New York Law Review

Tag: 1992

  • People v. Young, 81 N.Y.2d 727 (1992): Prior Threats and Justification Defense

    People v. Young, 81 N.Y.2d 727 (1992)

    Evidence of a victim’s prior threats against a defendant is admissible to determine who was the initial aggressor in a self-defense claim; however, an error in failing to instruct the jury on this point can be harmless if the evidence overwhelmingly disproves the justification defense.

    Summary

    Young was convicted of manslaughter and weapon possession after shooting Torrence. Young claimed self-defense, citing prior threats and violence by Torrence. The trial court allowed the jury to consider these threats only when evaluating Young’s state of mind, not when determining who was the initial aggressor. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while the trial court erred, the error was harmless because the evidence overwhelmingly indicated that Young was the initial aggressor and Torrence did not pose an imminent threat.

    Facts

    On July 2, 1990, Young shot Torrence in the back of the neck, paralyzing him. Torrence later died from complications. Young claimed self-defense, alleging that Torrence had repeatedly threatened him in the weeks leading up to the shooting. Young testified that on the night of the shooting, Torrence made a gesture toward his waistband, leading Young to believe he was about to be attacked. Witnesses testified that Torrence was unarmed, attempted to flee, and was shot in the back of the neck.

    Procedural History

    Young was indicted for attempted murder, then for murder after Torrence’s death. At trial, Young argued justification. The trial court instructed the jury that prior threats could only be considered in evaluating Young’s state of mind. The jury convicted Young of manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the deceased victim’s prior threats against the defendant could only be considered in determining the defendant’s state of mind, and not in determining who was the initial aggressor.

    Holding

    Yes, the trial court erred because prior threats can be used to determine the initial aggressor; however, the error was harmless because the evidence overwhelmingly disproved the justification defense, indicating that Young was the initial aggressor and Torrence posed no imminent threat.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the precedent set in Stokes v. People and People v. Miller, holding that evidence of a deceased victim’s prior threats against the defendant is admissible to prove that the victim was the initial aggressor, regardless of whether the threats were communicated to the defendant. The Court reasoned that such threats can indicate an intent to act upon them. However, the Court found that the error in this case was harmless because the evidence clearly showed that Torrence was unarmed, tried to run away, and was shot in the back. The Court emphasized that Young’s use of deadly force was unreasonable, as there was no persuasive evidence that Torrence was about to use deadly physical force against him. The Court stated: “Because there was overwhelming evidence disproving the justification defense and no reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different had the charge been correctly given, the error in the trial court’s justification charge was harmless.” The Court also held that the trial court properly excluded cumulative and collateral testimony. The Court cited People v Davis, noting the trial court has discretion to admit or preclude relevant evidence based on an analysis of its probative value versus whether it confuses the main issues and misleads the jury.

  • CITIC Industrial Bank v. Superintendent of Banks, 79 N.Y.2d 412 (1992): Authority to Seize Foreign Bank Assets in New York

    CITIC Industrial Bank v. Superintendent of Banks, 79 N.Y.2d 412 (1992)

    The Superintendent of Banks has broad authority under New York Banking Law to seize assets of a failed foreign bank located in New York, even if those assets are related to transactions initiated before the seizure but completed afterward.

    Summary

    CITIC Industrial Bank sought the return of $31 million it transferred to a New York bank account of the Tokyo branch of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) just before the New York Superintendent of Banks seized BCCI’s New York agency. The transfer was part of a “Eurodollar” agreement. The Court of Appeals held that the Superintendent had the authority to seize the funds under Banking Law § 606(4), which grants broad powers to seize assets of foreign banks in New York, even if those assets are related to a foreign branch and the transaction was in progress when the New York agency was seized. The Court rejected CITIC’s claims of restitution, constructive trust, and mistake of fact.

