New York Law Review

Tag: 1996

  • In re Claim of Jan Werner, 87 N.Y.2d 693 (1996): Distinguishing Employee from Independent Contractor Status

    In re Claim of Jan Werner, 87 N.Y.2d 693 (1996)

    Incidental control over the results produced by a worker, without further evidence of control over the means employed to achieve those results, does not constitute substantial evidence of an employer-employee relationship for unemployment insurance purposes.

    Summary

    This case addresses the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor in the context of unemployment insurance benefits. Jan Werner, a marketing representative for Hertz Corporation, was denied unemployment benefits by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, which determined she was an employee, not an independent contractor. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Hertz’s limited control over Werner’s work (specifying products and presentation style) did not establish sufficient control over the *means* of achieving results to qualify her as an employee. The court emphasized that incidental control over results doesn’t equate to control over the methods used to achieve those results. The matter was remitted for further proceedings consistent with the determination that Werner was an independent contractor.

    Facts

    Jan Werner worked for STARS (Special Travel Agency Representative Service Network), a marketing organization for Hertz Corporation. She visited travel agencies to promote Hertz’s products by distributing materials and making presentations. Werner had autonomy in choosing which agencies to visit and when, within her assigned territory. She was paid per visit and wasn’t required to attend meetings. She also had the freedom to sell non-competing products. Her contract with Hertz identified her as an independent contractor, and Hertz reported her income on a 1099 form.

    Procedural History

    The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board determined that Werner was a Hertz employee and thus eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case with instructions to remand to the respondent for proceedings consistent with its memorandum decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether substantial evidence exists to support the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s determination that the claimant, Jan Werner, was a Hertz employee for the purposes of receiving unemployment insurance benefits.

    Holding

    No, because Hertz’s control over Werner was incidental and focused on the results, not the means by which she achieved those results, which is insufficient to establish an employer-employee relationship.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the key factor in distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor is the level of control exercised by the employer. An employer-employee relationship exists only when the employer controls the results produced *and* the means used to achieve those results. The Court cited Matter of 12 Cornelia St., 56 NY2d 895, 897 (1982). The court found that Hertz’s actions, such as providing instructions on what to wear, which products to promote, and how to make a presentation, were not indicative of control over the *means* of Werner’s work. The Court quoted Matter of Werner, 210 AD2d 526, 528 (3d Dept 1994), stating: “The requirement that the work be done properly is a condition just as readily required of an independent contractor as of an employee and not conclusive as to either.” The court emphasized that incidental control over the results produced, without further evidence of control over the means employed to achieve the results, is insufficient to establish an employer-employee relationship, citing Matter of Ted Is Back Corp., 64 NY2d 725, 726 (1984). The court effectively clarified that specifying desired outcomes does not transform an independent contractor into an employee.

  • Matter of La Pietra, 89 N.Y.2d 311 (1996): Judicial Candidate’s Use of “Law and Order” Not Necessarily Misconduct

    Matter of La Pietra, 89 N.Y.2d 311 (1996)

    A judicial candidate’s use of the phrase “law and order” in campaign literature, without more, does not automatically constitute judicial misconduct warranting disciplinary action.

    Summary

    A Justice of the Esopus Town Court, sought review of a determination by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct, which sustained a charge of misconduct against her and imposed a sanction of admonition. The charge stemmed from the Justice’s campaign literature, where she identified herself as a “Law and order Candidate.” The Commission believed this phrase committed her to a pro-prosecution bias. The Court of Appeals reversed the Commission’s finding on the “law and order” charge, holding that the use of the phrase in judicial campaign literature, without more, does not amount to misconduct. The Court upheld the admonition based on a separate charge related to misrepresenting her educational background.

    Facts

    The petitioner, a Justice of the Esopus Town Court, was subject to a charge by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct based on her campaign activities. The first allegation was that she misrepresented her academic credentials in campaign literature, stating she was a “graduate” of “Judicial Law Course[s]” at various institutions, when in reality, she only had a high school diploma and had taken continuing education courses for court clerks. The second allegation was that she identified herself as a “Law and order Candidate” in her campaign literature.

