New York Law Review

Tag: 1998

  • People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708 (1998): Establishing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

    People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708 (1998)

    To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel’s challenged actions.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of intentional second-degree murder. On appeal, he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to object to certain questions during the cross-examination of an alibi witness and to part of the prosecutor’s summation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for his counsel’s actions. The court emphasized that defense counsel presented a coherent defense, actively participated in the trial, and that her actions could be attributed to tactical trial decisions.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder based largely on the testimony of his cousin, who claimed to have overheard him planning the murder, witnessed the act, and heard him discuss it afterward. The defense presented an alibi witness, the mother of the defendant’s child. The jury chose to believe the cousin, leading to the defendant’s conviction.

    Procedural History

    Following his conviction, the defendant appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A judge of the New York Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal to that court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to specific questions during the cross-examination of the alibi witness and to a portion of the prosecutor’s summation.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for his counsel’s actions, and it is presumed that counsel acted in a competent manner and exercised professional judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard that requires a defendant to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel’s alleged shortcomings. The court noted that defense counsel actively participated in jury selection, cross-examined prosecution witnesses, presented an alibi defense, and gave a detailed summation. The court emphasized that an unsuccessful defense does not automatically equate to ineffective assistance. The court noted the high number of objections made by the defense, and that not objecting further may have been a tactical decision to avoid annoying the court or jury, or to avoid highlighting damaging evidence.

    The court cited People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705, 709 (1988), stating, “it will be presumed that counsel acted in a competent manner and exercised professional judgment” when the defendant fails to demonstrate the absence of strategic reasons for counsel’s actions. The court found that the defendant failed to meet this burden, and therefore, the presumption of competence applied.

    The court also addressed the prosecutor’s conduct, noting that while some of the prosecutor’s actions were inappropriate, the record did not show that they affected counsel’s performance.

  • Fleet Bank v. Saleh, 91 N.Y.2d 743 (1998): Enforceability of Guaranty When Note Allows for Extensions

    Fleet Bank v. Saleh, 91 N.Y.2d 743 (1998)

    A guarantor is not relieved of their obligations if the guaranty agreement, when read in conjunction with the underlying promissory note, indicates consent to modifications or extensions of time for payment.

    Summary

    Saleh guaranteed a promissory note given by JMS Food Corp. to Fleet Bank. The note contained a clause where guarantors agreed to extensions of time for payment. JMS defaulted, and a modification agreement was signed without Saleh’s explicit consent. Fleet Bank sought summary judgment against Saleh as guarantor. The Court of Appeals held that Saleh was still bound by the guaranty because the original note and guaranty, read together, demonstrated his prior consent to such modifications. The Court emphasized that the note and guaranty constituted a single transaction, and Saleh failed to adequately rebut this.

    Facts

    On September 30, 1994, JMS Food Corp. gave a promissory note to Fleet Bank to pay an existing debt of $305,430, secured by JMS’s property. Saleh and his brother, Samir Saleh, both guaranteed the note in their individual capacities. In March 1996, JMS defaulted. On March 26, 1996, JMS and Samir Saleh signed a modification agreement reducing weekly payments and granting more time to pay the remaining debt of $140,001. Saleh did not sign the modification agreement.

    Procedural History

    Fleet Bank sought summary judgment against Saleh as a guarantor of the original note. The Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, with one Justice dissenting. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Saleh, as a guarantor, was relieved of his obligations because he did not consent to the modification agreement, despite the original note containing a clause where guarantors agreed to extensions of time for payment.

    Holding

    Yes, Saleh was still bound by his guaranty, because the note and guaranty were to be read as one transaction and the note explicitly stated the guarantors agreed to potential extensions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a guaranty is interpreted strictly, and a guarantor’s obligation cannot be altered without consent. However, the Court found that Saleh had provided the necessary consent within the original agreement. The promissory note stated that “the Makers and Guarantors of this Note severally waive demand, presentment, notice of protest and notice of non-payment, and agree and consent that the time for payment may be extended or said Note renewed from time to time.” The Court emphasized that the note and the guaranty were one transaction. Saleh had not adequately argued against this point in prior proceedings. The guaranty itself referenced the “within Note,” indicating an awareness of the note’s provisions. The court stated that “[a]fter respondents made their prima facie showing of the obligation and default, appellant was required to present defenses establishing that he was not bound by his guaranty.” By failing to adequately rebut the Bank’s showing that the note and guaranty formed a single agreement, Saleh was bound by the terms allowing for modifications. The court cited Uribe v Merchants Bank of N.Y., 91 NY2d 336, 341 (1998) stating “a contract should be enforced according to its terms and is ‘not to be subverted by straining to find an ambiguity which otherwise might not be thought to exist’”.

