignor was made whole, emphasizing the importance of actual damages in a legal malpractice action.

  • People v. Quinones, 95 N.Y.2d 349 (2000): Permissibility of Simultaneous Restitution and Mandatory Surcharge

    95 N.Y.2d 349 (2000)

    A sentencing court may simultaneously impose a sentence of restitution to the crime victim and a mandatory surcharge/crime victim assistance fee, consistent with Penal Law § 60.35 (6), until the defendant has actually made restitution.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a sentencing court could simultaneously order restitution to a crime victim and impose a mandatory surcharge/crime victim assistance fee under Penal Law § 60.35(6). The Court held that such simultaneous imposition is permissible until the defendant has actually made restitution. This interpretation favors and encourages payment of restitution to the crime victim while ensuring the state recovers costs for victim services. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, finding no merit in the defendant’s additional claims.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery charges stemming from two separate incidents. In the first, he and others robbed a taxicab driver at knifepoint, taking $100 and the cab itself. The second incident involved robbing another victim of 25 cents and a stick of gum, also at knifepoint. The defendant’s accomplices pleaded guilty and testified against him at trial.

    Procedural History

    The robberies were charged in separate indictments but joined for trial. After a jury found the defendant guilty on all robbery counts, the County Court imposed prison terms for each conviction. The court also ordered the defendant to pay $100 in restitution to the cab driver and imposed the mandatory surcharge and crime victim assistance fee for both robberies. The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s decision, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Penal Law § 60.35 (6), a sentencing court may order a defendant who has not yet made restitution to pay both restitution and a mandatory surcharge/crime victim assistance fee.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain language of Penal Law § 60.35(6) permits the imposition of both restitution and the mandatory surcharge/crime victim assistance fee until the defendant has actually made restitution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court’s reasoning centered on the interpretation of Penal Law § 60.35(6), which states that “where a person has made restitution or reparation pursuant to section 60.27 of this chapter, such person shall not be required to pay a mandatory surcharge or a crime victim assistance fee.” The Court emphasized the use of the past tense “has made,” indicating that the exemption from the surcharge only applies after restitution has been completed. The Court noted that the Legislature could have prohibited the simultaneous imposition of both but chose not to. The Court stated, “The Legislature could have prohibited the imposition of both outright, but instead employed the past tense with regard to the payment of restitution and reparations under Penal Law § 60.27, thus indicating that until restitution has been paid a defendant can be ordered to pay the mandatory surcharge/crime victim assistance fee.” The Court also pointed to Penal Law § 60.35 (4), which provides a mechanism for a refund of the surcharge and fee if they are ultimately “not required” after restitution is made. This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent to prioritize restitution to victims while also ensuring funding for victim services through the surcharge. The Court acknowledged the split in Appellate Division Departments on this issue, siding with the Second and Fourth Departments’ view. The Court agreed with the Practice Commentary to Penal Law § 60.35 (6), noting the effect is to prefer and encourage payment of restitution to the crime victim.

  • People v. Keen, 94 N.Y.2d 533 (2000): Valid Waiver of Right to Be Present During Jury Selection

    People v. Keen, 94 N.Y.2d 533 (2000)

    A defendant may validly waive their right to be present during sidebar conferences with prospective jurors if the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently, either by the defendant personally or by defense counsel in the defendant’s presence.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a defendant’s waiver of his right to be present during sidebar conferences with prospective jurors. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant validly waived this right because his attorney, in his presence and on the record, explicitly waived it. The Court distinguished this from cases where the waiver was implicit or made outside the defendant’s presence, emphasizing the importance of ensuring the defendant’s understanding and voluntary relinquishment of their right. The dissent argued that a more explicit, on-the-record waiver directly from the defendant is required to ensure a truly knowing and intelligent waiver.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. During jury selection, numerous prospective jurors were questioned at sidebar, outside the defendant’s presence. On the record, in the defendant’s presence, his attorney waived the defendant’s right to be present at these sidebar conferences. The defendant did not object to his attorney’s waiver at that time. The defendant later appealed, arguing that his waiver was invalid because he did not personally waive his right on the record.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding that the defendant had validly waived his right to be present. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s right to be present during sidebar conferences with prospective jurors is validly waived when defense counsel, in the defendant’s presence and on the record, explicitly waives that right.

