New York Law Review

Tag: 1994

  • Scheiber v. St. John’s University, 84 N.Y.2d 120 (1994): Religious Institution Exemption from Anti-Discrimination Laws

    Scheiber v. St. John’s University, 84 N.Y.2d 120 (1994)

    A religious institution’s exemption from anti-discrimination laws, under New York Executive Law § 296(11), permits preferential hiring of individuals sharing the same faith to promote its religious principles, but does not allow for wholesale discrimination based on religion unrelated to those principles.

    Summary

    Donald Scheiber, a Jewish former Vice-President of Student Life at St. John’s University (SJU), sued after being fired, alleging religious discrimination. SJU claimed the firing was due to poor performance and asserted an affirmative defense under Executive Law § 296(11), allowing religious institutions to prefer employees of the same religion. The New York Court of Appeals held that while SJU qualifies as a religious institution under the statute, summary judgment was inappropriate because there were disputed issues of fact as to whether SJU was actually exercising its statutory preference or engaging in unlawful discrimination.

    Facts

    Donald Scheiber, a Jewish man, worked at St. John’s University (SJU) for 20 years, eventually becoming Vice-President of Student Life. After a new University President was appointed, Scheiber was fired. SJU is operated in connection with the Vincentian order, a Roman Catholic religious organization. Scheiber claimed that the new administration, particularly the President’s preference for Vincentians, was a pretext for religious discrimination, violating state and federal laws, and that he was singled out for increased scrutiny as the only Jewish Vice-President. SJU maintained Scheiber was terminated due to poor job performance and invoked its right to prefer Roman Catholics in certain positions.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted SJU’s motion for summary judgment under Executive Law § 296(11), finding that SJU could prefer a Roman Catholic for the Vice President of Student Life position. The Appellate Division affirmed. Scheiber appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether St. John’s University, as an institution operated in connection with a religious order, is entitled to claim the religious exemption under Executive Law § 296(11)?

    Whether, even if SJU is a religious institution, the exemption under Executive Law § 296(11) automatically entitles it to summary judgment against a claim of religious discrimination?

    Holding

    Yes, SJU is a religious institution entitled to claim the exemption because it is an educational organization operated in connection with the Vincentian order.

    No, because disputed issues of fact existed as to whether the University was exercising the preference allowed by statute or engaging in unlawful discrimination, therefore, SJU did not establish a basis for summary judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that SJU qualified as a religious institution under Executive Law § 296(11) because it is an educational organization connected with the Vincentian order. However, the court emphasized that the religious exemption is not a license for wholesale discrimination. Citing Matter of Klein (Hartnett), 78 NY2d 662, 667, the court stated that the Human Rights Law should be read to accomplish its anti-discriminatory purpose, and the exemption is narrow, intended to allow preference in hiring to promote religious principles. The court found that the exemption operates to exclude from the definition of “discrimination” exercise of a preference in hiring for persons of the same faith where that action is calculated by the institution to effectuate its religious mission. A religious employer may not discriminate against an individual for reasons having nothing to do with the free exercise of religion and then invoke the exemption as a shield against its unlawful conduct. The court noted SJU’s denial of preferential hiring and its advertisement as an equal opportunity employer contradicted its defense. Because SJU did not conclusively demonstrate that it fired Scheiber to promote its religious principles by hiring a Catholic replacement, a genuine issue of material fact remained, precluding summary judgment. The court emphasized the absence of an undisputed factual predicate to delve into complex constitutional issues of Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.

  • Johannesen v. New York City Dept. of Housing Preservation, 84 N.Y.2d 132 (1994): Secondhand Smoke as Accidental Injury

    Johannesen v. New York City Dept. of Housing Preservation, 84 N.Y.2d 132 (1994)

    An employee’s bronchial asthma, aggravated by prolonged exposure to excessive secondhand cigarette smoke in a confined work environment, can constitute a compensable accidental injury under the Workers’ Compensation Law.

