New York Law Review

Tag: 1996

  • People v. Jardin, 88 N.Y.2d 956 (1996): State’s Duty to Preserve Evidence for DNA Testing

    People v. Jardin, 88 N.Y.2d 956 (1996)

    The state does not violate a defendant’s due process rights by failing to gather and preserve evidence for DNA testing unless the evidence was material and possessed an exculpatory value that was evident before its destruction, loss, or failure to preserve, and the defendant was unable to obtain comparable evidence by reasonable means.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for first-degree rape, rejecting his claim that the prosecution’s failure to gather and preserve a semen sample for DNA testing violated his due process rights. The complainant testified to forcible penetration, while the defendant admitted to consensual oral sex but denied intercourse. The court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the potential DNA evidence was material and possessed exculpatory value before the failure to preserve it, and that he could not obtain comparable evidence. Because identification was never an issue, and the People did not introduce DNA evidence, no due process violation occurred.

    Facts

    The complainant, familiar with the 60-year-old defendant, visited his apartment late at night to assist him with homework on June 27, 1990. After helping him, she attempted to leave, but the defendant allegedly forced her to engage in sexual intercourse. A neighbor, witnessing part of the incident through a window, reported a possible rape to the police, who arrived while the complainant was still in the apartment. Subsequent testing confirmed the presence of sperm in the complainant’s vagina, but the quantity was insufficient for DNA testing.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree rape following a jury trial. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution’s failure to gather and adequately preserve a sample of semen for DNA testing violated his due process rights. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution’s failure to gather and adequately preserve a sample of semen sufficient for DNA testing violated the defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the potential evidence was material and possessed exculpatory value before its destruction, loss, or failure to preserve, and that the defendant was unable to obtain comparable evidence by reasonable means.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard articulated in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) and People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375 (1987), which requires a defendant to demonstrate that the potential evidence was material, meaning it possessed an exculpatory value evident before its destruction, loss, or failure to preserve. The court emphasized that the defendant also needed to show he could not obtain comparable evidence by reasonable means. The court noted that identification was never an issue in the case, and the People did not offer any DNA evidence. The court found that the defendant failed to meet the burden of showing the semen sample had exculpatory value before its failure to be preserved. As such, the lower courts did not err by denying a hearing and precluding cross-examination on the failure to conduct DNA testing. The decision highlights the importance of establishing the materiality and exculpatory nature of unpreserved evidence to support a due process claim. The Court referenced California v Trombetta, 467 US 479, 489; People v Alvarez, 70 NY2d 375.

  • People v. Gomez, 89 N.Y.2d 947 (1996): Impeachment of Alibi Witness Based on Knowledge of Defendant’s Incarceration

    People v. Gomez, 89 N.Y.2d 947 (1996)

    A prosecutor may cross-examine a defendant’s alibi witness regarding their knowledge of the defendant’s incarceration pending trial to impeach the witness’s credibility, provided the relationship between the defendant and the witness suggests a strong incentive to come forward with exculpatory evidence.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for robbery, holding that the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant’s alibi witness regarding his knowledge of the defendant’s incarceration was permissible for impeachment purposes. The Court reasoned that the witness’s awareness of the defendant’s imprisonment, coupled with his failure to come forward with exculpatory evidence, bore on his credibility. The Court emphasized the importance of considering the relationship between the defendant and the witness when determining the admissibility of such questioning and cautioned against the invariable resort to this form of impeachment.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. During the trial, the prosecutor cross-examined the defendant’s alibi witness, who was also the defendant’s nephew and with whom the defendant resided, about his knowledge of the defendant’s incarceration since his arrest and his failure to come forward with exculpatory information. The alibi witness admitted knowing about the defendant’s jail status and speaking with him while incarcerated. The trial court provided a curative instruction, stating that there is no general duty to come forward with exculpatory evidence, but the failure to do so may bear on credibility.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree in the trial court. The defendant appealed, arguing the testimony regarding his incarceration was irrelevant and prejudicial, leading to a motion for a mistrial which was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant’s alibi witness regarding his knowledge of the defendant’s incarceration pending trial was permissible impeachment?

    2. Whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed the potential for prejudice to the defendant?

    3. Whether the eliciting of testimony regarding the defendant’s incarceration status violated his constitutional right to a fair trial by compromising the presumption of innocence?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a close relative or friend’s knowledge that the defendant is incarcerated pending trial may be inconsistent with the witness’s failure to offer exculpatory evidence.

