New York Law Review

Tag: 1999

  • Perez v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 92 N.Y.2d 749 (1999): Statute of Limitations Tolled by Filing Motion to Amend

    Perez v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 92 N.Y.2d 749 (1999)

    Under New York’s commencement-by-filing system, the Statute of Limitations is tolled when a plaintiff files a motion for leave to amend a complaint to add a defendant, attaching the proposed supplemental summons and amended complaint, until the court rules on the motion.

    Summary

    Plaintiff Carlos Perez sued Paramount Communications for negligence, alleging injuries from a construction accident at Madison Square Garden. Discovering that Madison Square Garden, L.P. (MSG) actually owned the premises, Perez moved to amend his complaint to add MSG as a defendant, including a copy of the proposed supplemental summons and amended complaint. The motion was filed before the Statute of Limitations expired, but the court’s order granting leave to amend came after. The New York Court of Appeals held that filing the motion to amend tolled the Statute of Limitations until the order granting the amendment was entered, making the action against MSG timely. This decision harmonizes New York law with federal practice and promotes judicial economy.

    Facts

    Carlos Perez was injured on November 20, 1990, while working on a scaffold during renovations at Madison Square Garden. On November 27, 1992, Perez sued Paramount Communications, Inc., believing them to be the owner/operator of Madison Square Garden. During discovery, Perez learned that Madison Square Garden, L.P. (MSG) owned the premises and that Herbert/HRH Construction were the general contractors. On June 16, 1993, Perez moved to amend the complaint to add MSG as a defendant, attaching the proposed supplemental summons and amended complaint. The motion was filed with the court and copies were mailed to Paramount. The order granting the amendment was entered on November 3, 1993, after the Statute of Limitations would have expired. The supplemental summons and complaint were served on November 1, 1993, and filed with proof of service on December 2, 1993.

    Procedural History

    Perez filed a separate action against Herbert/HRH Construction on November 29, 1993, and successfully moved to consolidate the cases. All defendants moved to dismiss. Paramount’s motion was granted because they did not own or operate MSG. Herbert/HRH’s motion was granted based on the Statute of Limitations. The Supreme Court initially found the claim against MSG untimely but held that MSG and Paramount were united in interest, thus making the claim timely. The Appellate Division affirmed, disagreeing on the united-in-interest point but finding the claim timely because the motion to amend was filed before the Statute of Limitations expired. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the filing of a motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a defendant to a pending action, including a copy of the proposed supplemental summons and amended complaint, tolls the Statute of Limitations as against the party sought to be added until the court rules on the motion.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under New York’s commencement-by-filing system, the filing of the motion tolls the Statute of Limitations until the court rules on the motion to amend.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals overruled its prior precedent in Arnold v Mayal Realty Co., which held that service of motion papers alone was insufficient to stop the Statute of Limitations. The court reasoned that under the modern commencement-by-filing system, requiring a party to wait for a court’s decision before the Statute of Limitations is tolled would be unjust. The court adopted a rule that filing a motion for leave to amend, accompanied by the proposed supplemental summons and amended complaint, tolls the Statute of Limitations until the court rules on the motion. This approach aligns with federal practice and the policies of judicial economy and preventing a multiplicity of suits, as well as being consistent with the holdings in Matter of Fry v Village of Tarrytown and Matter of Gershel v Porr. The court stated that “Statutes of Limitation are designed to promote justice by preventing prejudice through the revival of stale claims…That goal would not be served by a rule which would render the timeliness of a claim dependent upon the speed with which a court decides a motion.”

  • People v. Grassi, 92 N.Y.2d 695 (1999): Sufficiency of Evidence for Arson Conviction Based on Accessorial Liability

    People v. Grassi, 92 N.Y.2d 695 (1999)

    A defendant can be convicted of arson as an accessory if the evidence demonstrates the requisite mens rea and that the defendant solicited, requested, commanded, importuned, or intentionally aided the principal actor in committing the arson, even if the defendant was not physically present at the scene.

