New York Law Review

Tag: 1999

  • People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 170 (1999): Appellate Court’s Power to Modify Illegal Sentences

    People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 170 (1999)

    An intermediate appellate court has the discretion, when reversing or modifying a sentence, either to remit the case to the trial court for resentencing or to substitute its own legal sentence for the illegally imposed sentence.

    Summary

    The People appealed from an Appellate Division order modifying a judgment of the trial court by directing that all sentences run concurrently, arguing that the Appellate Division’s only option was to remit the case for resentencing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that under CPL 470.20, an intermediate appellate court has the discretion to either remit for resentencing or substitute its own legal sentence when correcting an illegal sentence. The Court found that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in choosing to modify the sentence itself.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of sodomy in the first degree and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences for these convictions. The Appellate Division found that imposing consecutive sentences was erroneous because both convictions arose from a single incident.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant and imposed consecutive sentences. The Appellate Division modified the trial court’s judgment, directing that the sentences run concurrently instead of consecutively. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Appellate Division lacked the authority to modify the sentence and should have remitted the case to the trial court for resentencing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under CPL 470.20, the Appellate Division’s only available corrective action on the illegal sentence was to remit for resentencing by the trial court.

    Holding

    No, because an intermediate appellate court, in exercising its responsibility under CPL 470.20 to take “such corrective action as is necessary and appropriate,” has the discretion, upon reversing or modifying a sentence, either to remit to the trial court for resentencing or to substitute its own legal sentence for the illegally imposed sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 470.20 grants appellate courts the power to take “such corrective action as is necessary and appropriate.” This broad language, according to the Court, allows the Appellate Division to choose between remitting the case or modifying the sentence directly. The Court emphasized that the Appellate Division is not limited to remittal and has the discretion to substitute its own legal sentence. The court stated that an intermediate appellate court has the discretion, upon reversing or modifying a sentence, either to remit to the trial court for resentencing or to substitute its own legal sentence for the illegally imposed sentence. The court found no abuse of discretion in the Appellate Division’s decision to modify the sentence, concluding that the statute allows for both options when an illegal sentence is identified. The decision provides flexibility for appellate courts to efficiently correct sentencing errors without necessarily requiring a new hearing at the trial level. The ruling ensures that appellate courts have the tools necessary to provide effective remedies for sentencing errors, promoting judicial efficiency and fairness in the criminal justice system.

  • Barr v. Crosson, 94 N.Y.2d 754 (1999): Rational Basis Review of Judicial Salary Disparities

    94 N.Y.2d 754 (1999)

    A state’s decision to pay judges in different counties different salaries does not violate equal protection if there is a rational basis for the disparity, such as differences in median home values or caseloads.

    Summary

    Monroe County Court Judges sued the State of New York, arguing that their lower salaries compared to judges in Albany County violated equal protection. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that a rational basis existed for the salary disparity based on higher median home values and greater caseloads in Albany County. This case emphasizes that a state needs only a rational basis, not a precise equalization of economic factors, to justify differing judicial salaries.

    Facts

    Current and former Monroe County Court Judges sued New York State, its Chief Administrator of the Courts, and its Comptroller, alleging a violation of equal protection. They were paid $86,000, less than their counterparts in Albany ($90,000), Nassau ($95,000), Putnam ($90,000), Suffolk ($95,000), and Westchester ($94,000) counties. The judges argued that their jurisdiction, practices, procedures, and workload were identical to Albany County judges and that the cost of living was substantially similar.

    Procedural History

    The Monroe County Supreme Court initially granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding a violation of equal protection based on the salary discrepancy between Monroe and Albany counties. Upon reargument, the Supreme Court reversed its decision, granting summary judgment to the defendants, finding a rational basis for the disparity. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that no rational basis existed based on a review of the “totality of economic indicators.” The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a rational basis existed for the disparity in salaries between Monroe and Albany County Court Judges, such that the disparity does not violate equal protection principles?