    Procedural History

    The Referee who initially heard the complaint determined that the petitioner misled voters regarding her academic credentials, but found that the “law and order” allegation did not warrant disciplinary action. The Commission affirmed the Referee’s finding on the misrepresentation charge but rejected the Referee’s finding on the “law and order” charge, concluding that the phrase created the appearance that the petitioner would favor the prosecution. The Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a judicial candidate’s use of the phrase “law and order” in campaign literature constitutes an impermissible pledge or promise of conduct in office or a statement that commits or appears to commit the candidate with respect to cases likely to come before the court, in violation of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct (22 NYCRR 100.5 [A] [4] [d] [i], [ii]).

    Holding

    No, because the phrase “law and order” is widely and indiscriminately used in everyday parlance and election campaigns and does not, by itself, represent a commitment or pledge of conduct in office that compromises judicial impartiality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Commission’s determination that the phrase “law and order” in judicial campaign literature amounted to misconduct. The court reasoned that the phrase is widely used and understood and should not automatically be treated as a commitment or pledge of conduct in office. The court acknowledged the Commission’s argument that the phrase, in light of its historical and political context, might convey the image of a criminal law conservative. However, the Court stated that even if this interpretation were accurate, the Commission had not sufficiently shown that the phrase inherently compromises judicial impartiality.

    The Court distinguished between a general statement of being a “law and order” candidate and making specific pledges or promises about how one would rule in particular cases. The Court emphasized that the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct aim to prevent candidates from pre-committing themselves on issues likely to come before the court or from making promises that undermine the faithful and impartial performance of their duties. The Court found that the petitioner’s use of the phrase “law and order” did not rise to this level of prohibited conduct.

    The Court did, however, uphold the admonition based on the unchallenged finding that the petitioner misrepresented her educational background, stating, “Reasonable voters viewing petitioner’s advertisements would be led to believe that the courses trained enrollees in judging, and voters would not have suspected that the last formal educational institution to have graduated petitioner was her high school.”

  • People v. Vasquez, 88 N.Y.2d 742 (1996): Hearsay Exception for Present Sense Impression Requires Contemporaneity

    88 N.Y.2d 742 (1996)

    The present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule requires that the statement be made contemporaneously with the event being described, leaving no time for reflection.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a 911 call reporting a past crime was improperly admitted as a present sense impression. The caller identified the defendant as the person who committed a murder several hours earlier. The court reasoned that the time lapse between the event and the statement allowed for reflection, undermining the reliability of the statement. While the admission was deemed erroneous, the court found it to be harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt from eyewitness testimony.

    Facts

    On August 12, 1993, at approximately 4:30 a.m., the defendant, Vasquez, allegedly shot and killed the victim. Two eyewitnesses identified Vasquez as the shooter. Between 7:11 a.m. and 7:31 a.m., an anonymous caller made 911 calls claiming to observe the person who committed the murder earlier that morning. The caller described the suspect’s clothing. These 911 tapes were introduced as evidence at trial.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of homicide and weapons possession. The trial court admitted the 911 tapes under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. The defendant appealed, arguing the tapes were improperly admitted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the 911 tapes were properly admitted under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule when the caller referred to observations made several hours earlier.

    2. Whether the admission of the 911 tapes, if erroneous, constituted harmless error.

    Holding

    1. No, because the caller had time for reflection between the event (the shooting at 4:30 a.m.) and the 911 call (made after 7:00 a.m.), which negates the reliability that underlies the present sense impression exception.

    2. Yes, because the proof of guilt was overwhelming based on eyewitness testimony, and there was no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted had the 911 tapes not been introduced.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the 911 tapes were erroneously admitted because they did not meet the requirements of the present sense impression exception. The court emphasized that the key to this exception is the contemporaneity of the statement and the event observed, which eliminates the possibility of reflection or faulty recollection. The court quoted People v. Brown, stating that “because the contemporaneity of the event observed and the hearsay statement describing it leaves no time for reflection * * * the likelihood of deliberate misrepresentation or faulty recollection is eliminated.” The court found that the three-hour time lapse provided ample opportunity for reflection, rendering the identification unreliable.

    The court then addressed whether the error was harmless. It applied the nonconstitutional harmless error standard from People v. Crimmins, which requires assessing whether (1) proof of guilt was overwhelming; and (2) there was no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted had the proscribed evidence not been introduced. The court found that the eyewitness testimony and the defendant’s flight demonstrated overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court further noted that the 911 tapes lacked detail and contained potential discrepancies, making it unlikely that the jury’s verdict depended on their admission. Therefore, the court concluded that the erroneous admission of the 911 tapes was harmless error.

