New York Law Review

Tag: 1997

  • Gazza v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 89 N.Y.2d 603 (1997): Subsequent Purchasers and Regulatory Takings Claims

    89 N.Y.2d 603 (1997)

    A subsequent purchaser of property may bring a regulatory takings claim, but such a claim will only succeed if the regulation denies the owner economically viable use of the property.

    Summary

    Gazza sought to build a single-family home on his property, but his application was denied due to tidal wetlands regulations. He claimed the denial constituted a taking without just compensation. The New York Court of Appeals held that while a subsequent purchaser can bring a takings claim, Gazza failed to prove the regulation deprived his property of all economic value. The court reasoned that Gazza was aware of the regulations when he purchased the land, but that did not automatically bar his claim. However, because he could not demonstrate that the property retained no economic value, his takings claim failed.

    Facts

    Gazza purchased a parcel of land in 1988. The land was designated as tidal wetlands and subject to regulations under the Tidal Wetlands Act. Gazza applied to the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) for permission to build a single-family home on the property. The DEC denied the permit, citing the regulations protecting tidal wetlands. Gazza then filed suit, claiming the denial of the permit constituted a taking of his property without just compensation.

    Procedural History

    Gazza initially sued in Supreme Court, which ruled against him. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider whether a subsequent purchaser can bring a regulatory takings claim and whether Gazza had established a taking.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a subsequent purchaser of property, who takes title with knowledge of pre-existing regulations restricting the use of the property, is automatically barred from bringing a regulatory takings claim.

    2. Whether the denial of a permit to build on the property constituted a regulatory taking requiring just compensation.

    Holding

    1. No, because a subsequent purchaser is not automatically barred from bringing a regulatory takings claim; the timing of the purchase is a factor to be considered.

    2. No, because Gazza failed to demonstrate that the denial of the permit deprived his property of all economically viable use.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the split of authority on whether a subsequent purchaser can bring a takings claim. The court rejected a per se rule barring such claims, reasoning that it would unduly restrict the alienability of property. The court stated that while knowledge of the regulation is a factor in determining whether a taking occurred, it is not dispositive. The court emphasized the importance of analyzing whether the regulation denies the owner economically viable use of the property. Quoting from prior precedent, the court stated: “a subsequent purchaser may attack previously enacted regulations that affect the purchased property as beyond government’s legitimate police power”. The court found that Gazza failed to meet his burden of proving that the DEC’s denial deprived the property of all economic value. He did not demonstrate that the property was unsuitable for other uses or that it had no remaining market value. Therefore, his takings claim failed. Judge Wesley concurred, agreeing with the result but disagreeing with the majority’s view that a subsequent purchaser’s claim should be treated differently.

  • Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 89 N.Y.2d 535 (1997): Subsequent Purchasers and Regulatory Takings Claims

    89 N.Y.2d 535 (1997)

    A subsequent purchaser of property is generally prevented from asserting a regulatory takings claim based on regulations that were in effect at the time of purchase, especially when the property is also subject to restrictive covenants.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether a property owner, Anello, who purchased land already subject to wetlands regulations and restrictive covenants, could claim a regulatory taking. The New York Court of Appeals held that Anello could not claim a taking. The court reasoned that the regulations were in place when she bought the property, and the prior owner had already encumbered the property with covenants that limited its use and value. Therefore, Anello did not have the unrestricted development rights in her “bundle” of property rights when she acquired the land, precluding her takings claim.

    Facts

    A prior owner of the property filed covenants that substantially restricted the use and value of the property, in exchange for the right to subdivide and develop what was then a larger parcel. Later, Anello purchased the property. At the time of purchase, the property was subject to both the existing wetlands regulations and the previously filed restrictive covenants.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court determined that the Town did not need to compensate Anello as if she retained the unrestricted right to develop the parcel. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a claimant is prevented from claiming a regulatory taking of her property based on regulations already in place at the time she took title, when the property is also subject to restrictive covenants filed by a former owner substantially restricting its value and use.

