New York Law Review

Tag: 1999

  • People v. Seda, 93 N.Y.2d 307 (1999): Tolling the Statute of Limitations for Out-of-State Defendants

    93 N.Y.2d 307 (1999)

    The statute of limitations for criminal offenses is tolled for any period, even intermittent, during which a defendant is continuously outside the state, facilitating apprehension and prosecution.

    Summary

    Seda was indicted for arson and criminal mischief related to a 1988 bombing. He argued the indictment was time-barred because it was filed more than five years after the crime. The prosecution argued the statute of limitations was tolled because Seda lived out of state for a portion of that time. Seda claimed his frequent visits to New York meant he wasn’t “continuously” out of state. The Court of Appeals held that the statute was tolled for all periods, even intermittent, that Seda was outside New York, rejecting the argument that only extended, uninterrupted absences should count towards tolling. The focus is on the difficulty of apprehending defendants outside the state.

    Facts

    An explosion occurred at a Bellmore, NY car dealership on July 4, 1988. Seda, then a New York resident, became a suspect. In September 1991, Seda’s family moved to North Carolina. Seda joined them around December 19, 1991, and later moved to Virginia in February 1993. Seda’s wife returned to New York in 1995, and they divorced the following year. In November 1997, Seda’s ex-wife provided information to the police linking Seda to the 1988 crime. Seda was indicted on February 24, 1998.

    Procedural History

    Seda moved to dismiss the indictment as untimely. The County Court dismissed the indictment, finding Seda’s visits to New York meant he wasn’t “continuously” out of state. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling, but on different reasoning.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Statute of Limitations was tolled during periods between December 19, 1991, and February 24, 1998, due to Seda’s absences from the state, even if those absences were interrupted by visits to New York.

    Holding

    Yes, because the tolling provision of CPL 30.10 (4)(a)(i) applies to all periods when a defendant is outside the state, regardless of whether those periods are continuous and uninterrupted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on the meaning of “continuously outside this state” in CPL 30.10 (4)(a)(i). The Court stated, “The focus of the tolling provision of CPL 30.10 is ‘the difficulty of apprehending a defendant who is outside the State’.” The Court reasoned that all periods of a day or more that a nonresident defendant is out-of-State should be totaled and toll the Statute of Limitations. The Court rejected Seda’s argument that the civil tolling provision (CPLR 207), requiring a minimum four-month absence, should apply analogously. The Court emphasized CPL 30.10 (4)(a)(i) contains no minimum durational requirement, and the Court refused to add one. The Court noted that Seda bore the burden of proving his presence in New York to stop the toll. The Court found Seda’s presence in New York for 114 (or even 219) days during the relevant period was insufficient to overcome the tolling of the statute of limitations, rendering the prosecution timely. The court emphasized the practical difficulty in apprehending a defendant who spends most of their time outside the jurisdiction, even if they occasionally return.

  • Spensieri v. Lasky, 94 N.Y.2d 231 (1999): Admissibility of Physician’s Desk Reference and Jury Charges in Medical Malpractice

    Spensieri v. Lasky, 94 N.Y.2d 231 (1999)

    The Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR) is generally inadmissible as direct evidence of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases, and jury charges must be tailored to the specific facts and issues presented at trial.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of the PDR as evidence of the standard of care in a medical malpractice case and the necessity of specific jury charges. The plaintiff, Spensieri, sued Dr. Lasky for prescribing Estinyl, alleging negligence. The Court of Appeals held that the PDR is not, on its own, admissible as evidence of the standard of care. The court also addressed the importance of tailored jury instructions, emphasizing that while a generalized malpractice charge may suffice, specific facts may require a charge focusing on the standard of care in prescribing medications. Ultimately, the court affirmed the lower court’s order due to the plaintiff’s failure to properly preserve objections to the jury charge.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Spensieri, brought a medical malpractice action against Dr. Lasky, alleging negligence in prescribing Estinyl (estrogen medication). The plaintiff attempted to introduce the Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR) as evidence of the standard of care. The plaintiff also requested a specific jury charge concerning the standard of care in prescribing medications.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to introduce the PDR as evidence. The specific jury charge requested by the plaintiff was not given in the form requested. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Dr. Lasky. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the exclusion of the PDR and the failure to give the requested jury charge were errors. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR) is admissible as evidence to establish the standard of care in a medical malpractice action.
    2. Whether the jury charge given adequately addressed the applicable standard of care for prescribing medication, given the facts of the case.

