New York Law Review

Tag: 1994

  • Council of the City of New York v. Giuliani, 84 N.Y.2d 381 (1994): Amending a City Charter Requires More Than a Budget Resolution

    Council of the City of New York v. Giuliani, 84 N.Y.2d 381 (1994)

    A city charter amendment or repeal requires legislative action of equal dignity and import, such as a local law, and cannot be accomplished merely through the adoption of a budget resolution or modification.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether New York City officials properly amended the City Charter by defunding the Independent Budget Office (IBO) through budget modifications and resolutions, rather than a local law. The Court of Appeals held that the City Council’s budget actions were insufficient to amend or repeal the Charter provisions mandating the IBO’s establishment and funding. The Court emphasized that amending the City Charter requires a legislative act of equal dignity and import, which a budget resolution does not meet, and that implied repeals of legislation are disfavored. The Court affirmed the lower court’s order compelling the establishment and funding of the IBO, remitting the case to set a new compliance timeframe.

    Facts

    In 1989, New York City voters approved a revision to the City Charter establishing the IBO to enhance public understanding of the city’s budget. The Charter mandated the IBO’s establishment, funding (at least 10% of the Office of Management and Budget’s expenses), and the appointment of a Director. For fiscal year 1991, $2,898,000 was appropriated for the IBO. However, due to a recession, the Mayor proposed postponing the IBO’s start-up, and the City Council approved a budget modification eliminating IBO funding for fiscal year 1991. The fiscal year 1992 budget, also approved by the City Council, contained no appropriations for the IBO. Not-for-profit advocacy groups then initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding to compel the establishment and funding of the IBO.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking mandamus to compel the Mayor and City Council to establish and fund the IBO and to compel the Special Appointment Committee to appoint a Director. The Supreme Court granted the petition, ordering the city to fund the IBO and appoint a director. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the City Council’s adoption of a budget modification eliminating funding for the IBO and the adoption of a budget with no appropriation for the IBO was the legislative equivalent of a local law delaying the establishment of the IBO.

    2. Whether the 1991 budget modification and 1992 budget implicitly amended the Charter’s IBO provisions.

    Holding

    1. No, because a legislative act of equal dignity and import is required to modify a statute, and a budget resolution is not equivalent to a local law.

    2. No, because repeals or modifications of legislation by implication are disfavored, and the City Council did not manifest an intent to amend the Charter’s IBO provisions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the City Charter mandated the establishment of the IBO, and the City Council did not express an intent to amend the Charter through proper legislative channels. The Court cited Matter of Gallagher v Regan, 42 NY2d 230, 234, emphasizing that “’a legislative act of equal dignity and import’” is required to modify a statute, and “'[n]othing less than another statute will suffice.’” Additionally, the Court noted that section 32 of the New York City Charter requires local laws to embrace only one subject, which the budget modification and budget did not satisfy. The Court emphasized that repeals by implication are disfavored, stating that “[r]epeal or modification of legislation by implication is not favored in the law” (Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v Department of Envtl. Conservation, 71 NY2d 186, 195). Because the City Council did not manifest an intent to amend the City Charter’s IBO provisions, the Court held that the budget actions did not implicitly amend the Charter. The Court affirmed that the lower courts had room to exercise their discretion in compelling respondents to comply with the IBO provisions and remitted the case to Supreme Court to propose a new timeframe for compliance.

  • People v. Mato, 83 N.Y.2d 406 (1994): When a Wade Hearing is Required for Undercover Identifications

    83 N.Y.2d 406 (1994)

    A Wade hearing is required when there is a significant lapse of time between an undercover officer’s initial encounter with a suspect and a subsequent identification, or when the circumstances surrounding the identification suggest a risk of misidentification, even if the identification is labeled “confirmatory.”