    Summary

    Veronica Johannesen, an office assistant for New York City, developed bronchial asthma aggravated by years of exposure to secondhand cigarette smoke in her poorly ventilated office. Approximately half of her 50 co-workers smoked in a large room crammed with desks, and the ventilation system was inadequate. After her transfer requests were denied, Johannesen sought workers’ compensation benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board found that her condition constituted an accidental injury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the continuous exposure to secondhand smoke was an unusual environmental condition that exacerbated her pre-existing asthma, thus qualifying as an accidental injury.

    Facts

    Veronica Johannesen worked as an office assistant for the City of New York in a large room shared by approximately 50 employees. A significant number of these employees smoked cigarettes. The office was crowded, and the windows were typically closed due to smoke emanating from a restaurant below. The office ventilation system was also malfunctioning. Beginning in 1983, Johannesen started experiencing wheezing and coughing at work. By 1985, she was diagnosed with bronchial asthma aggravated by the tobacco smoke and dust in her workplace. Her doctor recommended a smoke-free environment, but her requests for a transfer were denied. In January 1986, she suffered two severe asthmatic attacks at work, requiring emergency hospitalization.

    Procedural History

    Johannesen sought workers’ compensation benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Law Judge initially found that she suffered from a compensable occupational disease. The Workers’ Compensation Board rescinded this finding, determining instead that she sustained an accidental injury due to repeated exposure to passive cigarette smoke. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision. The City of New York appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an employee’s bronchial asthma, aggravated by prolonged exposure to excessive amounts of secondhand cigarette smoke in a confined work environment, constitutes an accidental injury compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the continuous exposure to secondhand smoke in the claimant’s workplace constituted an unusual environmental condition that exacerbated her pre-existing asthma, thus qualifying as an accidental injury under the Workers’ Compensation Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the remedial nature of the Workers’ Compensation Law and the wide latitude given to the Workers’ Compensation Board in determining whether a disabling condition constitutes an accident. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Mack v. County of Rockland, noting that Mack was an occupational disease case focusing on the nature of the work, while this case concerns an accidental injury related to the workplace environment. The court reasoned that an accidental injury can accrue gradually over time and that the claimant’s exposure to excessive secondhand smoke, coupled with her pre-existing asthmatic condition, created an unusual hazard. The court found that the two severe on-the-job asthma attacks requiring emergency medical attention satisfied the time-definiteness component of the accidental injury rule. The court cited Professor Larson, noting that compensation has been awarded in many jurisdictions for asthma developing gradually over time. Rejecting the employer’s argument that this ruling would open the floodgates to frivolous claims, the court stated that claimants still must demonstrate unusual environmental conditions or extraordinary events causing the accidental injury. The court also emphasized that a pre-existing condition does not preclude compensation if the employment causally aggravates or accelerates the condition. The Court stated, “Claimant worked in an office where the tools of her trade are papers, pens, files, computers and telephones. Cigarette smoke is surely not a natural by-product of the Department of Housing Preservation and Development’s activities and her employment role.”

  • Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44 (1994): School’s Duty to Supervise Students and Foreseeable Harm

    84 N.Y.2d 44 (1994)

    Schools have a duty to adequately supervise students and are liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision, especially when the school has specific knowledge of potential danger to a student.

    Summary

    Two student sisters, Virna and Vivia Mirand, were attacked at their high school after Virna reported a threat from another student, Donna Webster, to a teacher and found the security office unattended. Vivia was stabbed trying to defend her sister. The New York Court of Appeals held that the school district could be liable for negligent supervision because it had notice of a specific threat against Virna but failed to take adequate steps to protect her, and because school security was absent from key locations at dismissal time, when the attack occurred. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the jury verdict in favor of the sisters.

    Facts

    Virna Mirand, a student at Harry S. Truman High School, had an altercation with fellow student Donna Webster, who threatened to kill her. Virna reported the threat to a teacher after finding the security office closed. Later, while waiting for her sister Vivia, Webster and her companions attacked Virna on the school veranda. Vivia was injured when she intervened to protect her sister; she was stabbed in the wrist by Webster’s brother. No security personnel were present during the attack.