    2. Yes, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the evidence’s probative value outweighed the potential for prejudice, especially considering the curative instructions given.

    3. No, because the references to the defendant’s incarceration were temporary and brief, and the trial court provided curative instructions. This situation is distinguishable from cases where the defendant was forced to wear prison clothing throughout the trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Dawson principle applied, permitting the impeachment of the alibi witness based on his failure to come forward with exculpatory evidence, given his close relationship with the defendant and knowledge of the defendant’s incarceration. The Court emphasized that the procedural requirements of People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311 (1980) were met. The Court found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the potential for prejudice, especially considering the trial court’s curative instructions. The Court distinguished the case from Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), where the defendant was forced to wear prison clothing throughout the trial, creating a constant reminder of the accused’s condition. Here, the references to the defendant’s incarceration were temporary and served a legitimate state interest—assessing the credibility of the alibi witness. However, the Court cautioned against the invariable resort to this form of impeachment, stating that questioning should be limited to instances where the relationship between the defendant and the witness indicates a strong incentive to come forward with exculpatory evidence.

  • People v. Clark, 88 N.Y.2d 552 (1996): Reopening Wade Hearings Based on New Facts

    People v. Clark, 88 N.Y.2d 552 (1996)

    A trial court has discretion to deny a motion to reopen a Wade hearing (regarding the admissibility of identification evidence) when the “additional pertinent facts” presented by the defendant are not sufficiently related to the issue of police suggestiveness.

    Summary

    Clark was convicted of attempted robbery. Prior to trial, a Wade hearing was held regarding the victim’s identification of Clark. At trial, Clark sought to reopen the Wade hearing based on a discrepancy between the arresting officer’s testimony at the Wade hearing and the victim’s grand jury testimony regarding the chase that led to Clark’s arrest. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the discrepancy was not “pertinent” to the issue of police suggestiveness in the identification.

    Facts

    Ronald Cuocolo was making a delivery when he was accosted by Clark, who demanded money. After a struggle, Clark fled. Cuocolo and others chased Clark. Cuocolo then directed police officers toward Clark, who was standing on the sidewalk two blocks away. The police arrested Clark. Cuocolo identified Clark as the perpetrator in a “corporeal non-lineup.” Prior to trial, a Wade hearing was held to determine the admissibility of Cuocolo’s identification.

    Procedural History

    Prior to trial, Clark moved to suppress Cuocolo’s identification. A Wade hearing was granted. The hearing court denied suppression. At trial, after the People’s opening statement, Clark renewed the motion to suppress or, alternatively, to reopen the Wade hearing based on a discrepancy in testimony. The trial court denied the motion. Clark was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to reopen the Wade hearing based on a discrepancy between the arresting officer’s Wade hearing testimony and the victim’s grand jury testimony regarding the events leading to the defendant’s arrest.

    Holding

    No, because the discrepancy between the testimonies was not “pertinent” to the issue of police suggestiveness in the identification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 710.40(4) allows a court to permit renewal of a suppression motion if “additional pertinent facts have been discovered by the defendant which he could not have discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination of the motion.” The Court of Appeals stated that the crucial question is whether the asserted facts are “pertinent” to the issue of official suggestiveness such that they would materially affect or have affected the earlier Wade determination. The Court emphasized that the statute doesn’t mandate that the new facts be outcome-determinative, but they must be related to the issue of suggestiveness by law enforcement. The court found that the discrepancy regarding the chase was not pertinent to whether the police engaged in suggestive conduct during the identification. The court distinguished this case from *People v. Dixon*, where no Wade hearing was held initially. The court stated: “To suggest here that this standard was met as a matter of law and that the victim-initiated and uninterrupted chase, culminating in the apprehension of this perpetrator was a police-arranged procedure (dissenting opn, at 559), as a matter of law also, compelling a reopening of the *Wade* hearing, goes well beyond what this record presented to the trial court and Appellate Division.”

  • People v. Vasquez, 88 N.Y.2d 561 (1996): Admissibility of 911 Calls as Present Sense Impressions

    88 N.Y.2d 561 (1996)

    For a statement to be admissible under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, it must be made substantially contemporaneously with the event it describes and be corroborated by independent evidence supporting the statement’s content.

