New York Law Review

Tag: 1997

  • People v. Burdo, 91 N.Y.2d 146 (1997): Limits on Interrogation When Defendant Has Counsel on Unrelated Charge

    91 N.Y.2d 146 (1997)

    Once a defendant in custody is represented by counsel, even on an unrelated charge, police cannot interrogate the defendant about any matter without counsel present, absent a counseled waiver.

    Summary

    Burdo was incarcerated on rape charges and an unrelated probation violation. Police questioned him about a murder, after advising him of his Miranda rights and confirming he understood them and was willing to speak without a lawyer present. Burdo admitted to involvement in the murder. The trial court suppressed the confession, citing People v. Rogers. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under Rogers, because Burdo was in custody and represented by counsel on another charge, questioning on any matter was prohibited without counsel present, protecting the attorney-client relationship and mitigating state coercion.

    Facts

    Francis Burdo was jailed on rape and probation violation charges and was represented by counsel on the rape charges.

    Police investigators questioned Burdo about the murder of Leo Gebo.

    Burdo was given Miranda warnings and waived his rights, agreeing to speak to the officers without counsel.

    He confessed to the Gebo murder. Burdo stated that he was high on pot and booze when the murder occurred.

    Burdo then signed a written statement detailing his involvement in the murder.

    Procedural History

    The County Court suppressed Burdo’s confession, citing People v. Rogers, as Burdo was in custody on unrelated charges for which he had counsel.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s order.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements made during a custodial interrogation, without counsel present, are admissible when the defendant is represented by counsel on a pending, unrelated charge.

    Holding

    No, because once a defendant in custody on a particular matter is represented by counsel, custodial interrogation about any subject, related or unrelated to the charge upon which representation is sought or obtained, must cease, unless there is a counseled waiver.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the precedent set in People v. Rogers, which held that once an attorney has entered the proceeding, police must cease questioning the defendant in custody without counsel present. This protects the attorney-client relationship from being undermined by police interrogation. The Court reaffirmed its commitment to Rogers. The Court emphasized the principle that it is the attorney, not the police, who determines which matters are related and unrelated to the subject of the representation. The Court rejected the argument that Rogers only applies when an attorney actively interjects to stop questioning, clarifying that representation alone triggers the protection. Dissent argued Burdo failed to establish a clear attorney-client relationship or invoke his right to counsel, citing a distinction between the Sixth Amendment right and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Dissent claimed extending the Rogers rule this far could impede law enforcement’s ability to investigate crimes. The majority stated the decision neither expands nor narrows Rogers, which established the principle that a defendant represented by counsel on the charge on which he is held in custody cannot be interrogated in the absence of counsel “on any matter.” The Court noted that the Rogers rule ensures that it is the defendant’s attorney, not the police, who determines which matters are related and unrelated to the subject of the representation.

  • Matter of Merson v. McNally, 90 N.Y.2d 742 (1997): Permissibility of Project Modifications Under SEQRA

    Matter of Merson v. McNally, 90 N.Y.2d 742 (1997)

    Under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), modifications to a Type I action during the review process are permissible and do not automatically invalidate a negative declaration if the modifications address and mitigate potential environmental concerns in an open and deliberative manner.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which modifications to a development project during the SEQRA review process affect the validity of a negative declaration. The Court of Appeals held that modifications made to a mining project in response to environmental concerns raised during the Planning Board’s review did not automatically convert the negative declaration into an improperly conditioned one. The court emphasized that SEQRA encourages an open process where environmental concerns are addressed and mitigated through project modifications, provided the process is transparent and deliberative, and the modifications genuinely negate potential adverse effects.

    Facts

    Philips-town Industrial Park, Inc. (PIP) sought a mined land reclamation permit from the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and a special use permit from the Town of Philipstown for a mining and reclamation project. The Planning Board, acting as the lead agency under SEQRA, identified potentially significant environmental impacts. In response to concerns raised by the Board, other agencies, and the public, PIP modified its project plans, including reducing noise levels, addressing traffic concerns, and protecting groundwater resources. After these modifications, the Planning Board issued a negative declaration.