    Holding

    1. No, because the PDR, by itself, does not establish the standard of care.
    2. Yes, in this specific case, because the plaintiff did not properly preserve their objections to the jury charge for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the PDR is not a substitute for expert testimony in establishing the standard of care. While the PDR may contain information relevant to a physician’s knowledge, it does not, on its own, dictate the standard of care. Regarding the jury charge, the court acknowledged that a tailored charge might be necessary depending on the specific facts, particularly concerning the standard of care in prescribing medications. However, because the plaintiff’s request for a specific charge was bundled with inappropriate requests and the plaintiff failed to properly redact or clarify their request, the court found no reversible error. As Judge Smith stated in his concurrence, “The trial court’s instructions ‘should state the law as applicable to the particular facts in issue in the case at bar, which the evidence in the case tends to prove; mere abstract propositions of law applicable to any case, or mere statements of law in general terms, even though correct, should not be given unless they are made applicable to the issues in the case at bar’ ” citing Green v Downs, 27 NY2d 205, 208. The court emphasized that specific requests to change the charge are necessary to preserve the issue for appeal.

  • Iazzetti v. City of New York, 94 N.Y.2d 183 (1999): Determining Which Collateral Source Statute Applies

    Iazzetti v. City of New York, 94 N.Y.2d 183 (1999)

    When a public employee sues their employer for personal injury, CPLR 4545(b), not 4545(c), governs collateral source reductions, and only past economic losses can be offset.

    Summary

    Mario Iazzetti, a sanitation worker, sued New York City for a work-related injury. The jury awarded damages, including future lost earnings. The City sought to reduce the award based on Iazzetti’s accident disability retirement pension, arguing CPLR 4545(c) allowed offsetting both past and future economic losses. The Court of Appeals addressed whether CPLR 4545(c) impliedly repealed CPLR 4545(b), which only allows offsets for past losses in suits by public employees against their employers. The Court held that CPLR 4545(b) remained in effect and governed the case, meaning the City could not offset future lost earnings with the pension benefits. The decision emphasizes the principle that implied repeals of statutes are disfavored and that specific statutes take precedence over general ones.

    Facts

    Mario Iazzetti, a New York City Department of Sanitation employee, was injured at work. He received an accident disability retirement pension from the city. Iazzetti and his wife sued the City, alleging negligence. A jury awarded damages for past and future lost earnings, pain, and suffering. The City sought to reduce the award under CPLR 4545 based on the collateral source rule due to Iazzetti’s pension.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court reduced the award for past lost earnings based on CPLR 4545(b) but refused to reduce future losses. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that CPLR 4545(c) applied, allowing offsets for both past and future economic losses. The Supreme Court then reduced the award further, offsetting future losses with the pension. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPLR 4545(c) impliedly repealed CPLR 4545(b), thereby allowing collateral source offsets for future economic losses in personal injury actions brought by public employees against their employers.

    Holding

    No, because CPLR 4545(b) remains in effect for actions brought by public employees against their employers, and it only permits offsets for past economic losses.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that implied repeals are disfavored in law, stating, “Implied repeal…is distinctly not favored in the law.” The Court emphasized that statutes should be read harmoniously, especially when they relate to the same subject matter. CPLR 4545(a) and (b) govern specific types of actions (medical malpractice and suits by public employees, respectively), while CPLR 4545(c) applies to all other personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death actions. The Court noted that the legislature amended CPLR 4545(a) in the same session it enacted CPLR 4545(c), indicating an intent for both to remain viable. The Court also referenced Ryan v. City of New York, noting that CPLR 4545(b) prohibits reductions for future collateral source payments. The Court highlighted the principle that a specific statutory provision takes precedence over a general one. The court stated, “whenever there is a general and a particular provision in the same statute, the general does not overrule the particular but applies only where the particular provision is inapplicable”. Thus, CPLR 4545(b) continues to apply to the specific situation of public employees suing their employers, and only allows for offsets of past economic losses.

  • Ganley v. Giuliani, 94 N.Y.2d 207 (1999): Involuntary Transfers and NYC Residency Requirements

    Ganley v. Giuliani, 94 N.Y.2d 207 (1999)

    Section 1127 of the New York City Charter, requiring nonresident City employees to pay the equivalent of City income tax, does not apply to employees involuntarily transferred from public benefit corporations or authorities to City agencies because the statute envisions a voluntary, pre-employment contract.