  • People v. Wynter, 669 N.E.2d 505 (N.Y. 1996): Disqualification from Jury Service Based on Prior Attendance

    People v. Wynter, 669 N.E.2d 505 (N.Y. 1996)

    A person is disqualified from future jury service for four years if they have fulfilled their jury service obligation by responding to a summons for jury duty through either actual physical attendance or telephone standby service, even if they were never impaneled as a juror.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a prospective juror was disqualified from serving on a jury because they had appeared for Federal jury duty within the previous four years but had never actually sat as a juror in a case. The Court held that under Judiciary Law § 524, read in conjunction with § 525, actual impanelment is not required for disqualification. Responding to a jury duty summons, whether through physical attendance or telephone standby, constitutes jury service sufficient to trigger the four-year disqualification. The court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, finding no error in the trial court’s dismissal of the prospective juror.

    Facts

    Orville P. Wynter was charged with two counts of robbery in the second degree. During jury selection, a prospective juror was dismissed by the court because they had reported for Federal jury duty within the previous four years. The defendant argued that because the juror had never been sworn in as a juror, they were not disqualified under Judiciary Law § 524. The trial court rejected this argument, as well as the defendant’s attempt to waive the juror’s ineligibility, and denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of the robbery charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prospective juror is disqualified from jury service under Judiciary Law § 524 if they appeared for jury duty within the previous four years but never served on a jury in a case.

    Holding

    Yes, because Judiciary Law § 524, when read in conjunction with § 525, indicates that the Legislature did not intend to require actual impanelment as a trial or grand juror to trigger disqualification for future jury service. Rather, responding to a jury summons through physical attendance or telephone standby is sufficient.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its reasoning on statutory interpretation. It emphasized that Judiciary Law § 524 must be read in conjunction with § 525 to understand the Legislature’s intent. Judiciary Law § 525(c) defines actual attendance to include “a juror’s actual physical attendance wherein the court convenes or service by means of a telephone standby system.” This indicates that the Legislature intended jury service to include more than just being impaneled on a jury. The Court also referenced New York Rules of Court §§ 128.8 and 128.9(b), which were promulgated to implement the Judiciary Law provisions. These rules further support the interpretation that jury service includes both service in the court and telephone standby service. The Court stated: “when sections 524 and 525 are read together, it is evident that the Legislature did not intend to require the impaneling of a person as a trial or grand juror in order to be deemed ineligible for future juror service under the statute. Rather, section 524 is intended to include individuals who fulfilled their jury service obligations by responding to a summons for jury duty through either actual physical attendance or telephone standby service.”

  • People v. Demczuk, 88 N.Y.2d 771 (1996): Admissibility of Evidence to Prove Notice of Order of Protection

    People v. Demczuk, 88 N.Y.2d 771 (1996)

    Notice of an order of protection, sufficient to support a criminal contempt charge, can be established through a combination of written documentation and oral communication, and testimony regarding the oral communication is admissible to prove that notice was given, not for the truth of the matter asserted.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the reinstatement of a criminal contempt charge against the defendant, holding that sufficient evidence existed to establish that the defendant had notice of the contents of an order of protection. The evidence included a written order and a State Trooper’s testimony that the judge informed the defendant about the order’s issuance for his wife’s protection. The court found that the trooper’s testimony was admissible to prove the defendant received notice, not to prove the truth of the judge’s statement. This combination of evidence sufficiently established the elements of criminal contempt.

    Facts

    An order of protection was issued for the temporary protection of the defendant’s wife. The defendant was present when the judge issued the order. A State Trooper testified that the judge informed the defendant about the order’s issuance and its purpose. The defendant was later charged with violating the order of protection, leading to a criminal contempt charge.

    Procedural History

    The County Court order was modified by the Appellate Division, which reinstated the first count of the indictment. A dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division granted the defendant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, effectively reinstating the criminal contempt charge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether notice of the contents of an order of protection, required to prove criminal contempt, can be established through a combination of the written order and oral communication from the judge, as testified to by a State Trooper.