    Facts

    • CITIC regularly engaged in “dollar placements” with the BCCI Tokyo branch, depositing U.S. dollars into a BCCI Tokyo branch account at BankAmerica International (BAI) in New York.
    • On July 4, 1991, CITIC and BCCI Tokyo agreed to a Eurodollar agreement, where CITIC would transfer $31 million to BCCI Tokyo, to be repaid with interest the following Monday.
    • On July 5, 1991, CITIC initiated an electronic transfer of $31 million from its Citibank account in New York to the BCCI Tokyo branch account at BAI in New York.
    • Later that morning, the New York Superintendent of Banks seized the New York agency of BCCI due to its unsound financial condition.
    • BAI was informed of the seizure and instructed not to allow any funds out of BCCI accounts.
    • The transfer from Citibank to BAI was completed after the seizure, and the funds were credited to the BCCI Tokyo branch account.

    Procedural History

    • The Superintendent sought release of the $85 million seized from the BCCI Tokyo branch account at BAI.
    • Supreme Court ruled in favor of CITIC, ordering the return of $31 million.
    • The Appellate Division reversed, upholding the Superintendent’s authority to seize the funds.
    • The Court of Appeals granted CITIC leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Superintendent of Banks had the authority under Banking Law § 606(4) to seize funds transferred to a New York bank account of a foreign branch of BCCI after the Superintendent seized BCCI’s New York agency.
    2. Whether CITIC was entitled to the return of its funds under the doctrine of constructive trust.
    3. Whether the transaction was executed under a mistake of fact, warranting recovery under the contract doctrine of impossibility/impracticability of performance.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Banking Law § 606(4) grants the Superintendent broad powers to seize assets of foreign banks in New York, including assets of a foreign branch located in New York regardless of whether those assets have any business connection to the New York agency.
    2. No, because CITIC was not an innocent victim and knowingly took a risk by doing business with BCCI, which was known to be in financial trouble.
    3. No, because the mistake did not exist at the time the contract was negotiated; at that time the Tokyo branch was operating normally.

    Court’s Reasoning

    • The Court emphasized the broad language of Banking Law § 606(4)(c)(2), which defines “business and property in this state” to include assets of a foreign bank located in New York State regardless of whether those assets have any business connection to the New York agency.
    • The Court distinguished this case from traditional receivership principles, which might apply to deposits transferred to the seized business of a New York agency or branch. Here, the seizure was of assets in an account at BAI, a fully operational unrelated banking entity, belonging to a foreign branch of BCCI which at the moment of seizure was still in operation.
    • The Court rejected CITIC’s argument that the seizure of the New York agency meant that BCCI could no longer accept deposits, stating that it overestimated the Superintendent’s ability to control a multinational banking corporation.
    • The Court emphasized the policy of granting the Superintendent the necessary powers to seize assets of a failed foreign banking entity to protect the integrity of the New York financial market.
    • Regarding the constructive trust claim, the Court found that CITIC was not an innocent party, as it knew or should have known of BCCI’s financial troubles.
    • The Court also rejected the mutual mistake and impossibility arguments.
    • The court stated, “This case does not involve overreaching by the State at the expense of an innocent depositor, but rather the entirely proper seizure of funds which CITIC chose to transfer to BCCI prior to its collapse. BCCI’s financial and legal troubles were well documented and well known prior to the seizure. It is clear that CITIC took a known risk, hoping to reap a larger return than it could have elsewhere. Risk assessment is always clearer after the disaster. CITIC’s attempts to invoke such hindsight cannot serve as a valid basis to grant relief.”