    Summary

    This case concerns the applicability of Section 1127 of the New York City Charter to non-resident employees who were involuntarily transferred to City agencies due to mergers. The petitioners, former members of the NYC Transit Authority, Housing Authority Police, and Emergency Medical Services, challenged the City’s imposition of deductions equivalent to city income tax. The Court of Appeals held that Section 1127, which requires a pre-employment agreement for such payments, does not apply to these involuntarily transferred employees because they did not seek City employment nor sign such an agreement. The court emphasized that the statute is intended for new employees voluntarily seeking employment with the city.

    Facts

    The petitioners in Ganley were former members of the New York City Transit Authority and Housing Authority Police Departments who resided outside the City and were involuntarily transferred to the New York City Police Department via mergers in April 1995. Petitioners in Hill were Emergency Medical Services personnel formerly associated with the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC). These employees were transferred to the New York City Fire Department in March 1996. The City sent notices to the transferred employees stating that their acceptance of employment with the City constituted an agreement under Section 1127 to pay the equivalent of City income tax if they were non-residents. The employees protested these deductions.

    Procedural History

    In Ganley, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and complaint, determining that the employees confirmed their agreement to abide by Section 1127 by accepting employment with the City after notice. The Appellate Division modified by issuing a declaration against petitioners, and as so modified, affirmed. In Hill, the Supreme Court enjoined enforcement of Section 1127 and directed the City to reimburse petitioners, distinguishing Ganley based on the employees’ prior exempt status with HHC. The Appellate Division reversed, relying on its decision in Ganley. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and certified questions from the Appellate Division regarding the propriety of its orders.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Section 1127 of the New York City Charter applies to non-resident employees involuntarily transferred from public benefit corporations or authorities to City agencies, requiring them to pay the equivalent of City income tax.

    Holding

    No, because Section 1127 envisions a voluntary, pre-employment contract between a new employee and the City, which is not present in the case of involuntary transfers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Section 1127 explicitly applies to “every person seeking employment with the city.” The statute intends to equalize take-home pay between resident and non-resident City employees, encouraging City residency. The Court emphasized that the petitioners did not “seek City employment; nor did they sign an agreement with the City. Rather the City unilaterally merged them into its workforce.” The court rejected the argument that cashing paychecks constituted a waiver of their rights, noting that petitioners protested the deductions. The Court distinguished the situation from a voluntary acceptance of employment, stating, “To suggest that they were required to quit their employment to protect their rights ignores the obvious.” The court cited Matter of Legum v Goldin, 55 NY2d 104, emphasizing that Section 1127 envisions a pre-employment contract. The Court also cited General Motors Acceptance Corp. v Clifton-Fine Cent. School Dist., 85 NY2d 232, 236, regarding the lack of acquiescence due to the protests. Therefore, the City could not impose the non-resident deductions upon the petitioners.

  • Matter of Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d 136 (1999): Suspicionless Taxi Stops and Fourth Amendment Rights

    94 N.Y.2d 136 (1999)

    Warrantless, suspicionless stops of taxicabs by law enforcement, conducted as part of a roving patrol rather than at a fixed checkpoint and without adequate procedural safeguards to limit officer discretion, violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address the constitutionality of the New York City Taxi-Livery Task Force’s practice of stopping taxicabs without reasonable suspicion to conduct safety checks. In both cases, passengers were arrested after drugs were discovered during the stops. The New York Court of Appeals held that these stops were unconstitutional because they were conducted as part of a roving patrol, lacked sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement, and were more intrusive than necessary to advance the government’s interest in preventing taxi robberies. The court emphasized the importance of limiting police discretion in the absence of individualized suspicion.

    Facts

    In Muhammad F., plainclothes officers in an unmarked car stopped a cab in which Muhammad F. was a passenger, purportedly to conduct a safety check. The officers decided to check one in three occupied cabs. An officer noticed Muhammad F. acting suspiciously and ordered all passengers out of the car. A search of the cab revealed crack cocaine, leading to Muhammad F.’s arrest.

    In Boswell, officers in plain clothes and an unmarked car stopped every third livery vehicle at a fixed location to distribute safety tips. After stopping the cab in which Keith Boswell was a passenger, an officer observed Boswell attempting to conceal a plastic bag. Boswell denied ownership of the bag, which was found to contain crack cocaine, leading to his arrest.