    Holding

    Yes, because notice of an order of protection may be given either orally or in writing, or a combination of both, and testimony regarding the oral notice is admissible to evidence the fact that the statement was made, not for the truth of its content.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the array of evidence presented to the Grand Jury was sufficient to support all elements of the criminal contempt charge. The written order of protection, coupled with the State Trooper’s testimony, established that the defendant had sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct and the person to whom it related (his wife). The court clarified that the State Trooper’s testimony regarding the judge’s statements was admissible because it was offered to prove that the statement was made, thereby establishing notice, and not to prove the truth of the statement itself. The court cited People v. Davis, 58 NY2d 1102, 1103, emphasizing that the evidence was “not for the truth of its content but to evidence the fact that the statement was made.” The court found that this evidence, in conjunction with the written order, satisfied the requirements for establishing notice for a criminal contempt charge. By allowing this combination of evidence, the court emphasizes the importance of ensuring defendants are fully aware of the terms of protective orders. This ruling helps to facilitate prosecutions for violations of such orders, thus enhancing the protection afforded to potential victims. The decision underscores that proving notice does not require strict adherence to formalistic rules of evidence when other reliable means exist to demonstrate actual knowledge of the order’s contents.

  • People v. Jaber, 89 N.Y.2d 870 (1996): Court’s Power to Correct Illegal Sentences

    People v. Jaber, 89 N.Y.2d 870 (1996)

    A trial court has the inherent power to correct an illegal sentence, even if it means imposing a more severe sentence than originally promised, provided the defendant is given the opportunity to withdraw their guilty plea.

    Summary

    Defendant pleaded guilty to robbery and received a sentence to run concurrently with a prior sentence. The Department of Correctional Services informed the court that the sentence was illegal, as it should have been consecutive under Penal Law § 70.25 (2-a). The trial court resentenced the defendant to a consecutive term, over his objection. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court possessed the inherent power to correct the illegal sentence. However, the Court noted that when a correction results in a more severe sentence than originally promised, the defendant must be given the opportunity to withdraw their guilty plea.

    Facts

    Defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree robbery on October 25, 1995.

    On November 17, 1995, the trial court sentenced him to two to four years in prison, to run concurrently with an undischarged portion of an earlier sentence.

    By letter dated January 5, 1996, the Department of Correctional Services notified the trial court that Penal Law § 70.25 (2-a) required the sentence to run consecutively with his prior sentence.

    At resentencing, defense counsel stated the defendant did not want to withdraw his plea nor be resentenced. The court resentenced the defendant to a consecutive term over his objection.

    Procedural History

    The trial court resentenced the defendant to a consecutive term after being informed that the original concurrent sentence was illegal.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the resentencing.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court had the authority to vacate the original sentence and impose a consecutive term when the original sentence was illegal under Penal Law § 70.25 (2-a), even though the defendant objected to the resentencing and did not want to withdraw his guilty plea?

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court has the inherent power to correct an illegal sentence it initially imposed. However, when the corrected sentence is more severe than the original promise, the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to withdraw their guilty plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent, specifically People v. Williams, to establish that a trial court has the inherent power to correct an illegal sentence. The Court distinguished this case from Matter of Campbell v. Pesce, where the court held that a court could not vacate a misdemeanor conviction and reinstate a felony charge after the defendant’s sentence had begun when the initial reduction was illegal. The Court acknowledged the potential problem presented by People v. Selikoff which held that if a court makes a sentencing promise to a defendant and is unable to fulfill it, the defendant has a right to withdraw the guilty plea and to be restored to pre-plea status. The Court stated that while the resentencing resulted in a more severe sentence, the defendant did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea and did not demonstrate that he detrimentally relied on the illegal sentence in a way that could not be rectified by restoring him to his pre-plea status if he so desired. Thus, the defendant should have been offered that opportunity. The Court did not reverse the decision, implying that since the defendant did not want to withdraw his plea, the error was harmless. The Court reasoned: “We conclude that the trial court had inherent power to correct the illegal sentence it initially imposed.”

  • Commissioner of the Department of Social Services v. Judson, 89 N.Y.2d 101 (1996): Recovery of Medicaid Overpayments Due to Agency Error

    89 N.Y.2d 101 (1996)

    A government agency is not estopped from recovering Medicaid benefits incorrectly paid to an ineligible person, even if the overpayment resulted from the agency’s own error and not from fraud or misrepresentation by the recipient.