    Summary

    Grassi was convicted of second-degree arson based on accessorial liability. The trial court set aside the verdict, arguing that Grassi’s absence from the scene couldn’t be reconciled with the prosecution’s claim that he solicited the crime. The Appellate Division reversed, finding sufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division. The Court held that viewing the evidence favorably to the prosecution, a rational jury could conclude Grassi had the motive and opportunity to aid in the arson, given the nightclub’s financial woes, Grassi’s actions before the fire, and his false statements afterward. The Court emphasized that it is not bound to consider alternative inferences when assessing the sufficiency of evidence.

    Facts

    Grassi co-owned a nightclub that faced financial difficulties, police complaints, and potential liquor license revocation.
    He closed a safe deposit box used for club proceeds and briefly put the club up for sale.
    Shortly before the fire, Grassi purchased an insurance policy, removed furniture, and depleted the liquor stock.
    The fire alarm was intentionally disabled, and the fire was intentionally set using an accelerant.
    Grassi removed an expensive lighting system, falsely claiming it was destroyed in the fire, but police later found parts of it at his home.

    Procedural History

    Grassi was convicted of second-degree arson in County Court.
    The County Court granted Grassi’s motion to set aside the verdict.
    The Appellate Division reversed the County Court’s decision and reinstated the verdict.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support Grassi’s conviction for second-degree arson as an accessory.

    Holding

    Yes, because viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of arson in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt, including Grassi’s intent and his role in soliciting or aiding the arson.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied Penal Law § 20.00, which states that a person is criminally liable for the conduct of another when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission of a crime, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct.
    The Court emphasized the standard for appellate review: whether, after viewing the evidence favorably to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
    The Court noted that evidence showed Grassi had motive (financial troubles, police complaints, potential loss of liquor license) and opportunity to solicit or aid the arson.
    “The totality of the evidence, with permissible inferences, would allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that defendant was an accessory to the arson.”
    The Court highlighted Grassi’s actions before and after the fire, including disabling the fire alarm, removing valuable property, and lying about the lighting system.
    The Court rejected Grassi’s argument that there were innocent explanations for the evidence, stating that the Court is not bound to consider alternative inferences when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.
    The court noted, “Defendant has offered myriad innocent explanations or inferences that could be drawn by a jury to counter this evidence. That, however, is not the legal standard by which this Court is bound for reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence appeal.”

  • Alca Industries, Inc. v. Delaney, 92 N.Y.2d 775 (1999): Bid Withdrawal Criteria Are Not Always Rules Subject to SAPA

    Alca Industries, Inc. v. Delaney, 92 N.Y.2d 775 (1999)

    Bid withdrawal criteria included in a specific contract bid advertisement by the Office of General Services (OGS) do not constitute a “rule” of general applicability under the State Administrative Procedure Act (SAPA) and therefore do not require formal promulgation under SAPA.

    Summary

    Alca Industries challenged the Office of General Services’ (OGS) decision to retain its bid security after Alca sought to withdraw its bid due to a mistake. Alca argued that the bid withdrawal criteria used by OGS were “rules” under the State Administrative Procedure Act (SAPA) and were unenforceable because they hadn’t been formally promulgated. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ rulings, holding that the bid withdrawal criteria, as applied to a specific contract, did not constitute a “rule” under SAPA because they lacked general applicability. The court emphasized the distinction between ad hoc decision-making and establishing a general course of conduct for the future, finding that OGS acted within its discretionary capacity, not in a quasi-legislative, rule-making capacity.

    Facts

    Alca Industries submitted a bid, along with a bid bond for $11,800, for an oil separator project advertised by the Office of General Services (OGS). After the bids were opened, Alca realized it had failed to include an allowance for “washwater treatment equipment,” a required component in the project manual. Alca immediately requested to withdraw its bid and have its bid security returned. OGS denied the request, citing bid withdrawal criteria that required the mistake to have occurred “in the absence of negligence in the preparation of the bid,” which OGS found was not met.