    Procedural History

    In Muhammad F., the Supreme Court denied the motion to suppress, and Muhammad F. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the suppression motion. The presentment agency appealed.

    In Boswell, the Supreme Court granted Boswell’s motion to suppress. The Appellate Division reversed, denying the suppression motion. Boswell appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether suspicionless stops of taxicabs by a roving patrol of plainclothes officers, without fixed checkpoints or specific guidelines to limit officer discretion, constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

    2. Whether evidence obtained as a result of such stops should be suppressed.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because these stops were conducted arbitrarily at the discretion of the officers in the field, were more intrusive than necessary, and lacked sufficient safeguards to ensure uniformity and prevent abuse.

    2. Yes, because the evidence was obtained as a result of an unconstitutional seizure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the balancing test from Brown v. Texas (443 U.S. 47 (1979)), weighing the public interest against the individual’s right to be free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement. The court acknowledged the government’s interest in preventing robberies against taxi drivers. However, it found that the stops in these cases were unreasonable because they lacked sufficient limitations on officer discretion and were more intrusive than necessary.

    The court distinguished these stops from permissible checkpoint stops, noting the absence of fixed checkpoints, written guidelines, and uniformed officers. The court emphasized that “the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.”

    The court found the roving-patrol nature of the stops, the use of unmarked cars and plainclothes officers, and the lack of standardized procedures created an unacceptable risk of arbitrary enforcement and heightened the subjective intrusion on individual liberty. The court also noted the absence of empirical evidence demonstrating that this type of patrol stop was a reasonably effective means of furthering the State interest in reducing violent crimes against taxi drivers.

    Quoting Delaware v. Prouse, the court stated that “persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police officers.” Because the stops failed to meet the constitutional requirement of explicit, neutral limitations on officer conduct, the evidence obtained was deemed inadmissible.

  • Windsor Metal Fabrications, Ltd. v. General Accident Insurance Company, 94 N.Y.2d 124 (1999): Determining the Statute of Limitations for Surety Bond Claims

    Windsor Metal Fabrications, Ltd. v. General Accident Insurance Company, 94 N.Y.2d 124 (1999)

    The one-year statute of limitations for suing a surety on a public improvement construction bond begins when the subcontractor demands final payment from the general contractor and 90 days have passed since the subcontractor ceased work; this cannot be altered by subcontract provisions.

    Summary

    Windsor Metal Fabrications, a subcontractor, sued General Accident, the surety for the general contractor, Eberhard, on a public improvement project. Windsor sought to recover on a payment bond after Eberhard became insolvent. The key issue was whether Windsor’s lawsuit was filed within the one-year statute of limitations under State Finance Law § 137(4)(b). The Court of Appeals held that the limitations period began when Windsor demanded final payment from Eberhard and 90 days had passed since Windsor ceased work, rejecting Windsor’s argument that the limitations period should be tolled until the resolution of arbitration proceedings against Eberhard. The Court emphasized the need for a clear, definitive starting point for the limitations period to ensure fairness and predictability in construction disputes.

    Facts

    Eberhard Construction Company held a prime contract with New York State for a project at Green Haven Correctional Facility. Windsor subcontracted with Eberhard to provide structural steel. General Accident provided the statutory payment bond. The state terminated its contract with Eberhard, leading to Windsor’s cessation of work on March 28, 1995. Prior to termination, Eberhard was behind on payments to Windsor. On March 31, 1995, Windsor notified General Accident of the amount owed. Eberhard and General Accident denied owing additional compensation. Windsor filed a mechanic’s lien and a demand for arbitration against Eberhard.

    Procedural History

    Windsor won an arbitration award against Eberhard, which was confirmed by the Supreme Court. A judgment was entered against Eberhard, but Eberhard was insolvent. Windsor then sued General Accident. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to General Accident based on the statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed, relying on subcontract provisions to find that the limitations period had not run. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s ruling, dismissing Windsor’s complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the one-year statute of limitations for suing a surety on a public improvement construction bond, under State Finance Law § 137(4)(b), begins to run from the date of an arbitration award in favor of the subcontractor, or from when the subcontractor demanded final payment and 90 days have passed since the subcontractor ceased work.