  • Hassan v. Hendel Products, Inc., 92 N.Y.2d 354 (1998): Statutory Owner May Sue Other Owners Under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388

    Hassan v. Hendel Products, Inc., 92 N.Y.2d 354 (1998)

    Under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, a statutory owner of a vehicle is not precluded from bringing a claim against other statutory owners for injuries sustained as a result of the negligent operation of the vehicle by a permissive user.

    Summary

    Marianne Hassan, an employee of Hendel Products, Inc., was injured while a passenger in a company car leased from First Union Auto Finance, Inc. Her husband, who was driving with permission, was killed in the accident. Hassan sued Hendel and First Union as owners of the vehicle under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hassan, as a statutory owner due to her exclusive use of the vehicle, could not sue co-owners. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the statute does not preclude a statutory owner from suing other owners for injuries caused by a permissive driver.

    Facts

    Marianne Hassan was employed by Hendel Products, Inc., and provided with a company vehicle leased from First Union Auto Finance, Inc., for both business and personal use. She used the vehicle for approximately two years. On May 25, 1997, Hassan was a passenger in the vehicle, driven by her husband, with the permission of Hendel and First Union. The car collided with a truck, resulting in her husband’s death and her severe injuries.

    Procedural History

    Hassan sued First Union and Hendel as owners of the vehicle, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388. The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order and granted summary judgment in favor of Hendel and First Union, concluding that Hassan was a statutory owner and could not sue co-owners. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a statutory owner of a vehicle, as defined by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 128, is precluded from bringing a claim under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 against other statutory owners of the same vehicle for injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of a permissive user.

    Holding

    No, because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 does not limit the class of possible plaintiffs to non-owners, and the statute’s purpose is to ensure access to a financially responsible party for those injured by the negligence of a permissive user.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the language of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, noting that it does not limit the class of plaintiffs to non-owners. The statute states that “Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle…by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.” The court emphasized that the defendants, Hendel and First Union, were owners who permitted the negligent driver to operate the vehicle. Therefore, whether or not Hassan was also an “owner,” her injuries caused by a driver operating the vehicle with the owners’ consent brought her within the statute’s protection. The court reiterated the purpose of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 is to “ensure access by injured persons to ‘a financially responsible [party] against whom to recover for injuries’ ” and “to impose liability upon the owner of a vehicle ‘for the negligence of a person legally operating the car with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.’” (Morris v Snappy Car Rental, 84 NY2d 21, 27 [1994]). The court did not find any language suggesting an intention to preclude a statutory owner from recovering against other owners under the statute. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. DeFreese, 91 N.Y.2d 714 (1998): Justifiable Use of Deadly Force in Defense Against Burglary

    91 N.Y.2d 714 (1998)

    A person in control of an occupied building may use deadly physical force when they reasonably believe another is committing a burglary and that such force is necessary to prevent or terminate the commission of the burglary.

    Summary

    DeFreese, a store employee, was convicted of criminally negligent homicide after fatally stabbing an unruly customer who had been asked to leave the store but re-entered and became violent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s affirmation of the conviction, holding that the trial court erred in not charging the jury on the justifiable use of deadly force in defense of burglary. The Court reasoned that a reasonable view of the evidence could lead a jury to conclude that the customer’s initial lawful entry became unlawful when he defied the order to leave, and his violent conduct supported the belief that deadly force was necessary.

    Facts

    Troy Alexander, heavily intoxicated, entered a convenience store where DeFreese worked. Alexander bumped into a customer, accosted another, and argued with DeFreese’s brother. Alexander physically threatened DeFreese’s brother. DeFreese escorted Alexander out, but Alexander re-entered, throwing items and threatening to kill DeFreese and his brother. Alexander punched DeFreese, who then grabbed a knife and swung it, fatally striking Alexander in the neck.