    Procedural History

    Alca petitioned to overturn OGS’s determination in Supreme Court, arguing the bid withdrawal criteria were unenforceable rules under the State Administrative Procedure Act (SAPA). The Supreme Court agreed with Alca. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the matter to the Supreme Court for consideration of remaining contentions.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the bid withdrawal criteria used by OGS in a specific contract bid advertisement constitute a “rule” of general applicability subject to the promulgation requirements of the State Administrative Procedure Act (SAPA).

    Holding

    1. No, because the bid withdrawal criteria applied only to the specific contract at issue and did not establish a general standard of conduct applicable to all OGS contract bidding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between ad hoc decision-making and rulemaking, defining rulemaking as establishing “any kind of legislative or quasi-legislative norm or prescription which establishes a pattern or course of conduct for the future.” Citing People v. Cull, 10 NY2d 123, 126. The court noted that SAPA defines a rule as an agency statement “of general applicability.” The court reasoned that OGS was acting in its discretionary capacity when it included the withdrawal criteria in its bid advertisement for the oil separator project, not in its quasi-legislative rule-making capacity. The court emphasized that the bid withdrawal criteria only covered the bidding for this particular contract, and there was no evidence that these criteria were required for all contract bidding. The court distinguished this case from Matter of J.D. Posillico, Inc. v Department of Transp., 160 AD2d 1113, where the Department of Transportation applied fixed standards for all contract bidding. Here, Alca’s rights and remedies were determined by bidding conditions it assented to when it submitted its bid. The court also emphasized that including bid withdrawal standards falls within OGS’s statutory authority to “best promote the public interest” by awarding contracts to the “lowest responsible and reliable bidder.” Finally, the court found that Alca had notice of the conditions contained within the bid invitation, addressing concerns about lack of public rules. The court noted, “Here, Alca could conform its bid to OGS expectations and standards, and it knew precisely what circumstances would result in forfeiture of its bid deposit.”

  • World Trade Center Bombing Litigation v. Port Authority, 93 N.Y.2d 1 (1999): Public Interest Privilege and Government Security Documents

    93 N.Y.2d 1 (1999)

    The public interest privilege, protecting confidential government communications, may shield security-related documents from discovery, but its application requires an in camera balancing of the public’s interest in disclosure against the potential harm to public safety from disclosure.

    Summary

    Following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, plaintiffs sought discovery of the Port Authority’s (PA) security plans and documents, specifically the 1985 Office for Special Planning (OSP) Report. The PA claimed the public interest privilege, arguing disclosure would compromise public safety. The Court of Appeals held that the privilege is not automatically precluded and requires an in camera assessment to balance the need for disclosure against the potential harm to the public. The Court emphasized that the PA’s role as a bi-state agency responsible for public safety distinguishes it from a private landlord, warranting consideration of the privilege.

    Facts

    The Port Authority (PA) owned and operated the World Trade Center (WTC). In 1984, the PA created the Office for Special Planning (OSP) to assess and address potential terrorist threats. The OSP produced a report in 1985 detailing vulnerabilities at the WTC. In 1993, a bomb exploded at the WTC, resulting in deaths, injuries, and extensive damage. Plaintiffs, individuals and businesses affected by the bombing, sued the PA for negligence, alleging inadequate security measures. They sought discovery of the OSP Report and related security documents.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs filed motions to compel production of the OSP Report and other security-related documents. The Supreme Court initially ordered an in camera review by a Special Master, who recommended withholding some documents based on the public interest privilege. The Supreme Court adopted the report with revisions. Both parties appealed. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the PA’s role as a landlord precluded application of the public interest privilege as a matter of law and ordered full disclosure subject to a confidentiality agreement. The PA appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the public interest privilege, which protects confidential governmental communications, is precluded as a matter of law from protecting the Port Authority’s security-related documents concerning the World Trade Center.