    Summary

    The Commissioner of Social Services sought to recover Medicaid benefits paid to Marion Judson, the beneficiary of a self-settled trust. The Department initially denied Judson’s application but later approved it without including the trust principal as an available resource, an error that made Judson eligible when she should not have been. The Department argued that the payments were “incorrectly paid” and recoverable under Social Services Law § 369(3), even absent fraud or misrepresentation. The Court of Appeals held that the benefits were indeed incorrectly paid and were recoverable, reversing the Appellate Division’s order. The court emphasized that the statutory scheme requires the Department to correct any overpayment, including payments to ineligible persons, and that a government entity is not estopped from correcting its own errors.

    Facts

    Marion Judson resided in a nursing home and initially paid privately. Her son applied for Medicaid benefits on her behalf, disclosing that Judson was the beneficiary of a self-settled, irrevocable trust. The trust instrument gave the trustee discretion to apply the principal for Judson’s support. The initial application was denied, but a subsequent application was approved. In determining eligibility, the Department included the trust income but not the trust principal, which was an error. Had the trust principal been considered, Judson would have been ineligible for Medicaid. From October 1991 until her death in December 1995, Judson received $121,302.97 in Medicaid benefits. At the time of her death, the trust principal was approximately $150,000.

    Procedural History

    The Department commenced an action against the trustee and Judson’s sons (as co-executors and beneficiaries) to recover the Medicaid payments. Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment to the Department, holding that the Medicaid payments were incorrectly paid and recoverable. The co-executors appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the benefits were “correctly paid” because there was no fraud or misrepresentation in the application process. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Medicaid benefits paid to a recipient who was deemed eligible due to the Department of Social Services’ error in calculating eligibility are considered “correctly paid” under Social Services Law § 369(2)(b)(i), thereby precluding recovery of those benefits in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation.

    Holding

    No, because overpayment includes payments made to ineligible persons, regardless of whether the ineligibility was due to recipient fraud or agency error. The limitations of Social Services Law § 369 (2) (b) (i) on an agency’s ability to recover benefits “correctly paid” are not applicable where benefits were paid to an ineligible recipient due to the agency’s error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred by importing a condition of fraud or misrepresentation into the statute, which has no basis in the statutory language. The Court relied on Social Services Law § 106-b, which requires the Department to correct any overpayment, including payments made to ineligible persons. The Court stated, “[o]verpayment shall include payments made to an eligible person in excess of his needs as defined in this chapter and payments made to ineligible persons.” Because the Department failed to include the trust principal in its eligibility calculation, it paid benefits to an ineligible individual. The court also emphasized that a mistake does not estop a government entity from correcting errors. Citing previous cases, the court stated, “[o]ne employee’s mistake cannot irreversibly chart the course of the Department’s responsibilities in this regard.” The Court distinguished this case from Matter of Akullian, which the Appellate Division had relied on, stating that Akullian improperly created a condition for the recovery of Medicaid benefits that is not found in the statute. The Court also noted that the federal Medicaid statute does not limit the right to recover benefits to those paid only as a result of fraud or misrepresentation, suggesting that Congress intended to permit recovery even from those who mistakenly received them. The court emphasized that the policy underlying the Medicaid program is to provide funds to indigent individuals as the “payor of last resort” and that allowing the defendants to retain the benefits would circumvent this policy.

  • Credit Suisse First Boston v. Utrecht-America Finance Co., 80 F.3d 537 (1996): Accrual of Contract Claims for Statute of Limitations Purposes

    Credit Suisse First Boston v. Utrecht-America Finance Co., 80 F.3d 537 (1996)

    For purposes of New York’s borrowing statute (CPLR 202), a contract cause of action accrues where the plaintiff sustains the economic injury, typically the plaintiff’s place of residence or principal place of business.

    Summary

    Credit Suisse First Boston sued Utrecht-America Finance Co. in New York, alleging breach of contract and quantum meruit. Utrecht sought dismissal based on New York’s borrowing statute, arguing that Delaware or Pennsylvania’s shorter statutes of limitations applied because Credit Suisse was incorporated in Delaware and had its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. Credit Suisse argued that the cause of action accrued in New York, where the contract was negotiated, performed, and breached. The court held that the cause of action accrued where Credit Suisse sustained the economic injury, which was either Delaware or Pennsylvania, thus the action was time-barred.

    Facts

    Credit Suisse, a Delaware corporation, contracted with Utrecht-America Finance Co. on February 1, 1988, to provide consulting services.

    In March 1989, Credit Suisse located an investment company to purchase Utrecht’s outstanding shares.

    From February 1988 to August 1989, Credit Suisse advised Utrecht on corporate planning.