    Holding

    No, because the claimant took title subject to covenants filed by the former owner of the property, which substantially restrict the value and use of the property, and because the wetlands regulations were already in effect when the claimant purchased the property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the wetlands regulations did not deprive the claimant of any interest in the property that had not already been encumbered by the former owner through the covenants. By purchasing the property with pre-existing restrictions, the claimant never possessed the unrestricted right to develop the parcel. The court essentially adopted the principle that a purchaser cannot claim a taking based on regulations already in place when they bought the property, because the purchase price presumably reflected the restrictions. Wesley, J., concurring, stated that, even if the property should be valued for single-family residences, that valuation is “a consequence of the covenants entered into by the former owner in exchange for the right to subdivide and develop what was then a larger parcel.” The court, in effect, decided that the restrictions already ran with the land, meaning the current owner took title to land that already had those restrictions in place.

  • People v. Rossey, 89 N.Y.2d 970 (1997): Appellate Standard of Review for Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence

    People v. Rossey, 89 N.Y.2d 970 (1997)

    The standard of appellate review for legal sufficiency of evidence is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence; the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if a rational trier of fact could conclude the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Summary

    Rossey was convicted of second-degree murder and weapons possession. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence of Rossey’s intent to cause the victim’s death. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the Appellate Division applied an incorrect standard of review for circumstantial evidence. The Court of Appeals clarified that the standard for appellate review of legal sufficiency is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence: whether, viewing the evidence favorably to the prosecution, a rational fact-finder could conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The case was remitted for factual review under the proper standard.

    Facts

    The defendant, Rossey, drove the shooter (Ocasio) and another individual to the crime scene. Rossey drove around, seemingly searching for the victim. Rossey engaged the victim in a heated verbal argument on the street. Rossey then turned and waved his arms, appearing to signal someone. At that point, Ocasio exited the car and fatally shot the victim, Guerra. Rossey then drove Ocasio away from the scene.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court of second-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment, concluding that the evidence failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in concert with Ocasio to intentionally cause Guerra’s death. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts and other issues raised but not considered on the appeal to that Court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division applied the correct standard when reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction, which was based primarily on circumstantial evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the test for appellate review on the issue of the legal sufficiency of the evidence is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence: whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in its review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The Appellate Division had applied a standard requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt or to a moral certainty, and that the evidence did not exclude every “fair inference” that the defendant did not share the shooter’s intent. The Court of Appeals stated that the correct standard, applicable to both direct and circumstantial evidence, is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, a rational trier of fact could conclude that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stated, “Generally, including a circumstantial evidence case, ‘the standard of [appellate] review in determining whether the evidence before the jury was legally sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt’ (People v Cabey, 85 NY2d 417, 420; see also, People v Norman, 85 NY2d 609, 620).” The court found that the evidence presented, when viewed favorably to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that the defendant was acting in concert with the shooter. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to review the facts under the correct standard.

  • Fenzel v. St. Francis Hosp., 1192 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1997): Res Ipsa Loquitur Applies When a Foreign Object Is Left in a Patient

    1192 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1997)

    Res ipsa loquitur allows a jury to infer negligence when an event occurs that ordinarily wouldn’t happen without negligence, the defendant had exclusive control over the instrumentality, and the plaintiff didn’t contribute to the injury; this can apply in medical malpractice when a foreign object is left inside a patient, even with conflicting expert testimony.

    Summary

    Florence Fenzel underwent a hysterectomy performed by Dr. Sperrazza at St. Francis Hospital. Post-surgery, she experienced stomach pain, and an X-ray revealed a large laparotomy pad in her abdomen. The pad was surgically removed, but Fenzel’s condition deteriorated, and she died. Her family sued, alleging negligence. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur, and the jury found for the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that res ipsa loquitur was applicable because leaving a large surgical pad inside a patient is the type of event that doesn’t occur absent negligence, and expert testimony didn’t preclude its application.

    Facts

    Florence Fenzel underwent a hysterectomy performed by Dr. Ralph Sperrazza at St. Francis Hospital in August 1986. Ten laparotomy pads were available and used during the procedure. Several months after the operation, Fenzel began experiencing stomach pain. X-rays revealed a foreign object in her abdomen. A subsequent surgery revealed a large (18-by-18 inch) laparotomy pad inside her bowel. Fenzel’s condition worsened, and she died from infection-related illnesses.