    Holding

    No, because the public interest privilege is not precluded as a matter of law, and an in camera review is required to balance the public’s interest in disclosure against the potential harm to public safety before deciding whether the privilege applies.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the public interest privilege protects confidential communications between public officers when the public interest requires confidentiality. The PA’s bi-state governmental function distinguishes it from a private landlord. The Court emphasized the need for a fact-specific, in camera balancing test, weighing the litigant’s need for information against the government’s duty to prevent similar occurrences and maintain public welfare. The Court quoted Cirale v. 80 Pine St. Corp., stating that “[o]nce it is shown that disclosure would be more harmful to the interests of the government than [nondisclosure would be to] the interests of the party seeking the information, the overall public interest on balance would then be better served by nondisclosure.” The Court acknowledged the PA’s arguments that disclosure could endanger lives, inhibit candor in government security efforts, and reveal confidential law enforcement information. The Court rejected the argument that a confidentiality agreement could substitute for the privilege. The Court explicitly stated, “The public interest privilege adheres to the disputed documents here on a presumptive basis since the PA ‘is and of necessity has to be a State agency’.” Therefore, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remanded for further proceedings, including an in camera review, to determine the extent to which the public interest privilege protects the documents, highlighting the importance of balancing competing interests in a fact-driven manner.

  • Cole v. Mandell Food Stores, Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 34 (1999): Pleading Requirements for Exceptions to Limited Liability in Personal Injury Cases

    93 N.Y.2d 34 (1999)

    A plaintiff seeking to avoid the limitations on liability for noneconomic damages under CPLR Article 16 must plead and prove an exception to the statute; failure to do so precludes raising the issue on appeal.

    Summary

    Plaintiff was injured when a security gate fell on him while entering a supermarket owned by Mandell. He sued Mandell, who then brought a third-party claim against United Steel, the gate’s manufacturer. The jury found both liable, apportioning 20% fault to Mandell and 80% to United Steel. The court allowed plaintiff to recover the full judgment from Mandell. On appeal, plaintiff argued that Mandell had a nondelegable duty, an exception to the rule limiting liability to the percentage of fault. The Court of Appeals held that because plaintiff failed to plead this exception as required by CPLR 1603, he could not raise it on appeal.

    Facts

    Plaintiff was entering a Key Food supermarket owned by Mandell when a metal security gate fell and injured him. The gate was designed and manufactured by United Steel Products. Plaintiff sued Mandell for negligence; Mandell then commenced a third-party action against United Steel for contribution. The plaintiff never sued United Steel directly.

    Procedural History

    The case was bifurcated. The jury found Mandell and United Steel jointly liable, apportioning 20% of the fault to Mandell and 80% to United Steel, and awarded damages to the plaintiff. Mandell and United Steel moved to limit Mandell’s liability for noneconomic loss to its 20% share. Supreme Court denied the motion, allowing plaintiff to recover the full judgment from Mandell. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Mandell was not liable for noneconomic loss beyond its share because plaintiff hadn’t pleaded an exception to CPLR Article 16. The Court granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plaintiff seeking to recover noneconomic damages from a defendant whose liability is 50% or less must plead and prove an exception to CPLR Article 16 to avoid the limitation of liability.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPLR 1603 explicitly requires a party asserting an exception to Article 16 to plead and prove it. Failure to do so precludes raising the exception on appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the plain language of CPLR 1603, which states that a party asserting an exception to the limitations on liability in Article 16 must “allege and prove by a preponderance of the evidence” that the exception applies. The Court emphasized that pleadings must provide adequate notice to the adverse party to allow them to prepare a defense. The Court stated, “Indeed, it is elementary that the primary function of a pleading is to apprise an adverse party of the pleader’s claim and to prevent surprise.” Because the plaintiff never pleaded the nondelegable duty exception, Mandell was prejudiced by being unable to prepare a defense based on that theory. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the omission was harmless, finding that it deprived Mandell of the opportunity to adjust its trial strategy. Regarding the cross-appeal, the court found that res ipsa loquitur was correctly applied, stating “Supreme Court properly submitted to the jury the case against Mandell under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur”. The Court reinforced the requirement of adequate notice to allow for proper defense preparation and strategy.

  • Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.Y.2d 682 (1999): Interpreting ‘Similar Coverage’ in CGL Policies

    92 N.Y.2d 682 (1999)

    The phrase “similar coverage for ‘your work’” in the excess coverage provision of a commercial general liability (CGL) policy refers to first-party property coverage, not third-party liability coverage.

    Summary

    This case addresses the interpretation of an “other insurance” clause in a Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy. A carpenter was injured while working at Selby’s apartment. Selby had a homeowner’s policy with Great Northern, and her contractor, Monier, had a CGL policy with Mount Vernon. Both policies covered the loss, but they disagreed on which was primary. The Mount Vernon policy was primary except when the other insurance was “Fire, Extended Coverage, Builder’s Risk, Installation Risk or similar coverage for ‘your work.’” The court held that “similar coverage for ‘your work’” refers to first-party property coverage, not third-party liability coverage like Selby’s homeowner’s policy; therefore, Mount Vernon’s CGL policy was primary.

    Facts

    John Hlavaty, a carpenter, was injured while renovating Linn Howard Selby’s cooperative apartment. Hlavaty was an independent contractor working for William Monier Construction Company, the general contractor hired by Selby. Monier agreed to defend and indemnify Selby for injuries arising from the construction work and obtained a CGL policy from Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company, naming Selby as an additional insured. Selby also had a homeowner’s policy with Great Northern Insurance Company.

    Procedural History

    Great Northern and Selby sued Mount Vernon in federal court to determine coverage responsibilities. The District Court held both policies were excess to each other, requiring pro rata sharing of costs. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the interpretation of the phrase “similar coverage for ‘your work’”. The New York Court of Appeals accepted the certified question.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the phrase “similar coverage for ‘your work’” in the excess coverage provision of the “other insurance” clause of a commercial general liability policy renders that policy’s coverage excess to the third-party liability coverage provided by a homeowner’s policy.

    Holding

    No, because the phrase “similar coverage for ‘your work’” in the CGL policy refers to first-party property coverage and not third-party liability coverage provided by a standard homeowner’s insurance policy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the phrase “similar coverage for ‘your work’ ” must be interpreted within the context of the enumerated coverages (Fire, Extended Coverage, Builder’s Risk, Installation Risk) listed in the Mount Vernon policy’s “other insurance” clause. These enumerated coverages are all forms of first-party property insurance, which protect against loss or damage sustained by an insured to its own property. “First-party coverage pertains to loss or damage sustained by an insured to its property; the insured receives the proceeds when the damage occurs.” The court distinguished this from third-party coverage, which protects against claims made by third parties against the insured. The Great Northern homeowner’s policy, while a hybrid policy, primarily provided third-party liability coverage for Hlavaty’s injuries. Because the Mount Vernon policy was designed to be excess only to policies providing first-party property coverage for commercial work, the court held that the Great Northern homeowner’s liability coverage was not “similar coverage” within the meaning of the Mount Vernon policy. The court cited cases from other states and industry interpretations supporting its conclusion. As stated by the court, “Thus, read within the context of the enumerated coverages, we interpret ‘similar coverage for your work” to mean first-party property coverage for commercial work.’”