    Holding

    No, because the one-year limitations period starts when the subcontractor has demanded final payment and 90 days have passed since the subcontractor ceased work. This cannot be extended by contractual provisions, such as those related to arbitration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that State Finance Law § 137(4)(b) mandates that the limitations period begins when final payment under the subcontract becomes due. It rejected Windsor’s argument that arbitration tolled the statute of limitations. The Court emphasized that the statutory formula controls and should not be overridden by contract-based calculations. The Court noted, “[T]he triggering date for the limitations period should not be pegged to so uncertain an event with its usual confirmation steps and review potentialities.” Further, the Court relied on Legnetto Constr. v Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 92 NY2d 275, for the proposition that courts should not look beyond the face and terms of the bond and the statute to the contract provisions when the bond incorporates the one-year limitations period from the statute. The Court recognized the legislative intent behind State Finance Law § 137, which is to provide a fair and consistent remedy while ensuring prompt payment and defining the surety’s litigation exposure. Allowing contractual clauses to interject an open durational set of events into the statute would undermine its purpose. The court concluded that “[w]e cannot, by adroit construction of the statute that sidesteps its purpose, as well as our guiding precedents, countenance a sympathetic escape hatch for a particular subcontractor’s claim under these circumstances.”

  • Stoll v. New York State College of Veterinary Medicine, 94 N.Y.2d 162 (1999): Determines FOIL applicability to Cornell’s Statutory Colleges

    Stoll v. New York State College of Veterinary Medicine, 94 N.Y.2d 162 (1999)

    Records related to disciplinary actions against faculty at Cornell University’s statutory colleges are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) because Cornell acts independently in these matters, not as an agent of the State.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether Cornell University, while administering New York State’s statutory colleges, is subject to the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) regarding faculty disciplinary records. The Court of Appeals held that Cornell acts independently in these matters, not as an agent of the State, and therefore is not subject to FOIL. The Court reasoned that while the state provides funding and owns the property, Cornell maintains sufficient autonomy in its operations to be considered a private entity for the purposes of faculty discipline. The dissent argued that Cornell acts as a representative of the State University Trustees and thus should be subject to FOIL.

    Facts

    The plaintiff sought records concerning disciplinary actions taken against a professor at the New York State College of Veterinary Medicine, a statutory college administered by Cornell University. Cornell denied the request, claiming it was not an “agency” subject to FOIL. The statutory colleges are funded by the state, and the state owns the buildings and property. Cornell, however, manages the colleges, including faculty appointments, disciplinary actions, and educational policies.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially granted the petitioner’s application, ordering Cornell to release the documents. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Cornell was not an agency subject to FOIL. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Cornell University, in administering the New York State statutory colleges, acts as an “agency” of the State and is therefore subject to the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) regarding records of faculty disciplinary proceedings.

    Holding

    No, because Cornell University, while administering the statutory colleges, acts with sufficient independence and is not considered an agent of the state for purposes of faculty disciplinary proceedings; therefore, it is not subject to FOIL regarding these records.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the key inquiry is whether the entity is performing a governmental function. While the statutory colleges receive state funding and the state owns the property, Cornell maintains significant autonomy in administering the colleges, particularly concerning faculty matters. The Court emphasized that the day-to-day operations and academic decisions are controlled by Cornell, and the disciplinary actions against faculty are internal matters managed by the university’s own policies and procedures. The Court distinguished the statutory colleges from other state agencies, noting Cornell’s unique position as a private university managing state-funded institutions.

    The dissent argued that Education Law explicitly grants Cornell authority to administer the statutory colleges “as the representative of the state university trustees.” To exempt Cornell from FOIL regarding disciplinary actions would undermine the transparency intended by FOIL and contradict the statutory framework. The dissent also distinguished the cases cited by the majority, arguing that they did not involve the specific provisions of the Education Law relating to statutory colleges.

  • People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 171 (1999): Presumption of Vindictiveness After Retrial

    94 N.Y.2d 171 (1999)

    A presumption of vindictiveness in sentencing does not automatically arise when a defendant receives a greater sentence on an individual count after retrial, but a lesser overall sentence; courts must examine the record for a reasonable likelihood that the enhanced sentence was retaliatory.