    Summary

    This case consolidates three appeals concerning the admissibility of 911 calls as present sense impressions. The New York Court of Appeals clarified the requirements for this hearsay exception, emphasizing contemporaneity and corroboration. In People v. Vasquez, a 911 call reporting a shooting was deemed inadmissible due to lack of corroboration of the caller’s description. In People v. Dalton, the defendant’s 911 call after a shooting was excluded because it wasn’t contemporaneous with the event. In People v. Adkinson, a 911 call reporting a sexual assault was deemed inadmissible. The Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, stressing the need for statements to be made during or immediately after the event and supported by independent evidence to ensure reliability.

    Facts

    • People v. Vasquez: An anonymous 911 caller reported a shooting, describing a black man fleeing. A defense witness described the shooter differently.
    • People v. Dalton: The defendant called 911 after shooting the victim, claiming self-defense.
    • People v. Adkinson: A victim’s aunt called 911 after a sexual assault; the victim stated he couldn’t see the attacker’s face, contradicting his later testimony.

    Procedural History

    • People v. Vasquez: The trial court excluded the 911 call; the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    • People v. Dalton: The trial court excluded the 911 call; the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    • People v. Adkinson: The trial court excluded the 911 call; the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    • Each case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the 911 call in People v. Vasquez was admissible as a present sense impression.
    2. Whether the 911 call in People v. Dalton was admissible as a present sense impression or an excited utterance.
    3. Whether the 911 call in People v. Adkinson was admissible as a present sense impression.

    Holding

    1. No, because the content of the 911 call was not sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence.
    2. No, because the statement was not contemporaneous with the event, nor was it made under the stress of excitement.
    3. No, because the statement was not contemporaneous with the event.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the present sense impression exception requires both contemporaneity and corroboration. Contemporaneity means the statement must be made during or immediately after the event, leaving no time for reflection. Corroboration requires independent evidence supporting the substance of the statement. In Vasquez, the 911 call lacked corroboration because the caller’s description of the fleeing man differed from the defense witness’s description of the shooter. In Dalton, the defendant’s call was made after the shooting and his retreat indoors, allowing time for reflection. The court noted, “Without satisfaction of this requirement, the essential assurance of reliability—the absence of time for reflection and the reduced likelihood of faulty recollection—is negated.” In Adkinson, the victim’s statement on the 911 call was not contemporaneous with the assault. The Court distinguished present sense impressions from excited utterances, noting that the former relies on contemporaneity and corroboration, while the latter depends on the declarant’s excited state. The Court stated, “‘Excited utterances’ are the product of the declarant’s exposure to a startling or upsetting event that is sufficiently powerful to render the observer’s normal reflective processes inoperative…’Present sense impression’ declarations, in contrast, are descriptions of events made by a person who is perceiving the event as it is unfolding.”

  • Juarez v. Wavecrest Management Team Ltd., 88 N.Y.2d 628 (1996): Landlord Liability for Lead Paint Exposure

    Juarez v. Wavecrest Management Team Ltd., 88 N.Y.2d 628 (1996)

    A landlord’s liability for lead paint exposure under New York City’s Local Law 1 requires actual or constructive notice that a child under seven resides in the apartment, and the landlord’s actions are judged by a standard of reasonableness.

    Summary

    This case addresses a landlord’s liability under New York City’s Local Law 1 for a child’s lead poisoning. The Court of Appeals held that a landlord must have actual or constructive notice that a child under seven resides in the apartment to be liable. However, if the landlord has such notice, they are charged with constructive notice of hazardous lead conditions. The landlord’s actions to abate the hazard are evaluated based on reasonableness. The court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment, finding a factual dispute about whether the landlord had notice of the child’s residency before receiving a Department of Health order.

    Facts

    Mayaghor Realty acquired a building in 1984. Julio Ortiz was the tenant of record for apartment 4C. In 1987, Noemi Juarez and her two daughters sublet part of the apartment from Ortiz without Mayaghor’s knowledge. Juarez paid Ortiz rent. The apartment had peeling paint from the beginning, and Juarez observed her daughters eating paint chips. In 1988, her daughter Peggy was diagnosed with lead poisoning. The Department of Health found lead paint violations in the apartment and issued an abatement order. Despite this order, the lead problem was not corrected, and Peggy’s lead levels remained high.