  • People v. Hill, 79 N.Y.2d 1078 (1992): Impeachment of Alibi Witnesses and the Dawson Rule

    People v. Hill, 79 N.Y.2d 1078 (1992)

    A proper foundation for cross-examination of an alibi witness about their failure to come forward prior to trial requires showing the witness was aware of the charge, knew they possessed exculpatory information, had a reasonable motive to act, and knew how to make the information available to law enforcement.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for second-degree robbery, holding that the prosecution properly impeached the defendant’s alibi witnesses. The witnesses had failed to provide exculpatory information to law enforcement at the arrest scene, the station house, and during an aborted meeting with the trial assistant. The Court found that a proper foundation was laid for questioning the witnesses about the aborted meeting, where they refused to speak without defense counsel present, because it was not shown that the defense counsel instructed the witnesses to remain silent. The jury was properly instructed on how to weigh the impeachment evidence.

    Facts

    The defendant was identified by a cab driver as the person who had robbed him. Police officers arrested the defendant and frisked him and his three companions, releasing the companions. Two of these companions were alibi witnesses for the defendant at trial. The alibi witnesses claimed they tried to tell the police at the station house that the defendant was with them at a nightclub and could not have committed the robbery, but no one listened. Police officers disputed this, stating the witnesses never offered exculpatory information.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree robbery after a jury trial. Prior to the defense’s case, the trial court ruled the People could question the alibi witnesses about an aborted meeting with the trial assistant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution properly impeached the defendant’s alibi witnesses by questioning them about their failure to provide exculpatory information to law enforcement before trial, specifically concerning their silence at the arrest scene, the station house, and during an aborted meeting with the Assistant District Attorney.

    Holding

    Yes, because a proper Dawson foundation was laid for cross-examination regarding the aborted interview with the Assistant District Attorney, and the defense failed to preserve the issues regarding the arrest scene and station house by not objecting on Dawson grounds.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on People v. Dawson, which outlines the foundation required to cross-examine an alibi witness about their pre-trial silence. This foundation requires showing that the witness: (1) was aware of the charges against the defendant; (2) knew they possessed exculpatory information; (3) had a reasonable motive to act; and (4) was familiar with the means of making the information available to law enforcement. The Court found that the defense failed to object on Dawson grounds to the questioning about the witnesses’ silence at the arrest scene and station house, thus those issues were not preserved for review. However, the Court found that a proper Dawson foundation was laid for questioning the witnesses about the aborted interview with the Assistant District Attorney, where the witnesses refused to speak without defense counsel present. Because there was no indication that defense counsel instructed the witnesses to remain silent, the witnesses’ discomfort was not a reason to exclude questioning. The Court stated that “As is true in any instance in which impeachment evidence is offered, the trier of fact may reasonably be expected to weigh the available information and determine for itself whether the witness’ trial testimony is consistent with his prior behavior and assertions.” The trial judge provided appropriate limiting instructions, which defense counsel did not object to, regarding the impeachment value of the witnesses’ failure to come forward before trial.

  • People v. Sloan, 79 N.Y.2d 396 (1992): Right to Presence During Jury Selection and Meaningful Contribution

    People v. Sloan, 79 N.Y.2d 396 (1992)

    A defendant has a right to be present during all material stages of the trial, including questioning of prospective jurors about their ability to weigh evidence objectively, and reversal is required unless the defendant’s presence could not have afforded any meaningful opportunity to affect the outcome.