    Summary

    Defendant was initially convicted of multiple offenses and sentenced to an aggregate term of 45 years to life. After a successful appeal and retrial, he was convicted of only one offense, but received a sentence of 25 years to life on that count, exceeding the original sentence for that specific count, though the aggregate sentence was reduced. The New York Court of Appeals held that a presumption of vindictiveness did not automatically arise because his aggregate sentence was lower and required examination of the record to determine the likelihood the enhanced sentence was a result of vindictiveness. It affirmed the sentence because the record indicated it was based on his extensive criminal history.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with burglary and related offenses. He was convicted and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 45 years to life. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction. Upon retrial, Defendant was convicted of only one count: criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree. The second trial court sentenced Defendant, as a persistent felony offender, to 25 years to life on that count.

    Procedural History

    The initial conviction was reversed by the Appellate Division. After retrial and a new sentence, the Appellate Division affirmed the new sentence, finding no increased sentence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a presumption of vindictiveness arises when a defendant receives a lesser overall sentence following retrial, but a greater sentence on an individual count?

    Holding

    No, because the presumption of vindictiveness arises only if the circumstances evince a reasonable likelihood that the greater sentence on the individual count was the result of vindictiveness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the principle that defendants should not be penalized for exercising their right to appeal, citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort’”). It noted the presumption of vindictiveness arises when defendants who have won appellate reversals are given greater sentences after retrials. However, this presumption is not absolute. Quoting Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989), the court stated that the presumption of vindictiveness “do[es] not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial”. The court reasoned that the key is whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the enhanced sentence was retaliatory.

    The court declined to adopt a strict “aggregate” or “count-by-count” approach. Instead, it mandated examination of the record to determine whether there’s a “reasonable likelihood” that the enhanced sentence was due to vindictiveness. In this case, the court emphasized Defendant’s extensive criminal history, including convictions for murder, robbery, and burglary, and the sentencing judge’s focus on this history. The court explained that the initial lenient sentence on the stolen property count was because the other convictions allowed for the desired overall sentence, but after retrial, the stolen property conviction was the only means to impose an appropriate sentence. Therefore, no presumption of vindictiveness arose because it was clear the increased sentence was based on his criminal history.

  • Maas v. Cornell University, 94 N.Y.2d 87 (1999): Limits on Breach of Contract Claims Against Universities

    Maas v. Cornell University, 94 N.Y.2d 87 (1999)

    An employee cannot bring a breach of contract action against a university for failing to follow its internal procedures for resolving disputes, absent evidence of an express agreement or detrimental reliance.

    Summary

    Professor Maas sued Cornell University, alleging breach of contract for failing to adhere to its internal procedures when handling sexual harassment claims against him. The New York Court of Appeals held that Maas could not maintain a plenary breach of contract action. The Court reasoned that universities are best suited to handle internal matters and that the University’s adherence to its own procedures does not create a contractual relationship that is subject to judicial review in a plenary action. The proper avenue for judicial review is a CPLR Article 78 proceeding, which Maas initially opposed.

    Facts

    James Maas, a tenured psychology professor at Cornell University, was accused of sexual harassment by four students in 1994. The University processed the complaints under its internal procedures. Following an investigation and hearings, the Professional Ethics Committee found that Maas had engaged in unprofessional conduct and sexual harassment. The Dean of the College upheld the Committee’s determination, and an appeal to the Provost was rejected. Maas remained a tenured faculty member.

    Procedural History

    Maas filed suit against Cornell, alleging multiple causes of action, including breach of contract and negligence. The Supreme Court dismissed most of the claims, refusing to convert the action into a CPLR Article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division affirmed. After remittal, the Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Cornell on the remaining negligence claims. The Appellate Division affirmed again, rejecting Maas’s request for CPLR Article 78 conversion because he had previously opposed it. The New York Court of Appeals granted Maas leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a university’s internal regulations and procedures create a contractual relationship with its employees, such that a violation of those procedures can form the basis for a breach of contract action.

    2. Whether the lower courts erred in refusing to convert Maas’s plenary action into a CPLR Article 78 proceeding.

    Holding

    1. No, because administrative decisions of educational institutions involve specialized professional judgment, and these institutions are generally better suited to make final decisions concerning internal matters.

    2. No, because Maas initially opposed the conversion to a CPLR Article 78 proceeding and cannot now seek such relief after his plenary action was dismissed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that universities are best suited to resolve internal disputes, and courts should exercise restraint in applying traditional legal rules to academic matters. The Court stated, “In these so-called ‘university’ cases, CPLR article 78 proceedings are the appropriate vehicle because they ensure that the over-all integrity of the educational institution is maintained and, therefore, protect more than just the individual’s right to employment.”