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of selling drugs based on an undercover officer’s identification. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a Wade hearing to determine the admissibility of the identification testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a Wade hearing was necessary due to the time lapse between the initial drug transaction and the subsequent identification, as well as the circumstances surrounding the identification. The court emphasized that a “confirmatory” identification does not automatically obviate the need for a Wade hearing and that a case-by-case analysis is required.

    Facts

    An undercover officer purchased drugs from the defendant on July 12, 1989. The officer mistakenly recorded the address of the transaction. A search warrant was issued based on this incorrect information, leading to the wrongful arrest of a family. On August 7, 1989, the undercover officer returned to the correct address and purchased drugs again. He saw the defendant standing outside the building, had a brief conversation with him, and then arrested him for the July 12 transaction. The undercover officer viewed the defendant again, handcuffed, outside the building and at the police station.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a Wade hearing to suppress the identification testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for a Wade hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a Wade hearing, given the time lapse between the drug transaction and the identification, the officer’s initial mistake regarding the address, and the circumstances of the subsequent viewings of the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the time lapse between the initial encounter and the subsequent identification, combined with the circumstances of the identification, created a significant risk of misidentification, necessitating a Wade hearing to determine the admissibility of the identification testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the identification in this case did not meet the criteria for a “confirmatory” identification that would obviate the need for a Wade hearing. The court emphasized that a significant time lapse between the initial encounter and the identification, as seen in People v. Newball, raises concerns about the reliability of the identification. The court distinguished this case from People v. Wharton, where the identification was considered an ordinary and proper completion of an integral police procedure because the viewing by the officer occurred at a place and time sufficiently connected and contemporaneous to the arrest. Here, the 26-day gap, the officer’s mistake about the address, and the suggestiveness of viewing the defendant in handcuffs all pointed to the need for a Wade hearing. The court stated, “(c)omprehensive analysis, not superficial categorization, ultimately governs.” The Court noted that testimony regarding the August 7th identification was only permissible if it directly related back to the original transaction of July 12th and that showup evidence should be avoided and subjected to Wade hearings to safeguard accuracy.

  • People v. Garcia, 83 N.Y.2d 817 (1994): Preserving Objections for Appellate Review

    People v. Garcia, 83 N.Y.2d 817 (1994)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must raise a specific objection at trial; a general objection, or an objection on other grounds, does not preserve the issue.

    Summary

    The defendant, Garcia, was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At trial, the prosecution presented expert testimony on street-level drug transactions. Garcia objected, arguing the testimony would prejudice the jury by suggesting involvement in a larger narcotics organization. On appeal, Garcia argued the expert testimony was unnecessary and improperly bolstered the prosecution’s witnesses. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Garcia’s initial objection did not preserve the new arguments raised on appeal. The Court emphasized the importance of specific objections to allow the trial court to address the alleged error.

    Facts

    Garcia was arrested during a buy-and-bust operation in the Bronx and charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

    At trial, a detective involved in the arrest testified about the circumstances.

    The detective was permitted to testify as an expert on street-level drug transactions, defining terms like “hawker,” “money man,” and “hand-to-hand.”

    Garcia objected to the expert testimony, arguing it would mislead the jury into believing he was involved in a larger narcotics organization, even though only a single sale was at issue.

    Procedural History

    The jury convicted Garcia.

    The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the judgment.

    One of the dissenting Justices at the Appellate Division granted Garcia leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s objection at trial, based on the potential for the jury to infer involvement in a larger narcotics organization, preserved the defendant’s appellate claims that the expert testimony was unnecessary and improperly bolstered the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s objection at trial was based on a different ground than the arguments raised on appeal. The Court of Appeals held that the initial objection did not preserve the defendant’s current claims that the expert testimony was inadmissible because it was unnecessary and that it improperly bolstered the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the principle of preservation of error. To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a specific objection at trial, giving the trial court an opportunity to address the alleged error.

    Garcia’s objection at trial was that the expert testimony would prejudice the jury by suggesting he was involved in a larger drug trafficking operation. On appeal, Garcia argued the expert testimony was unnecessary and improperly bolstered the prosecution’s case. These were distinct arguments.