    Procedural History

    A group of community residents filed a CPLR Article 78 petition seeking to annul the negative declaration. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the Planning Board’s determination. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the negative declaration was the functional equivalent of a conditioned negative declaration, which is impermissible for Type I actions. PIP then sought final approval of the special use permit, which was denied by the Town Board. PIP filed another Article 78 proceeding, which the Supreme Court granted, but the Appellate Division reversed based on its prior ruling in Merson. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether modifications made to a Type I action during the SEQRA review process automatically invalidate a negative declaration.
    2. Whether the Planning Board’s negative declaration was an improperly conditioned negative declaration.

    Holding

    1. No, because modifications made to a Type I action during the SEQRA review process do not automatically invalidate a negative declaration if they address and mitigate potential environmental concerns in an open and deliberative manner.
    2. No, because the modifications were not conditions unilaterally imposed by the lead agency, but rather adjustments incorporated by the project sponsor to mitigate concerns identified by the public and reviewing agencies through an open and deliberative process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged SEQRA’s policy of integrating environmental considerations into governmental decision-making. The court disagreed with the Appellate Division’s blanket prohibition of any modifications during the review process, opting for an approach that allows for legitimate maturation of development projects. The court distinguished between permissible modifications made as part of an open, deliberative process and impermissible “conditioned negative declarations,” which are only allowed for unlisted actions.

    The Court established a two-fold inquiry to determine if a negative declaration has been impermissibly conditioned: (1) whether the project, as initially proposed, might result in significant adverse environmental effects; and (2) whether the proposed mitigating measures were “identified and required by the lead agency” as a condition precedent to the issuance of the negative declaration.

    The Court emphasized that mitigating measures are acceptable if they clearly negate the potential adverse effects of the proposed action. In this case, the modifications made by PIP—such as limiting Saturday hours, pursuing a separate access road, and increasing overburden—were not conditions unilaterally imposed by the Planning Board, but adjustments incorporated by PIP to address concerns. The Court highlighted the open discussions and input from all parties involved, aligning with SEQRA’s purposes. The Court quoted from the regulations to show that the EAF process is intended to be flexible enough to incorporate information to fit a project or action, and does not necessarily mean that identifying an impact as potentially large means that it is also necessarily significant.

    Ultimately, the Court held that the mere fact of modifications is insufficient to nullify a negative declaration; the dispositive factors are the character and source of the modifications and whether the agency’s determination of nonsignificance is reasonable. Because the SEQRA process was conducted openly and deliberatively, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter for further proceedings.

  • People v. Blair, 90 N.Y.2d 1003 (1997): Admissibility of Prior Uncharged Crimes as Rebuttal Evidence

    People v. Blair, 90 N.Y.2d 1003 (1997)

    Evidence of a prior uncharged crime is inadmissible to demonstrate a defendant’s bad character or criminal propensity unless it is linked to a specific material issue relating to the charged crime and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact; additionally, rebuttal evidence must counter some affirmative fact the defendant attempted to prove.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of drug-related crimes. His defense was that an informant planted the drugs in his closet. The prosecution called a rebuttal witness who testified that eight months prior, the defendant had sold her drugs from his apartment. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, finding that the rebuttal testimony was inadmissible because it only demonstrated the defendant’s propensity to sell drugs and did not refute his claim that he had been framed. The Court held that the prior uncharged crime evidence was inadmissible because it didn’t address a material issue raised by the defense.

    Facts

    Police, assisted by an informant, obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s apartment. During the search, police found drugs in the defendant’s bedroom closet. At trial, the defendant claimed that the informant planted the drugs to frame him. After the defense rested, the People called a rebuttal witness. The witness testified that approximately eight months before the search, the defendant had sold her drugs, retrieving them from a back room of his apartment. The defendant objected, arguing that the testimony lacked probative value and was unduly prejudicial. The trial court overruled the objection, finding the evidence relevant to “the issue of knowledge and weight.”