    Procedural History

    The Mirand sisters sued the Board of Education for negligent supervision. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court set aside the verdict and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the jury verdict. The Board of Education appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board of Education negligently failed to provide adequate supervision, leading to the plaintiffs’ injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because the school had notice of a specific threat and failed to take reasonable steps to protect the student, and because the absence of security personnel at a critical time and location was a proximate cause of the injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that schools have a duty to adequately supervise students, acting in loco parentis. To establish a breach of this duty when injuries are caused by fellow students, it must be shown that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused the injury and that the injury was foreseeable. The Court highlighted the fact that the school, through a teacher, was made aware of Webster’s death threat to Virna. The Court also noted the absence of security personnel at dismissal time, despite the school’s own security plan requiring their presence. The court emphasized, “The violent acts which caused plaintiffs’ injuries were sparked by a prior altercation and death threat of which defendant, through one of its teachers, was expressly made aware; yet no action was taken to prevent escalation of the incident…” The Court found that the jury reasonably concluded that the Board was on notice of imminent danger and did not take reasonable steps to protect Virna. It further stated, “On the issue of proximate cause, we conclude that a rational jury could find that the complete absence of security or supervisory personnel at a time and place when vigilance was absolutely essential constituted the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries.” The court concluded that the jury’s verdict was supported by sufficient evidence and should be upheld.

  • American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. New York State Dept. of Taxation, 84 N.Y.2d 31 (1994): Commerce Clause and Discriminatory State Tax Laws

    American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. New York State Dept. of Taxation, 84 N.Y.2d 31 (1994)

    A state tax law violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution if it discriminates against interstate commerce by treating in-state and out-of-state economic interests differently, thereby providing a commercial advantage to local businesses.

    Summary

    American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) challenged a New York State tax law, arguing it violated the Commerce Clause. The law allowed local telephone carriers to include access service fees in their tax base while permitting long-distance carriers to deduct those fees. However, the deduction for interstate carriers like AT&T was applied pre-apportionment, limiting their deduction compared to intrastate carriers. The New York Court of Appeals held that the pre-apportionment deduction unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce, as it favored intrastate carriers by allowing them a full deduction while limiting interstate carriers to a percentage based on their property within the state. This differential treatment provided a commercial advantage to local businesses, violating the Commerce Clause.

    Facts

    Prior to 1990, AT&T included access fees (charges imposed by local carriers for long-distance calls) as part of its New York taxable income without a corresponding deduction. In 1990, New York amended Tax Law § 186-a, requiring local carriers to include access fees in their tax base and allowing long-distance carriers to deduct these fees. AT&T paid taxes under this amended provision, deducting its New York carrier access expense from its total interstate and international receipts before apportionment. AT&T then sought a refund, arguing the deduction should apply only to its New York revenues, and challenged the constitutionality of Tax Law § 186-a (2-a).

    Procedural History

    AT&T commenced an action seeking a declaratory judgment that Tax Law § 186-a (2-a) was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied AT&T’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, granting AT&T’s motion. The New York Court of Appeals heard the appeal based on constitutional grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Tax Law § 186-a (2-a), by requiring interstate long-distance carriers to deduct access fees from their total interstate and international revenues before apportionment to New York, violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution by discriminating against interstate commerce.

    Holding

    Yes, because the pre-apportionment deduction under Tax Law § 186-a (2-a) discriminates against long-distance carriers engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, granting a commercial advantage to intrastate carriers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the method of calculating the tax deduction under the 1990 amendment offends the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Commerce Clause prohibits states from unjustifiably discriminating against or burdening the interstate flow of articles of commerce. The court stated, “‘discrimination’ simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter”.

    The court reasoned that the pre-apportionment deduction for interstate carriers, as opposed to the full deduction for intrastate carriers, had the “practical and real effect of treating differently long-distance carriers similarly situated in all respects except for the percentage of their property located within New York State.” Because the access fees are fixed and easily traceable to New York, the court found that requiring the deduction to be taken before apportionment created a direct commercial advantage to intrastate long-distance carriers.