    Procedural History

    Juarez sued Mayaghor, Wavecrest, and a successor owner, alleging negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that the landlord had notice of the lead condition and a child living in the apartment. The Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment against Mayaghor, holding that Local Law 1 imposes an affirmative duty of inspection. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that liability requires notice of a child under seven residing in the apartment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Local Law 1 imposes an affirmative duty on landlords to ascertain if children under six reside in their dwelling units and to inspect for lead hazards, and whether violation of Local Law 1 results in absolute liability.

    Holding

    No, because Local Law 1 does not impose a continuous affirmative duty to inspect for the residence of children under seven. No, because liability under Local Law 1 requires a showing of negligence, including notice and a reasonable opportunity to repair the condition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while Local Law 1 imposes a duty to ameliorate hazardous levels of lead-based paint, it does not create absolute liability. A landlord’s actions are judged by a standard of reasonableness. The court noted that Local Law 1 doesn’t explicitly eliminate the common-law notice requirement. “Under Local Law 1, lead-based paint constitutes a hazard when two conditions are present: first, lead in an amount exceeding the stated threshold and second, a child six years of age or under residing in the apartment.” The Court distinguished Local Law 1 from other regulations, like the window guard law, which explicitly requires landlords to inquire about children residing in the apartment. However, if a landlord has notice that a child under seven resides in an apartment, Local Law 1 provides for constructive notice of the hazardous lead condition because the law grants the landlord a right of entry to inspect and repair. Causation was established because the child lived in the apartment with lead paint, was seen eating paint chips, and had elevated lead levels. The defendant’s speculative assertions were insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

  • People v. Torres, 88 N.Y.2d 928 (1996): Exclusion of Delay for Defendant Avoiding Apprehension

    People v. Torres, 88 N.Y.2d 928 (1996)

    The prosecution is not required to demonstrate due diligence in locating a defendant to exclude periods of delay from speedy trial calculations when the defendant is actively attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution.

    Summary

    Defendant was arrested for drug possession, failed to appear for arraignment, and a bench warrant was issued. After his re-arrest, he moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in requiring the People to demonstrate due diligence in locating the defendant during the period he was a fugitive because the trial court had found he was actively avoiding apprehension. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to review that finding and other relevant factual issues.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested on March 27, 1989, and indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance. He was released on his own recognizance but failed to appear for arraignment on the indictment on June 13, 1989, resulting in a bench warrant for his arrest. A detective was assigned to the warrant on July 5, 1989. The detective periodically checked the computer for information and received a photograph of the defendant on July 24, 1989. The detective investigated two addresses provided by the defendant and discovered that neither was valid. On June 27, 1990, defendant was arrested while assisting a co-conspirator attempting to smuggle cocaine. He later pleaded guilty to a federal indictment.

    Procedural History

    While incarcerated on federal charges, defendant moved to dismiss the state charges on speedy trial grounds; the Supreme Court denied the motion. A jury convicted defendant of criminal possession. The Appellate Division held the appeal in abeyance and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for a de nova hearing on the speedy trial motion. On remand, the Supreme Court determined defendant’s speedy trial rights had not been violated, because he had been avoiding apprehension and the People had exercised due diligence in attempting to locate him. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the People had failed to exercise due diligence, and granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the 73-day period from July 24, 1989, to October 6, 1989, should be charged to the People in calculating the speedy trial period, given that the People allegedly failed to exercise due diligence in locating the defendant.

    Holding

    No, because pursuant to CPL 30.30(4)(c), the People need not exercise due diligence in attempting to locate a defendant who is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on CPL 30.30 (4)(c), which addresses excluding periods of delay from the time chargeable to the People when a defendant’s location is unknown and the defendant is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution. The Court stated, “The People need not exercise due diligence in attempting to locate a defendant who is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution” (People v. Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d 71, 80, n. 3). The Court found that the Appellate Division erred in imposing a due diligence requirement on the prosecution. The Court remitted the case to the Appellate Division, instructing it to review the Supreme Court’s finding that the defendant had attempted to avoid apprehension or prosecution, along with any other relevant factual issues.

  • People v. Alston, 88 N.Y.2d 519 (1996): Permissible Jury Selection Methods Under New York Criminal Procedure Law

    88 N.Y.2d 519 (1996)

    CPL 270.15 allows trial courts flexibility in jury selection, permitting methods where the prosecution exercises peremptory challenges before the defendant, without requiring the prosecution to exhaust all challenges to the entire panel at once.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether New York’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 270.15) mandates the prosecution to make all peremptory challenges to a jury array before the defendant makes any, or if the court can require sequential challenges to individual jurors or subsets. The Court of Appeals held that CPL 270.15 allows trial courts flexibility in jury selection as long as the prosecution exercises peremptory challenges before the defendant and doesn’t challenge a juror already accepted by both parties. This decision upheld the trial courts’ methods and affirmed the defendants’ convictions.