    The Court stated that “That objection does not preserve defendant’s current claims that the expert testimony was inadmissible because it was unnecessary and that it improperly bolstered the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses…We therefore may not address these claims.”

    Because Garcia’s initial objection did not alert the trial court to the specific errors he now alleged, the Court of Appeals declined to review those claims.

    The Court also found that the preserved claim, that the expert testimony implied Garcia’s involvement in extensive drug trafficking, was without merit, especially since the trial court limited the testimony to defining specific terms.

  • Schwartfigure v. Hartnett, 83 N.Y.2d 296 (1994): Agency Rulemaking Requirements for Benefit Recoupment

    Schwartfigure v. Hartnett, 83 N.Y.2d 296 (1994)

    An administrative agency’s rigid policy of recouping overpaid benefits through a fixed percentage reduction, applied without considering individual circumstances, constitutes a “rule” subject to the rulemaking procedures of the State Administrative Procedure Act (SAPA).

    Summary

    Schwartfigure was overpaid unemployment benefits through no fault of her own. When she later became eligible for new benefits, the agency recouped the overpayment by reducing her new benefits by 50% according to a long-standing policy. She challenged this recoupment method, arguing it violated state law and constituted an unpromulgated rule under SAPA. The court held that while the agency had the right to recoup overpayments, the rigid 50% reduction policy was a rule that required formal promulgation under SAPA, as it was a fixed, general principle applied without considering individual circumstances.

    Facts

    In 1988, Schwartfigure received unemployment benefits. In December 1989, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board determined she was overpaid $2,112, but not due to any misrepresentation on her part. She did not appeal this determination. In January 1991, she again qualified for benefits. Starting February 1991, the agency paid her only 50% of the eligible benefits, offsetting the remaining 50% to recoup the prior overpayment. Her offer to repay in smaller installments was rejected.

    Procedural History

    Schwartfigure filed a hybrid declaratory judgment and Article 78 proceeding, arguing the recoupment violated Labor Law § 597(4) and the recoupment policy was an unpromulgated rule under SAPA. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding a 1983 amendment restored the agency’s common-law right of setoff. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the agency’s method of recouping overpaid unemployment benefits through a 50% reduction of subsequent benefits contravenes Labor Law § 597(4)?

    2. Whether the agency’s 50% set-off policy for non-willful overpayments constitutes a “rule” within the meaning of the State Administrative Procedure Act, requiring formal promulgation?

    Holding

    1. No, because the 1983 amendment to Labor Law § 597(4) restored the agency’s common-law right of setoff to recoup funds erroneously paid.

    2. Yes, because the agency’s rigid, numerical 50% set-off policy, invariably applied without regard to individual circumstances, falls within the definition of a “rule” under SAPA.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the agency’s restored common-law right of setoff to recoup overpaid benefits. However, it distinguished between the right to recoup and the manner in which that right is exercised. The court emphasized that any procedure chosen by the agency to implement its right of setoff is subject to the rulemaking requirements of SAPA unless a statutory exception applies.

    The court, citing Matter of Roman Catholic Diocese v New York State Dept. of Health, 66 NY2d 948, 951, defined a rule as “a fixed, general principle to be applied by an administrative agency without regard to other facts and circumstances relevant to the regulatory scheme of the statute it administers”. The agency’s 50% set-off policy was deemed a rigid, numerical policy invariably applied across-the-board without regard to individualized circumstances or mitigating factors.

    The court rejected the argument that the policy concerned only internal management. The court reasoned that the recoupment directly and significantly affected the segment of the public over which the agency exercises direct authority. Because the 50% setoff was accomplished pursuant to an administrative rule not properly promulgated under SAPA, Schwartfigure was entitled to a determination of benefits considering her individual circumstances at the time the benefits were payable.