    Procedural History

    Fenzel’s family sued Dr. Sperrazza and St. Francis Hospital for medical malpractice. The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ request to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiffs moved to set aside the verdict, which was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granting a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a medical malpractice case where a laparotomy pad was left inside the patient’s abdomen following surgery.

    Holding

    Yes, because leaving a large laparotomy pad inside a patient’s abdomen following surgery is the kind of event that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence, and the defendants had exclusive control over the instrumentality that caused the injury. The plaintiffs satisfied the conditions necessary for a res ipsa loquitur instruction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that res ipsa loquitur allows a jury to infer negligence from the circumstances of an accident where the specific cause is unknown. The court outlined the three conditions necessary for res ipsa loquitur to apply: (1) the event must be of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.

    The Court emphasized that the plaintiff doesn’t need to eliminate all other possible causes, but only needs to show that negligence is the most likely explanation. The court stated, “Manifestly, the lay jury here did not require expert testimony to conclude that an 18-by-18-inch laparotomy pad is not ordinarily discovered inside a patient’s abdomen following a hysterectomy in the absence of negligence.” The court distinguished this type of case from those requiring expert testimony to establish the standard of care. The fact that the defendants presented an alternative theory (that the patient swallowed the pad) did not preclude the application of res ipsa loquitur; it merely presented a question of fact for the jury to decide. The Court noted, “[F]rom this the jury may still be permitted to infer that the defendant’s witnesses are not to be believed, that something went wrong with the precautions described, that the full truth has not been told”.

  • Matter of Case v. Monroe Community College, 89 N.Y.2d 438 (1997): Service on Union as Service on Member for Arbitration Appeals

    Matter of Case v. Monroe Community College, 89 N.Y.2d 438 (1997)

    When a union represents a member in arbitration, service of the arbitration award on the union constitutes service on the individual member for purposes of calculating the time to appeal the award, regardless of whether the union pursues an appeal.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether serving an arbitration award on a union representing an aggrieved member counts as service on the member for appeal timeliness. The Court of Appeals held that it does. Case, a college employee, was subject to a grievance initiated by his union. After an unfavorable arbitration ruling was served on the union, Case, dissatisfied, attempted to appeal individually after the statutory period. The Court found that because Case elected union representation, service to the union acted as service to him. Therefore, his individual appeal was untimely. This decision clarifies that union representation in arbitration carries with it the responsibility of the union to act as the agent for service, impacting the individual’s appeal timeline.

    Facts

    Petitioner Case was a non-tenured employee at Monroe Community College, serving as Director of Athletics.
    A student accused Case of sexual harassment, leading the College to not renew his employment contract.
    The faculty union, of which Case was a member, initiated a grievance on his behalf, alleging procedural violations in the non-renewal process.
    An arbitrator denied the grievance, finding no violation of the collective bargaining agreement and concluding Case was properly terminated for insubordination.
    The arbitrator mailed the award to both the union and the College on September 8, 1993; both acknowledged receipt around September 14, 1993.
    Case informed the union of his dissatisfaction with the award on September 22, 1993, requesting an appeal.
    The union declined to appeal the decision.
    Case then filed an individual petition to vacate or modify the award on March 14, 1994.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Case’s petition and the College’s cross-motion to dismiss.
    The Appellate Division modified the award, striking the portion stating Case was “properly terminated,” and affirmed the decision as modified.
    The College appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether service of an arbitration award upon the union representing an aggrieved member constitutes service upon that individual member, for purposes of measuring the timeliness of an appeal from the award under CPLR 7511(a).