    Procedural History

    DeFreese was indicted for second-degree murder and first-degree manslaughter. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense but declined to instruct on justifiable use of deadly force in defense of burglary. The jury convicted DeFreese of criminally negligent homicide. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, dismissing the indictment without prejudice to the People’s application to resubmit the criminally negligent homicide charge to a grand jury.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the justifiable use of deadly force in defense of burglary, pursuant to Penal Law § 35.20, given the defendant’s claim that he reasonably believed the victim was committing a burglary.

    Holding

    Yes, because a reasonable view of the evidence supported the conclusion that the victim’s initial lawful entry became unlawful when he defied the defendant’s order to leave the premises, and the victim’s violent conduct and threats supported the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that deadly physical force was necessary to prevent or terminate a burglary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied Penal Law § 35.20(3), which permits the use of deadly force by a person in control of an occupied building who reasonably believes another is committing a burglary, and reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent or terminate the commission of the burglary. The court noted that burglary occurs when a person “knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein” (Penal Law § 140.20). Citing People v. Brown, the Court stated that a licensee’s privilege to be on the premises is revoked when “he defies a lawful order not to enter or remain, personally communicated to him by the owner of such premises or other authorized person” (Penal Law § 140.00 [5]).

    The Court concluded that a jury could reasonably find that Alexander’s entry became unlawful when he defied DeFreese’s order to leave. Further, Alexander’s violent conduct and threats supported the reasonableness of DeFreese’s belief that deadly force was necessary. The Court emphasized it must view the record in the light most favorable to the defendant. The Court cited People v. Padgett, 60 NY2d 142, 144 (1983) and People v. Torre, 42 NY2d 1036, 1037 (1977) for the standard that a reasonable view of the evidence entitles the defendant to a justification charge pursuant to Penal Law § 35.20.

    Because the defendant was convicted of a lesser-included offense, the court dismissed the indictment, allowing the prosecution to seek leave to resubmit the criminally negligent homicide charge to a grand jury.

  • People v. Miller, 91 N.Y.2d 372 (1998): Cross-Examination on Prior Guilty Pleas Before Sentencing

    People v. Miller, 91 N.Y.2d 372 (1998)

    A defendant who pleads guilty to a crime waives their Fifth Amendment rights regarding the facts admitted during the plea allocution, and may be cross-examined on those admissions in a subsequent trial, even if sentencing on the prior plea is pending, absent a credible claim that the plea is subject to vacatur.

    Summary

    Miller was convicted of robbery. Prior to trial, the court ruled that if Miller testified, the prosecution could cross-examine him regarding a prior robbery to which he had pleaded guilty but had not yet been sentenced. The cross-examination was limited to the facts Miller admitted during his guilty plea allocution. Miller appealed, arguing that because sentencing was pending on the prior robbery, cross-examination violated his right against self-incrimination. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Miller waived his Fifth Amendment rights regarding the admitted facts when he pleaded guilty, and had not demonstrated a risk of incriminating himself beyond those admitted facts.

    Facts

    Miller robbed three children at a McDonald’s restaurant on August 11, 1996. He pleaded guilty to attempted robbery on November 20, 1996, admitting under oath to taking $70 from a child. Before sentencing, Miller was arrested for another robbery. At the trial for the second robbery, the People sought to cross-examine Miller about the McDonald’s robbery, for which he was still awaiting sentencing. The trial court permitted the cross-examination, limited to Miller’s admissions during his guilty plea allocution for the McDonald’s robbery. Miller did not testify and was convicted.

    Procedural History

    After being convicted of robbery, Miller appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Miller leave to appeal to that court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court errs in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine a defendant about a prior crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty, but for which the defendant has not yet been sentenced, when the cross-examination is limited to the defendant’s admissions during the guilty plea allocution?