    Facts

    In People v. Alston, after initial rounds of jury selection, the trial court directed the parties to exercise peremptory challenges to the first five prospective jurors to complete the jury. The defendant objected, arguing the prosecution had to challenge the entire panel. In People v. Morris, the court instructed attorneys to make peremptory challenges juror by juror, with the prosecution going first. The defendant objected, arguing CPL 270.15 required the prosecution to exhaust all peremptory challenges against the entire panel before the defense made any.

    Procedural History

    Both defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial courts’ methods violated CPL 270.15. The Appellate Division rejected these arguments. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals due to the similar issue regarding jury selection procedures.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 270.15 mandates that the prosecution exercise all peremptory challenges to a particular array of jurors before the defendant is required to exercise any peremptory challenges to that array, or whether the trial court has discretion to implement alternative methods.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 270.15 provides flexibility in jury selection, permitting methods where the prosecution exercises peremptory challenges before the defendant, and the prosecution does not challenge a juror already accepted by both parties, consistent with the statute’s language and history.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that CPL 270.15 allows flexibility in jury selection. Specifically, the court noted the ambiguity in CPL 270.15 (2), stating that the phrase “[t]he people must exercise their peremptory challenges first” can be interpreted to mean that each prosecution challenge must precede each defense challenge, rather than requiring all prosecution challenges to precede any defense challenges. The court reasoned that interpreting the statute to require the prosecution to exhaust all peremptory challenges to the entire panel would give some defendants a tactical advantage, dependent on the judge’s discretionary decisions regarding filling the jury box. Quoting People v. McQuade, the court acknowledged that “the requirement…that the People shall challenge first, is the only substantial advantage remaining to a defendant.” The Court found that the historical rule that the People make peremptory challenges first, and never be permitted to go back and challenge a juror accepted by the defense was not violated by the juror-by-juror method. The dissent argued the statute plainly requires the People to exercise all peremptory challenges to the panel “first,” before the defense begins and that once the defense exercises its challenge or challenges, the statute precludes the People from challenging any juror then in the box, not just those jurors in the box whom “both sides have had an opportunity” to challenge.

  • People v. Vargas, 88 N.Y.2d 363 (1996): Examining the Validity of Defendant’s Waiver to Attend Jury Selection Sidebars

    People v. Vargas, 88 N.Y.2d 363 (1996)

    A defendant’s waiver of the right to be present during sidebar questioning of prospective jurors is valid if it is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, even when the trial court poses conditions on the exercise of that right, so long as those conditions do not violate constitutional or statutory rights.

    Summary

    This case addresses the validity of a defendant’s waiver of their right to be present at jury selection sidebars. The New York Court of Appeals held that waivers are valid even if the trial court imposes conditions on the exercise of the right, provided those conditions do not infringe upon other constitutional or statutory protections. The Court emphasized that trial courts have discretion in managing voir dire and that posing choices to defendants, even difficult ones, does not necessarily invalidate a waiver. The Court also addressed the specific situation where a juror expressed fear of the defendant prior to voir dire.

    Facts

    Four separate cases were consolidated for appeal, each involving the issue of a defendant’s right to be present at jury selection sidebar discussions. In People v. Vargas, People v. Pondexter and People v. Hutton, the trial courts stated certain conditions would be attached to the examination of prospective jurors if the defendants chose to be present at sidebars. In People v. Wilson, a judge held a private conference with a potential juror, without the defendant or attorneys present, after that juror expressed fear for their safety.

    Procedural History

    Defendants Vargas, Hutton, and Wilson appealed their convictions, arguing their waivers of presence at sidebars were invalid or that their rights were violated by the private juror conference. Defendant Pondexter also appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions in Vargas, Wilson, and Hutton. The Appellate Division’s order was reversed in Pondexter, and a new trial was ordered. Appeals were then made to the Court of Appeals of New York.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant’s waiver of the right to be present at jury selection sidebars is invalid if the trial court imposes conditions on the exercise of that right?
    2. Whether a trial court violates a defendant’s rights by holding a private conference with a prospective juror who expresses fear of the defendant before voir dire begins?
    3. Whether the trial court erred in not striking testimony of a witness who recanted ex parte?