    Holding

    1. No, because data indicated that median home values were higher in Albany County than in Monroe County, and Albany County Court Judges handled more filings and dispositions per judge than their Monroe County counterparts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that comparable salaries are required for judges of coordinate jurisdiction where contiguous areas constitute a “true unity of judicial interest.” However, it rejected the “totality of economic indicators” test used by the Appellate Division, relying on its prior holdings in D’Amico v. Crosson and Henry v. Milonas. The court found that data indicating higher median home values and greater caseloads in Albany County provided a rational basis for the salary disparity. "[E]conomic differentials in median home values and per capita income can ‘alone provide a rational basis for a salary disparity’" (quoting Henry v. Milonas, 91 N.Y.2d 264, 269). The plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that there was no reasonably conceivable state of facts that rationally supported the distinction. The court noted that the less than 5% pay differential was justified given the workload and economic differences. The court did not address the issue of prejudgment interest on the back pay award, as it was moot given the finding that the salary disparity was constitutional.

  • People v. Kearns, 720 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1999): Appealability of Sex Offender Risk Level Determinations

    People v. Kearns, 720 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1999)

    A risk level determination under New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), made contemporaneously with a criminal judgment of conviction, is not independently appealable from that criminal judgment.

    Summary

    Defendant pleaded guilty to sexual abuse. Following the plea, the trial court, over defense counsel’s objection, designated the defendant a sexually violent predator under SORA. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction but stated the SORA determination was not reviewable. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a SORA risk level determination, even when made alongside the criminal judgment, is not appealable as part of that judgment. The Court reasoned that SORA’s requirements are not an integral part of the sentence and lack explicit statutory authorization for appeal within the criminal proceeding.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with multiple counts of rape and sexual abuse for acts committed in August 1995. He pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree sexual abuse in satisfaction of the indictment. As part of the plea, defendant executed a written waiver of his right to appeal. Following the plea, but before sentencing, the Supreme Court conducted a SORA hearing to determine the defendant’s risk level.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court determined the defendant to be a sexually violent predator and imposed the negotiated sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence, stating the SORA assessment was not reviewable. Leave to appeal was granted by a judge of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the risk level determination not independently appealable from the criminal judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a risk level determination made under SORA contemporaneously with a criminal judgment of conviction is independently appealable as part of that criminal judgment.

    Holding

    No, because the risk level determination is not an integral part of the sentence and lacks explicit statutory authorization for appeal within the criminal proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in People v. Stevens, 91 N.Y.2d 270 (1997), which held that SORA’s registration and notification requirements were not a “traditional, technical or integral part of a sentence that somehow relates back to or becomes incorporated into the antecedent judgment of conviction.” The Court distinguished People v. Hernandez, 93 N.Y.2d 261 (1999), which involved a certification requirement that was explicitly made part of the order of commitment and certificate of conviction. The Court emphasized that the risk level determination lacks the same explicit statutory integration into the judgment. The Court stated: “Here, the fact that the evaluation was made contemporaneously with the criminal judgment does not change the analysis, the governing principle, or the essential nature of the risk level determination.” The Court also noted that the Legislature amended SORA to authorize civil appeals of risk level determinations, but only for determinations made on or after January 1, 2000. Allowing appeals in cases like Kearns’ would create dual criminal and civil tracks of appeal potentially leading to conflicting results, which the Court deemed undesirable. The court declined to “promulgate a nonenacted avenue of appeal for this case and its limited cadre of cases”.

  • People v. Archbold, 75 N.Y.2d 54 (1999): Reviewability of Unauthorized Sentences

    People v. Archbold, 75 N.Y.2d 54 (1999)

    A sentence imposed in violation of a statutory mandate, rendering it unauthorized, is reviewable on appeal even if the defendant failed to object to the sentence at the time of sentencing.

    Summary

    Archbold was convicted of robbery and burglary. He was sentenced as a second violent felony offender based on a prior burglary conviction. However, the sentencing for the prior conviction occurred after Archbold committed the robbery and burglary. Under New York law, a prior conviction can only serve as a predicate if the sentence for that conviction was imposed before the commission of the subsequent felony. Archbold did not object to the enhanced sentence at the time. The New York Court of Appeals held that the unauthorized sentence was reviewable on appeal, even though the defendant failed to object during sentencing, because the right to be sentenced as provided by law is fundamental.