    Holding

    No, because the defendant waived his Fifth Amendment rights regarding the facts admitted during the plea allocution and did not demonstrate a credible risk of incriminating himself beyond those admitted facts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Betts, 70 N.Y.2d 289 (1987), where the Court held that a defendant who testifies does not waive their self-incrimination rights with respect to “pending” unrelated criminal charges. Here, Miller had already pleaded guilty to the prior crime, waiving his Fifth Amendment rights in connection with the facts he admitted during the plea allocution. The Court emphasized that Miller never suggested that his guilty plea was vulnerable or that there was any ground upon which it could be vacated. The Court also distinguished Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), where the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s guilty plea did not waive her right to remain silent during sentencing proceedings where further testimony was expected. In this case, there was no basis for Miller to fear or expect a sentencing hearing at which proof would be taken or that he would be called upon to incriminate himself beyond what he admitted at the plea allocution. The Court stated, “By meticulously limiting the inquiry as it did, the trial court foreclosed any incriminating inquiry as to the McDonald’s crime, save what defendant himself said when he relinquished his Fifth Amendment rights during the plea colloquy.” The court concluded that Miller’s arguments regarding self-incrimination were theoretical and unavailing because the trial court only allowed questioning related to what Miller already admitted to under oath. The Court noted that it was not deciding whether People v. Spitaleri, 9 N.Y.2d 168 (1961), which barred the use of withdrawn guilty pleas, should be extended to admissions made in another trial.

  • Community Housing Improvement Program v. DHCR, 92 N.Y.2d 48 (1998): Urstadt Law and “More Stringent” Rent Control Provisions

    Community Housing Improvement Program v. DHCR, 92 N.Y.2d 48 (1998)

    The Urstadt Law, prohibiting “more stringent or restrictive” rent regulations, does not prevent New York City from adopting a more accurate measure of capital value in its rent control formula, even if it reduces potential profits for landlords, as long as the fundamental regulatory scheme remains intact.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge by landlords to New York City’s Local Law 73, which changed the method for calculating maximum base rent (MBR) for rent-controlled apartments. The law substituted Real Property Tax Law article 12 for article 12-A in determining “equalized assessed valuation,” a factor in the MBR formula. Landlords argued this violated the Urstadt Law, which prohibits “more stringent or restrictive” rent regulations. The Court of Appeals held that the change was permissible because it aimed to provide a more accurate valuation method and did not fundamentally alter the existing regulatory scheme, even though it potentially reduced landlord profits.

    Facts

    The City’s MBR formula ensures landlords an 8.5% return on capital value, based on equalized assessed valuation. Originally, Local Law 30 (1970) specified using Real Property Tax Law article 12-A for this valuation. Over time, disparities arose between valuations under article 12-A and article 12, particularly after the City classified real property into four classes, assessing Class One properties (one-, two-, and three-family homes) at a much lower percentage of market value than other classes, including most apartment buildings. In 1997, the City enacted Local Law 73, substituting article 12 for article 12-A in the MBR calculation. This generally resulted in lower MBRs for landlords.

    Procedural History

    Landlords and real estate organizations challenged Local Law 73, arguing it violated the Urstadt Law. The City countered, seeking a declaration upholding the law. Supreme Court denied the landlords’ motion and granted summary judgment to the City and tenant groups, declaring Local Law 73 valid. The Appellate Division modified the order, but otherwise affirmed the lower court’s decision. The landlords appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City’s adoption of article 12 to measure capital value in the MBR formula violates the Urstadt Law’s prohibition against “more stringent or restrictive provisions of regulation and control.”

    Holding

    No, because adopting article 12 is a permissible adjustment aimed at achieving a more accurate valuation of capital value, and it does not fundamentally alter the existing rent control regulatory scheme established under Local Law 30. It does not constitute a “more stringent or restrictive provision” as contemplated by the Urstadt Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Urstadt Law’s primary intent was to prevent the City from expanding rent regulation or undermining state policies aimed at vacancy decontrol. The law was enacted to encourage investment in existing housing units by limiting the fear of more stringent controls. The Court reviewed its prior Urstadt Law jurisprudence, emphasizing that “more stringent or restrictive” refers to changes that enlarge the City’s regulatory control over landlords, not simply measures that might reduce landlord profits. The Court highlighted that the City’s action preserved the existing regulatory framework while seeking a more accurate valuation method, aligning with the State Legislature’s presumed intent of having capital value reflect the actual value of rent-controlled buildings. The Court rejected the argument that the Urstadt Law gave landlords a vested interest in overvaluation. It emphasized that Local Law 73 aimed for accuracy in capital valuation, a goal the Urstadt Law does not prohibit. Quoting from prior rent control cases, the court noted such legislation often “contains serious gaps, not readily filled by interpretation based on intention, because there was none” and thus requires a practical approach. The court emphasized an “accurate result” is essential and the goal of Local Law 73 was accuracy in capital valuation.