    The Court also noted that the State failed to demonstrate that the discriminatory methodology advanced a legitimate local purpose that could not be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. Since the New York access fees are quantifiable and easily measured, the court concluded that the discriminatory calculation method, with its apportionment of the deduction, was not practically necessary and was constitutionally offensive.

  • Armstrong v. Centerville Fire Co., 83 N.Y.2d 937 (1994): Statute of Limitations for Fire Company Expulsion

    Armstrong v. Centerville Fire Co. , 83 N.Y.2d 937 (1994)

    A proceeding challenging a fire company’s expulsion of a member is subject to a four-month statute of limitations, which begins to run when the expulsion becomes final, unless the member was statutorily entitled to a hearing.

    Summary

    Armstrong, a volunteer member of the Centerville Fire Company, was directed to resign as secretary. Upon his failure to do so, the fire company expelled him. He unsuccessfully sought reinstatement and then commenced an Article 78 proceeding. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the petition as time-barred, holding that the four-month statute of limitations began to run on the effective date of the expulsion because Armstrong was not statutorily entitled to a hearing before being expelled for violating the fire company’s bylaws.

    Facts

    Armstrong, a volunteer member of the Centerville Fire Company, received a letter in January 1991 directing him to resign as secretary by February 1, 1991.

    Armstrong failed to resign. A majority of the fire company members voted to expel him, effective March 28, 1991.

    He was notified of his expulsion by letter dated March 21, 1991.

    Armstrong unsuccessfully demanded reinstatement at a meeting on May 23, 1991.

    Procedural History

    Armstrong commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding on September 6, 1991, seeking reinstatement.

    Supreme Court dismissed the petition as time-barred.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the four-month statute of limitations for commencing an Article 78 proceeding challenging Armstrong’s expulsion from the fire company began to run on the date the expulsion became final.

    Holding

    Yes, because Armstrong was not statutorily entitled to a hearing before being expelled for violating the fire company’s bylaws, the statute of limitations began to run on the date the expulsion became final.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that Armstrong’s expulsion became final and binding on March 28, 1991, and the statute of limitations began to run on that date unless he was entitled to a hearing before being expelled, citing Matter of De Milio v Borghard, 55 NY2d 216, 220.

    General Municipal Law § 209-l grants volunteer officers and members of fire departments the right to a hearing before removal for incompetence or misconduct, but the Court reasoned that the Legislature did not intend to interfere with the disciplining of volunteer firefighters in connection with the internal affairs of a fire company.

    General Municipal Law § 209-z expressly provides that the right to a hearing and other statutory procedural protections “shall not affect the right of members of any fire company to remove a volunteer officer or voluntary member of such company for failure to comply with the constitution and by-laws of such company”.

    The Court determined that assessing whether Armstrong’s refusal to submit a resignation violated the fire company’s bylaws involved more than a nondiscretionary ministerial duty. Therefore, Armstrong’s sole remedy was in the nature of mandamus to review rather than mandamus to compel, citing Matter of Scherbyn v Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77 NY2d 753, 757.

    The four-month limitations period governing mandamus to review begins when the determination becomes final and binding, as stated in Matter of De Milio v Borghard, supra, at 220. In this case, that occurred on March 28, 1991, the effective date of Armstrong’s expulsion. Thus, the proceeding commenced in September was untimely.

  • American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. New York State Dept. of Taxation, 84 N.Y.2d 31 (1994): Commerce Clause and Discriminatory Tax Treatment

    84 N.Y.2d 31 (1994)

    A state tax law violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution if it facially discriminates against interstate commerce by providing a direct commercial advantage to local businesses over similarly situated interstate businesses and the discriminatory treatment is not justified by a legitimate local purpose that cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory means.