    Facts

    A Queens County jury convicted Archbold of robbery and burglary committed on February 7, 1995.
    The prosecution sought to sentence Archbold as a second violent felony offender, relying on a March 28, 1995 Kings County conviction for burglary.
    Thus, the Kings County conviction occurred *after* the commission of the Queens County crimes.
    At the sentencing hearing, Archbold admitted the Kings County conviction, but the chronological sequence was not addressed.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Queens County, sentenced Archbold as a second violent felony offender.
    On appeal, Archbold argued the sentence was unauthorized because the predicate offense occurred after the instant offense.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the claim was unpreserved due to the lack of objection at sentencing.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an unauthorized sentence, imposed in violation of Penal Law § 70.04(1)(b)(iv), is reviewable on appeal when the defendant failed to object to the sentence at the time of sentencing.

    Holding

    Yes, because “the right to be sentenced as provided by law, though not formally raised at the trial level, preserves a departure therefrom for review in this court” (citing People v. Fuller, 57 N.Y.2d 152, 156).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law § 70.04(1)(b)(iv) clearly requires that the sentence for the predicate felony must have been imposed *before* the commission of the felony for which the defendant is being sentenced. The court found the sentence was unauthorized because it violated this statutory mandate.
    The Court rejected the argument that the defendant waived his right to challenge the sentence, noting that the discussions at sentencing centered solely on the validity of the Kings County conviction, not on the chronological sequence of the offenses and sentencing.
    Regarding preservation, the Court acknowledged the general rule that unpreserved issues are not reviewable on appeal. However, it cited exceptions for unauthorized sentences, relying on People v. Fuller and People v. Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d 259.
    The Court distinguished People v. Smith, 73 N.Y.2d 961, noting that Smith involved a question of whether an out-of-state conviction was equivalent to a New York felony, which requires factual development at the trial level. In contrast, the sequentiality issue in this case was apparent from the record.
    The Court emphasized that “the court’s lack of authority to sentence a defendant as a predicate felon based on a conviction concededly out of sequence may be determined from the face of the appellate record, which necessarily contains both relevant dates. No resort to outside facts, documentation or foreign statutes is necessary.”
    The Court also noted that challenges to presentence procedures are distinct from challenges to sentencing power itself (citing People v. Oliver, 63 N.Y.2d 973).

  • Wilson v. City of White Plains, 93 N.Y.2d 784 (1999): Establishing Reasonable Suspicion for Employee Drug Testing

    Wilson v. City of White Plains, 93 N.Y.2d 784 (1999)

    A public employer may require an employee to submit to a drug test based on reasonable suspicion of drug use, which can be established through a combination of factors, including past substance abuse history, physical manifestations of impairment, and credible reports of on-the-job substance use.

    Summary

    The City of White Plains Fire Department dismissed firefighter Wilson after a drug test revealed cocaine metabolites in his urine. The Appellate Division annulled the dismissal, finding a lack of objective evidence to justify the drug test. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the fire department had reasonable suspicion to order the test based on Wilson’s history of substance abuse, an anonymous letter alleging he reported to work under the influence, his record of absenteeism, his reputation for on-the-job substance use, and a deputy commissioner’s observation of his impaired state just before the test. The Court remitted the case to the Appellate Division to consider other issues not previously addressed.

    Facts

    Wilson, a firefighter for the City of White Plains, voluntarily sought treatment for substance abuse in 1986. Upon his return to work, the Fire Commissioner informed him that he would be monitored for signs of recurring substance abuse and tested if such signs appeared. In August 1996, the Fire Commissioner received an anonymous letter stating Wilson was reporting to work under the influence of alcohol. A review of Wilson’s personnel file revealed a history of chronic absenteeism. He had a reputation for reporting to work under the influence, earning him the nickname “Scotch Wilson.” On the day of the test, a deputy commissioner observed that Wilson had watery eyes and difficulty focusing. Based on this information, Wilson was ordered to submit to urine and blood tests, which tested positive for cocaine metabolites.

    Procedural History

    The City of White Plains Fire Department terminated Wilson’s employment. Wilson challenged his dismissal in an Article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division annulled the dismissal, finding a lack of objective evidence to support the drug test order. The City appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City of White Plains Fire Department had reasonable suspicion to order Wilson to submit to a drug test.