  • Rupert v. Rupert, 309 A.D.2d 1247 (1998): Enforceability of Antenuptial Agreements and Appellate Review

    Rupert v. Rupert, 309 A.D.2d 1247 (1998)

    When a final judgment rests on an alternative basis independent of a prior nonfinal appellate order, the nonfinal order does not necessarily affect the final judgment, precluding appellate review of the nonfinal order.

    Summary

    This case addresses the enforceability of an antenuptial agreement and the scope of appellate review. The husband appealed a final judgment arguing that a prior Appellate Division order holding the antenuptial agreement valid was incorrect. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that because the Supreme Court’s final judgment rested on an alternative ground (promissory estoppel) in addition to the Appellate Division’s validation of the agreement, the prior non-final order did not necessarily affect the final judgment. Thus, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the prior order.

    Facts

    The husband and wife entered into an antenuptial agreement, which was later amended by two additional documents. In a prior appeal, the Appellate Division held that the original agreement and the two amendments constituted one integrated and enforceable agreement. Upon remittal to the Supreme Court, the court resolved financial issues, and determined that the case could also have been decided under a theory of promissory estoppel, which would have resulted in the same outcome.

    Procedural History

    1. The Supreme Court initially addressed the validity of the antenuptial agreement.
    2. The Appellate Division reversed in part, holding the antenuptial agreement and its amendments valid and enforceable. The case was remitted to Supreme Court to determine the value of property obtained during the marriage (Rupert v. Rupert, 245 A.D.2d 1139 (1997)).
    3. On remand, the Supreme Court resolved the financial issues and also found an alternative basis for its decision based on promissory estoppel.
    4. The husband appealed the final Supreme Court judgment to the Court of Appeals, seeking review of the prior Appellate Division order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prior nonfinal Appellate Division order necessarily affects a final judgment of the Supreme Court, when that final judgment rests on an alternative basis independent of the Appellate Division’s order, thus permitting review of the nonfinal order by the Court of Appeals.

    Holding

    No, because the final judgment of the Supreme Court rested on an alternative basis (promissory estoppel) for the result reached by the Appellate Division, the Appellate Division’s nonfinal order does not necessarily affect the final determination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on CPLR 5602 (a) (1) (ii), which dictates the circumstances under which appeals can be taken to the Court of Appeals to bring up for review a prior nonfinal Appellate Division order. The statute requires that the Appellate Division order “necessarily affect the final judgment.” The Court reasoned that because the Supreme Court’s decision was based on an alternative ground—promissory estoppel—independent of the Appellate Division’s determination that the antenuptial agreement was valid, the Appellate Division’s order was not essential to the final judgment. The court stated, “Inasmuch as the final judgment of Supreme Court rests on an alternative basis for the result reached by the Appellate Division, the Appellate Division’s nonfinal order does not necessarily affect the final determination. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed.” The Court explicitly noted that dismissing the appeal did not constitute an endorsement of the Appellate Division’s prior order. This implies that the underlying validity of the antenuptial agreement remained an open question, although unreviewable in the present procedural posture. This case highlights the importance of ensuring that challenges to non-final orders are raised in a way that directly impacts the final judgment, otherwise appellate review may be precluded.

  • People v. Curtis, 92 N.Y.2d 544 (1998): Determining Dismissal Rights for Defendants Under Civil Commitment After Jackson v. Indiana

    People v. Curtis, 92 N.Y.2d 544 (1998)

    Custodial time under civil commitment orders pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law does not count toward the statutory time limit for dismissal of indictments under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 730.50, which applies only to time spent in custody under criminal court orders.

    Summary

    Curtis was indicted for manslaughter but found unfit to stand trial and committed to the Commissioner of Mental Health. Later, he was converted to civil patient status under the Mental Hygiene Law, pursuant to Jackson v. Indiana. Years later, he sought dismissal of the indictment, arguing that his total time in custody exceeded two-thirds of the maximum possible sentence, as per CPL 730.50(3) and (4). The Court of Appeals held that time spent under civil commitment does not count toward the CPL 730.50 limit, reversing the lower courts’ decisions and denying the motion to dismiss. The Court reasoned that the statute explicitly refers to custody under criminal court orders, not civil orders, and that denying dismissal does not violate equal protection or due process rights.