    Summary

    Defendant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing he was wrongly excluded from voir dire questioning of prospective jurors. The trial court did not record substantial portions of the voir dire, leading the Appellate Division to order a reconstruction hearing. The reconstruction court found the defendant absent during bench conferences with jurors about their impartiality. Two of these jurors were peremptorily challenged by the defense, and one was excused by consent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal, holding that the defendant’s exclusion violated his right to be present at a material stage of the trial because he could have meaningfully contributed to decisions about excusing these jurors.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of first and second-degree robbery. During jury selection (voir dire), the trial court held unrecorded bench conferences with prospective jurors. The defendant was not present during these conferences, where jurors were questioned about their ability to be fair and impartial. Two of the prospective jurors discussed during these off-the-record conferences were later excused via defense peremptory challenges, and a third was excused by consent.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, arguing that his exclusion from the voir dire violated his right to be present at trial. The Appellate Division remanded the case for a reconstruction hearing because the trial court failed to record substantial portions of the voir dire. Following the reconstruction hearing, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s exclusion from bench conferences with prospective jurors during voir dire, where two jurors were later peremptorily challenged by the defense and one was excused by consent, violated the defendant’s right to be present during a material stage of the trial, requiring reversal.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant might have provided valuable input regarding his attorney’s discretionary decisions to excuse these venire members, the record does not negate the possibility that the defendant might have made a meaningful contribution to the proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a defendant has the right to be present during the questioning of prospective jurors concerning their ability to weigh the evidence objectively. The Court emphasized that a defendant’s exclusion requires reversal unless their presence “could not have afforded any meaningful opportunity to affect the outcome.” The court reasoned that because three of the prospective jurors were ultimately excused either through defense peremptory challenges or with defense counsel’s consent, the defendant’s input could have influenced the decisions to excuse those jurors. The court rejected the People’s argument to analyze whether each dismissed juror appeared favorable or unfavorable, deeming it speculative and reiterating that a case-specific prejudice analysis is inapplicable to violations of a defendant’s fundamental right to be present. The court quoted People v. Roman, stating that the record must ” ‘do[es] not negate the possibility that defendant might have made a meaningful contribution to the [proceeding]’ “. This highlights that the *possibility* of meaningful contribution is sufficient to warrant reversal, reinforcing the importance of the defendant’s presence during jury selection. The decision underscores the significance of the defendant’s right to participate in discretionary decisions regarding jury selection, emphasizing that the potential for input, not just proof of actual prejudice, is the determining factor.

  • People v. Lewis, 80 N.Y.2d 1007 (1992): Discharging Juror After Partial Verdict

    People v. Lewis, 80 N.Y.2d 1007 (1992)

    A juror may be discharged even after deliberations have begun if the court finds the juror is grossly unqualified based on facts unknown during jury selection, but this determination must be based on concrete evidence, not speculation.

    Summary

    Lewis was convicted of robbery and attempted robbery. On the second day of deliberations, a juror expressed fear for her family’s safety after recognizing someone in the courtroom. The court questioned the juror and, learning the jury had reached a verdict on some counts the previous day, took a partial verdict on those counts and discharged the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the juror’s disqualification arose only after the first day of deliberations, making the partial verdict valid. The court emphasized that a juror’s disqualification must be based on concrete evidence, not speculation.

    Facts

    Defendant Lewis was tried with two codefendants and convicted of robbery in the first degree and three counts of attempted robbery in the first degree.
    During the second day of jury deliberations, the court learned that at least one juror was experiencing a personal problem. A juror then sent a note expressing concern for her family’s safety because she recognized someone in the courtroom. The juror feared reprisal if the verdict was unfavorable to the defendants. The juror stated that her fear arose after the first day of deliberations ended. The defendant moved for a mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court, after determining that the jury had reached a verdict on some counts at the end of the first day, took a partial verdict finding Lewis guilty of one count of robbery in the first degree and three counts of attempted robbery in the first degree. The jury did not reach a verdict on the remaining count of robbery in the first degree. The trial court then discharged the jury and denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in taking a partial verdict and discharging the jury after a juror expressed fear for her family’s safety, claiming she recognized someone in the courtroom, and stating her fear arose after the first day of deliberations.

    Holding

    No, because the juror’s disqualification arose only after the first day of deliberations, making the partial verdict valid, and the trial court properly terminated deliberations after determining the jury could not reach a verdict on all counts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The court cited CPL 270.35, which allows a juror to be discharged even after deliberations have begun if the court finds the juror is grossly unqualified based on facts unknown during jury selection. However, the court emphasized that under People v. Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299, “In concluding that a juror is grossly unqualified, the court may not speculate as to possible partiality of the juror based on her equivocal responses. Instead, it must be convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict”. The court reasoned that because the juror stated she did not feel unable to continue deliberating until after the jury had been discharged on the first day, she was not grossly unqualified to participate in the first day’s deliberations. Therefore, the partial verdict was reached by a qualified and competent jury. Further, the court noted that having determined that the jury would be unable to reach a verdict on all counts, the trial court properly terminated the deliberations and ordered the jury to render a partial verdict under CPL 310.70 [1] [a].