    Holding

    Yes, because when an individual elects to be represented by their union in a grievance proceeding, the union acts as their agent for service of relevant documents, including the arbitration award.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, emphasizing that procedural rules dictate that once counsel (or a designated agent, like a union) appears, statutory time requirements begin when that representative is served.
    The court drew upon the precedent set in Matter of Bianca v. Frank, 43 N.Y.2d 168 (1977) which underscored the importance of serving counsel, extends to union representatives.
    Citing Matter of Beckman v. Greentree Sec., 87 N.Y.2d 566 (1996), the court reiterated that due process requires adequate notice and opportunity to object, not necessarily actual receipt by the individual.
    The court stated, “When an individual elects to be represented by his or her union, regardless of whether the union assigns an attorney or a layperson as the representative, that individual has designated the union as his or her agent for service during the pendency of the entire grievance proceeding. Hence, the grievant would be bound by all limitations periods applicable to the union.”
    The court noted that the individual still retains the right to pursue further proceedings individually if the union declines, as established in Matter of Diaz v. Pilgrim State Psychiatric Ctr., 62 N.Y.2d 693 (1984), but the timeliness is measured from service on the union.
    Because the union received the award on September 14, 1993, Case’s March 14, 1994, petition was untimely.

  • Wetherill v. Eli Lilly & Co., 89 N.Y.2d 506 (1997): Discovery of Injury Under CPLR 214-c

    89 N.Y.2d 506 (1997)

    Under CPLR 214-c (2), the statute of limitations in a toxic tort case begins to run when the plaintiff discovers the primary condition on which the claim is based, not when the plaintiff connects the condition to a specific cause.

    Summary

    Susan Wetherill sued DES manufacturers, claiming injuries from her mother’s DES use during pregnancy. Her action, filed in 1992, followed years of reproductive issues, including miscarriages and a diagnosis of a T-shaped uterus. The key issue was whether the statute of limitations began when she knew of her conditions or later, when she suspected a DES link. The Court of Appeals held that the statute began when Wetherill knew of her injuries, regardless of when she linked them to DES. The court reasoned that CPLR 214-c(4) specifically addresses delays in discovering the cause, and the legislative intent was to address the discovery of the injury itself, not its cause. Thus, the action was time-barred.

    Facts

    Susan Wetherill experienced several reproductive health issues, including dysplasia (diagnosed in 1978/1979), multiple miscarriages (1980/1981, 1984, 1986), a T-shaped uterus (diagnosed in 1987), and an incompetent cervix (diagnosed after a preterm delivery in 1988). She first learned of DES and its potential impact on daughters of users around March 1988 through a conversation with her sister. She overheard a physician mention that her medical history revealed “classic symptoms of DES” in late 1989.

    Procedural History

    Wetherill commenced action in August 1992. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, finding it time-barred. The Appellate Division reversed, stating the statute of limitations began when the plaintiff discovered her symptoms were attributable to a third party. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “discovery of the injury” under CPLR 214-c (2) occurs when the plaintiff discovers the symptoms or when the plaintiff connects those symptoms to a non-biological cause (i.e., exposure to a harmful substance)?

    Holding

    No, the “discovery of the injury” under CPLR 214-c(2) occurs when the plaintiff discovers the symptoms or manifestations of the injury itself, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the cause of the injury because CPLR 214-c(4) provides a specific mechanism for extending the statute of limitations when the cause of the injury is discovered later.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPLR 214-c(4) anticipates situations where a plaintiff is aware of the injury but not its cause, providing an extension under certain conditions. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that CPLR 214-c(4) only applies when the precise toxic substance is unknown, but not when the very fact of a non-natural cause is unknown, stating, “discovery that a plaintiff’s symptoms were attributable to an injury inflicted by an outside force is the same as ‘discovery of the cause of the injury’ within the meaning of CPLR 214-c (4), and the plaintiff’s proposed distinction is illusory.” The court emphasized that CPLR 214-c was enacted to address the harshness of prior case law where claims were barred before the harm was even discovered. The legislature intended to focus on the discovery of the physical condition, not its non-organic etiology. The Court stated, “The goal of the Legislature in adopting CPLR 214-c was to ‘provide relief to injured New Yorkers whose claims would otherwise be dismissed for untimeliness simply because they were unaware of the latent injuries until after the limitations period had expired.’” The dissent argued the majority’s interpretation removed the factual inquiry into the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence, replacing it with an objective standard. The dissent also pointed out that the majority effectively required plaintiffs to sue before potential defendants were identified. The court countered that “if the interpretation and rationale advanced by the dissent were to prevail, the date for commencing an action under CPLR 214-c (2) would depend on such fortuitous circumstances as the medical sophistication of the individual plaintiff and the diagnostic acuity of his or her chosen physician.”