  • People v. Breland, 83 N.Y.2d 294 (1994): Independent Criminal Acts and Accomplice Corroboration

    People v. Breland, 83 N.Y.2d 294 (1994)

    A witness’s participation in a crime is severed when the defendant commits a subsequent, independent criminal act against that witness, thus nullifying the need for accomplice corroboration regarding the independent act.

    Summary

    Victor Breland was convicted of enterprise corruption and multiple counts of murder and other crimes related to his leadership in a crack cocaine network. Key evidence included accomplice testimony regarding two sets of killings: one at a beauty parlor and another of a man named Lovell. Breland argued that the accomplice testimony was insufficiently corroborated, as required by CPL 60.22. He also argued that a witness, Ashton, who was also a victim of Breland’s violence, should have been considered an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Breland’s act of shooting Ashton constituted a separate and independent crime, thus eliminating the need for corroboration of Ashton’s testimony and that sufficient non-accomplice evidence connected Breland to the crimes.

    Facts

    Breland, a leader in a crack cocaine network, orchestrated a series of violent crimes. He and an accomplice murdered two people at the Glamorama Beauty Parlor, intending to kill a rival drug lord. Breland also shot and wounded Willie Ashton, an accomplice who was acting as a lookout, and killed another lookout, Mitchell Rich, to eliminate witnesses. A week later, Breland murdered Joseph Lovell, who had been used to register vehicles for the drug operation. Accomplices provided detailed accounts of both the Glamorama shootings and the Lovell murder.

    Procedural History

    Breland was convicted by a jury in the Supreme Court, Kings County, of enterprise corruption, multiple counts of second-degree murder, attempted murder, assault, and weapons possession. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Breland appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Willie Ashton should be considered an accomplice as a matter of law regarding Breland’s attempted murder of Ashton, thus requiring corroboration of Ashton’s testimony under CPL 60.22.

    2. Whether there was sufficient non-accomplice evidence to corroborate the accomplice testimony regarding the Glamorama shootings and the Lovell murder, as required by CPL 60.22.

    3. Whether the police identification procedure used with Ashton was impermissibly suggestive, thereby tainting Ashton’s identification of Breland.

    Holding

    1. No, because Breland’s attempted murder of Ashton constituted a subsequent, independent criminal act, severing Ashton’s initial accomplice relationship.

    2. Yes, because the non-accomplice evidence sufficiently connected Breland to both sets of killings, satisfying the requirements of CPL 60.22.

    3. No, because Ashton’s prior relationship with Breland and the circumstances of their encounters ensured that the identification was not the product of police suggestion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding Ashton’s status, the Court reasoned that Breland’s act of shooting Ashton was a distinct criminal event, separate from the initial plan. "Breland’s attempted murder of his erstwhile accomplice, Ashton, constitutes a subsequent independent criminal frame in a series of violent criminal scenes and acts. His own shooting of Ashton outside the beauty parlor severed, in the most profound legal and actual sense, Ashton’s initial accomplice relationship to him." This eliminated the need to corroborate Ashton’s testimony.

    As for accomplice corroboration, the Court emphasized that the non-accomplice evidence need only "fairly tend[] to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime." The Court found sufficient corroboration for both the Glamorama shootings and the Lovell murder, including independent evidence regarding the location of Lovell’s body, vehicle registration records linking Breland to Lovell and the Glamorama attack, and testimony from a UPS driver who identified a getaway vehicle and another accomplice. The court noted, regarding corroboration: "The corroborative glue does not require independent proof of the elements of the crime to sustain a conviction; it just has to bind the accomplice evidence to the defendant."

    Finally, the Court dismissed Breland’s argument about police suggestibility, noting Ashton’s close and intense encounters with Breland. The Court noted "while Ashton’s viewings of Breland’s face and features, as described in the Rodriguez hearing, may have been relatively brief, they could not have been more intense or focused," further observing that Ashton’s face-to-face encounter with Breland at the time he was shot precluded any claims of police suggestibility.