  • Rivera v. Oak Point Management, 79 N.Y.2d 982 (1992): Landowner’s Duty to Protect Passersby from Criminal Acts

    Rivera v. Oak Point Management, 79 N.Y.2d 982 (1992)

    A landowner generally does not have a duty to protect passersby from criminal acts occurring outside of its property, even if those acts are committed by individuals who may have been engaging in activity related to the building.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a landlord, Oak Point Management, had no duty to protect an infant plaintiff who was shot on the street 191 feet away from the front of the apartment building they owned and operated. The plaintiff was visiting a tenant in the building. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s position was no different from any other passerby, and the fact that he was visiting a tenant was merely a coincidence. The court reversed the Appellate Division order and granted summary judgment to Oak Point Management, dismissing the complaint against them.

    Facts

    An infant plaintiff was shot on the street, 191 feet from the front of a residential apartment building owned and operated by Oak Point Management.

    The plaintiff was visiting one of the tenants in the building.

    The area around the building was known for drug-related activity.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially ruled in favor of the plaintiff.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted summary judgment to the defendant, Oak Point Management.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Oak Point Management had a duty to secure the front door of its residential apartment building to protect passersby from criminal actions by individuals engaging in drug-related activity in or around the building.

    Holding

    No, because under the circumstances of this case, Oak Point Management had no duty to protect passersby from criminal acts occurring outside of its property. The plaintiff’s presence near the building was merely a fortuity and did not establish a duty of care.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent from cases like Muniz v Flohern, Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 869 and Waters v New York City Hous. Auth., 69 N.Y.2d 225, which established limits on a landowner’s duty to protect others from criminal activity. The court reasoned that extending the duty of care to a passerby located 191 feet from the building would create an unreasonable burden on landowners. The court emphasized that the plaintiff’s relationship to a building tenant was “a mere fortuity having nothing to do with the circumstances surrounding the shooting.” The court distinguished between a duty to tenants or invitees and a duty to the general public passing by the property. The court essentially determined that foreseeability of criminal activity alone is not sufficient to create a duty of care; a special relationship or other specific circumstances must exist. The decision reflects a policy consideration of limiting landowner liability for criminal acts occurring off their premises when there is no direct causal link or special relationship between the landowner and the victim.

  • In re Dante L., 80 N.Y.2d 78 (1992): Proof of Neglect and Positive Newborn Toxicology

    In re Dante L., 80 N.Y.2d 78 (1992)

    A positive toxicology report for a controlled substance in a newborn, without additional evidence, is generally insufficient to establish neglect; however, such a report, coupled with other evidence, can support a finding of neglect if it demonstrates actual impairment or imminent danger of impairment to the child.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a newborn’s positive toxicology for cocaine, standing alone, is sufficient to establish neglect of the newborn and an older sibling. The New York Court of Appeals held that while a positive toxicology alone is generally insufficient, it can support a neglect finding when considered with other evidence demonstrating actual impairment or imminent risk of impairment to the child. The Court affirmed the lower court’s finding of neglect based on the totality of the evidence, including the mother’s history of drug abuse, the child’s low birth weight and prematurity, and the mother’s failure to testify, leading to the inference that she used cocaine during pregnancy.