  • Alliance of American Insurers v. Chu, 89 N.Y.2d 573 (1997): Facial Challenges to Tax Laws Require Concrete Harm

    Alliance of American Insurers v. Chu, 89 N.Y.2d 573 (1997)

    A facial challenge to a statute’s constitutionality will fail if the challenger’s claims are based on speculative or hypothetical applications of the law and the statute contains mechanisms for addressing potential constitutional issues.

    Summary

    Thirteen insurance carriers and their trade association challenged Article 15 of New York’s Tax Law, arguing it was facially unconstitutional because it mandated insurers remit sales tax directly to the state without guaranteeing refunds for overpayments or instances of double taxation. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the law, stating that facial challenges require demonstrating the law is unconstitutional in all its applications. The Court found the insurers’ claims speculative, as the law wasn’t yet in effect, and highlighted the existence of refund mechanisms within the Tax Law. The court emphasized that a presumption of constitutionality attaches to statutes, and courts should avoid interpreting laws in a way that renders them unconstitutional if possible.

    Facts

    In 1991, New York amended its Tax Law to ensure sales tax revenue collection by requiring insurance companies to directly remit the sales tax portion of motor vehicle damage insurance awards to the State Commissioner of Taxation and Finance. Claimants would then receive a credit voucher usable at repair shops or dealerships. The plaintiff insurance carriers and their trade association challenged the law before it took effect, arguing it violated their due process rights.

    Procedural History

    The insurance carriers brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Article 15 was facially unconstitutional and an injunction to prevent its implementation. The lower courts ruled against the insurers. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision upholding the law, finding the facial challenge premature and without merit.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Article 15 of the Tax Law is facially unconstitutional because it allegedly (1) does not allow for refunds when insurers remit excessive sales tax to the state, and (2) may result in unconstitutional double taxation without a refund mechanism.

    Holding

    No, because the challengers’ claims rely on speculative future events, and the Tax Law contains provisions allowing for refunds of erroneously collected taxes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the presumption of constitutionality afforded to statutes, stating that courts must avoid interpreting statutes in a way that would render them unconstitutional if possible. The Court dismissed the insurers’ arguments as speculative, noting that Article 15 was not yet in effect. The court reasoned that it could not presume that the law would result in overpayment of taxes or double taxation. Crucially, the Court pointed out that Article 15 incorporates provisions from Article 28 of the Tax Law, which includes a general refund provision for taxes “erroneously, illegally or unconstitutionally collected or paid.” The court stated, “At this point, then, we cannot presume that it will result in overpayment of taxes or double taxation. Nor can we presume that a refund request would be denied.” The Court concluded that a constitutional challenge would be more appropriate if and when the statute actually resulted in overpayment or double taxation in a specific instance, stating that the constitutionality of the statute as applied to a particular claimant or insurer might be addressed when and if the statute actually does result in overpayment of taxes or double taxation.

  • In re St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center, 682 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1997): Determining Responsibility for Counsel Fees in Mental Hygiene Proceedings

    In re St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center, 682 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1997)

    When a court appoints counsel for an indigent person in a Mental Hygiene Law article 81 proceeding, the locality (e.g., a city or county) is responsible for compensating the appointed counsel, absent legislation directing otherwise.

    Summary

    St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center initiated proceedings to appoint a guardian for an indigent individual. The court appointed counsel and a court evaluator for the individual, but the statute did not specify who should pay for the counsel. The Supreme Court determined that the City of New York must pay for the court-appointed attorney. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the legislative intent of providing counsel for indigents necessarily implies authorization for the court to compensate counsel, and that the locality is responsible for funding the counsel in accordance with County Law article 18-B, in the absence of legislation to the contrary.

    Facts

    In November 1993, St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center began proceedings under Mental Hygiene Law article 81 to appoint a guardian for an indigent, allegedly incompetent person (AIP). The purpose was to transfer the AIP to a nursing home and authorize major medical/dental treatment decisions without her consent. The AIP was entitled to counsel of her choice if she could afford it, and the court was obliged to assign counsel if she could not. The Supreme Court appointed an attorney as counsel and Mental Hygiene Legal Services as a court evaluator.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court determined competent counsel could not be obtained without compensation and ruled the City of New York must pay. The Appellate Division affirmed this determination. The Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the court may require that assigned counsel in a Mental Hygiene Law article 81 proceeding be paid.