    Facts

    Curtis was indicted for manslaughter in 1981. He was found mentally incapacitated to stand trial and committed to the custody of the State Commissioner of Mental Health under CPL Article 730. In 1983, Curtis’s status was converted to civil patient status under Article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law, following Jackson v. Indiana. He remained in the Commissioner’s custody under civil commitment orders.

    Procedural History

    In 1998, Curtis moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing he had been in custody for longer than two-thirds of the maximum sentence, pursuant to CPL 730.50(3) and (4). The Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who was initially held under a criminal order of commitment but later converted to civil status under the Mental Hygiene Law pursuant to Jackson v. Indiana, is entitled to have the time spent under civil commitment counted toward the statutory limit for dismissal of the indictment under CPL 730.50(3) and (4).

    Holding

    No, because CPL 730.50(3) and (4) apply only to the periods prescribed in criminal orders of commitment and retention, not to time spent under civil commitment orders issued pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on the statutory language of CPL 730.50(3), which refers to “the aggregate of the periods prescribed in the temporary order of commitment, the first order of retention and all subsequent orders of retention.” The Court stated: “As quoted, the statute clearly provides that not every custodial retention of an indicted defendant by the Commissioner for two thirds of the authorized imprisonment is sufficient for dismissal. It is only custody for periods ‘prescribed’ (emphasis supplied) in orders of commitment and retention that may be aggregated and counted in determining the defendant’s entitlement to dismissal of the indictment.” Because Curtis was held under civil commitment orders, he was not entitled to the benefit of CPL 730.50(3) and (4). The Court noted that “whenever the phrase ‘superior court’ is used in the Criminal Procedure Law, it refers to a court exercising criminal jurisdiction.” The Court also rejected Curtis’s arguments based on equal protection and due process, finding a rational basis for treating civilly committed defendants differently. The Court distinguished Klopfer v. North Carolina, noting that in this case, unlike in Klopfer, the People were statutorily barred from proceeding against this defendant because he was incapacitated to stand trial. Finally, the Court emphasized that Curtis had exchanged his right to automatic dismissal under CPL 730.50 for the benefits of civil commitment, which allowed for release under a less stringent standard.

  • People v. Defeo, 92 N.Y.2d 947 (1998): Criminal Mischief Requires Proof of Damage

    People v. Defeo, 92 N.Y.2d 947 (1998)

    To sustain a conviction for criminal mischief in the fourth degree under New York Penal Law § 145.00, the prosecution must prove that the defendant intentionally damaged tangible property.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminal mischief after she pulled a surveyor’s stake from the ground during a property dispute with her neighbor. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the criminal mischief conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that the defendant’s actions caused any damage to tangible property, which is a necessary element of the crime under Penal Law § 145.00. While the extent of damage required is slight, some amount of damage must be proven.

    Facts

    During a dispute with her neighbor regarding the boundary line between their properties, the defendant removed a marker stake that a surveyor (hired by the neighbor) had placed on the property line. The defendant threw the stake several feet. The defendant was subsequently charged with criminal mischief in the fourth degree, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted by a Town Court jury of criminal mischief in the fourth degree and disorderly conduct. The County Court affirmed the Town Court’s judgment. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a conviction for criminal mischief in the fourth degree under New York Penal Law § 145.00 requires proof of damage to tangible property.

    Holding

    Yes, because Penal Law § 145.00 requires proof that the defendant intentionally damaged the property of another person without the right to do so or reasonable grounds to believe that she had such a right.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law § 145.00(1) requires proof of intentional damage to the property of another. While the extent of damage necessary to sustain a conviction for fourth-degree criminal mischief is slight, some amount of damage is required. The Court emphasized the absence of any evidence presented by the prosecution demonstrating damage to the property demarcated by the stake or to the stake itself. The Court stated, “In order for a defendant to be found guilty of criminal mischief in the fourth degree, the People must prove that defendant intentionally damaged the property of another person without the right to do so or reasonable grounds to believe that she had such a right (Penal Law § 145.00 [1]). While the extent of damage necessary to sustain a conviction for fourth degree criminal mischief is slight, some amount of damage is required…However, on this record, proof of damage is completely lacking.” The Court found the jury charge for disorderly conduct was proper. The Court modified the order by dismissing the criminal mischief charge and remitting to the Town Court for resentencing.