    Facts

    Appellant gave birth to Dante, who tested positive for cocaine. The Nassau County Department of Social Services (DSS) initiated proceedings to remove Dante temporarily. Evidence presented included Dante’s positive toxicology, low birth weight, appellant’s history of cocaine abuse, admissions to drug rehabilitation centers, and her mother’s custody of her other children due to her drug use. Appellant’s mother observed Appellant high on cocaine during her pregnancy with Dante. Appellant claimed she might have smoked a cigarette containing cocaine at a party. DSS subsequently brought a consolidated child protective proceeding on behalf of Dante and his older sister, Dantia.

    Procedural History

    Family Court initially dismissed DSS’s petition for temporary removal of Dante. Subsequently, DSS brought a consolidated child protective proceeding. The Family Court found Dante’s positive toxicology sufficient for a neglect finding as to both children, permitting appellant to retain custody under DSS supervision. The Appellate Division affirmed, relying on additional evidence in the record to support the Family Court’s factual findings of neglect. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a finding of neglect regarding a newborn and an older sibling can be based solely on the newborn’s positive toxicology for a controlled substance.

    Holding

    No, because a positive toxicology report, standing alone, does not prove that a child has been physically, mentally, or emotionally impaired, or is in imminent danger of being impaired; however, a positive toxicology report, in conjunction with other evidence, may support a neglect finding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed Section 1012(f)(i)(B) of the Family Court Act, defining a neglected child as one whose condition is impaired or in imminent danger of impairment due to a parent’s failure to exercise a minimum degree of care by misusing drugs. The court emphasized that a positive toxicology report alone fails to establish the necessary causative link between the drug use and actual or imminent impairment of the child. However, the Court found that the Family Court’s determination could be upheld due to the presence of additional evidence in the record.

    The Court noted Dante’s prematurity, low birth weight, need for specialized care, and the mother’s history of drug abuse and possible drug use during pregnancy. Because the appellant did not testify at the fact-finding hearing, the court drew the strongest possible inference against her, concluding that she knowingly used cocaine during her pregnancy. This, combined with her past inability to care for her children due to drug use, provided sufficient grounds to conclude that Dante was in imminent danger of impairment. The Court also noted that proof of neglect as to one child is admissible on the issue of neglect as to another, therefore the neglect of Dante could be considered in determining whether Dantia was neglected.

    The Court stated, “Appellant’s use of cocaine during her pregnancy, considered in conjunction with her prior, demonstrated inability to adequately care for her children while misusing drugs provided a sufficient basis to conclude, at the least, that Dante was in imminent danger of impairment.”

    The Court emphasized that the subsequent negative toxicology tests and social worker testimony regarding the appellant’s current home environment were relevant to disposition, not to the prior neglect. The limited supervision ordered by the Family Court was deemed an appropriate level of state intervention.

  • People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 730 (1992): Requiring Wade Hearings for Showup Identifications

    People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 730 (1992)

    A Wade hearing is required to determine if a showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive, unless it falls under a recognized exception such as a confirmatory identification.

    Summary

    Following a robbery, the victim identified the defendant in a showup after police apprehended him in a building. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding, without a Wade hearing, that the identification was free from police suggestion. The Court emphasized that even though the victim initiated the pursuit of the suspect, the showup did not automatically qualify as a confirmatory identification. The court remitted the case for a Wade hearing to determine whether the showup was unduly suggestive, highlighting the potential for police influence during the pursuit and waiting period.

    Facts

    A robbery victim and his sister informed nearby police officers that he had been robbed of jewelry, allegedly at gunpoint, in his building’s elevator. The victim accompanied the officers in their marked police car, canvassing the adjacent block. The victim identified a person he believed to be the robber. As the police approached in their vehicle, the suspect, wearing a brown sheepskin jacket and a black baseball hat, fled into an apartment building. An officer pursued the suspect on foot. Backup officers arrived and searched the building. The jacket and hat were found on the third floor. The defendant was apprehended in the stairwell and presented to the victim on the ground floor landing, where the victim identified him. Neither a gun nor the stolen jewelry was recovered.