    Holding

    Yes, because based on Wilson’s past substance abuse, the anonymous letter, his record of absenteeism, his reputation for on-the-job substance use, and the deputy commissioner’s observation of his impaired state, the Fire Department had reasonable suspicion to order the drug test.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a public agency may lawfully order an employee to submit to a drug test on reasonable suspicion of drug use. The Court found that the Appellate Division erred in concluding there was no objective evidence of Wilson’s substance abuse. The Court highlighted the Hearing Officer’s findings, which the Appellate Division overlooked. The Court emphasized that reasonable suspicion was supported by far more than just the anonymous letter. The City presented evidence of Wilson’s physical manifestations of substance abuse on the day he was tested, his long record of excessive absences, his prior substance abuse problems, his reputation for showing up at work under the influence, as well as his understanding that he could be tested if he showed any signs of recurring substance abuse.

    The Court cited Matter of Perez v Ward, 69 NY2d 840, 842 and Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222, 231, noting that the standard of review in CPLR article 78 proceedings is whether there was substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer’s decision.

    The Court found that based on all of the evidence presented, the Appellate Division erred in concluding otherwise. Because the Appellate Division did not address all of Wilson’s contentions, the Court remitted the case to the Appellate Division for further consideration.

  • In re Claims of Goodman, 94 N.Y.2d 18 (1999): Harmonizing Strike and Academic Recess Unemployment Benefits

    In re Claims of Goodman, 94 N.Y.2d 18 (1999)

    When an industrial strike overlaps with an academic recess, both Labor Law § 590(11) (regarding reasonable assurance of employment) and § 592 (regarding strike-related unemployment) can apply, and the ‘Triborough Doctrine’ (preserving terms of expired public sector CBAs) does not extend to private sector disputes to establish ‘reasonable assurance’.

    Summary

    Employees of Barnard College went on strike six weeks before the end of the spring semester in 1996. They applied for unemployment benefits. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board denied benefits, relying on Labor Law § 590(11), which prohibits benefits during academic recesses if there’s reasonable assurance of re-employment. The employees argued this section didn’t apply because they were on strike, and only Labor Law § 592 (suspending benefits for seven weeks during a strike) should apply. The Court of Appeals held that both sections could be harmonized. However, the Court reversed the Board’s decision because it erroneously relied on the ‘Triborough Doctrine’ (applicable to public sector labor disputes) to determine that the employees had ‘reasonable assurance’ of employment. The case was remitted for a new determination of ‘reasonable assurance’ without considering the expired collective bargaining agreement.

    Facts

    The petitioners were non-professional employees of Barnard College, represented by a union. Their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expired on December 31, 1995, but they continued working. They engaged in two strikes during 1996: one in February/March, and another beginning on April 10, six weeks before the end of the spring semester, lasting until September. Barnard did not send out customary letters regarding fall semester work to striking desk attendants, fearing it would violate federal labor law. The CBA prohibited Barnard from terminating employees without good cause and the employees were considered permanent, not temporary.

    Procedural History

    The local unemployment insurance office initially approved the employees’ applications for benefits. Barnard objected, arguing Labor Law § 590(11) precluded benefits due to the academic recess. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially ruled in favor of the employees, finding no affirmative expression of intent to rehire. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board reversed, concluding that the employees had a “reasonable assurance” of employment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 590(11) and § 592 can be reconciled when an industrial strike overlaps an academic recess.

    2. Whether the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board erred in relying on the “Triborough Doctrine” to determine the existence of a ‘reasonable assurance’ of employment.

    3. Whether under Labor Law § 590(11)(d), the denial of unemployment insurance benefits was improper because the strike lasted several weeks into the fall semester.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statutes can be read together without undermining each other.

    2. Yes, because the “Triborough Doctrine” is only applicable in the public employment context.

    3. No, because the employees returned to work for the fall semester once the strike was settled, precluding application of this section.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while § 590(11) addresses unemployment during academic recesses, and § 592 addresses unemployment due to strikes, nothing prevents them from operating together when both situations occur. Applying only § 592 would nullify § 590(11) during strikes overlapping summer recesses. The Court emphasized that statutes should be harmonized if possible. The strike began less than seven weeks before the summer recess, triggering § 592. Once the recess began, § 590(11) took effect, contingent on “reasonable assurance” of employment. However, the Court found the Appeal Board erred in relying on the ‘Triborough Doctrine,’ which preserves the status quo under an expired CBA in the public sector. As the Court explained, “[N]otably, the ‘Triborough Doctrine’ has never been applied in the private employment context because the doctrine is grounded in the limitations imposed on public employee organizations by the Civil Service Law.” The Court noted that both parties agreed that the ‘Triborough Doctrine’ cannot supersede an employer’s right under federal law to replace striking workers. Because an error of law occurred the Court remitted the case for reconsideration of the “reasonable assurance” question, without reliance on the expired collective bargaining agreement, and clarified that because the employees did return to work after the strike, they could not claim retroactive benefits under section 590(11)(d).