    Summary

    American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) challenged a New York State tax law, arguing it discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The law allowed local telephone carriers to deduct access fees from their income after these fees were paid to them by long-distance carriers like AT&T. However, the statute required interstate carriers like AT&T to deduct the access fees from their total interstate and international receipts *before* apportioning to New York, while wholly intrastate carriers could claim a dollar-for-dollar deduction. The New York Court of Appeals agreed that this pre-apportionment deduction for interstate carriers unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce because it favored local carriers.

    Facts

    Prior to 1990, AT&T included access fees (charges imposed by local telephone carriers for long-distance calls) in its New York taxable income but received no deduction for these pass-through costs.
    In 1990, New York amended Tax Law § 186-a, requiring local carriers to include access fees in their tax base and allowing long-distance carriers to deduct those fees.
    AT&T paid taxes under the amended law, deducting access fees from its total interstate and international receipts *before* apportionment to New York.
    AT&T then sought a refund, arguing it should be allowed to deduct access fees only from its New York revenues. The refund was denied, and AT&T sued, claiming the tax law was unconstitutional.

    Procedural History

    AT&T sued the New York State Department of Taxation seeking a declaratory judgment that Tax Law § 186-a (2-a) was unconstitutional.
    Supreme Court denied AT&T’s motion for summary judgment.
    The Appellate Division reversed and granted AT&T’s motion, finding the law violated the Commerce Clause.
    The New York Court of Appeals heard the case on appeal as of right due to the constitutional question.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Tax Law § 186-a (2-a), which requires interstate long-distance carriers to deduct access fees from their total interstate and international revenues before apportionment to New York, violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by discriminating against interstate commerce.

    Holding

    Yes, because the pre-apportionment deduction for interstate carriers creates a direct commercial advantage for intrastate carriers and the state failed to show that the discriminating methodology advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Commerce Clause prohibits states from unjustifiably discriminating against or burdening the interstate flow of commerce. “‘Discrimination’ simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”
    The court focused on the practical operation of the statute. It found that the pre-apportionment deduction effectively treated similarly situated long-distance carriers differently based solely on the percentage of their property located within New York.
    A wholly intrastate carrier could deduct all of its New York access fees, while an interstate carrier like AT&T was limited to its apportionment percentage (5.04% in AT&T’s case), even though both reported 100% of their New York taxable income.
    Since access fees are fixed, traceable to New York, and essentially already apportioned, the pre-apportionment deduction created a direct commercial advantage for intrastate carriers.
    New York failed to demonstrate that the discriminatory methodology advanced a legitimate local purpose that could not be achieved through nondiscriminatory alternatives. The court noted that the New York access fees are quantifiable and easily measured.
    Therefore, the court concluded that the discriminatory calculation method was not practically necessary and unconstitutionally offensive. The court cited *New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach*, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) to reinforce this principle.

  • Morris v. Snappy Car Rental, Inc., 84 N.Y.2d 21 (1994): Enforceability of Indemnification Clauses in Car Rental Agreements

    84 N.Y.2d 21 (1994)

    A car rental company can secure indemnification from a renter for liability exceeding the minimum insurance coverage required by Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 370 and 388, provided the indemnification agreement is clear, conscionable, and doesn’t attempt to disclaim the minimum liability mandated by statute.

    Summary

    Barbara Morris rented a car from Snappy Car Rental. She was injured in an accident while her husband was driving. Morris sued Snappy, among others. Snappy sought indemnification from Morris based on a clause in the rental agreement. The New York Court of Appeals held that Snappy could enforce the indemnification clause for liability exceeding the statutory minimum insurance requirements, but not for amounts within that minimum. The court emphasized the importance of freedom of contract and found the indemnification clause was not unconscionable, as it was clearly stated and the renter had the opportunity to read it. The court affirmed that Snappy was not entitled to litigation costs and attorney’s fees.

    Facts

    On October 5, 1989, Barbara Morris rented a car from Snappy Car Rental for 30 days. Three days later, she sustained injuries in a collision while her husband, a permissive user under the agreement, was driving. The other vehicle was driven by Eric Sherry, who was working for Franco’s Pizzeria. Morris suffered a fractured femur requiring multiple surgeries.