    On November 6, 1989, Credit Suisse demanded over $9 million for services, which Utrecht refused the following week.

    Credit Suisse filed suit in federal court in New York on November 9, 1995, but it was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

    Credit Suisse then filed a similar suit in New York Supreme Court.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the cause of action accrued where Credit Suisse suffered injury, i.e., its place of residence.

    The Appellate Division affirmed.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, for purposes of CPLR 202, a nonresident plaintiff’s contract claim accrues in New York, where most of the relevant events occurred, or in the plaintiff’s state of residence, where it sustained the economic impact of the alleged breach.

    Holding

    No, because for purposes of New York’s borrowing statute, a contract cause of action accrues where the plaintiff sustains the economic injury, which is typically the plaintiff’s place of residence or principal place of business.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPLR 202 requires a cause of action to be timely under both New York’s limitations period and the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued. This prevents nonresidents from forum shopping in New York.

    The court rejected the argument to apply a “grouping of contacts” approach, typically used in substantive choice-of-law questions, to determine accrual under CPLR 202. The court stated that the legislature intended the term “accrued” in CPLR 202 to mean the time when and the place where the plaintiff first had the right to bring the cause of action.

    The court noted that prior cases have consistently employed the traditional definition of accrual in tort cases: a cause of action accrues at the time and in the place of injury. The court used Martin v. Dierck Equip. Co., 43 NY2d 583 as an example.

    When an alleged injury is purely economic, the place of injury is usually where the plaintiff resides and sustains the economic impact of the loss. As the court noted, “For purposes of the New York borrowing statute, a cause of action accrues where the injury is sustained. In cases involving economic harm, that place is normally the state of plaintiffs residence.”(Gorlin v Bond Richman & Co., 706 F Supp 236, 240)

    The court distinguished Insurance Co. v. ABB Power Generation, 91 NY2d 180, stating that in ABB Power, the place of injury and the place where all operative facts occurred were the same (California), so the court did not have to decide between a choice-of-law analysis and a place-of-injury rule.

    The court emphasized that “CPLR 202 is designed to add clarity to the law and to provide the certainty of uniform application to litigants” (Insurance Co. v ABB Power Generation, 91 NY2d 180, 187). A rule requiring determination of the plaintiff’s residence better serves this goal than a rule dependent on a litany of events relevant to the “center of gravity” of a contract dispute.

  • People v. Adessa, 89 N.Y.2d 910 (1996): Limits on Resubmitting Charges to Grand Juries After Dismissal

    People v. Adessa, 89 N.Y.2d 910 (1996)

    When a court dismisses an indictment due to insufficient evidence, the prosecution is not limited in the number of times it can resubmit the charges to a grand jury, unlike when a grand jury itself dismisses the charges.

    Summary

    The defendant was initially indicted on robbery charges, but the court dismissed the indictment due to insufficient evidence. After a second grand jury declined to indict, the prosecution obtained permission to present the case to a third grand jury, which then indicted the defendant. The defendant argued that this third presentation violated CPL 190.75(3), which limits resubmissions after a grand jury dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals held that CPL 190.75(3) applies only to grand jury dismissals, not to court-ordered dismissals based on insufficient evidence under CPL 210.20. Therefore, the prosecution was permitted to resubmit the charges.

    Facts

    The defendant was initially charged with two counts of robbery in the second degree.

    The Supreme Court dismissed the initial indictment because the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was legally insufficient.

    The court granted leave to resubmit the charges to another Grand Jury.

    A second Grand Jury considered the charges, including two additional charges for attempted robbery, but voted “no true bill” (declined to indict).

    The People moved for leave to resubmit to a third Grand Jury, stating that the defendant’s friend, who had already pleaded guilty in connection with the crimes, would be willing to testify.

    The court granted leave, and the third Grand Jury indicted the defendant on all charges.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially dismissed the indictment due to insufficient evidence.

    After the third grand jury indicted the defendant, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the presentation to a third grand jury violated CPL 190.75(3).

    The Supreme Court rejected this argument.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 190.75(3), which limits resubmissions to a grand jury after a grand jury dismissal, applies when a court dismisses an indictment due to insufficient evidence under CPL 210.20.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 190.75(3) applies only to Grand Jury dismissals, not court-ordered dismissals based on insufficiency of evidence under CPL 210.20.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that at common law, a prosecutor could repeatedly resubmit charges to Grand Juries until an indictment was obtained. The Legislature enacted provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law to prevent prosecutorial abuse, including CPL 190.75, which governs Grand Jury dismissals, limiting the number of times the People can resubmit after a Grand Jury has dismissed charges. Specifically, CPL 190.75(3) states that if a Grand Jury dismisses a charge, the People can resubmit only after obtaining permission from the court, and if the charge “is again dismissed, it may not again be submitted to a grand jury.”