  • People v. Garcia, 93 N.Y.2d 42 (1999): Right to Counsel at TASC Program Appearances

    People v. Garcia, 93 N.Y.2d 42 (1999)

    A defendant does not have the right to counsel at court appearances related to participation in a Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) program when those appearances are primarily administrative and do not involve accusatory proceedings or factual determinations affecting the defendant’s liberty.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s right to counsel was not violated when he appeared in court without counsel for TASC-related proceedings. Garcia pleaded guilty to a drug offense with the understanding that he would enter a TASC program. He was later ejected from the program for a rules violation. At a subsequent court appearance to discuss his status, the TASC representative suggested the court proceed to sentencing. The court agreed and discharged TASC from the case. The Court of Appeals reasoned that this appearance was not a “critical stage” requiring counsel because it was an administrative matter, not an accusatory proceeding involving new factual or legal determinations.

    Facts

    In 1994, Garcia sold heroin and crack cocaine to an undercover officer and was indicted. In 1995, he pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance, the top count of the indictment, with the understanding that he would be admitted into a TASC program. The court warned him that if he failed to complete the program or committed another crime, he could face a sentence of 4½ to 9 years. After participating in the program for 18 months, Garcia was ejected for violating rules and remained at large for three months. He was brought back to court on a bench warrant.

    Procedural History

    After being ejected from the TASC program, Garcia appeared in court several times without counsel. At one such appearance, the TASC representative suggested that the court sentence Garcia. The court discharged TASC from the case and scheduled sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, with counsel present, Garcia was sentenced to 4½ to 9 years. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction, and Garcia appealed, arguing a violation of his right to counsel.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the February 20th court appearance, where the court determined Garcia would be sentenced to jail after his ejection from the TASC program, constituted a “critical stage” of the proceedings requiring the presence of counsel.

    Holding

    No, because the February 20th appearance was an administrative proceeding and not an accusatory one requiring factual or legal determinations affecting Garcia’s liberty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished TASC appearances from parole or probation revocation hearings, where the right to counsel is required because the outcome (liberty or imprisonment) depends on factual determinations of misconduct. In revocation hearings, counsel is needed to marshal facts, introduce mitigating evidence, and assist the defendant. In contrast, Garcia’s February 20th appearance was not accusatory. The court emphasized that it was undisputed that Garcia had violated the TASC program rules. The court stated that “No factual or legal questions were at issue, and defendant’s views were not relevant to TASC’s decision to readmit him or its ability — given the circumstances created by defendant’s conduct — to find a new program for him.” The court’s decision was driven by administrative concerns and TASC’s assessment, not by any new allegations or factual disputes requiring legal representation. The Court concluded that the presence of counsel was not required to protect Garcia’s due process rights in this context. The court noted, “At the core of that right, which we have long recognized as inviolable and fundamental to our form of justice, is the recognition that defendants, confronted with both the intricacies of the criminal law and the experienced advocacy of the public prosecutor, require the ‘guiding hand of counsel’ to aid their defense.”

  • People v. Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d 677 (1999): Sufficiency of Factual Allegations for Physical Injury in Assault Cases

    People v. Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d 677 (1999)

    An information charging assault in the third degree is facially sufficient if it alleges facts from which a jury could infer that the victim suffered substantial pain, even if the long-term effects of the injury are not yet known at the time the information is filed.

    Summary

    Henderson was charged with assault in the third degree after allegedly kicking a victim during an attempted robbery, causing contusions, swelling, and substantial pain. He pleaded guilty, but later appealed, arguing that the information was facially insufficient to establish “physical injury.” The Appellate Term reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that the factual allegations in the information were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of assault in the third degree because a jury could infer substantial pain from the described injuries.

    Facts

    The defendant, acting with another individual, attempted to steal the victim’s motor scooter. During the attempt, the defendant and his accomplice kicked the victim about the legs. The victim suffered contusions and swelling about the legs and experienced substantial pain, alarm, and annoyance.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged in New York City Criminal Court with assault in the third degree, attempted petit larceny, resisting arrest, and harassment. The defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the third degree. The Appellate Term reversed the judgment of conviction and dismissed the information, finding it insufficient regarding physical injury. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the factual allegations in the information were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of assault in the third degree, specifically whether the allegations were sufficient to establish the “physical injury” element of the offense.