  • Bettenhauser v. Worcester Ins. Co., 92 N.Y.2d 422 (1998): Insurer’s Duty to Timely Disclaim Coverage Based on Policy Exclusion

    92 N.Y.2d 422 (1998)

    An insurer must timely disclaim coverage under Insurance Law § 3420(d) when denying a claim based on a policy exclusion, if the claim would otherwise fall within the policy’s coverage provisions.

    Summary

    Thomas Bettenhauser, injured in a car accident while driving his own uninsured vehicle, sought underinsurance benefits under his parents’ policy with Worcester Insurance. Worcester initially processed the claim, requesting discovery and consenting to Bettenhauser’s settlement with the other driver. Over a year later, Worcester sought to stay arbitration, arguing the policy didn’t cover family members driving their own uninsured vehicles. The New York Court of Appeals held that Worcester’s failure to timely deny coverage, as required by Insurance Law § 3420(d), precluded them from later relying on a policy exclusion to deny the claim. This case clarifies the distinction between claims falling outside a policy’s initial coverage and those denied due to an exclusion.

    Facts

    Thomas Bettenhauser was injured in a two-car accident while driving his own automobile on November 22, 1995.

    The other driver’s insurance policy had a $10,000 limit, and Bettenhauser’s policy did not include underinsurance coverage.

    On February 1, 1996, Bettenhauser, who lived with his parents, filed an underinsurance claim under their policy with Worcester Insurance Company.

    Worcester requested discovery and a medical examination, which Bettenhauser complied with over the next several months.

    In December 1996, with Worcester’s consent, Bettenhauser settled his negligence action against the other driver for the policy limit of $10,000.

    Procedural History

    After settlement negotiations stalled, Bettenhauser demanded arbitration.

    Worcester then commenced a special proceeding to permanently stay arbitration, arguing for the first time that the policy didn’t cover Bettenhauser because he was driving his own vehicle.

    Supreme Court granted the stay, concluding the policy didn’t cover family members driving uninsured automobiles.

    The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an insurer must timely disclaim coverage under Insurance Law § 3420(d) when denying a claim based on a policy exclusion, if the claim would otherwise fall within the policy’s coverage provisions.

    Holding

    Yes, because Bettenhauser’s claim fell within the policy’s coverage provisions, and denial of coverage was predicated on a specific exclusion. Worcester’s failure to timely disclaim coverage as required by Insurance Law § 3420(d) precluded them from later relying on the exclusion to deny the claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Worcester was required to timely deny coverage under Insurance Law § 3420(d). The court distinguished between situations where a claim falls outside the scope of the policy’s coverage portion (requiring no disclaimer) and where denial of coverage is based on a policy exclusion (requiring timely disclaimer).

    The court emphasized that disclaimer is unnecessary when a claim falls outside the scope of the policy’s coverage portion because the insurance policy does not contemplate coverage in the first instance. By contrast, disclaimer is necessary when denial of coverage is based on a policy exclusion without which the claim would be covered. Failure to comply with section 3420(d) precludes denial of coverage based on a policy exclusion.

    Referencing the case of Handelsman v Sea Ins. Co., the court noted “Because mother and son were “insureds” who satisfied all the conditions of the relevant coverage provisions — which did not contain any limitation with reference to vehicles — we concluded that a relationship between the carrier and the claimants existed, requiring timely denial of coverage based on the policy exclusion. We further explained that the carrier’s failure to timely disclaim was “dispositive” and precluded subsequent reliance on the exclusion to avoid its obligations.”

    The court found that Bettenhauser’s claim fell within the policy’s coverage provisions in the “Insuring Agreement.” The relevant conditions of the Insuring Agreement were met. Denial of coverage was predicated on one of the designated “Exclusions.” But for a specified circumstance — here, the use of a family-owned motor vehicle not insured by the policy — Bettenhauser’s claim would have been covered.

    The court stated that Insurance Law § 3420(d) was enacted to avoid prejudice to an injured claimant who could be harmed by delay in learning the insurer’s position. Worcester waited more than a year to deny coverage, all the while subjecting Bettenhauser to discovery demands, and ultimately consenting to settlement of his action against the other driver. The Court concluded that Worcester could not rely on the policy exclusion to escape liability because they did not comply with Insurance Law § 3420(d).