    Procedural History

    Morris sued Snappy, Eric Sherry, Laura Sherry, and Franco’s Pizzeria. Snappy denied negligence and asserted an affirmative defense and counterclaim for indemnification based on the rental agreement. Supreme Court denied Snappy’s motion to dismiss the complaint but granted a conditional order of summary judgment for Snappy on its indemnification counterclaim, also granting Snappy attorney’s fees and denying Morris’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division modified the order, limiting Snappy’s indemnification to amounts exceeding the statutory minimum insurance and denying Snappy costs and attorney’s fees. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a car rental company can enforce an indemnification clause in its rental agreement, requiring the renter to indemnify the company for liability arising out of the use of the vehicle, specifically regarding:

    1. Whether such an indemnification clause is void as against public policy to the extent it seeks to disclaim liability imposed by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388.

    2. Whether the indemnification agreement is unenforceable as an adhesion contract or the result of procedural unconscionability.

    Holding

    1. No, because while a car rental company cannot disclaim the minimum liability coverage mandated by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, it can secure indemnification for amounts exceeding that minimum.

    2. No, because the indemnification agreement was not an adhesion contract, nor was it procedurally unconscionable, as the renter had the opportunity to read and understand the terms.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 was enacted to ensure injured parties have access to financially responsible insured persons. However, the statute does not prevent a lessor/owner from securing indemnification from a lessee/driver for liability exceeding the statutory minimum insurance. The court emphasized the importance of freedom of contract, stating that the Legislature did not intend to abrogate the right of indemnification. Quoting the Restatement of Restitution § 76, the court said, “[a] person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and another should have been discharged by the other, is entitled to indemnity’”. The court distinguished this case from MVAIC v. Continental Natl. Am. Group Co., where the rental agreement sought to entirely evade liability. Here, Snappy only sought indemnification for amounts exceeding the statutory minimum. The court found no evidence of high-pressure tactics or deceptive language, and the plaintiff signed the agreement, affirming she had read and understood it. Therefore, the indemnification agreement was enforceable up to the point of overage of mandatory insurance requirements. The court agreed with the Appellate Division in denying Snappy its costs and expenses of litigation.

  • People v. Sierra, 83 N.Y.2d 928 (1994): Flight Plus Specific Circumstances Justifies Police Pursuit

    83 N.Y.2d 928 (1994)

    A defendant’s flight in response to a police approach, combined with other specific circumstances indicating possible criminal activity, can create reasonable suspicion justifying police pursuit.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases, People v. Sierra and People v. Robbins, address when a suspect’s flight from police justifies pursuit. The Court of Appeals held that in Sierra, the police had reasonable suspicion due to the defendant’s flight combined with the known drug activity in the area and suspicious behavior. Thus, the drugs Sierra abandoned were admissible. However, in Robbins, the defendant’s flight after exiting a cab stopped for a traffic violation, without any other indicia of criminal activity, did not justify the pursuit. The drugs Robbins abandoned should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    People v. Sierra: Police patrolling a high-crime area known for drug activity observed Sierra call out to a man exiting a car with out-of-state plates. When the man saw the police, he turned away. Sierra then refused to approach the police cruiser and fled. During the pursuit, Sierra abandoned a bag containing drugs.

    People v. Robbins: Police stopped a livery cab for defective brake lights. Robbins, a passenger, exited the cab, grabbed at his waistband, and ran. During the pursuit, he abandoned a bag containing drugs.

    Procedural History

    People v. Sierra: The lower courts denied Sierra’s motion to suppress the drug evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding reasonable suspicion justified the pursuit.

    People v. Robbins: The lower courts denied Robbins’ motion to suppress the drug evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the pursuit was unlawful, and the evidence should have been suppressed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant’s flight from police, combined with other circumstances, can establish reasonable suspicion to justify police pursuit.