    The Court found that Maas’s breach of contract claim failed because he did not demonstrate that Cornell intended its internal procedures to become part of his employment contract. The Court distinguished the case from wrongful termination disputes, where detrimental reliance on an employer’s written policies can create contractual obligations. The Court reasoned that “Cornell cannot be held to have contractually bound itself to follow these internal rules when it hired Maas.”

    The Court also cited Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4, noting that an implied-in-fact contract requires mutual agreement and an intent to promise, which were not present in this case. The Court noted that “the concept of handbooks as part of a contract with commitments and expectations on both sides’ is not universally accepted”.

    The Court distinguished Tedeschi v. Wagner College, stating that while universities must substantially observe their procedures for suspension or expulsion, the legal theory underlying that rule is not well-defined and does not necessarily create a contract. The Court concluded that Maas failed to plead a cognizable breach of contract action and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions.

  • Sullivan LaFarge v. Town of Mamakating, 94 N.Y.2d 802 (1999): Consequences of Failing to File a Note of Issue in Property Tax Assessment Review

    LaFarge v. Town of Mamakating, 94 N.Y.2d 802 (1999)

    Failure to file a note of issue within four years of commencing a Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) article 7 proceeding results in mandatory dismissal of the petition, irrespective of any actions taken during that period, unless the parties stipulate otherwise or the court orders an extension for good cause shown within the four-year timeframe.

    Summary

    Sullivan LaFarge commenced multiple RPTL article 7 proceedings against the Town of Mamakating and Sullivan County, challenging property tax assessments from 1989 to 1992. Despite engaging in discovery, settlement negotiations, and appraisal filings between 1991 and 1996, LaFarge failed to file notes of issue within the four-year period prescribed by RPTL former 718. The Town moved to dismiss the petitions, and the Supreme Court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that RPTL 718 mandates dismissal absent a note of issue filing or a stipulated or court-ordered extension within four years, regardless of other actions taken in the case. This ruling emphasizes the strict application of statutory deadlines to prevent the accumulation of multiple years of tax assessment review proceedings.

    Facts

    Sullivan LaFarge initiated RPTL article 7 proceedings against the Town of Mamakating and Sullivan County, challenging the 1989 tax assessment on a parcel of land. LaFarge subsequently commenced similar proceedings for the tax years 1990, 1991, and 1992, and in 1992 challenged the assessment of a different parcel. From 1991 to 1996, the parties participated in court conferences, settlement talks, discovery, and filed appraisals. Despite these activities, LaFarge did not file a note of issue in any of the proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The Town of Mamakating moved to dismiss all petitions based on LaFarge’s failure to file notes of issue within the statutory four-year period outlined in RPTL former 718. Supreme Court granted the Town’s motion and dismissed the petitions. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether RPTL former 718 requires dismissal of a tax assessment review proceeding when the petitioner fails to file a note of issue within four years of commencing the proceeding, even if the parties have engaged in other actions related to the case during that period.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain language of RPTL 718 is mandatory and requires dismissal unless a note of issue is filed within four years or the parties stipulate to an extension, or the court orders one for good cause within the four-year period. The statute applies “irrespective of any and all circumstances” where these conditions are not met.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the mandatory nature of RPTL former 718, stating that it applies “irrespective of any and all circumstances” unless the parties stipulate otherwise or obtain a court order for an extension within the four-year period. The court rejected LaFarge’s argument that the statute only applies when there is complete inactivity, holding that “some action” is insufficient to avoid dismissal. The Court looked to the legislative history, noting that the re-enactment of RPTL 718 was intended to prevent the pyramiding of multiple years of tax assessment review proceedings, a practice that burdened court calendars and municipalities. The court found that LaFarge’s conduct of accumulating four years of proceedings without filing a note of issue directly contravened the purpose of the statute. The Court cited Matter of Waldbaum’s #122 v Board of Assessors, stating that the plain language of RPTL 718 is mandatory. The Court stated the statute provides for an extension of the four-year period only when the parties otherwise stipulate or obtain a court order based on good cause within the four-year period. Because petitioner failed to avail itself of either option, the petitions must be dismissed.