    Procedural History

    The trial court concluded, without holding a Wade hearing, that the victim’s identification was free of police suggestion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals modified the order, remitting the case to the Supreme Court for a Wade hearing. If the hearing determined police suggestiveness tainted the showup, the defendant would be entitled to a new trial; otherwise, the judgment of conviction and sentence should be amended to reflect the hearing’s result.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Wade hearing is required to determine if a showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive when, after a robbery, the victim identifies the defendant in a showup after police apprehended him in a building, even though the victim initially pointed out the defendant to the police.

    Holding

    Yes, because the showup identification procedure does not automatically fall into the category of confirmatory identifications, and a hearing is necessary to determine if police suggestiveness tainted the procedure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court erred in determining the identification was free from police suggestion without holding a Wade hearing. The court noted that even though the victim initiated the police chase, the subsequent showup did not automatically qualify as a confirmatory identification, which is a recognized exception to the Wade hearing requirement. The court emphasized the need to examine the circumstances surrounding the identification to determine if it was unduly suggestive. The court stated, “Absent a hearing, it is impossible to discern whether the police had any influence on the victim during the pursuit immediately following the robbery, or to evaluate the effect on the identification procedure of the time the victim spent waiting in the police car outside the building while the police were searching for the perpetrator inside, or to determine the circumstances of the showup itself.” The court further stated, “Therefore, the courts below had no basis to determine that the police-arranged showup was free of taint, and that the victim was impervious to police suggestion.” Because the circumstances surrounding the showup identification were unclear, the Court found that a Wade hearing was necessary to determine if the procedure resulted in an unduly suggestive identification. The court distinguished the case from situations involving confirmatory identifications, where the witness has prior familiarity with the defendant, making a Wade hearing unnecessary.

  • People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656 (1992): Defendant’s Right to Be Present at Trial Proceedings

    People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656 (1992)

    A defendant has a right to be present during a trial when their presence has a reasonably substantial relation to the opportunity to defend against the charge; however, presence is not required when the proceeding involves only questions of law or procedure.

    Summary

    Dokes was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At issue was whether Dokes’ presence was required at a side-bar conference, held outside his earshot, to determine if his direct testimony opened the door to cross-examination about a prior conviction. The Court of Appeals held that Dokes’ presence was not required because the side-bar conference involved a purely legal question regarding the admissibility of evidence. The court reasoned that the conference did not implicate Dokes’ peculiar factual knowledge, nor did it present the potential for his meaningful participation, distinguishing it from hearings where factual matters are discussed.

    Facts

    Dokes was arrested for selling two vials, one containing cocaine and one without, to an undercover officer. Prior to trial, the court ruled that the prosecution could question Dokes about his prior felony conviction for attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance but could not inquire into the underlying facts of that conviction. During his direct testimony, Dokes described himself as a hustler who sold fake drugs to avoid jail time, stating that he had a prior felony selling drugs and another felony would result in jail time. The prosecutor then requested a side-bar to ask about cross-examining Dokes about the underlying facts of the prior conviction, which also involved selling one fake and one real vial of cocaine.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the prosecution’s request. Dokes was convicted. The Appellate Division reduced Dokes’ sentence but otherwise affirmed the conviction, rejecting Dokes’ argument that he was denied his right to be present at a material stage of trial. Dokes appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s presence is required at a side-bar conference where the attorneys argue, and the court determines, the legal issue of whether the defendant’s testimony had opened the door to cross-examination about a prior crime.