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted on narcotics-related charges in the trial court. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting rebuttal testimony regarding a prior uncharged drug transaction when the defendant’s defense was that the drugs were planted, and the testimony served only to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to sell drugs rather than to rebut a specific fact affirmatively asserted by the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the rebuttal testimony concerning an alleged drug transaction eight months before the events for which he was convicted did nothing to refute defendant’s claim that he had been framed, but merely tended to show his propensity to sell drugs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that evidence of a prior uncharged crime is inadmissible solely to demonstrate a defendant’s bad character or criminal propensity. However, such evidence may be admissible if it is linked to a specific material issue relating to the charged crime and if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact. Furthermore, evidence offered in rebuttal must counter “’some affirmative fact’” which defendant attempted to prove (quoting People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 345, quoting Marshall v. Davies, 78 N.Y. 414, 420). In this case, the defendant’s defense was that he never possessed the drugs found in his closet; he claimed they were planted. The Court found that while evidence of prior uncharged crimes may be relevant to show intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake, these elements were not at issue in the defendant’s case. The Court reasoned that “whether defendant intended to sell the drugs, knew of their weight, or mistakenly or accidentally sold or possessed the drugs was never placed in issue by defendant.” The Court concluded that the rebuttal testimony did not refute the defendant’s claim of being framed and instead, merely demonstrated his propensity to sell drugs, violating the rule against using prior uncharged crimes as propensity evidence. The court cited People v. Crandall, 67 N.Y.2d 111, 118-119.

  • DeJesus v. DeJesus, 90 N.Y.2d 643 (1997): Determining Marital Property Interest in Stock Options

    DeJesus v. DeJesus, 90 N.Y.2d 643 (1997)

    Stock options granted during a marriage, but contingent on future employment, require a determination of whether they compensate for past services, incentivize future services, or both, to equitably distribute their value as marital property.

    Summary

    In a divorce action, the central issue was the classification and distribution of stock options granted to the husband during the marriage, which were contingent on his continued employment post-divorce. The trial court deemed the entirety of the stock plans marital property, to be divided equally. The husband appealed, arguing for a time-rule calculation similar to pension rights. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted, holding that a proper determination requires evidence on whether the stock plans compensate for past services, incentivize future services, or both. This case provides a framework for evaluating how to equitably distribute stock options in divorce proceedings.

    Facts

    The parties married in 1979. The husband began employment with Astoria Financial Corporation seven months before the marriage and progressed to First Assistant Vice-President during the marriage. In 1993, Astoria granted the husband two restricted stock benefit plans: the Incentive Stock Option Plan (ISOP) and the Recognition and Retention Plan (RRP). Both plans were contingent on the husband’s continued employment with Astoria. The wife commenced a divorce action in 1994.

    Procedural History

    The wife commenced a divorce action in Supreme Court. The parties stipulated to all issues save the stock plans. The trial court deemed all stock plans marital property, to be divided equally. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether stock options granted during a marriage, but contingent on future employment, constitute marital property subject to equitable distribution, and if so, how should their value be determined?

    Holding

    No, not without further determination. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted, holding that the trial court lacked a sufficient basis to determine whether the stock plans constituted deferred compensation for employment during the marriage, or if any portion was purely an incentive for future services. “The parties’ submissions, absent sworn testimony or documentation from persons with knowledge of just how and why these stock plans came to be, do not suffice to enable the courts to determine what portions of the plans at issue, if any, constitute marital property.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the determination of whether an asset is marital property is a question of law subject to review. Marital property includes “all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action” (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [c]). The court noted stock plans can be deferred compensation for past services or incentives for future services. It reviewed approaches from other states, highlighting the need to balance considerations of law and equity. Drawing from In re Marriage of Miller (Colorado), the court suggested an analysis to determine whether the stock plans were granted for past services (wholly marital property) or future services (not marital property until those services are performed). The court adopted a Miller-type analysis to accommodate tensions between portions of stock plans acquired during and outside the marriage, and those compensating for past versus future services. It instructed the trial court to consider if the plans were offered as a bonus or alternative to fixed salary, if the value was tied to future performance, and if the plan was used to attract key personnel. A time rule should be applied to determine the marital share of portions granted as compensation for past services and as incentive for future services. Ultimately, the portion deemed marital property would be subject to equitable distribution.

  • Abiele Contracting, Inc. v. New York City School Construction Authority, 91 N.Y.2d 1 (1997): Enforceability of Agency Default Determinations

    Abiele Contracting, Inc. v. New York City School Construction Authority, 91 N.Y.2d 1 (1997)

    A municipal agency’s determination that a contractor defaulted is not binding and does not foreclose a plenary action unless the agency has statutory or contractual authority to make a quasi-judicial, final, and binding determination.