    2. If so, whether the City or the State is responsible for that compensation.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Legislature, by providing for the assignment of counsel for indigents in the Mental Hygiene Law, intended, by necessary implication, to authorize the court to compensate counsel.

    2. The City is responsible because the responsibility of paying for assigned counsel in the overwhelming majority of cases in which the appointment of counsel for indigents has been authorized has fallen upon the locality under article 18-B of the County Law, rather than the State pursuant to Judiciary Law § 35.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute’s silence on the source of funds for appointed counsel does not preclude compensation. The court found a necessary implication that the legislature intended for counsel to be compensated when it mandated assignment of counsel for indigents. The court then analyzed article 18-B of the County Law and section 35 of the Judiciary Law, noting that assignments under article 18-B are paid by the county (or New York City), while appointments under section 35 are paid by the State. The Court emphasized the practical considerations, stating, “The evidence in the record before us establishes that article 18-B panels are better able, both financially and practically, to provide the needed assistance under this provision of the Mental Hygiene Law.” Therefore, absent explicit legislative direction to the contrary, the Court affirmed the lower courts’ determination that the City of New York should fund the assignment of counsel under County Law article 18-B. The court acknowledged, but rejected, the dissenting view below that the lower court could have avoided the issue by appointing Mental Hygiene Legal Services as counsel instead of as evaluator. The Court found that the Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law.

  • Matter of County of Suffolk v. New York State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 91 N.Y.2d 51 (1997): Transition Assessments and Payments in Lieu of Taxes

    91 N.Y.2d 51 (1997)

    When state law mandates both transition assessments and payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTS) following a state takeover of property, both apply; PILOTS are subtracted from state aid calculated for transition assessments, unless the legislature explicitly states otherwise.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether transition assessments under RPTL 545 apply to revenue decreases from the Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) takeover and decommissioning of the Shoreham nuclear power plant. The Court of Appeals held that RPTL 545 does apply because the LIPA Act doesn’t explicitly supersede it, and transition assessments are consistent with LIPA’s PILOT obligations under Public Authorities Law § 1020-q. The court emphasized that both statutes can be harmonized: PILOT payments are simply deducted from any transition assessment aid. The Appellate Division’s order was reversed and the matter remitted for further proceedings.

    Facts

    In 1987, the LIPA Act was enacted to replace LILCO with LIPA as owner of the Shoreham plant. Shoreham was transferred to LIPA on February 29, 1992. Public Authorities Law § 1020-q requires LIPA to make PILOTS, initially equal to the taxes the taxing jurisdictions would have received without the state takeover. These PILOTS decrease by 10% annually until they equal the taxes on Shoreham in an inoperative state. Several taxing jurisdictions applied for transition assessments under RPTL 545 due to the shortfall from declining PILOTS.

    Procedural History

    The SBEA initially certified a zero transition assessment, then later certified approximately $53 million for the 1993-1994 tax year. After the Appellate Division’s decision in a related PILOT litigation case, the SBEA rescinded both certifications, claiming RPTL 545 didn’t apply. Appellants commenced an Article 78 proceeding, which the Supreme Court dismissed. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that SBEA’s decision was rational, that declining PILOTS reflected Shoreham’s inoperative condition, and that the Legislature intended PILOTS to compensate for revenue loss. This appeal followed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether RPTL 545 applies to LIPA’s acquisition of Shoreham.

    2. If RPTL 545 applies, whether the LIPA Act supersedes the transition assessment provisions of RPTL 545.

    Holding

    1. Yes, RPTL 545 applies because Shoreham was acquired by a state agency (LIPA), became tax-exempt due to the acquisition, and constituted more than 2% of the total taxable assessed valuation.