  • People v. Weinberg, 83 N.Y.2d 262 (1994): Retroactive Application of Tax Law & Ex Post Facto

    People v. Weinberg, 83 N.Y.2d 262 (1994)

    A statute is not applied retroactively when it applies to future transactions, even if those transactions are founded upon antecedent events; enhanced penalties for repeat offenses do not violate ex post facto laws when applied to offenses committed after the law’s enactment, even if prior offenses occurred before.

    Summary

    Weinberg was convicted of failure to file tax returns and repeated failure to file, a felony under Tax Law § 1802, based on failures in 1983, 1984, and 1985. He argued the felony charge was an improper retroactive application of the law and violated ex post facto principles. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the law wasn’t retroactive because the last failure to file (1985) occurred after the law’s enactment. The court also ruled that the enhanced penalty for repeated offenses didn’t violate ex post facto principles because it was a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, not additional punishment for earlier non-filings.

    Facts

    Defendant failed to file New York State personal income tax returns for 1983, 1984, and 1985. In 1985, New York enacted the Omnibus Tax Equity and Enforcement Act, which included Tax Law § 1802, making repeated failure to file a felony. Weinberg filed the delinquent returns in August 1987, after being indicted. He was then convicted of misdemeanor counts for each year and a felony count for repeated failure to file.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Weinberg on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the application of Tax Law § 1802 to Weinberg’s failure to file tax returns, based in part on failures occurring before the statute’s effective date, constitutes an improper retroactive application of the statute.

    2. Whether applying Tax Law § 1802 to Weinberg constitutes an unconstitutional ex post facto law.

    3. Whether the trial court erred in giving supplemental instructions to the jury regarding the timeliness element of the offenses.

    4. Whether the trial court erred in preventing defense counsel from presenting the concept of jury nullification during summation.

    Holding

    1. No, because Tax Law § 1802 was applied to the 1985 failure to file, which occurred after the statute’s effective date.

    2. No, because Weinberg committed the repeated failure to file offense after section 1802’s effective date; the law didn’t punish acts innocent when performed or enhance punishment for a crime after its commission.

    3. No, because the trial court has a duty to respond meaningfully to the jury’s inquiry, and the supplemental instruction was a correction to assure the jury was not deliberating under a misapprehension of the law.

    4. No, because encouraging jury nullification would contravene the trial court’s authority to instruct the jury that they must follow and properly apply the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Tax Law § 1802 was not applied retroactively because the defendant “committed” the offense when he failed to file his 1985 tax return by April 15, 1986, after the law’s effective date. The court noted that “[a] statute is not retroactive * * * when made to apply to future transactions, merely because such transactions relate to and are founded upon antecedent events”. The court also pointed to a companion bill providing for a tax amnesty period, indicating the legislature intended § 1802 to take effect relatively soon after its enactment.

    Regarding the ex post facto argument, the Court relied on People v. Morse, stating that the conviction under § 1802 “‘is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier [nonfilings]. It is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one’”. The Court emphasized that the defendant had fair warning that failing to file in 1985 would result in criminal liability under § 1802.

    On the jury instruction issue, the Court cited CPL 310.30, noting the trial court must give requested information or instruction it deems proper. The timeliness instruction was deemed a meaningful response to the jury’s request for a recapitulation of all elements, especially given the defendant’s ultimate failure to file timely returns.

    Finally, the Court cited People v. Goetz, stating that while a jury can acquit despite finding the prosecution has proven its case, this “‘mercy-dispensing power’ * * * is not a legally sanctioned function of the jury and should not be encouraged by the court”.

  • People v. Matos, 83 N.Y.2d 509 (1994): Establishing Causation in Felony Murder

    People v. Matos, 83 N.Y.2d 509 (1994)

    A defendant is culpable for felony murder when their actions set in motion a chain of events that directly and foreseeably leads to another’s death, even if the defendant’s actions are not the sole or final cause of death.