    Holding

    No, because the side-bar conference involved a purely legal discussion and did not implicate the defendant’s peculiar factual knowledge, nor present the potential for his meaningful participation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a defendant has a statutory right to be present during the trial, including jury impaneling, evidence introduction, summations, and jury instructions. Furthermore, due process requires a defendant’s presence at ancillary proceedings that have a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of the opportunity to defend against the charge. However, a defendant’s presence is not required when the proceeding at issue involves only questions of law or procedure. The court distinguished the side-bar from Ventimiglia and Sandoval hearings, noting that the side-bar did not implicate Dokes’ factual knowledge or potential for meaningful participation. Regarding Dokes’ contention that he did not open the door, the court stated that when a defendant testifies to facts conflicting with evidence precluded by a Sandoval ruling, the defendant opens the door and is subject to impeachment using the otherwise precluded evidence. The court stated, “Where, as here, a defendant testifies to facts that are in conflict with evidence precluded by a Sandoval ruling, he or she ‘opens the door’ on the issue in question, and ‘is properly subject to impeachment by the prosecution’s use of the otherwise precluded evidence’” (People v. Fardan, 82 N.Y.2d 638, 646). The court noted it gave proper limiting instructions, cautioning the jury that evidence of prior convictions could not provide a basis for evaluating defendant’s guilt.

  • Matter of Professional, Clerical, Tech. Employees Assn. v. City of New York, 79 N.Y.2d 690 (1992): Competitive Exams Not Required for Reassignments Within a Civil Service Title

    Matter of Professional, Clerical, Tech. Employees Assn. v. City of New York, 79 N.Y.2d 690 (1992)

    A competitive civil service examination is not required for reassignment within different levels of responsibility within the same permanent civil service title, where the core duties and skills remain consistent.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the City of New York violated Civil Service Law by reassigning Transit Property Protection Supervisors (TPPS) from Level I to Level II without requiring a competitive examination. The Court of Appeals held that such reassignments within the same title, involving greater responsibility but no fundamentally different skills, did not constitute promotions requiring competitive exams. The decision upheld the Transit Authority’s discretion to assign personnel based on observed abilities, fitting within the concept of “broadbanding” where one exam qualifies individuals for a range of responsibilities within a single title.

    Facts

    The New York City Transit Authority created the title of Transit Property Protection Supervisor (TPPS) with two levels, I and II, within the same title. Both levels required passing an initial competitive civil service promotional exam to attain the TPPS title. Reassignment from Level I to Level II did not require a further written examination. The Transit Authority reassigned individual respondents from TPPS Level I to Level II. Petitioners, Level I TPPS employees, argued this reassignment constituted a promotion requiring a competitive examination.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to nullify the reassignments of respondents to TPPS Level II and to compel the Director of Personnel to administer a competitive examination for Level II positions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no violation of law. The Appellate Division affirmed, relying on prior case law that held a competitive examination was not required for reassignments within the TPPS title. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Civil Service Law §§ 52 and 63 require a competitive examination before employees are reassigned from Transit Property Protection Supervisor Level I to Transit Property Protection Supervisor Level II, where both positions fall under the same civil service title?

    Holding

    No, because the assignment to duties at either of two levels within a permanent civil service title is reasonable and is neither a promotion nor a demotion, provided the fundamental duties and skills required remain consistent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the reassignment from Level I to Level II was not a promotion requiring a competitive exam because it did not involve a change in title, nor did it demand new skills or tasks fundamentally different from Level I. The Court emphasized the increased responsibility and oversight at Level II, stating that the Transit Authority’s decision to assign individuals to Level II was based on an appraisal of abilities and temperaments not easily quantifiable for an objective written examination. This falls under the concept of “broadbanding,” where a single exam qualifies individuals for a range of responsibilities within a title. The Court cited precedent (Matter of Green v Lang, 18 NY2d 437) which allowed administrative officers latitude in assigning duties and fixing salaries within a class broadly achieved by competitive examination. The Court noted that while serving a probationary period might commonly be associated with promotions, the employees already achieved permanent status within the meaning of Civil Service Law § 63 when they became Level I employees. The court stated, “[w]e hold that individuals within the grade of Transit Property Protection Supervisor may be assigned to duties at either Level I or Level II and such assignment between levels constitutes neither a promotion nor a demotion under the Civil Service Law.”