    Summary

    Abiele Contracting, Inc. sued the New York City School Construction Authority (SCA) for breach of contract after the SCA terminated Abiele’s contract to renovate a high school, alleging poor performance. The SCA argued Abiele was required to challenge the default determination via an Article 78 proceeding and was barred from bringing a plenary action. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the SCA lacked the statutory or contractual authority to render a quasi-judicial, final, and binding determination of default, Abiele was not precluded from bringing a plenary action for breach of contract.

    Facts

    Abiele Contracting, Inc. contracted with the New York City School Construction Authority (SCA) to renovate a high school. Disputes arose regarding delays, costs, and payments. The SCA alleged poor performance by Abiele, while Abiele blamed the SCA for access and response issues. The SCA’s Default Committee convened and ultimately terminated Abiele’s contract for cause and barred them from future contracts. Abiele appealed to the president of the SCA, but the appeal was denied.

    Procedural History

    Abiele sued the SCA in a plenary action for breach of contract. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the SCA, finding that Abiele should have challenged the default determination in an Article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipal agency’s determination of default and subsequent termination of contract with its general contractor was reviewable only in a CPLR article 78 proceeding, and therefore not subject to a plenary action instituted by the general contractor?

    Holding

    No, because the SCA had neither statutory nor contractual authority to render a quasi-judicial determination. Therefore, it was not empowered to issue a final and binding determination of default reviewable only in an Article 78 proceeding, and a plenary action sounding in contract is not precluded.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while administrative actions are generally reviewed through Article 78 proceedings, the agency must have the authority to make binding determinations. The Court analyzed the contract and relevant statutes and determined that neither granted the SCA the power to make quasi-judicial, final, and binding determinations of default. The contract provision regarding termination for cause outlined the SCA’s right to terminate but did not indicate that Abiele surrendered its right to seek redress in a plenary action. The court noted the contract even contained a “Waiver of Remedies” section that preserved the contractor’s right to seek money damages. Furthermore, the Public Authorities Law did not expressly or impliedly grant the SCA adjudicatory power. The Court stated, “the jurisdiction of an administrative board or agency consists of the powers granted it by statute, [and thus] a determination is void * * * where it is made either without statutory power or in excess thereof.” The Court also rejected the argument that collateral estoppel applied because the SCA was not authorized to render a quasi-judicial determination of default. Therefore, Abiele’s plenary action for breach of contract was allowed to proceed.

  • People v. Brensic, 89 N.Y.2d 579 (1997): Corroboration of Underlying Felony in Hindering Prosecution

    People v. Brensic, 89 N.Y.2d 579 (1997)

    In a prosecution for hindering prosecution, CPL 60.50 requires independent corroborative evidence that the underlying felony occurred, but the threshold for such corroboration is low and can be satisfied by evidence such as the victim’s death, the suspect being a fugitive, and the suspect’s consciousness of guilt.

    Summary

    Brensic was convicted of hindering prosecution for assisting her common-law husband, Rivera, who she knew had committed a class A felony (murder). The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while CPL 60.50 requires corroboration of the underlying felony in hindering prosecution cases, the prosecution met this requirement. The court emphasized that the corroboration requirement exists to prevent convictions based solely on confessions when no crime has actually occurred. Here, testimony from investigating officers about the victim’s murder, Rivera’s status as a suspect and fugitive, and his violent flight from police provided sufficient corroboration.

    Facts

    Brensic provided a detailed statement to police that her common-law husband, Marcus Rivera, and others planned and carried out the murder of Roberto Corperone. She admitted to twice thwarting police efforts to apprehend Rivera by warning him in advance of their arrival. Detectives eventually apprehended Rivera in Philadelphia without Brensic’s knowledge after he violently resisted arrest and fled. Brensic was subsequently charged and convicted of hindering prosecution in the first degree.