    Holding

    1. No, because the right to be present at sidebars is statutory, not constitutional, and can be waived; the conditions imposed by the trial court did not violate any constitutional or statutory rights.
    2. No, because the conference occurred before any juror examinations began and was a reasonable response to the juror’s expressed fear.
    3. Yes, in the specific circumstances of the case because the trial court did not properly consider whether the witness had refused to testify on a matter so closely related to the crime that the prior testimony should be stricken.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the right to be present at sidebars is a statutory right under CPL 260.20, not a constitutional right, and therefore can be waived. The Court emphasized that trial courts have discretion to manage voir dire, including the choice of whether to hold sidebars at all. It was within the court’s power to open questioning to the public if the defendant insisted on being present at sidebars. Further, there is no absolute right to have jurors discuss biases at sidebar rather than in open court.

    Concerning the pre-voir dire conference with the prospective juror in People v. Wilson, the Court found that the conference was initiated by the juror and occurred before voir dire began. The court emphasized that the trial court had appropriately balanced the defendant’s rights with the juror’s safety concerns. Including the defense attorney would have defeated the purpose of the private meeting if that attorney was obligated to inform the defendant of the juror’s concerns.

    In People v. Pondexter, the court held that the trial court erred in failing to strike the testimony of Sharon Valdez after she recanted her testimony in a private conversation. The court should have explored the recantation to determine whether the witness essentially refused to testify on a matter so closely related to the crime that the prior testimony should be stricken. The centrality of Valdez’s testimony required a new trial.

  • People v. Huston, 88 N.Y.2d 400 (1996): Prosecutorial Misconduct and Impairment of Grand Jury Integrity

    People v. Huston, 88 N.Y.2d 400 (1996)

    A grand jury indictment must be dismissed when prosecutorial misconduct impairs the integrity of the grand jury proceedings and creates a substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard for dismissing an indictment due to prosecutorial misconduct during grand jury proceedings. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, finding that the prosecutor’s actions, including introducing inadmissible hearsay to influence witness testimony, expressing personal opinions about the defendant’s guilt, and undermining defense witnesses, impaired the integrity of the grand jury and created a risk of prejudice to the defendant. This required dismissal of the indictment, though the prosecution was granted leave to re-submit the charges to a new grand jury. The Court emphasized the importance of the grand jury as a check on prosecutorial power and the need for prosecutors to maintain impartiality.

    Facts

    Joshua Huston was charged with the murders of his wife and mother-in-law. One and a half years after the murders, grand jury proceedings commenced. Emma Threats testified about a conversation she had with Vickie Pickles, who claimed Huston confessed to the murders while covered in blood and carrying a knife. The prosecutor acknowledged that Threats’ testimony was inadmissible hearsay but introduced it to pressure Pickles to testify consistently with Threats’ account. Pickles later testified, corroborating parts of Threats’ account but differing on key details. Huston’s father, Jule Huston, denied Pickles’ version of events, stating that his son never came to his apartment on the night of the murders with a knife, and said that Pickles was an alcoholic who suffered from hallucinations. The prosecutor repeatedly pressed Jule Huston, assuming the truth of Pickles’ version despite Huston’s denials. Physical evidence included bloodstained sneakers and a jacket belonging to Huston, but the blood was insufficient to be typed.

    Procedural History

    The grand jury indicted Huston on two counts of second-degree murder. The trial court denied Huston’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on prosecutorial misconduct. Huston was convicted at trial, and the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Huston then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor’s improprieties during the grand jury proceedings impaired the integrity of the proceedings and created a substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant, thus requiring dismissal of the indictment under CPL 210.35(5).