    Holding

    Yes, because accepting the allegations as true, a jury could certainly infer that the victim felt substantial pain. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order and reinstated the judgment of Criminal Court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that, to be facially sufficient, an information must contain non-hearsay allegations that, if true, establish every element of the offense charged. The Court noted that “physical injury” is defined as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain” (Penal Law § 10.00 [9]). The Court clarified that substantial pain is more than a mere technical battery. Quoting prior precedent, the Court stated that “ ‘petty slaps, shoves, kicks and the like delivered out of hostility, meanness and similar motives’, are not within the definition” of the statute. Here, the kicks were part of a concerted physical attack to steal the victim’s property. The Court reasoned that because the supporting deposition is often secured shortly after the event, the victim would not necessarily know the lasting effects of the injury. Thus, allegations of substantial pain, swelling, and contusions following kicks are sufficient to constitute physical injury. The Court also emphasized that the prima facie case requirement is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial. Therefore, the factual allegations in the information were sufficient to make out a prima facie case of assault in the third degree and support the judgment of conviction based upon the defendant’s guilty plea.

  • Matter of Silver v. New York City Housing Authority, 92 N.Y.2d 674 (1999): Eligibility for Section 8 Housing Subsidy Based on Approved Family Membership

    Matter of Silver v. New York City Housing Authority, 92 N.Y.2d 674 (1999)

    To be eligible for a Section 8 housing subsidy as a surviving family member, the individual must have been previously certified as a family member by the Housing Authority during the original recipient’s participation in the program.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the petitioner could succeed to his deceased mother’s Section 8 housing subsidy. Esther Silver received Section 8 benefits for her apartment for many years, consistently stating she was the sole occupant. After her death, her son sought to continue the subsidy, claiming he lived with her. The NYCHA denied his request, and the son filed suit. The Court of Appeals held that because the son was never certified as a family member by the NYCHA during his mother’s participation in the program, he was not eligible to succeed to the Section 8 benefits. Allowing the claim would disregard the subsidy program’s intent and invite fraud.

    Facts

    Esther Silver received Section 8 subsidies for her apartment beginning in 1978 and continuing until her death in March 1995.

    Each year, Silver submitted a form to the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) stating that she was the sole occupant of her apartment.

    Upon Silver’s death, her son, the petitioner, sought to succeed to her housing subsidy, claiming he was a family member who had lived with her for several years.

    The NYCHA denied the petitioner’s request, terminating the subsidy in 1995.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking continuation of the Section 8 benefits.

    The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, determining he was a bona fide family member entitled to succeed to the Section 8 benefits.

    The Appellate Division reversed, remitting the case to the NYCHA for a hearing to determine whether the petitioner was entitled to Section 8 benefits as a remaining family member.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the petitioner is entitled to succeed to his deceased mother’s Section 8 housing subsidy as a surviving family member when he was never certified by the NYCHA as a family member during his mother’s participation in the program.

    Holding

    No, because the petitioner was never certified by the NYCHA as a family member during his mother’s participation in the Section 8 program, there is no basis to conclude he is a family member entitled to succeed to the benefits.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the issue is governed by federal law, specifically Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 USC § 1437f) and its implementing regulations.

    The court cited 24 CFR 982.201(c), which defines a family as “a single person or a group of persons,” and 24 CFR 982.551(h)(2), which requires Housing Authority (HA) approval for the composition of the assisted family residing in the unit and for the addition of any family member as an occupant.

    The Court relied on the fact that the deceased had made “13 unequivocal annual statements…that she lived in the apartment alone,” and that the petitioner was never certified as a family member by the NYCHA. Therefore, there was no basis to conclude that the petitioner was a family member or that a hearing was necessary.