    Procedural History

    Following a non-jury trial, Brensic was convicted of two counts of hindering prosecution in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Brensic appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission of an Appellate Division Justice.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to sustain Brensic’s conviction for hindering prosecution in the first degree.
    2. Whether the People provided sufficient corroboration under CPL 60.50 of Brensic’s statement that a class A felony (murder) had occurred.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Brensic’s detailed statement provided an eyewitness account of the intentional murder of Corperone, and the detectives’ testimony supported the conclusion that Brensic warned Rivera of impending apprehension.
    2. Yes, because CPL 60.50 requires some independent evidence that the underlying felony occurred. Here, the testimony of the investigating officers regarding Corperone’s murder, Rivera’s status as a suspect and fugitive, his indictment, and his violent flight from police provided sufficient corroboration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that to prove hindering prosecution in the first degree, the People must prove that the assisted person committed a class A felony. While the statute does not require proof of arrest or conviction, it does require proof of each element of the underlying felony. The court stated that the standard of review for legal sufficiency is “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

    Regarding corroboration, the court explained that CPL 60.50 requires “additional proof that the offense charged has been committed,” but does not mandate independent evidence of every component of the crime. The statute requires “some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” to avert ” ‘the danger that a crime may have been confessed when no crime in any degree has been committed by anyone.’ ” The court distinguished felony murder cases, where corroboration of the underlying felony is not required, because in those cases, the felony serves as a substitute for malicious intent. In contrast, without the underlying felony in a hindering prosecution case, no crime has been committed at all.

    The court emphasized the relatively low threshold for corroboration under CPL 60.50. Here, the detectives’ testimony that Corperone had been murdered, that Rivera was the immediate suspect, that a fugitive warrant was issued for his arrest, and that Rivera violently resisted arrest and fled from police constituted sufficient corroboration. Specifically, the court pointed to Rivera’s “consciousness of guilt” as crucial corroborating evidence. As the Court stated, “proof of motive or flight, may ‘be held to constitute the essential additional proof.’ ”

  • Twin County Recycling Corp. v. Yevoli, 90 N.Y.2d 1000 (1997): Special Use Permits and Substantial Evidence

    90 N.Y.2d 1000 (1997)

    A zoning board’s denial of a special use permit must be supported by substantial evidence and cannot be based solely on generalized community objections.

    Summary

    Twin County Recycling Corp. sought renewal of a special use permit to operate an asphalt recycling plant. The Town Board of Oyster Bay denied the renewal based on community opposition. Twin County challenged the denial, arguing it was not supported by substantial evidence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Town Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, as the denial was based on generalized community pressure rather than specific failures to meet applicable criteria. The Court emphasized that while a Town Board retains discretion in evaluating special use permit applications, its determination must be grounded in evidence, not merely community objections.

    Facts

    Twin County Recycling Corp. owned premises in an area zoned for industrial use in the Town of Oyster Bay.

    Twin County operated an asphalt recycling plant under a special use permit granted by the Town Board in 1982.

    The initial permit was for 10 years with a provision for a five-year renewal.

    In applying for renewal, Twin County presented the original permit, expert testimony regarding the plant’s operations and impact, and proof of compliance with EPA regulations.

    Opposition to the renewal came primarily from residents of nearby neighborhoods.

    The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation had not found the facility in violation of any regulations.

    Procedural History

    Twin County sought judicial review of the Town Board’s denial of the special use permit renewal.

    The lower courts ruled in favor of Twin County, annulling the Town Board’s determination.

    The Town Board appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Town Board’s denial of the special use permit renewal was supported by substantial evidence, or whether it was improperly based on generalized community objections.

    Holding

    No, because the Town Board’s decision was based on generalized community pressure rather than a failure by Twin County to meet the applicable criteria for renewal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decision to annul the denial of the special use permit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that classifying a use as permitted in a zoning district implies a legislative finding that the use aligns with the zoning plan and won’t adversely affect the neighborhood, citing Matter of North Shore Steak House v Thomaston, 30 N.Y.2d 238, 243.

    While a Town Board has discretion to evaluate special use permit applications, its decisions must be supported by substantial evidence, referencing Matter of Market Sq. Props. v Town of Guilderland Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 66 N.Y.2d 893, 895, and Matter of Pleasant Val. Home Constr. v Van Wagner, 41 N.Y.2d 1028, 1029.

    The Court noted that while expert testimony is not always required, a board cannot base its decision solely on generalized community objections, again citing Matter of Pleasant Val. Home Constr. v Van Wagner.

    The Court found that Twin County had established a sufficient record to warrant renewal, including compliance with environmental regulations and expert testimony. The denial, therefore, appeared to be driven by community pressure rather than objective criteria.

    The Court explicitly stated, “Given the present record established by petitioner, it is evident that the application was denied not because it failed to meet the applicable criteria but because of generalized community pressure. The determination was, therefore, properly annulled.”