    Holding

    Yes, because defense counsel’s explicit waiver in the defendant’s presence and on the record constitutes a valid waiver of the defendant’s right to be present during sidebar conferences with prospective jurors.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a defendant’s right to be present at trial, including during jury selection, can be waived. The Court emphasized that the waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The Court distinguished the present case from People v. Antommarchi, where the Court held that a defendant has the right to be present during sidebar questioning of prospective jurors concerning their biases. However, the Court clarified that this right can be waived.

    The Court found that the waiver was valid in this case because defense counsel, in the defendant’s presence and on the record, explicitly waived the defendant’s right. The Court noted that the defendant did not object to this waiver. The Court stated, “Here, defense counsel, in defendant’s presence, expressly waived defendant’s Antommarchi rights on the record. Thus, a valid waiver occurred.” The court distinguished this situation from scenarios where the waiver is implicit or made outside the defendant’s presence. According to the court, defense counsel can waive the defendant’s right.

    The dissenting judge argued that the waiver was insufficient because the defendant himself did not explicitly waive his right on the record. The dissent emphasized the importance of ensuring that the defendant fully understands the right being waived. “This is distinctly different from the situation in People v Keen (252 AD2d 278, 281, affd 94 NY2d 533), in which the Trial Judge asked the defense counsel in defendant’s presence, on the record, if he waived his Antommarchi rights and this Court ruled that there was a valid Antommarchi waiver.”

    The dissenting judge noted that the court reporter’s notes did not indicate anything about an Antommarchi waiver and that the defense attorney specifically stated that this waiver did not occur.

  • People v. Johnson, 95 N.Y.2d 368 (2000): Endangering the Welfare of a Child and Domestic Violence

    95 N.Y.2d 368 (2000)

    A defendant can be convicted of endangering the welfare of a child even when the harmful conduct is not specifically directed at the child, provided the defendant is aware that the conduct is likely to cause harm to the child.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant’s actions, though not specifically directed at children, could constitute endangering their welfare. Theodore Johnson attacked his ex-girlfriend, Vanessa Parker, in the presence of her children. The children witnessed the assault and were confined to a room while it continued. The Court held that the defendant’s conduct, though directed at Parker, knowingly created a risk of harm to the children, thus satisfying the elements of endangering the welfare of a child.

    Facts

    Theodore Johnson attacked his ex-girlfriend, Vanessa Parker, as she walked home with her three children. Johnson struck Parker, knocked over the baby carriage, and dragged her to her apartment. The children witnessed the attack. Inside the apartment, Johnson continued to beat Parker while the children hid in a bedroom, hearing the violence. Johnson was later arrested and threatened Parker from jail to drop the charges.

    Procedural History

    Johnson was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child, intimidating a victim, menacing, and felonies related to an order of protection. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reversing the convictions for endangering the welfare of a child but affirming the other convictions. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to both the People and the defendant.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support Johnson’s conviction for endangering the welfare of a child when his actions were not specifically directed at the children.

    Holding

    Yes, because Penal Law § 260.10(1) does not require that the harmful conduct be specifically directed at a child; it is sufficient that the defendant knowingly acted in a manner likely to be injurious to the child’s physical, mental, or moral welfare.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Penal Law § 260.10(1) is broad in scope and imposes a criminal sanction for the mere “likelihood” of harm to a child, provided the defendant “knowingly” acts in a manner that creates such a likelihood. The statute does not require that the conduct be specifically directed at a child; rather, the defendant must simply be aware that the conduct may likely result in harm to a child. The Court cited People v. Davis, 72 N.Y.2d 32, noting that the crime is defined by the risk of injury produced by the defendant’s conduct, not by specifically targeted acts or individuals. The Court emphasized the well-documented adverse effects of domestic violence on children, referring to the Governor’s approval of legislation addressing domestic violence in child custody determinations. The Court found that Johnson’s assaultive conduct created a likelihood of harm to the children, of which he was aware. The children witnessed the attack, were threatened, and were confined while the violence continued. The Court disapproved of prior cases that required conduct to be directly focused on the child. The court noted that each case is fact-specific, but prior case law supported the conclusion that domestic violence against a mother in the presence of a child constituted endangering the welfare of that child. In summary, the court emphasized that the focus is on the awareness of the potential for harm to the child, regardless of whether the actions were directly targeted at them.