  • People v. Hernandez, 93 N.Y.2d 261 (1999): Judge’s Absence During Testimony Readback

    People v. Hernandez, 93 N.Y.2d 261 (1999)

    A trial judge’s brief absence during the ministerial reading back of testimony to the jury, where the judge remains immediately available and no substantive rulings are required, does not constitute a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal of a conviction.

    Summary

    Hernandez was convicted of murder. During jury deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of testimony. The trial judge, with consent from both parties, absented himself from the courtroom during the readback, but remained immediately available in chambers. The Appellate Division initially affirmed the conviction, but later reversed it on a coram nobis petition, citing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue of the judge’s absence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the judge’s brief absence during a purely ministerial readback, with the judge remaining available, did not constitute reversible error.

    Facts

    Hernandez was convicted of second-degree murder and related weapons offenses. During jury deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of trial testimony. With the consent of both parties, the trial judge absented himself during the reading of the testimony. The judge informed everyone that he would be immediately available in his chambers should any issue arise. The judge himself conducted the requested rereading of the charge to the jury.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division initially affirmed Hernandez’s conviction. Hernandez then petitioned the Appellate Division for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the judge’s absence during readbacks. The Appellate Division granted the petition, vacated its prior affirmance, and reversed Hernandez’s conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial judge’s absence during the readback of testimony to the jury, when the judge remains immediately available and no substantive rulings are required, constitutes a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal.

    Holding

    No, because the readbacks required no further rulings or instructions beyond those previously made by the court, and no delegation of judicial authority occurred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Ahmed (66 N.Y.2d 307), where the trial judge delegated his duties to his law secretary during deliberations. In Ahmed, the law secretary reread portions of the charge and received jury notes without the judge’s consideration. Here, the judge made all substantive rulings and remained available. Citing People v. Monroe (90 N.Y.2d 982), the Court reasoned that the judge’s absence did not rise to the level of a “mode of proceedings” error requiring reversal. The court emphasized that the readbacks were purely ministerial and required no further rulings beyond those already made. The Court noted, “The absence of Trial Judges from readbacks is disfavored,” but found no reversible error here. The Court distinguished the case from situations where the judge delegates judicial authority or is unavailable to address issues that may arise during the readback. The Court implicitly acknowledged that the parties’ consent played a role in their analysis.

  • People v. Chappelle, 93 N.Y.2d 516 (1999): Prosecutorial Misconduct Depriving Fair Trial

    People v. Chappelle, 93 N.Y.2d 516 (1999)

    A prosecutor’s repeated disregard of court rulings and introduction of prejudicial information, even when followed by curative instructions, can cumulatively deprive a defendant of a fair trial.

    Summary

    Diane Chappelle, a teacher, was robbed at gunpoint in her classroom. She identified the defendant, Chappelle, in photo arrays and a lineup. Prior to trial, the court ruled the lineup testimony admissible but denied the prosecution’s request for a lineup photograph. During the trial, the prosecutor repeatedly violated court orders and introduced prejudicial information, including displaying a newspaper implicating the defendant’s parents in drug activities. The Court of Appeals held that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s misconduct denied the defendant a fair trial, even with curative instructions, necessitating a new trial.