    By contrast, CPL 210.20, governing judicial dismissals, provides without qualification that where a court dismisses an indictment based on insufficiency of the evidence, it “may, upon application of the people, in its discretion authorize the people to submit the charge or charges to the same or another grand jury” (CPL 210.20[4]).

    The court emphasized that “discretionary judicial dismissals do not present the same potential for prosecutorial abuse, and are subject to their own check of appellate review,” thus the provision for judicial dismissals does not limit the number of resubmissions.

    The court concluded that CPL 190.75(3) and 210.20 are separate statutory provisions addressing separate legislative concerns. The dismissal of the first indictment was court-ordered pursuant to CPL 210.20, not a Grand Jury dismissal that implicates the limitations imposed on resubmission pursuant to CPL 190.75(3). Thus, the People’s single resubmission after the Grand Jury dismissed the charges was consistent with the law.

    The court also addressed the defendant’s reliance on language in People v. Cade, clarifying that CPL 190.75(3) applies solely to Grand Jury dismissals, not court-ordered dismissals.

  • People v. Zinke, 89 N.Y.2d 243 (1996): Defining ‘Owner’ in Robbery and Larceny Cases

    People v. Zinke, 89 N.Y.2d 243 (1996)

    In robbery and larceny cases, the term “owner” refers to someone with a possessory right to the property superior to that of the taker, but does not automatically extend to anyone who attempts to prevent a theft without having a pre-existing claim or custodial duty regarding the property.

    Summary

    Zinke was convicted of robbery and petit larceny for forcibly stealing boots from a mall security guard (Davis), who the indictment identified as the “owner.” The boots were stolen from a store unaffiliated with the mall. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the robbery and petit larceny convictions, holding that Davis was not the “owner” of the boots because he did not have a possessory right superior to Zinke’s. The Court emphasized that merely attempting to stop a theft does not automatically create ownership rights in the stolen property.

    Facts

    Zinke and an accomplice stole a carton of Timberland boots from Mr. Lee’s Men’s Shop. They carried the boots into the nearby Gertz Mall. Frank Davis, a mall security guard, saw Zinke and his accomplice with the box of boots and stopped them. Zinke claimed the box was theirs but couldn’t produce a receipt. Zinke and his accomplice started transferring the boots to a bag. Davis radioed for assistance and tried to stop them from leaving. Zinke displayed a box cutter and threatened Davis. Zinke and his accomplice ran from the mall but were later apprehended by police officers.

    Procedural History

    Zinke was charged with first-degree robbery, petit larceny, and menacing. At trial, Zinke moved to dismiss the robbery and larceny charges, arguing that Davis was not the owner of the boots. The trial court denied the motion, and Zinke was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed the robbery and petit larceny convictions, finding that the People failed to prove that Davis had a right of possession superior to Zinke’s. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a mall security guard who attempts to stop a suspected theft of property from a store unaffiliated with the mall qualifies as an “owner” of the property for purposes of robbery and larceny statutes, based solely on his attempt to prevent the theft.

    Holding

    1. No, because the security guard did not have a possessory right to the boots superior to that of the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that robbery and larceny require a taking of property “from an owner thereof,” and ownership includes anyone with a right to possession superior to that of the taker. However, the Court rejected the trial court’s reasoning that a thief’s lack of ownership automatically makes anyone who tries to stop them an owner. The Court distinguished the case from prior holdings, noting that here, no special relationship or prior possessory interest existed between the security guard and the stolen boots. The guard’s actions, without more, did not create a superior right of possession. Relying on Foulke v. New York Consol. R. R. Co., the People argued that Davis was a gratuitous bailee, but the Court stated that the passenger/common carrier relationship was crucial to the creation of the bailment. In the present case, there was no relationship between the true owner and the security guard that could have given rise to a duty on the guard’s behalf to become a bailee of the property. The court further reasoned that “[l]abeling the security guard an owner would expand the crime of robbery beyond the definitional limits imposed by the common law and the Legislature.”