    Summary

    Eddie Matos was convicted of felony murder after a police officer died while pursuing him on a roof following a burglary. Matos and accomplices broke into a McDonald’s, and a responding officer, Dwyer, fell to his death down an airshaft while in pursuit of Matos on the roof. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Matos’s actions initiated a foreseeable chain of events leading to Dwyer’s death. The court emphasized that the defendant’s conduct must be a sufficiently direct cause of the death and that the ultimate harm should have been reasonably foreseen, even if it wasn’t the most likely outcome.

    Facts

    In October 1989, Eddie Matos and two accomplices broke into a McDonald’s restaurant in Manhattan using a sledgehammer. They rounded up employees at gunpoint. A maintenance worker escaped and returned with three police officers. The officers saw Matos running towards the back of the restaurant and climbing a ladder to the roof. Officer Dwyer pursued Matos up the ladder. Shortly after, another officer found Dwyer lying dead at the bottom of an airshaft on the roof.

    Procedural History

    Matos was convicted in the trial court of second-degree murder, second-degree burglary, and attempted robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a fleeing felon’s actions are a sufficiently direct cause of another’s death when a police officer pursuing the felon dies during the pursuit, for the purposes of Penal Law § 125.25 (3), the felony murder statute.

    Holding

    Yes, because Matos’s actions set in motion a foreseeable chain of events that led to the officer’s death. His commission of a violent felony and subsequent attempt to escape directly caused the officer to pursue him onto the roof, where the officer fell to his death.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that for criminal responsibility to attach, a defendant’s actions must be an actual contributory cause of death. The defendant’s acts need not be the sole cause of death, but they must set in motion the events that ultimately result in the victim’s death. The court emphasized that the defendant’s conduct must be a “sufficiently direct cause” of the death, meaning the ultimate harm should have been reasonably foreseen.

    The court distinguished the case from situations where the causal link is too attenuated. Instead, the court relied on precedents like People v. Kibbe, where abandoning a victim on the side of the road led to a foreseeable fatal accident, and People v. Hernandez, where a shootout initiated by the defendant led to an officer’s death, even though the fatal shot was fired by another officer.

    The court stated, “[i]mmediate flight and attempts to thwart apprehension are patently within the furtherance of the cofelons’ criminal objective.” Foreseeability does not require the result to be the most likely event, only a reasonably possible one.

    The court concluded that it was foreseeable that an officer would pursue Matos onto the roof during his escape. Given those circumstances, it was also foreseeable that someone might fall during the pursuit across urban roofs at night.

  • People v. Voliton, 83 N.Y.2d 192 (1994): Resisting Arrest After Unlawful Police Seizure

    83 N.Y.2d 192 (1994)

    A defendant can be convicted of resisting arrest even if the initial attempt to detain them was unlawful, provided there was a subsequent, authorized basis for the arrest.

    Summary

    Voliton was convicted of assault and resisting arrest after an encounter with police. The Appellate Division overturned the felony assault convictions, finding the initial police seizure unlawful under People v. May. However, they upheld the convictions for reckless assault and resisting arrest. Voliton appealed, arguing a due process violation and that the resisting arrest conviction was invalid because the initial detention was unlawful. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the due process claim unpreserved and finding that the reckless assault provided a basis for a subsequent, authorized arrest, thus supporting the resisting arrest conviction, focusing on his actions after being apprehended on foot.

    Facts

    Two police officers observed Voliton in a car parked near a suspected drug location. They blocked his car and approached with weapons drawn, suspecting criminal activity. Voliton attempted to drive away, injuring the officers. Shots were fired, and Voliton was eventually apprehended after a chase and physical struggle where he punched and kicked the officers.