    2. Whether, in People v. Sierra, the police possessed reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant.

    3. Whether, in People v. Robbins, the police possessed reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a defendant’s flight combined with other specific circumstances indicating that the suspect may be engaged in criminal activity, may give rise to reasonable suspicion, the necessary predicate for police pursuit.

    2. Yes, because the defendant’s flight, combined with the known drug activity in the area and the suspicious behavior, provided reasonable suspicion.

    3. No, because the defendant’s flight after exiting a cab stopped for a traffic violation, without any other indicia of criminal activity, did not justify the pursuit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that flight alone is not enough to justify police pursuit, but flight combined with specific circumstances indicating possible criminal activity can create reasonable suspicion. The Court noted that the determination of reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact, and the Court of Appeals will only reverse if there is no evidence to support the lower courts’ determination.

    In Sierra, the Court found sufficient evidence. The police were patrolling a known “narcotics supermarket.” They saw the defendant call out to a man who exited a car with New Jersey license plates, and the man turned away upon seeing the police. The court held that these facts “furnished an objective, credible reason to approach defendant. Defendant’s refusal to approach the cruiser and his subsequent flight gave rise to reasonable suspicion that he was committing or was about to commit a drug-related crime.”

    In Robbins, the Court found the evidence insufficient. The police only knew that Robbins exited a cab stopped for a traffic violation, grabbed his waistband, and fled. The Court stated that these facts “provided them with no information regarding criminal activity.” Therefore, the pursuit was unlawful, and the evidence obtained as a result should have been suppressed.

  • New York City Dept. of Health v. McBarnette, 84 N.Y.2d 194 (1994): Limits on Withholding State Aid Reimbursement for Public Health Services

    New York City Dept. of Health v. McBarnette, 84 N.Y.2d 194 (1994)

    A municipality is entitled to state aid reimbursement for public health services contracted out to other city agencies, provided that the city’s Department of Health maintains adequate supervision over those services and the contracted agencies do not have a legal responsibility to provide the services independently.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between the New York City Department of Health (City DOH) and the State Department of Health (State DOH) over state aid reimbursement for public health services that the City DOH contracted out to other city agencies. The State DOH denied reimbursement for certain services, arguing that the contracting agencies were legally responsible for providing those services. The Court of Appeals held that the State DOH’s denial was arbitrary and capricious because the contracting agencies were merely authorized, not legally obligated, to provide the services, and the City DOH maintained adequate supervision over them, satisfying the requirements for state aid reimbursement.

    Facts

    In 1990, the City DOH submitted its municipal health services plan to the State DOH, including public health services provided through contracts with other city agencies like the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (City HHC), the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (City DEP), and the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (City HPD). These services included family planning, prenatal care, disease control, lead paint inspections, and emergency responses to hazardous materials. The City DOH required these agencies to submit detailed quarterly financial reports and assigned staff to review and audit them.

    Procedural History

    The City DOH applied for state aid reimbursement for these services. The State DOH approved some reimbursement but rejected $8,973,311 related to services provided by the City HHC, City DEP, and City HPD. The City DOH commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the State DOH’s decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed and granted the petition. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State DOH’s denial of state aid reimbursement to the City DOH for public health services contracted out to other city agencies was arbitrary and capricious, where the State DOH argued the other agencies had legal responsibility for the services.

    Holding

    Yes, because the contracting city agencies were authorized, but not legally required, to provide the public health services, and the City DOH maintained sufficient supervision over those agencies as required by the Public Health Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the State DOH’s interpretation was inconsistent with the legislative intent of Article 6 of the Public Health Law, which was enacted to increase state assistance for preventative health programs. The court reasoned that Public Health Law § 604 requires a municipality to employ a full-time local commissioner of health to supervise the provision of public health services. The court determined that the City DOH met this requirement through its contractual arrangements, by requiring the City agencies to submit detailed quarterly financial reports itemizing the applicable expenses incurred, and the City DOH was required to assign staff members to review and audit the financial reports. The court cited the Governor’s Memorandum approving the legislation, stating its purpose was to “ensure that State resources will be committed to strengthen the existing local public health infrastructure and to expand preventative health programs [such as prenatal care, environmental health, nutrition and health education programs].”