    Facts

    Diane Chappelle, a teacher, arrived at her classroom and was confronted by a gunman who robbed her. She identified the defendant in two photo arrays and a lineup. Before trial, the defense successfully blocked the prosecution from obtaining the lineup photo. During trial, the prosecutor asked the defense for the photo in front of the jury. The defendant testified he was home with his parents at the time of the crime. During cross-examination, the prosecutor displayed a newspaper article alleging the defendant’s parents’ drug activities.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of robbery and burglary. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with two justices dissenting. A judge of the Court of Appeals granted the defendant’s application for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s conduct in asking for the lineup photograph in front of the jury, after the court had ruled it inadmissible, constituted prosecutorial misconduct.
    2. Whether the prosecutor’s introduction of evidence regarding the defendant’s parents’ alleged drug activities, by displaying a newspaper article, constituted prosecutorial misconduct.
    3. Whether the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s misconduct denied the defendant a fair trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the prosecutor deliberately disregarded the court’s pretrial ruling, creating prejudice against the defendant in front of the jury.
    2. Yes, because the prosecutor introduced prejudicial information not admitted into evidence, exceeding the bounds of fair advocacy.
    3. Yes, because the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s misconduct substantially prejudiced the defendant’s rights, warranting a new trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the prosecutor’s conduct, taken as a whole, deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The Court emphasized that the prosecutor deliberately disregarded the trial court’s rulings. Asking for the lineup photograph in front of the jury after a pre-trial ruling against its admissibility prejudiced the defendant by implying he was hiding evidence. Displaying the newspaper article about the defendant’s parents’ alleged drug dealing introduced prejudicial information not admitted into evidence. While curative instructions were given, the Court stated that such instructions cannot always eliminate the harm. Quoting People v. Carborano, the Court stated a jury instruction cannot “always assure elimination of the harm already occasioned” (301 NY 39, 42-43). The Court emphasized that each instance of misconduct, alone, might not warrant reversal, but the cumulative effect prejudiced the defendant’s rights. The court found that “Evenhanded justice and respect for the fundamentals of a fair trial mandate the presentation of legal evidence unimpaired by intemperate conduct aimed at sidetracking the jury from its ultimate responsibility — determining facts relevant to guilt or innocence” (People v. Alicea, 37 NY2d 601, 605).

  • City of New York v. Wing, 93 N.Y.2d 430 (1999): Retroactive Application of Social Services Law § 153-i

    City of New York v. Wing, 93 N.Y.2d 430 (1999)

    Social Services Law § 153-i can be applied retroactively to allow the State to recoup from New York City the full amount of federal disallowances for foster care expenses, including interest, when the final federal agency decision or settlement occurred after July 1, 1995, regardless of when the underlying mismanagement occurred.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between New York State and New York City over who should bear the cost of federal recoupment of foster care aid due to mismanagement by the City. The central issue is the retroactive application of Social Services Law § 153-i, which allows the state to recoup federal disallowances from the city. The Court of Appeals held that the amended statute applied retroactively because the final settlement between the State and the federal agency occurred after July 1, 1995, the date to which the amendment retroactively pertained. The Court also found the State had authority to recoup the interest charges associated with the disallowance from the City.

    Facts

    From 1983 to 1985, New York City received federal funds for foster care expenses under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. In 1988, a federal audit found that the City did not comply with federal eligibility requirements in numerous cases. As a result, the federal government sought to recoup approximately $92 million from the State. The State appealed the disallowance. In April 1995, HHS issued a negative grant award and recouped $31.2 million. A final settlement between HHS and DSS was reached in December 1996, with DSS paying HHS an additional $42.8 million. DSS then notified the City it would recoup the entire $74 million.

    Procedural History

    The City sued the State in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding, seeking to annul the recoupment efforts. Supreme Court granted relief to the City, rejecting retroactive application of Social Services Law § 153-i. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, agreeing that the State was responsible for half the disallowance but concluding that the State could recoup half the interest. Both the State and the City appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Social Services Law § 153-i may be applied retroactively to authorize the State to recoup federal foster care expenditures from the City.

    2. Whether the State may recover from the City the associated interest charges assessed by the Federal Government.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the 1999 amendment to Social Services Law § 153-i (8) applies retroactively irrespective of whether the actions underlying the disallowance occurred prior to July 1, 1995, if the final settlement occurred after that date.

    2. Yes, because Social Services Law § 153-i authorizes the State to recoup any disallowance based on a final agency decision or settlement, which includes the interest component.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the 1999 amendment to Social Services Law § 153-i (8) clearly states that the law applies retroactively. The crucial factor is when the final settlement between the State and the federal agency occurred. The Court determined that the final settlement occurred in December 1996, after July 1, 1995. Before that point, the disagreement over disallowance between DSS and HHS was still subject to review and dispute. The Court cited DAB’s acknowledgment that the administrative decision on the 72 uncontested sample cases was not yet final as of August 2, 1995. Therefore, the City is accountable for the entire amount recouped from the State by HHS.