  • People v. Blount, 90 N.Y.2d 998 (1997): Establishing Selective Prosecution Defense

    People v. Blount, 90 N.Y.2d 998 (1997)

    To establish a claim of unconstitutional selective enforcement of the law, a defendant must demonstrate both that the law was applied with an “unequal hand” and with an “evil eye,” meaning the selective application was deliberately based on an impermissible standard.

    Summary

    Defendants, inmates charged with possessing dangerous contraband, claimed unconstitutional selective prosecution. They argued that of hundreds of similar incidents, only a few were prosecuted, and these targeted inmates near release. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding the defendants failed to prove selective prosecution. The court reasoned the defendants didn’t show the prosecution was based on an impermissible standard like race or religion, nor did they demonstrate the prosecutorial choices lacked a rational basis, as prioritizing prosecution of inmates nearing release is rationally related to public safety and deterrence.

    Facts

    Inmates in two state correctional facilities in Cayuga County were found in possession of dangerous contraband. Of approximately 494 incidents involving possession of dangerous contraband by inmates, the District Attorney prosecuted only 13 cases. The defendants, among those prosecuted, argued that the prosecution’s enforcement choices were impermissibly based upon the offenders being within 3 1/2 years of their release dates.

    Procedural History

    The defendants challenged their prosecutions, claiming unconstitutional selective enforcement of the penal laws. The lower courts rejected the defendants’ claims. The Court of Appeals reviewed the lower court’s decisions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendants met their burden of establishing that they were victims of unconstitutional selective enforcement of the penal laws.

    Holding

    No, because the defendants failed to demonstrate that the People’s prosecutorial decisions were made with an “evil eye,” the core element of unlawful selective enforcement, and the prosecutorial choices had a rational basis.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that to establish a selective enforcement claim, a litigant must show that the law was enforced with both an “unequal hand” and an “evil eye.” The court, quoting Matter of 303 W. 42nd St. v Klein, 46 NY2d 686, 693, explained that “there must be not only a showing that the law was not applied to others similarly situated but also that the selective application of the law was deliberately based upon an impermissible standard such as race, religion or some other arbitrary classification.” The defendants only showed that the District Attorney prosecuted a small fraction of the total incidents. Such a showing only demonstrated “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement” and did not, without more, suggest a constitutional violation. Moreover, the court found the defendants failed to show there was no rational basis for the prosecutorial choices.

    The court reasoned that prioritizing prosecution of inmates nearing release is rationally related to public safety and deterrence. As inmates with considerable time left to serve may be effectively penalized through the prison rehabilitative and disciplinary systems, it makes sense to limit the use of scarce prosecutorial resources to the prosecution of inmates who will soon be leaving the jurisdiction of the correctional system. Moreover, inmates with continuing criminal propensities who are nearing their mandatory release dates pose a greater threat to society than those who can be expected to remain within prison walls for extended periods. Finally, the threat of prosecution will obviously have a greater deterrent effect on those who are closest to release than on the latter class of inmates. The court concluded that proximity to release date is not an irrational or facially suspect criterion. Therefore, the court held the defendants failed to demonstrate that the People’s prosecutorial decisions were made with an “evil eye,” the core element of unlawful selective enforcement.

  • People v. Thompson, 681 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 1997): Judge Substitution During Trial

    People v. Thompson, 681 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 1997)

    The substitution of a judge during a jury trial due to the original judge’s incapacitation does not automatically violate a defendant’s right to due process under the New York State Constitution, provided the substitute judge certifies familiarity with the trial record and the defendant suffers no undue prejudice.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, rape, sodomy, assault, and robbery. During the trial, the original judge became seriously ill and was replaced by another judge. The defendant moved for a mistrial, which was denied. The substitute judge certified familiarity with the record and the trial continued. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that substitution of a judge during a jury trial is permissible when the original judge is incapacitated, the substitute judge is familiar with the record, and the defendant suffers no prejudice. The Court declined to adopt a more stringent standard under the State Constitution than exists under the Federal Constitution.

    Facts

    The female complainant was abducted, sexually assaulted, and robbed by the defendant. During the 20-hour ordeal, she was able to briefly observe the defendant and her surroundings. She later identified the defendant in a lineup, and a search of his apartment uncovered evidence linking her to the scene.