    The court addressed the State DOH’s argument that its regulation disallowing reimbursement for the “cost of activities for which any other agency * * * has been given legal responsibility” (10 NYCRR 40-1.53 [p]) justified the denial. The court found that while the City agencies were authorized to provide the contracted services (citing McKinney’s Uncons Laws of NY § 7382 and NY City Charter §§ 1403 [h], 1803 [2]), none of them had a “legal responsibility” to do so. The court emphasized that the contractual relationship could lead to cost savings, another goal of the legislation. Therefore, the denial of reimbursement was deemed arbitrary and capricious.

  • Matter of Smith v. Board of Educ., 83 N.Y.2d 914 (1994): Seniority Calculation for Tenure Purposes

    Matter of Smith v. Board of Educ., 83 N.Y.2d 914 (1994)

    Seniority for tenure purposes under Education Law § 2585(3) is measured from the date of formal appointment to a certificated position under the Education Law, and time accrued in a Civil Service appointment cannot be credited toward service in a certificated administrative position.

    Summary

    Smith, previously a Director of Civil Service Personnel, was reclassified to a certificated position of Director of Civil Service Personnel under the Education Law. When her position was later terminated due to fiscal constraints, Smith challenged the Board of Education’s calculation of her seniority date. The Court of Appeals held that Smith’s seniority was properly measured from the date of her formal appointment to the certificated position, not from her prior service under the Civil Service Law. The court reasoned that no law or statute supports transferring seniority from a Civil Service appointment to a certificated position under the Education Law, thus the Board’s action was not arbitrary or capricious.

    Facts

    Smith was appointed Director of Civil Service Personnel on August 8, 1983, under the Civil Service Law. She received permanent certification as a School Administrator/Supervisor on September 1, 1986. On October 6, 1987, Smith requested reclassification of her position to a certificated position under the Education Law. The Board of Education reclassified her on February 6, 1989, with a seniority date of that day, initiating a new three-year probationary period. Smith noted her objection to the seniority date. Citing fiscal constraints, the Board terminated Smith’s position on February 1, 1992, citing her as the least senior within the tenure area.

    Procedural History

    Smith commenced an action challenging her termination, alleging miscalculation of her seniority date. Supreme Court granted the petition, setting Smith’s seniority date to October 6, 1987. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board of Education acted arbitrarily in measuring Smith’s seniority under Education Law § 2585(3) from the date of her formal appointment to a certificated position (February 6, 1989), rather than from the date she initially requested reclassification (October 6, 1987), or from her initial appointment under civil service law.

    Holding

    No, because under Education Law § 2585(3), seniority is measured from the date of formal appointment to a certificated position under the Education Law, and Smith’s prior service under the Civil Service Law is not transferable to her certificated position seniority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that “seniority” is defined as “length of service in a designated tenure area, rather than length of service in the district” (8 NYCRR 30.1[i]). Because Smith was first appointed to the certified administration position under the Education Law on February 6, 1989, her seniority under Education Law § 2585(3) must be measured from that date. The court explicitly rejected Smith’s argument that her previous duties under the Civil Service Law should count towards her seniority in the certificated position. The court emphasized that no case law or statute supports transferring seniority from a Civil Service appointment to a certificated position under the Education Law. The court distinguished Matter of Crandall, noting that in that case, the petitioners had been appointed to substitute positions under the Education Law prior to their probationary periods, which created continuous service. Here, Smith’s prior appointment was under the Civil Service Law, not the Education Law, so her service was not continuous. The court concluded that Smith could not properly credit the time accrued in her Civil Service appointment toward her service in her certificated administrative position. The key distinction is that credit is only given for continuous service within the educational system. The court’s decision emphasizes the importance of formal appointments and adherence to the statutory framework in determining seniority rights, providing clarity for school districts in managing personnel matters related to tenure and seniority.