    Regarding the interest charges, the Court noted that Social Services Law § 153-i (8) declares that the “block grant apportionment shall reflect the state share of sanctions or disallowances taken against the district pursuant to this chapter or federal law.” The Court reasoned that federal regulations, such as 45 CFR 30.13 (a) (1), stipulate that interest accrues on debts from the date the party has notice of the debt and is treated as part of the disallowance under federal law. Therefore, the State has the authority to recoup the interest amount from the City.

    The Court rejected any other contentions, stating they did not alter the outcome of the litigation. They concluded that the State is entitled to recoup from the City the entire amount of the Federal disallowance, including its interest component.

  • Brukhman v. Giuliani, 94 N.Y.2d 387 (1999): Prevailing Wage Law and Public Assistance Beneficiaries

    Brukhman v. Giuliani, 94 N.Y.2d 387 (1999)

    The prevailing wage provision of the New York State Constitution does not apply to public assistance beneficiaries participating in a Work Experience Program (WEP) as a condition of receiving benefits.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether public assistance recipients participating in New York City’s Work Experience Program (WEP) are entitled to be paid at the prevailing wage rate for their work assignments. These recipients were required to participate in WEP as a condition of receiving public assistance benefits. The plaintiffs argued that the city’s calculation of required work hours, based on the federal minimum wage rather than the higher prevailing wage, violated the state constitution. The New York Court of Appeals held that the constitutional prevailing wage provision does not extend to these public assistance recipients, because they are not “employees” of “contractors or subcontractors” engaged in “public work” as those terms are understood in the constitution.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs were public assistance recipients in New York City required to participate in a Work Experience Program (WEP) to continue receiving benefits. They were assigned to various not-for-profit organizations and city agencies, performing tasks ranging from skilled labor to clerical work. The city calculated their required participation hours by dividing the amount of their benefits by the federal minimum wage. The plaintiffs argued this violated the state constitution because the prevailing wage rate was higher and should have been used to calculate required hours, resulting in fewer hours worked.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted class certification and a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint, finding no violation of the prevailing wage provision or equal protection. The Court of Appeals granted an appeal as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prevailing wage provision of the New York State Constitution (Article I, § 17) applies to public assistance beneficiaries required to participate in a Work Experience Program (WEP) as a condition of receiving monetary grants.

    Holding

    No, because the constitutional prevailing wage provision does not extend to these public assistance recipients as they are not considered “employees” of “contractors or subcontractors” engaged in “public work” within the meaning of the constitutional provision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the state constitution’s prevailing wage provision protects laborers, workmen, or mechanics in the employ of a contractor or subcontractor engaged in public work. The court emphasized the limited scope of this protection based on the language and historical context of the constitutional provision. The court stated that the plaintiffs were not “in the employ of” anyone, nor were the agencies to which they were assigned “contractors or subcontractors.” Furthermore, the court determined that the work performed by the plaintiffs was not “public work” as contemplated by the constitution. The court reviewed the Record of the 1938 Constitutional Convention, noting that the prevailing wage protection was intended for “employees of contractors and subcontractors engaged in the performance of public work.” The court emphasized the importance of the term “employees” as deliberately chosen to limit the scope of the protection. The court cited Matter of Corrigan v. Joseph, 304 N.Y. 172 (1952), to support its narrow interpretation. The court stated that “Program participants simply are not ‘in the employ of’ anyone — that is the very reason they are receiving welfare benefits and required to participate in the Program.” The court further cited Varsity Tr. v Saporita, 71 A.D.2d 643 (2d Dept. 1979), aff’d, 48 N.Y.2d 767 (1979) which held “It is hornbook law that the Labor Law provision applies only to workers involved in the construction, replacement, maintenance and repair of ‘public works’ in a legally restricted sense of that term”. The court concluded that applying the prevailing wage requirement to WEP participants would broaden the scope of the constitutional provision beyond its intended limits. The Court explicitly stated, “That provision is New York’s proud enforcement of the value of work and the dignity of earned wages.”