    The court reasoned that allowing the petitioner to claim status as a surviving family member without prior certification would “open the door to possible fraudulent claims and to a wholesale disregard of the intent of the subsidy program.”

    The court distinguished the case from Garner v Popolizio (171 AD2d 539), clarifying that the issue was not about the right to continued possession of the premises under State law, but about the continuation of a subsidy under Federal law.

  • Smith v. City University of New York, 92 N.Y.2d 707 (1999): Defining “Public Body” Under Open Meetings Law

    Smith v. City University of New York, 92 N.Y.2d 707 (1999)

    An organization comprised of administrators, faculty members, and students authorized to review proposed budgets, allocate student activity fees, and authorize disbursements is deemed a “public body” performing a governmental function and is therefore subject to New York’s Open Meetings Law.

    Summary

    Smith v. City University of New York (CUNY) concerns whether the Fiorello H. LaGuardia Community College Association, Inc. is subject to New York’s Open Meetings Law. The Association, Inc. reviews budgets, allocates student activity fees, and authorizes disbursements. After the Association, Inc. held a closed meeting, Smith, a student, sued, claiming a violation of the Open Meetings Law. The Court of Appeals held that the Association, Inc. is a public body because it exercises a governmental function by managing student activity fees, and is therefore subject to the Open Meetings Law. The court emphasized the Association’s decision-making authority and control over student funds.

    Facts

    LaGuardia Community College, part of CUNY, collects student activity fees as a condition of enrollment. The Fiorello H. LaGuardia Community College Association, Inc., composed of administrators, faculty, and students, manages these fees. The Association, Inc. voted to suspend the student newspaper, The Bridge, after an article containing offensive statements about Jews was published. A subcommittee investigated the newspaper, and the Dean of Student Affairs disapproved a purchase order for the next issue, effectively suspending publication. At a closed meeting on March 30, 1994, the Association, Inc. lifted the suspension but imposed restrictions on The Bridge, including prepublication review. Two individuals, Smith and Maitland, were prevented from attending the meeting.

    Procedural History

    Smith and Maitland sued, alleging the closed meeting violated the Open Meetings Law. The Supreme Court declared the Association, Inc. a “public body,” ordered future compliance with the Open Meetings Law, and annulled actions taken at the closed meeting. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the Association, Inc. was not a public body because it performed merely an advisory function and the funds it managed were segregated from the University’s general revenues. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding the Association, Inc. is a public body subject to the Open Meetings Law.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Fiorello H. LaGuardia Community College Association, Inc., is a “public body” performing a governmental function, thus subject to New York State’s Open Meetings Law when it allocates student activity fees and regulates student publications.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Association, Inc. exercises real and effective decision-making power by managing student activity fees delegated by CUNY and by regulating student publications, it performs a governmental function, making it a “public body” subject to the Open Meetings Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Open Meetings Law, designed to ensure public business is conducted openly, applies to any entity performing a governmental function. The court emphasized that the Association, Inc.’s powers and functions, derived from State law through CUNY’s by-laws, extend beyond a mere advisory role. CUNY delegated its statutory power to administer student activity fees to the Association, Inc., giving it control over the student activity fee budget. The court also noted the Association, Inc.’s power to suspend, regulate, and reinstate student publications, demonstrating its substantial autonomy. While the funds were segregated from CUNY’s general revenues, the court held that mandatory student activity fees, collected by the State to support student activities at a public university, are public funds. Claims regarding the closed meeting itself were deemed time-barred by the four-month statute of limitations, but claims contesting the allocation of funds were timely. The court cited Matter of Panarella v Birenbaum, 32 NY2d 108 and Rosenberger v Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 US 819, noting mandatory student fees are public funds. In defining “public body”, the court considered various criteria including the authority under which the entity was created, the power distribution, the nature of its role, and its relationship to affected parties, holding that the Association, Inc. possesses “real and effective decision-making power.” According to the court, “This Association, Inc., therefore, is manifestly not just a club or extracurricular activity.”