    2. No, the LIPA Act does not supersede RPTL 545 because the LIPA Act does not explicitly repeal RPTL 545, and the two statutes can be read harmoniously, with PILOTS reducing the amount of state aid calculated for transition assessments.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that RPTL 545, a statute of general applicability, applies when the State or its agency acquires property that becomes exempt, meeting certain valuation thresholds. The court emphasized that the statute contains no exemptions preventing it from applying to the LIPA takeover. Regarding whether the LIPA Act supersedes RPTL 545, the court stated that repeals by implication are disfavored and require a finding that the statutes are in irreconcilable conflict. The court noted, “Generally, a statute is deemed impliedly repealed by another statute only if the two are in such conflict that it is impossible to give some effect to both. If a reasonable field of operation can be found for each statute, that construction should be adopted.” The court found that RPTL 545(6) already accounts for PILOTS by requiring transition assessments to be reduced by the amount of PILOTS paid. Therefore, the statutes are consistent. The court rejected the SBEA’s argument that the Legislature intended to displace all other laws with the LIPA Act, finding no unequivocal declaration to that effect. The Court explicitly stated that absent a legislative directive otherwise, they cannot disturb the manner of balancing state aid as explicitly stated in RPTL 545.

  • People v. Smith, 89 N.Y.2d 941 (1997): Prosecution’s Duty to Disclose Witness Statements Held by Corrections

    People v. Smith, 89 N.Y.2d 941 (1997)

    The prosecution is not obligated to locate and turn over witness statements made during a prison disciplinary proceeding when those statements are held by the Department of Correctional Services, as that agency is primarily administrative rather than law enforcement.

    Summary

    Smith, a prison inmate, was convicted of assault. He argued that the prosecution failed to disclose statements of witnesses made during his prison disciplinary proceeding, violating the Rosario rule. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the prosecution had no duty to obtain and disclose these statements because they were held by the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), an administrative agency. The court reasoned that DOCS is not a law enforcement agency with a duty to share such material with the District Attorney, distinguishing it from entities directly involved in criminal investigations.

    Facts

    The defendant, Smith, was an inmate. He was involved in an incident within the correctional facility that led to criminal charges of assault. During the prison’s internal disciplinary proceedings regarding the incident, witness statements were taken. These statements were recorded in transcripts held by the State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS).

    Procedural History

    Smith was convicted of assault. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution violated the Rosario rule by failing to disclose the witness statements from the prison disciplinary proceeding. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statements of witnesses made during the defendant’s prison disciplinary proceeding constituted Rosario material that the prosecution was required to disclose.

    2. Whether the inmate-eyewitness’s in-court identification had an independent source.

    3. Whether the admission of testimony by a correction officer regarding a pretrial identification procedure was permissible bolstering requiring reversal.

    4. Whether the circumstantial evidence offered at trial was legally sufficient to establish defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statements were not within the People’s control as they were generated and held by the State Department of Correctional Services, an administrative rather than a law enforcement agency.

    2. Yes, because there was support in the Wade hearing record for the Appellate Division’s finding that the inmate-eyewitness’s in-court identification had an independent source.

    3. No, because the admission of testimony by a correction officer regarding that pretrial identification procedure was impermissible bolstering; however, the error was harmless in light of the clear and strong evidence of defendant’s guilt.

    4. Yes, because the circumstantial evidence offered at trial was, when viewed in a light most favorable to the People, legally sufficient to establish defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Rosario rule, requiring the prosecution to disclose prior statements of its witnesses, only applies to materials within the People’s control. The witness statements in question were held by DOCS, which the court characterized as primarily an administrative agency, not a law enforcement agency with a duty to share information with the District Attorney. The Court distinguished the Correction Department from agencies at the end of the State’s law enforcement chain, emphasizing its administrative function. The court cited People v. Washington, 86 NY2d 189, 192-193 and People v. Flynn, 79 NY2d 779, 882, indicating that the People had no obligation to attempt to locate and gain possession of the material.

    Regarding the in-court identification, the Court deferred to the Appellate Division’s finding of an independent source. As to the bolstering claim, the Court acknowledged the error but deemed it harmless due to the strength of the other evidence against the defendant. Finally, the court found the circumstantial evidence legally sufficient, viewing it in the light most favorable to the prosecution, citing People v Norman, 85 NY2d 609, 620-622 and People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620.

    The Court stated: “The statements in question were embodied in transcripts that were generated and held by the State Department of Correctional Services. That agency has no duty to share such material with the District Attorney for the county in which the underlying conduct occurred.”