    Procedural History

    Voliton was convicted in the trial court of assault in the second degree (two counts), assault in the third degree, and resisting arrest. The Appellate Division overturned the second-degree assault convictions, citing an unlawful seizure, but affirmed the remaining convictions. Voliton appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether substantive due process bars convicting a defendant for actions in direct response to a police seizure later deemed illegal.
    2. Whether a resisting arrest conviction can stand when the initial attempt to detain the defendant was unlawful.

    Holding

    1. No, because the constitutional objection was raised for the first time on appeal and is therefore unpreserved.
    2. Yes, because the defendant’s commission of an assault, third degree, against one officer during the initial encounter furnished the predicate for his subsequent authorized arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held the due process argument was unpreserved because it was raised for the first time on appeal, and it did not fall under an exception to the preservation rule. The Court distinguished this case from situations impacting the court’s fundamental jurisdiction. Regarding the resisting arrest charge, the Court reasoned that although the initial attempt to detain Voliton may have been unlawful, his subsequent reckless assault of an officer provided probable cause for a lawful arrest. Because the jury found that Voliton punched and kicked the officers while they were attempting to handcuff him after the foot chase, the resisting arrest conviction was valid. The Court also cited Penal Law § 35.27, noting that a person may not use physical force to resist an arrest, authorized or unauthorized, when it reasonably appears the person is a police officer. The court highlighted the lack of a requested jury instruction regarding self-defense against excessive force. Judge Smith dissented, arguing that the trial was fundamentally flawed because the jury wasn’t instructed on justification, and they should have been informed the initial police conduct was illegal when considering the assault charge. He also argued no basis existed for the resisting arrest conviction because the initial police conduct was unlawful: “It is inconsistent for this Court, as it was for the Appellate Division, to sustain a charge of resisting arrest in the face of the conclusion that the police officers violated the law.”

  • Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. New York City, 83 N.Y.2d 215 (1994): Enforcing Mandatory Statutory Duties Through Mandamus

    83 N.Y.2d 215 (1994)

    When a statute imposes a clear legal duty on a government entity, courts can compel the performance of that duty through a writ of mandamus, even if compliance requires some exercise of discretion or enlisting the cooperation of others, and even if the government claims inadequate funding.

    Summary

    The Natural Resources Defense Council sued New York City, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the city’s compliance with the New York City Recycling Law. The NRDC argued the city failed to meet mandatory recycling goals. The City claimed the matter was a nonjusticiable political question due to budgetary constraints and argued that later actions by the city council implicitly repealed or modified the law. The New York Court of Appeals held the recycling law imposed mandatory duties on the city and that compliance could be compelled by mandamus, even if budgetary constraints existed or public cooperation was required. The Court found no implicit repeal or modification of the law.

    Facts

    In 1989, New York City enacted Local Law No. 19, the New York City Recycling Law, mandating a comprehensive recycling program. Due to a fiscal crisis, funding for the program was reduced. The NRDC sued the city, alleging non-compliance with several key provisions of the law, including failure to prepare recycling plans, establish collection programs for batteries and tires, develop recycling centers, and meet tonnage requirements.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the NRDC’s application, ordering the city to comply with the Recycling Law. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the NRDC’s application involved a nonjusticiable political question beyond the judiciary’s power to review.

    2. Whether Local Law No. 19’s recycling provisions were implicitly repealed or modified by subsequent actions of the City Council.

    3. Whether mandamus relief should have been denied because compliance with the tonnage goals of Local Law No. 19 is dependent upon the cooperation of the general public, and thus beyond respondents’ control.

    Holding

    1. No, because the legislation established a standard of conduct which executive officers must meet, making the dispute justiciable.

    2. No, because repeal or modification of legislation by implication is not favored in law, especially given the City Council’s explicit proscription against implied repeal.