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecutor’s intentional misconduct, which included introducing inadmissible hearsay to influence a witness, expressing personal opinions about the defendant’s guilt, and undermining defense witnesses, usurped the function of the grand jury and biased the proceedings against the defendant. This impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceedings and created a substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the prosecutor’s dual role as a public officer and advocate, with a duty to ensure justice is done. The Court found that the prosecutor violated this duty by using inadmissible hearsay to pressure a witness, vouching for the truthfulness of that hearsay, and conveying his personal belief in the defendant’s guilt. The Court highlighted that these actions usurped the grand jury’s function as the exclusive judge of the facts. The Court cited CPL 210.35(5), which mandates dismissal of an indictment when the integrity of the grand jury proceeding is impaired and prejudice to the defendant may result. The Court clarified that this standard does not require actual prejudice, only a possibility of prejudice. The Court found that the prosecutor’s actions made it more likely that the grand jury would believe Pickles’ testimony over Jule Huston’s, and that the prosecutor had improperly influenced the grand jury’s assessment of the blood evidence. The Court noted that “the statutory remedy of dismissal thus not only protects the defendant but also safeguards the liberty of all citizens by ensuring that improper prosecutorial influence during secret Grand Jury proceedings will not lead to unfounded prosecutions.” The Court concluded that the cumulative impact of the prosecutor’s misconduct impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceedings, warranting dismissal of the indictment, while allowing resubmission of the charges to a new grand jury for a fair determination.

  • Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413 (1996): Limits on Recoverable Damages in Fraud and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims

    Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413 (1996)

    In fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims, damages are limited to actual pecuniary loss directly resulting from the wrong, and do not include speculative lost profits or tax liabilities arising from intervening events.

    Summary

    Lama Holding Company sued Smith Barney, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and other claims related to Smith Barney’s merger with Primerica Corporation. Lama argued that Smith Barney’s misrepresentations induced them to vote in favor of the merger, resulting in a $33 million tax liability. The New York Court of Appeals held that Lama could not recover damages for fraud or breach of fiduciary duty because the tax liability was a consequence of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, not the alleged misrepresentations. The court emphasized that damages in fraud cases are limited to actual pecuniary loss, not speculative profits or losses caused by intervening events.

    Facts

    Lama Holding Company, owned by foreign entities, held a significant stake in Smith Barney stock. In 1987, Smith Barney merged with Primerica. Prior to the merger vote, Smith Barney representatives met with Lama and allegedly failed to disclose key information about the merger, including Primerica’s identity and potential tax consequences. Following the merger vote but prior to closing, Lama learned that the repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine would result in a substantial tax liability from the sale of its Smith Barney shares. Lama sought to restructure the deal to avoid this tax liability, but Primerica refused.

    Procedural History

    Lama initially sued Smith Barney and others in federal court, but the federal claims were dismissed, and the state claims were not retained. Lama then filed suit in New York State court. The Supreme Court dismissed several claims, and the Appellate Division modified, dismissing the entire complaint. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Smith Barney’s alleged misrepresentations at the May 19, 1987 meeting constituted actionable fraud, entitling Lama to recover its tax liability as damages.

    2. Whether Smith Barney breached a fiduciary duty to Lama by failing to disclose material information about the merger, and if so, whether Lama’s damages were compensable.

    3. Whether Smith Barney tortiously interfered with Lama’s contract or advantageous business relationship with Bankers Trust.

    4. Whether Smith Barney breached the June 1982 shareholders’ agreement with Lama.

    Holding

    1. No, because Lama’s tax liability was a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, not any act or omission by Smith Barney.

    2. No, because Lama received the undisclosed information in the proxy materials before the merger vote, making its decision an informed one.

    3. No, because there was no allegation that Smith Barney intentionally procured Bankers Trust’s breach of contract, nor that Bankers Trust actually breached its contract with Lama.

    4. No, because the complaint failed to allege any specific breach of the 1982 agreement by Smith Barney, and any damages were speculative.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that in fraud actions, the measure of damages is indemnity for the actual pecuniary loss sustained as a direct result of the wrong, known as the “out-of-pocket” rule. The court stated, “The true measure of damage is indemnity for the actual pecuniary loss sustained as the direct result of the wrong’ or what is known as the ‘out-of-pocket’ rule.” Lama’s tax liability was not caused by Smith Barney’s actions but by the intervening change in tax law. Even if fraud were sufficiently alleged, Lama received more than fair market value for its shares, negating any claim of loss. Regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court found that Lama had access to the allegedly undisclosed information before the merger vote through the proxy materials, meaning Lama’s decision was informed. The court also rejected the tortious interference and breach of contract claims due to a lack of evidence of intentional procurement of a breach and speculative damages, respectively. The court relied on prior case law, including Reno v. Bull, to reinforce the principle that damages in fraud cases are limited to actual losses and do not extend to speculative profits or consequential damages arising from independent events.