    Procedural History

    The jury trial commenced in Supreme Court. Mid-trial, the original Justice was hospitalized. The case was reassigned to a new Justice. The defendant moved for a mistrial, which was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the substitution of the presiding judge during a jury trial, due to the original judge’s incapacitation, violated the defendant’s right to due process under the New York State Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because the substitute judge certified familiarity with the record of the proceedings, and the defendant failed to demonstrate any prejudice stemming from the substitution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the right to a jury trial is guaranteed by both the Federal and State Constitutions. While early New York cases suggested that judge substitution was impermissible, the Court noted the evolving standards at the federal level, particularly the adoption of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(a), which permits substitution under specific circumstances. The court stated, “[T]here is no State constitutional mandate for a jury trial before the same Judge from start to finish.” The Court balanced the interests of the parties, the adequacy of the procedures, and the government’s stake in the outcome, concluding that midtrial substitution does not rise to a per se constitutional violation. The Court held that “generally, a Judge may be substituted for another if the original Judge becomes incapacitated during a jury trial, as long as the substitute indicates on the record the requisite familiarity with the proceedings and no undue prejudice occurs to the defendant or the People.” The court found the defendant demonstrated no prejudice.

  • Ferrante v. American Lung Ass’n, 90 N.Y.2d 623 (1997): Establishing Pretext in Age Discrimination Claims

    Ferrante v. American Lung Ass’n, 90 N.Y.2d 623 (1997)

    In an age discrimination claim under New York’s Human Rights Law, summary judgment for the employer is inappropriate where the employee raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer’s stated reasons for termination were a pretext for discrimination.

    Summary

    Ferrante sued the American Lung Association (ALA), alleging he was terminated due to age discrimination. ALA claimed Ferrante’s termination was performance-based. Ferrante argued that ALA’s reasons were pretextual and pointed to his supervisor’s ageist remarks and irregularities in the termination process. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to ALA, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding that Ferrante had raised a factual issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Ferrante presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether ALA’s reasons were a pretext for age discrimination, thus precluding summary judgment.

    Facts

    Ferrante, 58, was terminated from his position as controller at ALA after nearly 10 years of employment. He received merit-based salary increases until a new Chief Financial Officer (CFO) became his supervisor. Ferrante alleged the CFO made disparaging remarks about his age, referring to him as “the old man.” ALA claimed Ferrante was terminated for poor performance, citing errors in financial reporting and failure to adapt to a new computer system. However, the primary evidence of poor performance was a memorandum written by the CFO after Ferrante’s termination, which Ferrante argued deviated from ALA’s standard procedure.

    Procedural History

    Ferrante sued ALA, claiming age discrimination under New York’s Human Rights Law. The Supreme Court granted ALA’s motion for summary judgment, finding Ferrante failed to prove ALA’s reasons were pretextual. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Ferrante only needed to identify a disputed material issue of fact regarding pretext. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division properly reversed the Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to the American Lung Association, based on the plaintiff raising a question of fact as to whether the employer’s articulated basis for the dismissal was merely a pretext for discriminatory action?

    Holding

    Yes, because Ferrante presented sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether ALA’s stated reasons for his termination were a pretext for age discrimination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals aligned New York’s Human Rights Law standards with federal Title VII standards. The court reiterated the burden-shifting framework: the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If successful, the burden shifts to the employer to provide legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination. Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s reasons are pretextual.

    The court emphasized that while the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proving discrimination, to defeat summary judgment, the plaintiff only needs to raise a material issue of fact as to whether the employer’s asserted reason is false or unworthy of belief, and that more likely than not the employee’s age was the real reason. “To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment in an age discrimination case, plaintiffs must ‘show that there is a material issue of fact as to whether (1) the employer’s asserted reason for [the challenged action] is false or unworthy of belief and (2) more likely than not the employee’s age was the real reason.”

    The court found several factors that raised credibility issues and supported a finding of pretext, including the supervisor’s alleged ageist remarks, the timing of the performance memorandum (written after the termination), the deviation from standard termination procedures, and the contested evidence about other employees over 50 who were fired. The court noted that assessing credibility is not the court’s function on a motion for summary judgment. Because Ferrante successfully raised a question of fact concerning the falsity of ALA’s proffered basis for the termination, summary judgment was inappropriate.