    3. No, because the necessity of enlisting the cooperation of others in a public official’s performance of a statutory obligation does not automatically bar mandamus relief.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the use of the word “shall” throughout the Recycling Law indicates the mandatory nature of the duties imposed. The court noted that the City Council knew how to impart discretion within the provisions of Local Law No. 19 when that was their intention. Granting the NRDC the relief they seek would not involve the courts in resolving political questions or making broad policy choices on complex societal and governmental issues, involving the ordering of priorities.

    The court stated, “[petitioners] assert that the Legislature has mandated certain programs and that the executive branch has failed to deliver the services. The appropriate forum to determine the respective rights and obligations of the parties is in the judicial branch”.

    Regarding implicit repeal, the Court emphasized that such repeals are disfavored and require a clear manifestation of legislative intent. The Court cited Administrative Code Section 1-110(b), which explicitly proscribes implied repeal of the Code’s provisions. The Court found no such intent in the City Council’s participation in the Solid Waste Management Plan or its enactment of Local Law No. 72.

    The Court rejected the argument that reduced budget appropriations implied repeal, citing Ball v. State of New York, where a similar argument was rejected despite the elimination of specific appropriations for a state commission. The Court stated, “[manifestly, the Legislature may or may not appropriate funds necessary to fund these obligations, but the Commissioner does not discharge this statutory duty unless [s]he complies with the mandate contained in [the statute]”.

    Finally, the Court held that the need to enlist public cooperation does not automatically bar mandamus, citing Klostermann v. Cuomo. The Court stated that, “mandamus may compel acts that officials are duty-bound to perform, regardless of whether they may exercise their discretion in doing so.”

  • King v. New York State Division of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994): Parole Board’s Consideration of Improper Factors

    King v. New York State Division of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994)

    A parole board must provide an inmate with a proper hearing in which only the relevant statutory guidelines are considered when determining whether to grant discretionary release to parole supervision.

    Summary

    King sought release to parole supervision after being resentenced for the shooting death of an off-duty police officer. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision to remand the matter for a new hearing after the Supreme Court initially directed the Parole Board to release King. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that King was not afforded a proper hearing because one of the Commissioners considered factors outside the scope of Executive Law § 259-i, which governs parole decisions. The Court emphasized that the Parole Board must adhere to the statutory guidelines and not consider unauthorized factors like penal philosophy or the death penalty.

    Facts

    King was convicted of fatally shooting an off-duty police officer during a fast-food restaurant robbery in 1970 and sentenced to 25 years to life. In 1987, the Second Circuit determined the original sentence was constitutionally invalid due to the sentencing judge’s misunderstanding of parole eligibility. King was resentenced to 20 years to life, making him eligible for parole supervision in 1990. He applied for parole three times, and this case concerned the denial of his most recent request.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially directed the Parole Board to release King to parole supervision. The Appellate Division reversed that portion of the order requiring release and remanded the case for a de novo hearing. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the petitioner was afforded a proper hearing prior to the denial of his application for release to parole supervision, considering that a commissioner considered factors outside the scope of Executive Law § 259-i.

    Holding

    No, because the record showed that one of the Parole Commissioners considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy, the historical treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the consequences to society if those sentences are not in place.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on Executive Law article 12-B (§ 259 et seq.), particularly § 259-i (2) (c), which outlines the procedures governing parole. This section dictates that discretionary release should not be a mere reward for good behavior but based on whether “there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.” The Court emphasized that the Parole Board must consider guidelines such as the inmate’s institutional record, participation in temporary release programs, and release plans, along with the seriousness of the offense and prior criminal record. The court stated that while a Parole Board need not expressly discuss each of these guidelines in its determination, it must provide the inmate with a proper hearing in which only the relevant guidelines are considered, citing People ex rel. Herbert v New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 AD2d 128, 132. The Court found that the Commissioner’s consideration of factors like penal philosophy and the death penalty was not authorized by Executive Law § 259-i, thus invalidating the hearing. The court implies that adherence to the statute’s guidelines is essential for a fair parole hearing, underscoring the importance of procedural regularity in parole decisions.